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ii ABSTRACT 
This  thesis  analyses  Scottish  households'  tenure  choice  behaviour  by  using  economic 
approaches.  The  data  set  comes  from  the  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey 
(SHCS).  To  estimate  the  household's  tenure  decision  behaviour,  two  simulation 
models  with  different  structures  are  developed.  The  first  tenure  choice  model 
contains  a  simple  one-level  choice  set.  A  multinomial  logit  model  is  employed  to 
estimate  three  choice  alternatives:  owner-occupation,  social  renting  and  private 
renting.  The  second  tenure  choice  model  contains  a  two-level  choice  structure 
assuming  that  the  household  firstly  decides  to  move  or  stay  and  then  chooses  a  tenure 
alternative.  A  nested  multinomial  logit  model  is  employed  to  estimate  the  decision 
to  move/stay  and  the  choice  of  three  tenure  alternatives.  The  determinants  of  the  two 
tenure  choice  models  not  only  include  household  attributes  but  also  include  housing 
attributes.  The  household  attributes  generally  consist  of  the  household's  demographic 
and  socio-economic  variables,  while  housing  attributes  include  dwelling  type, 
location  and  neighbourhood  variables.  In  addition,  this  thesis  also  includes  the 
housing  subsidy  and  rationing  variables  to  estimate  their  impacts  on  tenure  choice. 
The  estimation  results  show  that  the  household  long  term  income,  the  user  cost  of 
housing,  housing  subsidy  and  rationing  variables,  as  expected,  have  the  most 
significant  influences  on  households'  tenure  decisions  in  Scotland.  Moreover,  three 
policy  issues  are  derived  from  the  results  of  the  tenure  choice  models.  The  first  issue 
discusses  the  simulation  of  the  influences  of  changes  in  the  income  tax  rate  and  the 
mortgage  rationing  ratios  on  tenure  choice.  The  second  issue  analyses  income 
inequality  and  tenure  polarisation.  The  third  issue  examines  the  distribution  of 
housing  subsidy  between  tenures  and  income  levels.  The  simulation  results  suggest  a 
direction  of  these  changes  on  the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour,  especially  the 
choice  of  owner-occupation.  The  results  of  the  second  and  the  third  issues  show  that 
low-income  households  are  significantly  concentrated  in  the  social  rented  sector. 
The  rigid  need-based  allocation  system  and  the  small  private  rented  sector  could 
partly  be  the  result  of  tenure  and  income  polarisation  in  the  social  housing  sector. 
On  the  other  hand,  some  low-income  homeowners,  primarily  elderly  and  outright 
owners,  could  not  afford  to  remain  in  owner-occupation.  Finally,  the  results  of  the 
three  issues  would  have  implications  for  housing  policy  reform  regarding  the  reform 
for  housing  benefit  and  the  allocation  system,  assisting  low-income  homeowners, 
and  promoting  the  private  rented  sector. 
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x CHAPTER  ONE  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Background 
Housing  tenure  through  owning  or  renting  (public  or  private)  implies  a  range  of  social 
and  economic  relations  surrounding  housing  (Barlow  and  Duncan  1988).  The  choice 
of  housing  tenure  expresses  the  household's  ability,  preferences,  expectations  and 
relations  to  different  tenures.  From  a  sociological  viewpoint,  the  choice  of  housing 
tenure  implies  the  housing  class  and  social  relations  to  different  tenures  (Rex  and 
Moore  1967,  Gray  1982).  From  an  economic  viewpoint,  the  housing  tenure  decision 
presents  a  consumer's  choice  behaviour  by  maximising  his/her  utility  on  different 
tenures  and  choosing  the  tenure  that  yields  the  maximum  utility  (Fallis  1985).  This 
thesis  analyses  the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour  by  using  economic 
approaches.  The  core  method  is  to  employ  economic  models  to  estimate  the 
household's  tenure  choice  in  Scotland. 
In  the  economic  perspective,  a  household  in  its  demand  for  housing  services  has  to 
make  several  choices.  An  important  one  is  to  decide  whether  to  acquire  housing 
services  through  owning  or  renting.  Many  studies  have  been  devoted  to  estimating  the 
demand  for  housing,  either  ownership  or  rental  (for  example  see  Lee  and  Trost  1978, 
Rosen  1979,  Henderson  and  Ioannides  1983,  Börsch-Supan  and  Pitkin  1988,  and 
Laakso  and  Loikkanen  1995).  In  the  UK,  however,  the  choice  of  housing  tenure  is  not 
simply  whether  to  own  or  to  rent.  Over  the  past  several  decades,  the  outcomes  of 
government  policy  in  the  housing  market  have  been  shown  in  a  rapidly  growing 
owner-occupied  market  and  in  a  strong  social  housing  sector  with  limited  access 
(King  1980).  The  private  rented  sector  is  relatively  small  and  it  is  vigorous.  It  plays 
an  important  transitional  role  between  owner-occupation  and  social  renting.  As  a 
result,  in  the  study  of  tenure  choice  in  the  UK,  the  household's  choice  for  housing 
tenure  should  at  least  include  three  alternatives:  owner-occupation,  social  renting  and 
private  renting. 
Many  studies  of  tenure  choice  in  the  UK  have  been  concentrated  in  England  (see  for 
example  Doling  1973,  King  1980,  and  Di  Salvo  and  Ermisch  1997).  Few  studies  have 
1 been  carried  out  in  Scotland.  While  Scotland  is  often  referred  to  as  a  region  of  the  UK, 
it  is  a  quite  distinct  country  with  its  own  administrative,  legal  and  education  system. 
In  the  housing  market,  the  unique  housing  bidding  system  and  historically  strong 
policy  on  social  housing  have  impacts  on  Scotland's  tenure  pattern  as  well  as  housing 
market  conditions,  distinguishing  it  from  the  rest  of  the  UK  (Murie  1996a).  We  have 
seen  a  lower  starting  point  but  a  rapid  increase  in  the  homeownership  rate  in  Scotland 
over  the  last  three  decades.  In  1971,  Scotland's  homeownership  rate  accounted  for 
31.2  per  cent  of  the  total  housing  stock  while  the  homeownership  rate  in  England  and 
Wales  was  52.4  per  cent  and  55.8  per  cent  respectively.  By  1998,  Scotland's 
homeownership  rate  rose  to  61.3  per  cent,  compared  to  68  per  cent  and  71.5  per  cent 
in  England  and  Wales  respectively. 
The  historical  importance  of  the  public  housing  sector  is  greater  in  Scotland  than  in 
the  rest  of  Britain.  In  the  1970s,  Scotland's  public  dwellings  accounted  for  half  of  the 
housing  stock,  while  in  both  England  and  Wales  public  dwellings  accounted  for  less 
than  30  per  cent  of  their  housing  stock.  Since  the  1980s,  as  a  result  of  the  Right  to 
Buy  scheme  and  the  Large  Scale  Voluntary  Transfer  scheme,  the  public  housing  stock 
in  Scotland,  as  well  as  in  the  rest  of  Britain,  has  significantly  reduced  (Murie  1996b). 
By  1998,  Scotland's  public  dwellings  only  accounted  for  26.6  per  cent  of  the  total 
housing  stock  but  the  figure  still  remained  the  highest  among  the  three  countries  and 
was  about  10  percentage  points  higher  than  that  in  England  and  Wales.  In  addition, 
Scotland's  independent  housing  association  sector  remains  much  smaller  and  there  are 
no  equivalents  of  England's  large  housing  associations  (Murie  1996a).  In  contrast  to  a 
rapidly  growing  owner-occupied  housing  and  a  strong  social  rented  sector,  private 
rented  dwellings  in  Scotland  remain  the  lowest  percentage  of  the  total  housing  stock 
among  the  three  countries.  By  1998,  Scotland's  private  rented  dwellings  accounted 
for  only  6.7  per  cent  of  the  total  housing  stock,  compared  to  11.1  per  cent  and  8.5  per 
cent  in  England  and  Wales  respectively. 
To  some  degree,  the  long-term  tenure  pattern  reveals  the  outcomes  of  the  household's 
tenure  decision  behaviour.  We  have  seen  that  Scotland's  tenure  pattern  is 
significantly  different  from  the  rest  of  Britain.  Hence  it  implies  that  the  Scottish 
household's  tenure  choice  behaviour  would  be  different  from  the  household  in  the  rest 
of  Britain.  As  a  result,  there  is  a  need  for  more  studies  to  analyse  the  household's 
2 tenure  choice  behaviour  in  Scotland.  To  study  tenure  choice,  this  thesis  attempts  to 
clarify  the  determinants  of  tenure  choice  and  to  analyse  the  impact  of  the  determinants 
on  Scottish  households'  tenure  decision. 
In  the  tenure  choice  literature,  a  household's  tenure  decision  is  influenced  by  a  variety 
of  factors.  These  factors  can  generally  be  grouped  into  several  key  determinants  such 
as  preferences,  the  user  cost  of  capital,  and  non-price  constraints  (Maclennan  1997). 
A  household's  preference  for  owner-occupation  or  renting  can  be  expressed  through 
different  household  structures,  socio-economic  backgrounds  and  household  formation. 
The  user  cost  of  capital  is  reflected  in  the  relative  prices  of  owning  versus  renting. 
Further,  non-price  constraints  are  the  household's  employment,  mobility  and  the 
housing  policy.  Housing  policy  through  housing  subsidy  and  the  taxation  system  has 
undoubtedly  had  significant  impacts  on  the  household's  tenure  decision. 
Moreover,  the  importance  of  these  tenure  choice  determinants  varies  between 
countries.  For  instance,  the  income  tax  advantages  for  owner-occupation  have  major 
influences  on  the  household's  tenure  choice  in  the  United  States  (see  Rosen  1979, 
Henderson  and  Ioannides  1983).  In  the  UK,  due  to  the  government's  strong 
intervention  in  the  housing  market,  the  housing  subsidy  system  and  rationing  in  the 
admission  to  owner-occupation  and  to  social  housing  have  significant  impacts  on  the 
household's  tenure  decision  (see  Doling  1973,  King  1980,  and  Gallent,  Baker  and 
Wong  1998).  As  a  result,  this  thesis  contains  an  analysis  of  the  influences  of  housing 
subsidy  and  rationing  factors  on  the  household's  tenure  choice  in  Scotland.  In 
particular,  these  two  factors  may  have  important  contributions  to  a  growing  owner- 
occupied  sector  and  a  strong  social  housing  sector  in  Scotland. 
To  analyse  the  household's  tenure  decision  behaviour,  two  simulation  models  with 
different  structures  are  developed  in  this  thesis.  The  first  model  contains  a  one-level 
choice  structure  to  estimate  the  household's  choice  behaviour  between  three 
alternative  tenures.  The  second  model  contains  a  two-level  choice  structure  to 
estimate  the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour  given  its  decision  to  move.  These 
two  models  would  provide  a  robust  analysis  of  Scottish  households'  tenure  choice 
behaviour  from  different  aspects. 
3 Furthermore,  to  estimate  these  two  simulation  models,  appropriate  discrete  choice 
models  are  employed  in  this  thesis.  Among  the  discrete  choice  models,  the 
multinomial  logit  model  and  the  nested  multinomial  logit  model  have  been  widely 
applied  to  the  tenure  choice  study,  and  these  two  models  are  employed  in  this  thesis. 
The  multinomial  logit  model  contains  a  simple  functional  form  to  estimate  the 
influence  of  the  determinants  on  the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour.  The  nested 
multinomial  logit  model  contains  a  hierarchical  functional  form  and  is  used  to 
estimate  the  household's  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice.  The  empirical  data  set 
comes  from  the  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey.  This  data  set  is  a  cross- 
sectional  survey  data  set  with  a  large  sample  size.  The  data  set  is  rich  in  information 
about  household  socio-economic  characteristics  and  dwelling  conditions,  which  are 
suitable  for  the  tenure  choice  study. 
It  is  expected  that  the  results  of  the  two  tenure  choice  models  would  provide  a  better 
understanding  of  Scottish  households'  tenure  decision  behaviour.  The  results  would 
indicate  that  some  key  determinants  such  as  household  income,  the  user  cost  of 
housing  and  some  household  demographic  characteristics  would  have  substantial 
influences  on  tenure  choice.  Two  determinants  -  housing  subsidy  and  rationing 
variables  emphasised  by  this  thesis  -  are  expected  to  have  important  impacts  on 
households'  tenure  choice.  This  indicates  that  the  household's  tenure  decision  is  not 
only  affected  by  household  attributes  but  also  affected  by  housing  attributes  and 
housing  policy.  Moreover,  the  thesis  attempts  to  interpret  the  model  results  from  the 
housing  policy  perspective.  Some  policy  issues  are  derived  from  the  model  results. 
The  first  issue  relates  to  some  simulation  work  regarding  the  influences  of  changes  in 
some  policy  or  schemes  on  the  household's  tenure  choice.  Two  other  issues  expect  to 
discuss  the  outcome  of  tenure  choice  and  income  distribution,  and  the  distribution  of 
housing  subsidies  between  different  tenures  and  income  levels.  Finally  the  analysis  of 
these  issues  is  expected  to  have  some  implications  for  current  housing  policy. 
1.2  Research  Questions 
The  main  objectives  of  this  thesis  are  not  to  develop  the  model  but  rather  to  clarify  the 
determinants  of  tenure  choice  and  to  estimate  the  influences  of  these  determinants  on 
4 tenure  choice,  then  to  explore  policy  issues  and  implications.  Based  on  these 
objectives,  three  research  questions  are  developed  as  follows: 
1.  What  is  the  nature  of  tenure  choice  and  its  determinants  in  Scotland? 
A  review  of  literature  intends  to  clarify  the  nature  of  tenure  choice  and  the 
determinants  of  tenure  choice.  The  literature  review  includes  a  discussion  of  the 
definition  of  housing  tenure  choice  from  different  perspectives;  a  discussion  of 
theoretical  and  empirical  studies  of  the  tenure  choice  model;  a  review  of  Scottish 
housing  tenure  structure  and  housing  market  conditions  (such  as  long-term  tenure 
patterns,  house  prices,  housing  transactions,  rationing  in  the  housing  market);  and 
housing  subsidy  to  assist  with  housing  cost. 
2.  To  what  extent  do  these  determinants  influence  the  household's  tenure  decision  in 
Scotland? 
Two  simulation  models  are  developed  to  estimate  the  influence  of  the 
determinants  on  the  household's  tenure  choice.  The  first  model  simply  estimates 
the  impact  of  the  determinants  on  the  household's  tenure  decision  between  three 
alternative  tenures.  The  second  model  estimates  the  impact  of  the  determinants  on 
the  household's  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice.  The  data  set  used  in  the 
thesis  is  the  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey,  which  consists  of  a  household 
survey  and  a  physical  inspection  of  the  dwellings  covering  the  whole  Scottish 
areas. 
3.  What  policy  issues  emerge  from  the  model  results  and  what  are  the  implications 
for  current  housing  policy  in  Scotland? 
Three  policy  issues  are  derived  from  the  results  of  the  tenure  choice  models.  The 
first  issue  concerns  some  simulations  in  terms  of  the  influences  of  changes  in  the 
income  tax  rate  and  the  mortgage  rationing  criteria  on  the  household's  tenure 
choice.  The  second  issue  concerns  the  outcomes  of  the  household's  tenure  choice 
and  income  distribution.  The  third  issue  relates  to  an  analysis  of  the  distributional 
effect  of  housing  subsidies  on  households  in  different  tenures  and  income  levels. 
These  issues  have  implications  for  current  housing  policy  in  terms  of  the  policy  of 
sustainable  homeownership  and  the  reform  for  housing  subsidy  and  social  welfare 
policy. 
5 1.3  The  Structure  of  the  Thesis 
The  structure  of  the  thesis  is  designed  to  achieve  the  goal  of  the  thesis  and  to  answer 
the  research  questions  stated  above.  Chapter  Two  is  a  literature  review  of  theoretical 
and  empirical  studies  of  tenure  choice.  This  chapter  begins  with  a  discussion  of  the 
nature  of  housing  tenure  choice  from  both  sociological  and  economical  perspectives; 
it  then  defines  the  scope  of  this  thesis's  tenure  choice  study  focusing  on  economic 
approaches.  From  an  economic  viewpoint,  the  theory  of  tenure  choice  is  derived  from 
consumer  choice  and  housing  demand  theories.  The  theory  of  consumer  choice 
applying  to  housing  -commodity  and  the  consumer's  housing  decision  in  housing 
demand  study  are  discussed  in  this  chapter.  In  general,  the  decision  of  demand  for 
housing  services  and  tenure  choice  can  be  seen  as  a  joint  choice.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  choice  of  housing  tenure  is  one  of  the  important  decisions  in  the  housing  decision 
package.  This  chapter  emphasises  the  importance  of  tenure  choice  in  the  housing 
decision  process.  A  variety  of  tenure  choice  studies  is  discussed,  which  includes  a 
review  of  the  cross-sectional  and  the  longitudinal  analysis  of  tenure  choice  models, 
and  a  review  of  tenure  choice  and  some  specific  determinants  such  as  residential 
mobility,  mortgage  rationing,  social  housing  rationing  and  housing  subsidy.  Through 
a  review  of  these  tenure  choice  studies  we  can  identify  the  determinants  of  tenure 
choice  chosen  for  this  thesis. 
Chapter  Three  is  an  analysis  of  the  housing  tenure  structure  and  housing  market 
conditions  in  Scotland.  Through  a  review  of  the  long-term  tenure  pattern  and  housing 
market  conditions  we  can  identify  the  unique  characteristics  of  housing  tenure  and  the 
housing  market  in  Scotland,  thus  helping  us  to  identify  the  determinants  of  tenure 
choice  suitable  for  the  Scottish  housing  market.  This  chapter  begins  with  a  discussion 
of  Scotland's  long-term  housing  tenure  pattern.  To  a  certain  extent,  tenure  pattern 
reflects  the  household's  tenure  decision  behaviour  in  the  Scottish  housing  market. 
Housing  tenure  pattern  is  also  influenced  by  housing  market  conditions  and  housing 
policy.  In  the  housing  market,  the  changes  in  the  number  of  new  house  building, 
house  prices  and  the  number  of  housing  transactions  are  discussed  in  this  chapter.  In 
addition,  the  rationing  factor  and  housing  subsidy  also  contributed  to  the  changes  in 
tenure  pattern  as  well  as  the  household's  tenure  decision  behaviour.  An  analysis  of 
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in  the  social  rented  sector  can  lead  us  to  understand  the  importance  of  these  rationing 
factors  on  the  household's  tenure  decision.  A  review  of  the  changes  in  housing 
subsidies  to  households  across  tenures  can  help  to  analyse  the  effect  of  housing 
subsidies  in  reducing  households'  housing  costs.  Housing  subsidies  addressed  in  this 
chapter  are  the  government's  expenditures  on  housing  subsidy  programmes  to 
households  and  housing  suppliers. 
The  methodology  of  this  thesis  is  to  model  the  household's  tenure  choice.  In  Chapter 
Four,  two  simulation  models  with  different  structures  are  developed  to  estimate  the 
household's  tenure  choice  behaviour  from  different  aspects.  The  first  model  sets  out 
to  estimate  the  household's  choice  for  three  alternative  tenures:  owner-occupation, 
social  renting  and  private  renting.  Based  on  this  framework,  a  multinomial  logit 
model  is  chosen  to  estimate  the  first  tenure  choice  model.  The  maximum  likelihood 
estimation  method  is  employed  to  estimate  the  coefficients  of  the  explanatory 
variables.  The  second  model  estimates  the  household's  mobility  decision  and  tenure 
choice.  This  model  assumes  that  the  household's  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice 
are  interdependent.  Using  a  hierarchical  choice  assumption,  this  model  assumes  that  a 
household  will  first  decide  to  move  or stay,  then  to  choose  a  tenure  alternative.  Based 
on  this  framework,  a  nested  multinomial  logit  model  is  employed  to  estimate  the  two- 
stage  decision  of  mobility  and  tenure  choice.  The  full  information  maximum 
likelihood  estimation  method  is  used  to  estimate  the  coefficients  of  the  explanatory 
variables.  The  functional  forms  of  the  multinomial  logit  model  and  the  nested 
multinomial  logit  model  are  discussed  in  this  chapter. 
Chapters  Five  and  Six  relate  to  the  empirical  study  of  the  household's  tenure  choice  in 
Scotland.  Chapter  Five  introduces  the  data  set  -  the  1996  Scottish  House  Condition 
Survey  (SHCS)  -  and  the  variables  used  in  the  two  tenure  choice  models.  The  1996 
SHCS  is  a  cross-sectional  household  survey  containing  a  large  sample  size  and  rich 
information  about  household  socio-economic  characteristics  and  dwelling  conditions, 
which  are  useful  for  modelling  the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour  in  Scotland. 
The  detailed  information  and  characteristics  of  this  survey  are  discussed  in  this 
chapter.  The  variables  of  the  two  tenure  choice  models  are  chosen  on  the  basis  of  the 
discussion  in  Chapter  Two  and  Chapter  Three.  The  determinants  of  the  two  tenure 
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attributes.  The  household  attributes  consist  of  household  demographic  and  socio- 
economic  variables  such  as  the  household  head's  age,  gender,  marital  and 
employment  status,  the  number  of  dependent  children  in  the  household,  household 
head's  previous  tenure  status,  likelihood  to  move,  household  long-term  income  and 
the  user  cost  of  housing.  The  housing  attributes  generally  include  the  dwelling  type, 
location  and  neighbourhood  quality.  In  addition,  housing  subsidy  and  rationing 
variables  are  also  included  in  the  two  tenure  choice  models.  Housing  subsidy  reduces 
the  housing  user  cost,  therefore  the  housing  subsidy  effect  can  be  derived  by 
examining  the  coefficients  of  the  user  cost  and  the  net  user  cost  (after  subsidy).  The 
rationing  variables  are  constructed  to  examine  whether  the  household  is  possibly 
constrained  from  mortgages  or  from  entering  the  social  housing  sector. 
In  the  model  of  mobility  and  tenure  choice,  the  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice 
are  assumed  to  be  interdependent.  In  this  sense,  some  variables  would  influence  both 
mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice.  As  a  result,  the  research  includes  the  household 
head's  age,  gender,  marital  and  employment  status,  the  number  of  dependent  children, 
household  long-term  income  and  neighbourhood  quality  variables  into  the  mobility 
decision  level.  Inevitably,  the  1996  SHCS  does  not  contain  all  the  variables  used  in 
the  two  tenure  choice  models.  Therefore,  some  variables  are  imputed  in  this  chapter. 
These  imputed  variables  include  household  long-term  income,  the  user  cost  of  housing, 
housing  subsidy  and  rationing  variables.  The  use  of  household  long-term  income  is 
assumed  that  the  household's  tenure  decision  is  made  on  the  basis  of  long  term, 
multiple  periods  rather  than  a  current  and  single  period.  In  this  sense,  the  use  of  long- 
term  income  would  be  better  than  current  income.  The  user  cost  of  housing  presents 
the  relative  cost  of  owning,  social  renting  and  private  renting.  Housing  subsidy  is 
measured  in  economic  terms.  The  rationing  variables  are  the  simulation  of 
households  who  could  potentially  be  constrained  by  mortgage  rationing  and  social 
housing  rationing.  The  interpretation  of  variable  selection  and  the  expected  sign  of 
these  variables  are  also  discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  Five.  Moreover,  this  chapter 
also  discusses  the  properties  of  the  data  and  variables  applied  to  the  two  tenure  choice 
models  including  the  selection  of  the  explanatory  variables  and  the  correlation 
analysis  of  these  explanatory  variables. 
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parameter  estimates  and  the  sign  of  explanatory  variables  are  fully  interpreted  to  show 
their  influences  on  tenure  choice.  To  examine  the  impacts  of  the  rationing  and 
housing  subsidy  factors,  a  simulation  is  carried  out  in  the  two  tenure  choice  models. 
Each  of  the  two  tenure  choice  models  involves  three  separate  simulations  (called 
Model  One,  Model  Two  and  Model  Three).  Model  One  examines  all  the  explanatory 
variables  without  housing  subsidy  and  rationing  variables.  Model  Two  examines  the 
housing  subsidy  effect  by  replacing  the  user  cost  variable  to  the  net  user  cost  variable 
in  the  model.  Model  Three  examines  the  rationing  effect  by  adding  mortgage 
rationing  and  social  housing  rationing  variables  into  the  model.  From  the  model 
results,  some  variables  such  as  household  long-term  income,  housing  user  cost, 
housing  subsidy  and  rationing  variables  have  expected  determining  influences  on  the 
household's  tenure  choice  in  Scotland. 
Chapter  Seven  explores  policy  issues  and  implications  drawn  from  the  results  of  the 
two  tenure  choice  models.  This  chapter  first  discusses  two  simulations  of  the  tenure 
choice  models.  The  first  simulation  examines  the  influence  of  a  change  in  the  income 
tax  rate  on  the  user  cost  of  owner-occupiers  and  on  tenure  choice.  The  second 
simulation  analyses  the  influence  of  a  reduction  in  the  mortgage  rationing  ratios  on 
tenure  choice.  The  second  issue  relates  to  an  analysis  of  income  inequality  and  tenure 
polarisation.  The  third  issue  concerns  the  distribution  of  housing  subsidies  between 
tenures  and  income  levels.  The  distributional  context  of  tenure,  income  and  housing 
subsidy  is  not  fully  addressed  in  the  two  tenure  choice  models.  However,  these  topics 
have  been  important  policy  issues  in  the  last  two  decades.  The  purpose  of  the  analysis 
of  these  two  issues  is  twofold.  It  is  not  only  to  address  the  problem  raised  from  tenure 
and  income  distributions  but  also  to  draw  attention  to  the  switch  of  housing  subsidies 
between  tenures  in  the  1990s  (say  1996),  compared  to  the  1980s.  The  three  issues  are 
expected  to  have  some  implications  for  current  housing  policy  with  regard  to 
supporting  sustainable  homeownership,  flexible  tenure,  housing  subsidy  and  welfare 
reform,  and  the  reform  for  the  social  housing  allocation  system. 
The  last  chapter  of  the  thesis  contains  the  conclusions.  I  summarise  the  results  of  each 
chapter  to  answer  the  three  main  questions  stated  in  the  first  chapter.  Then  the 
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in  the  concluding  chapter. 
10 CHAPTER  TWO  THEORETICAL  ANALYSIS  OF  HOUSING 
TENURE  CHOICE 
This  chapter  discusses  the  theory  of  housing  tenure  choice  and  reviews  previous 
tenure  choice  studies.  Through  a  review  of  theoretical  and  empirical  studies  of 
housing  tenure  choice,  this  thesis  summarises  the  framework  of  tenure  choice  analysis 
used  in  this  thesis.  This  chapter  is  organised  into  four  sections.  The  first  section 
discusses  the  definition  of  housing  tenure  choice.  The  second  section  discusses  the 
theory  of  housing  demand  and  consumer  choice,  and  analyses  the  relationship  of 
housing  demand  and  tenure  choice.  The  third  section  reviews  previous  studies  of 
tenure  choice  and  its  determinants,  and  the  last  section  is  a  summary  and  derives  the 
tenure  choice  analytical  framework. 
2.1  The  Definition  of  Housing  Tenure 
Housing  tenure  has  been  widely  discussed  in  housing  research  in  the  last  three 
decades.  There  is  also  a  variety  of  explanations  of  housing  tenure.  Barlow  and 
Duncan  (1988)  suggest  that  the  term  `housing  tenure'  has  a  statistical  and  a  conceptual 
interpretation  in  housing  research.  Statistically,  housing  tenure  can  be  seen  as  a 
taxonomic  collective  like  owner-occupation  or  social  rented  housing  corresponding 
with  other  categories  such  as  housing  quality  or  social  status.  Conceptually,  housing 
tenure  identifies  abstract  categories  such  as  housing  classes  or  consumption  cleavages 
with  specific  tenures.  Barlow  and  Duncan  also  argue  that  "'tenure'  has  become  more 
widely  used  as  a  taxonomic  `shorthand'  to  describe  broad  categories  which  very  often 
do  not  have  substantive,  binding  attributes"  (p.  229).  This  means  that  the  use  of  a 
single  and  uniform  explanation  of  housing  tenure  cannot  cover  its  diverse  activities 
linking  with  social,  economic  and  political  dimensions,  thus  leading  to  a  severe  loss  of 
information  and  of  analytical  sensitivity.  As  a  result,  the  authors  suggest  that  many 
different  explanations  should  be  used  to  describe  housing  tenure  depending  upon  the 
nature  of  the  problem  under  investigation. 
In  general,  all  housing  professionals  define  housing  tenure  for  particular  purposes. 
For  instance,  statisticians  and  economists  use  tenure  in  describing  housing  classes 
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social  category  related  to  the  household's  social-economic  status  and  political 
relations.  This  gives  housing  tenure  various  meanings  depending  upon  the  purpose  of 
the  research.  From  a  broader  view,  housing  tenure  is  taken  to  refer  to  a  whole  range 
of  financial,  social,  political  and  economic  relations  surrounding  housing.  As  a  result, 
the  choice  of  housing  tenure  is  not  just  a  simple  choice.  It  is  a  choice  of  a  complex 
package,  and  the  choice  expresses  the  household's  ability,  preferences  and 
expectations.  In  this  thesis,  the  definition  of  housing  choice  focuses  on  economic 
interpretation. 
In  neo-classical  economic  theory,  housing  tenure  choice  is  treated  as  a  special 
example  of  consumer  choice.  As  Fallis  (1985)  indicated,  housing  tenure  choice 
differs  from  conventional  consumer  choice  in  several  aspects.  The  choice  of  tenure  is 
discrete  rather  continuous,  that  is,  whether  to  own  or  to  rent;  the  durability  of  housing 
has  to  be  considered  in  the  household's  tenure  decision;  the  intertemporal  nature  of 
choice  allows  for  developing  a  multi-period  model. 
According  to  Fallis'  interpretation,  the  discrete  choice  of  housing  tenure  can  be 
analysed  by  modelling  the  household's  behaviour  as  solving  multiple  maximisation 
problems  rather  than  just  one.  For  example,  the  household  maximises  utility  as  a 
renter,  choosing  the  quantity  of  housing  services  and  other  goods  to  consume,  facing 
the  rental  price  of  housing  and  other  prices.  Then  the  household  maximises  utility  as 
an  owner,  choosing  the  amount  of  housing  services  and  other  goods  to  consume, 
facing  the  user  cost  of  housing  and  other  prices.  The  household  ultimately  chooses 
the  tenure  (and  consumption  bundle)  that  yields  the  maximum  utility  subject  to  the 
budget  constraint. 
Moreover,  the  model  of  tenure  choice  would  be  extended  to  multiple  periods  because 
the  transaction  costs  of  owner-occupation  are  relatively  high,  compared  to  other 
tenures  and  also  because  a  household  will  consider  the  value  of  the  housing  stock  in 
future  periods  when  making  a  tenure  and  consumption  choice  (Fallis  1985). 
Therefore,  households  are  likely  to  maximise  not  a  one-period  utility  function  but  a 
several-period  utility  function.  In  other  words,  today's  consumption  choices  are  the 
outcome  of  intertemporal  utility  maximisation;  that  is,  households  in  each  time  period 
12 formulate  consumption  plans  to  maximise  lifetime  utility  subject  to  a  lifetime  budget 
constraint.  The  budget  constraint  is  established  not  only  by  current  prices  and 
incomes  but  also  by  expected  future  prices  and  incomes. 
The  intertemporal  nature  of  tenure  choice  can  also  be  introduced  in  the  life-cycle 
analysis.  In  the  life-cycle  model,  households  in  each  period  pay  either  the  user  cost  of 
housing  if  they  decide  to  own  or  the  rental  price  of  housing  if  they  choose  to  rent.  The 
household  evaluates  all  possible  tenure  and  consumption  patterns  and  then  chooses  the 
package  of  consumption  and  tenure  that  yields  the  maximum  utility  over  the  life  cycle. 
However,  in  equilibrium,  the  rental  price  and  user  cost  are  equal,  implying  that  tenure 
choice  is  not  significant.  As  Fallis  stated,  tenure  choice  becomes  important  either  in 
disequilibrium  or  when  the  assumptions  of  no  taxes,  a  perfect  capital  market  and  no 
transaction  costs  are  removed.  In  other  words,  in  the  existence  of  income  and 
property  taxes,  mortgage  rationing  and  transaction  costs  in  the  housing  market,  the 
household's  price  for  renting  or owning  would  be  affected  by  these  conditions  thus  it 
shows  different  utility  of  renting  and  owning  for  the  household. 
Another  important  element  of  tenure  choice  analysis  considers  the  investment  issue. 
For  a  householder,  owning  a  house  is  to  place  some  of  his/her  savings  in  the  housing 
asset  as  opposed  to  other  assets,  such  as  government  bonds  and  stocks.  These 
different  investments  have  different  characteristics.  For  example,  they  are  different  in 
rate  of  returns,  in  risks  and  in  liquidity.  In  this  sense,  ownership  of  housing  can  be 
seen  as  part  of  a  portfolio  decision  which  allocates  saving  amongst  different  possible 
investments.  However,  it  is  noted  that  homeownership  is  a  joint  consumption  and 
investment  decision,  which  means  that  housing  stock  appears  both  in  the  budget 
constraint  and  in  the  utility  function  of  the  household  (Fallis  1985). 
In  addition  to  the  currently  dominant  economic  theory  of  tenure  choice,  some 
economists  believe  that  uncertainty  and  expectation  play  an  important  role  in  the 
housing  and  tenure  choice  process.  According  to  Marsh  and  Gibb  (1997),  uncertainty 
and  expectation  in  the  housing  and  tenure  choice  process  are  important  for  several 
reasons.  The  authors  suggest: 
In  the  owner  occupied  sector  housing  decisions  relate  to  what  is,  for 
most  households,  their  single  largest  long  term  investment  and  item 
13 of  revenue  expenditure.  Also,  decisions  regarding  tenure  choice  or 
residential  mobility  require  assessments  of  the  future  path  of  events 
over  extended  time  horizons  (Marsh  and  Gibb  1997,  p.  2) 
Although  the  neo-classical  aspect  of  consumer  choice  theory  is  the  dominant 
economic  theory  of  tenure  choice,  the  theory  of  uncertainty  and  expectation  can 
provide  an  alternative  view  to  understand  housing  tenure  choice  study.  As  Marsh  and 
Gibb  suggested,  the  alternative  view  must  recognise  the  meaning  of  genuine 
uncertainty  in  the  housing  decision  process  in  that: 
Individuals  are  more  likely  to  adopt  behaviour  that  is  rational  in  a 
procedural,  rather  than  maximising,  sense  (e.  g.  Lavoie,  1992)  and  to 
employ  more  or  less  sophisticated  behavioural  rules  which  allow 
them  to  cope  with  uncertainty  and  reach  a  decision  (1997,  p.  33) 
In  summary,  housing  tenure  choice  has  a  variety  of  explanations  depending  upon  who 
is  using  it  and  the  purpose  of  the  research.  In  a  sociological  aspect,  housing  tenure 
choice  can  be  seen  as  a  choice  of  social  relations  and  housing  classes.  In  an  economic 
aspect,  housing  tenure  choice  emphasises  the  measurement  of  the  household's 
preference  and  economic  ability  between  tenures.  As  the  aim  of  the  thesis  is  to  model 
the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour,  the  definition  of  housing  tenure  choice 
addresses  the  economic  interpretation.  The  following  section  will  discuss  the 
economic  theory  of  tenure  choice,  focusing  on  consumer  choice  and  housing  demand. 
2.2  Consumer  Choice  and  Housing  Demand 
As  discussed  in  the  last  section,  tenure  choice  is  a  kind  of  consumer  choice.  In  the 
housing  commodity,  the  choice  of  tenure  can  be  seen  as  one  of  housing  consumption 
decisions.  Thus,  in  the  discussion  of  tenure  choice  theory,  this  section  focuses  upon 
the  theories  of  consumer  choice  and  housing  demand.  There  are  three  parts  in  this 
section.  The  first  part  reviews  the  theory  of  consumer  choice  applying  to  the  housing 
commodity;  the  second  part  discusses  the  household's  housing  decisions  in  the 
housing  demand  study,  and  the  third  part  analyses  the  relationship  between  housing 
demand  and  tenure  choice. 
14 2.2.1  Applying  Consumer  Choice  Theory  to  Housing  Commodity 
In  applying  consumer  choice  theory  to  housing  demand  analysis,  previous  neo- 
classical  economists  have  assumed  that  there  is  a  competitive  housing  market  and,  in 
the  housing  market,  the  household  has  a  rational  and  complete  preference  ordering 
defined  over  the  array  of  existing  commodities  (see  Muth  1960  and  Olsen  1969).  The 
quantity  of  the  household's  demand  for  housing  under  the  competitive  theory  can  then 
be  expressed  by  maximising  utility  subject  to  the  budget  constraint  equating 
household  income  with  expenditure  over  the  relevant  time  period  (Maclennan  1982). 
In  this  case,  housing  is  a  function  of  income,  the  price  of  housing  and  the  price  of  all 
other  commodities. 
There  are,  however,  several  problems  in  applying  the  standard  consumer  choice  model 
to  housing  due  to  the  characteristics  of  housing  commodity  and  the  housing  market. 
Firstly,  the  durability  of  housing  characteristics  implies  that  housing  is  both  a 
consumption  and  investment  good,  and  it  is  usually  purchased  with  loan  finance.  In 
this  sense,  loan  institutions  may  place  rationing  on  borrowers  according  to  their 
income  and  expenditures.  Further,  as  the  income  measure  in  the  housing  demand 
analysis  is  likely  to  refer  to  permanent  income  rather  than  current  income,  it  often  has 
an  operational  problem  when  measuring  the  household's  permanent  income  (see 
Struyk  and  Marshall  1976,  Maclennan  1982). 
Secondly,  housing  is  a  complex,  multi-dimensional  commodity.  This  implies  housing 
"as  a  composite  demand  for  a  flow  of  services  embodying  a  variable  mix  of 
characteristics  rather  than  for  identifiable  units  of  a  commodity"  (Maclennan  1982,  p. 
41).  The  neo-classical  consumer  choice  model  can  be  modified  to  allow  for  this 
problem  by  identifying  the  implicit  prices  of  housing  attributes.  It  is  possible  to 
derive  demand  functions  for  individual  attributes  which  will  be  functions  of  income, 
life-cycle  characteristics  and  various  prices,  amongst  which  will  be  the  implicit  prices 
of  attributes  (ibid.  ).  Since  the  early  1970s,  it  has  become  popular  to  attempt  to 
estimate  implicit  prices  by  using  hedonic  techniques  in  housing  demand  analysis  (see 
for  example  Rosen  1974,  Maclennan  1977,  Case  1987,  Case  and  Quigley  1991,  and 
Mason  and  Quigley  1996). 
15 However,  there  are  some  criticisms  of  the  hedonic  price  technique.  Maclennan  (1982) 
argues  that  hedonic  price  has  a  theoretical  and  empirical  drawback  because  it 
constrains  the  income  elasticity  of  demand  for  each  attribute  to  unity.  `It  is  important 
to  recognise  that  in  this  case  the  choice  of  a  particular  demand  model  has  imposed 
strong  a  priori  notions  or  constraints,  which  are  built  in  and  will  interact  with  the  data 
thus  influencing  the  result  yielded'  (ibid.,  p.  46).  Further,  the  estimates  of  a  hedonic 
price  regression  tell  us  little  about  how  and  over  what  likely  time  period  equilibrating 
processes  take  place  (ibid.  ).  The  most  critical  drawback  is  that  the  selection  of  the 
content  and  the  form  of  the  hedonic  regression  always  fail  to  consider  the  housing 
time  inputs  (MacDonald  1979).  Another  major  weakness  of  hedonic  models,  given 
their  own  assumptions,  is  that  they  pay  no  regard  to  differences  in  the  quality  of 
housing  attributes  (Maclennan  1977). 
The  third  problem  for  applying  the  standard  consumer  choice  model  to  housing 
demand  is  that  the  economic  model  does  not  pay  attention  to  the  spatial  and  social 
situational  aspects  of  housing.  Maclennan  (1982)  stresses: 
Once  a  household  has  acquired  the  tenure  rights  of  home-ownership  or 
rental  housing  the  jointly  supplied  neighbourhood  and  environmental 
attributes  supply  monetary  and  psychic  costs  and  benefits  which  to  a 
great  extent  originate  externally  to  that  household  (p.  47). 
Thus  it  is  noted  that  the  satisfaction  yielded  by  the  purchased  tenure  rights  to 
homeownership  or  rental  housing  will  not  be  independent  of  the  jointly  supplied 
neighbourhood  and  physical  environment,  and  thus  spatial  preferences  are  important 
determinants  of  the  demand  for  housing.  Moreover,  the  external  attributes  such  as  the 
quality  of  the  environment  and  socio-economic  status  of  the  neighbourhood  can  be 
directly  entered  into  the  household's  utility  function.  However,  the  role  played  by 
status  in  the  housing  decision  is  a  complex  one,  which  is  difficult  to  measure  in  the 
housing  demand  analysis. 
Fourthly,  there  are  market  disequilibrium  or  even  frictional  factors  in  a  market,  and 
these  conditions  and  factors  are  usually  excluded  from  the  consumer  choice  model. 
For  example,  the  search  costs  may  influence  budget  constraints  and  the  search 
expectation  may  influence  choices,  and  these  factors  are  ignored  in  the  model. 
Maclennan  identifies  several  features  of  the  housing  market  disequilibrium  regarding 
16 imperfect  information,  transaction  costs  and  search  costs.  He  indicates  that 
individuals  infrequently  transact  in  the  housing  market,  which  means  that  consumers 
possess  imperfect  housing  market  information  when  entering  the  market.  It  is  also 
costly  to  re-enter  into  the  housing  market  because  imperfect  information  is  likely  to 
lead  the  consumer  to  engage  in  a  lengthy  search  process.  Furthermore,  the  house 
purchase  process  requires  households  not  only  to  engage  in  a  search  for  a  housing 
vacancy  and  for  loan  finance  but  also  to  engage  in  some  form  of  bidding.  Finally,  the 
fixity  of  secondhand  housing  stock  and  its  relatively  slow  rate  of  turnover  and 
relatively  sluggish  new  supply  is  likely  to  be  in  considerable  disequilibrium  in 
particular  submarkets  as  a  result  of  changes  in  demand  (Maclennan  1982). 
In  contrast  to  the  standard  consumer  choice  model,  which  treats  uncertainty  in  terms 
of  probability  and  expectation  as  rational,  Maclennan  seeks  an  alternative  explanation 
of  housing  and  tenure  choice.  Maclennan  thus  develops  a  behavioural  framework  of 
housing  choice,  which  recognises  the  particularities  of  housing  market  choice.  The 
framework  does  not  make  assumptions  about  choice  processes,  nor  include  standard 
assumptions  about  the  existence  of  equilibrium  as  a  necessary  feature.  "Me 
framework  attempts  to  incorporate  explicitly  the  linkage  between  individuals  and 
housing  market  institutions  and  it  introduces  the  concept  of  pre-search  aspiration 
because  it  is  argued  to  be  more  readily  identifiable  than  the  more  conventional 
concepts  of  `preference'  and  `constraint"'  (Maclennan  1982,  pp.  66-67).  Maclennan's 
framework  expresses  a  first  step  towards  an  alternative  to  current  choice  models.  His 
framework  is,  however,  considerably  loose  and  needs  to  be  strengthened  and 
elaborated.  "It  could  be  strengthened  theoretically  by  drawing  explicitly  on  a  rigorous 
conceptualisation  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty"  (Marsh  and  Gibb  1997,  p. 
33). 
Due  to  these  weaknesses  for  applying  consumer  choice  model  to  housing  demand, 
urban  housing  economists  have  attempted  to  modify  the  standard  model.  Many 
studies  emphasise  the  estimation  of  price  and  income  elasticities  of  housing  demand; 
others  focus  on  the  housing  choice  in  the  housing  market.  The  latter  is  the  focus  of 
this  section  and  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  section. 
17 2.2.2  Housing  Decision  in  the  Housing  Demand  Study 
Since  the  mid-1970s,  there  has  been  extensive  and  substantial  research  on  the 
household's  housing  decision  in  the  housing  demand  analysis  (see  Quigley  1976, 
Boehm  1982,  Clark  and  Onaka  1985,  Quigley  1985,  Fischer  and  Aufhauser  1988,  Tu 
1994).  These  studies  mainly  concern  the  nature  of  the  housing  decision  process  and 
analyse  the  household's  housing  choice  behaviour  in  the  housing  market.  Quigley 
(1985)  recognises  that  the  consumer's  consumption  decision  is  the  choice  of  one  unit 
from  a  large  of  set  of  discrete  alternatives.  In  making  these  choices,  housing 
consumers  presumably  select  samples  from  a  large  number  of  available  dwellings. 
They  then  evaluate  the  physical  characteristics  of  these  sampled  dwellings,  the 
neighbourhoods  in  which  they  are  located,  and  the  public  services  provided  to  them 
(ibid.  ).  On  the  basis  of  these  evaluations  and  the  prices  at  which  dwellings  are  offered, 
the  consumer  ultimately  chooses  one  dwelling  out  of  the  sampled  alternatives. 
In  his  study,  Quigley  assumes  that  there  are  three  distinct  features  of  consumer  choice 
for  a  dwelling.  Firstly,  a  consumer  selects  one  and  only  one  dwelling  from  a  large 
population  of  alternatives  in  almost  all  the  cases.  Secondly,  the  bundle  of  services 
provided  by  each  dwelling  alternative  is  extremely  heterogeneous.  Thirdly,  the 
consumer  choice  for  a  dwelling  includes  a  selection  of  a  price  as  well  as  of  the  other 
characteristics  associated  with  the  dwelling.  Based  on  these  features,  Quigley 
considers  the  household's  housing  decision  within  three  stages:  the  choice  of  dwelling, 
given  the  neighbourhood  and  town;  the  choice  of  neighbourhood,  given  the  town;  and 
the  marginal  choice  of  the  services  and  amenities  provided  in  a  town.  Quigley 
employs  a  nested  logit  choice  model  to  estimate  the  household's  housing  choice 
behaviour  in  the  Pittsburgh  metropolitan  housing  market.  His  empirical  results 
suggest  that  the  previous  studies'  assumption  of  the  independence  of  irrelevant 
alternatives  (IIA)'  may  be  inappropriate  and  also  that  housing  choice  may  be  more 
sensitive  to  variations  in  workplace  accessibility  than  is  indicated  by  the  more 
restricted  household  choice  model. 
'  The  IIA  is  a  consequence  of  the  initial  assumption  of  the  discrete  choice  models,  which  delineates  that 
the  probabilities  of  choosing  any  two  choice  alternatives  are  independent  and  irrelevant  from  the 
probabilities  of  choosing  any  other  alternatives  in  the  choice  set.  The  detailed  analysis  of  the  IIA 
assumption  will  be  discussed  in  chapter  four  and  chapter  six. 
18 Based  on  Quigley's  concern,  an  analysis  of  housing  choice  should  take  these  different 
relationships  between  dwelling  units  into  account.  Hierarchy  is  a  way  of  organising 
these  differences.  Boehm  (1982)  states  that  housing  choice  should  include  tenure 
choice  as  well  as  choices  for  dwelling  size,  structural  quality,  neighbourhood 
conditions,  and  public  services.  Thus  Boehm  constructs  a  three-level  hierarchical 
probability  model  of  housing  choice.  In  Boehm's  model,  the  probability  of  the 
household's  tenure  decision  is  estimated  at  the  first  level  of  a  choice  hierarchy.  Then 
the  household's  choices  over  dwelling  size  and  dwelling  quality  are  estimated  at  the 
second  and  the  third  levels,  respectively.  These  conditional  choices  are  combined  to 
produce  eight  joint  probabilities  of  housing  choice. 
One  of  the  most  significant  contributions  of  Boehm's  study  is  the  development  of  the 
hierarchical  housing  choice  model,  which  provides  better  estimation  results  than  the 
conventional  housing  choice  model  with  regard  to  the  effects  of  income,  relative 
prices  of  owning  or  renting  and  other  socio-economic  variables  on  the  household's 
housing  choice.  However,  Boehm's  hierarchical  choice  model  which  classified  into 
eight  probabilities  would  be  too  simple  in  his  assumptions  of  defining  dwelling  size 
and  quality.  This  model  should  be  expanded  in  order  to  include  additional  hierarchy 
levels  and  perhaps  incorporate  other  consumer  decisions  related  to  housing  choice.  Of 
course,  the  ability  to  expand  this  hierarchy  level  would  depend  upon  the  availability  of 
a  sufficient  number  of  observations  and  data  sources. 
A  further  study  by  Börsch-Supan  and  Pitkin  (1988)  explores  several  specifications  of 
discrete  choice  models  in  estimating  housing  consumption  decisions.  Unlike  previous 
studies,  the  authors  include  household  formation  into  housing  decisions.  In  their  study, 
housing  decisions  are  defined  as  the  choice  between  headship  and  shared  housing, 
tenure  choice,  and  the  selection  of  dwelling  size.  As  a  result,  housing  choice  is 
classified  into  nine  groups  including  three  types  of  homeownership,  five  types  of 
rented  housing  and  a  non-head  household  group.  In  order  to  estimate  the  optimal 
housing  consumption  decision  pattern,  the  authors  simulate  several  forms  of  decision 
tree.  A  variety  of  multinomial  and  nested  multinomial  logit  models  were  also 
proposed  to  estimate  these  housing  decision  trees.  Their  empirical  results  suggest  that 
the  hierarchical  choice  models  provide  better  goodness-of-fit  in  estimating  housing 
decisions.  The  results  also  show  that  the  multinomial  logit  model  strongly 
19 overestimates  some  of  the  actual  price  responses  and  underestimates  others,  while  the 
nested  multinomial  logit  models  may  present  reasonable  results.  With  respect  to  the 
determinants  of  housing  choice,  the  results  show  that  current  income  and  relative  out- 
of-pocket  costs  have  strong  influences  on  housing  choice. 
Börsch-Supan  and  Pitkin's  study  provides  a  new  insight  into  housing  choice  in  which 
they  put  a  form  of  housing  demand,  the  household  formation,  into  the  housing 
decision  process.  Their  results  also  demonstrate  the  importance  of  household 
headship  in  the  selection  of  the  optimal  housing  decision  structure.  Börsch-Supan  and 
Pitkin's  study  suggests  that  a  hierarchical  housing  choice  structure  provides  better 
estimation  results  of  the  household's  housing  choice  behaviour.  However,  the 
hierarchical  structure  of  the  housing  decision  process  implies  strong  assumptions  in 
the  ordership  of  housing  decision  tree  and  thus  it  only  represents  an  analytical  device. 
Moreover,  the  use  of  current  income  as  an  explanatory  variable  in  their  housing  choice 
models  is  questionable.  Studies  have  indicated  that  long-term  or  life-cycle  income 
would  be  more  adequate  than  current  income  in  estimating  housing  choice  since  the 
decision  of  housing  demand  is  based  on  a  life-cycle  decision  (see  Maclennan  1982 
and  Fallis  1985). 
In  addition  to  the  study  of  the  nature  and  the  process  of  housing  choice,  some  studies 
have  paid  attention  to  the  cause-effect  of  the  household's  housing  choice,  for  example, 
the  relationship  between  residential  mobility  and  housing  choice.  Clark  and  Onaka 
(1985)  suggest  that  the  type  and  quantity  of  housing  unit  available  for  occupancy 
surely  influences  housing  dissatisfaction  as  well  as  the  cost  of  searching  for  a  new 
home.  As  a  result,  the  decision  to  move  and  to  make  a  choice  of  a  specific  dwelling 
are  closely  interrelated.  As  Clark  and  Onaka  indicate,  the  traditional  model  of 
intraurban  residential  mobility,  however,  did  not  fully  account  for  the  impact  of 
housing  choice  on  the  mobility  decision.  Therefore  they  propose  an  alternative  model 
of  residential  mobility  which  considers  the  joint  nature  of  the  decisions  concerning 
mobility  and  housing  choice. 
In  their  study,  Clark  and  Onaka  employ  a  nested  multinomial  logit  (NMNL)  model  to 
estimate  the  joint  choice  of  moving  and  housing  choice.  In  the  three-level  choice 
model,  the  choice  of  the  dwelling  type  is  followed  by  the  choice  of  neighbourhood 
20 and  finally  by  the  choice  of  moving  or  staying.  The  hierarchical  choice  model  is 
estimated  for  three  household  categories  stratified  by  the  age  of  the  household  head 
and  household  size,  and  for  nine  neighbourhoods  with  different  locations.  Their 
model  results  show  that  space  has  a  significant  impact  on  the  household's  choice  for 
dwelling  type.  Length  of  stay  plays  an  important  role  in  the  household's  mobility 
decision  but  it  is  least  effective  in  small  young  households.  However,  a  major 
weakness  is  that  the  model  has  less  confident  estimation  results  on  neighbourhood 
choice.  There  is  a  need  to  make  greater  efforts  in  identifying  the  spatial  structure  of 
neighbourhoods  and  the  factors  which  influence  the  household's  choice  among 
neighbourhoods. 
The  above  studies  have  attempted  to  estimate  the  household's  housing  choice  under 
the  assumption  of  a  relatively  competitive  housing  market.  Some  studies,  however, 
have  analysed  the  housing  choice  in  a  regulated  housing  market  (see  for  example 
Fischer  and  Aufhauser  1988,  and  Timmerman  et  al.  1996).  Fischer  and  Aufhauser 
(1988)  indicate  that  in  many  Western  European  countries,  housing  markets  are  highly 
regulated  by  the  government.  Thus  characteristics  of  the  housing  market  in  these 
countries  are  organised  by  a  relatively  competitive  part  of  the  market  and  a  part  that  is 
subject  to  varying  degrees  and  forms  of  government  regulation.  The  authors, 
therefore,  integrate  several  important  elements  of  the  institutionalised  and  regulated 
nature  of  the  housing  market,  and  analyse  the  relationship  between  household  type 
and  housing  choice  in  Vienna  where  the  housing  market  was  a  "prototype  of  a  highly 
regulated  and  institutionalised  market"  (ibid.,  p.  48).  The  authors  assume  that  the 
institutionalised  nature  of  the  housing  market  could  be  expressed  in  three  ways. 
Firstly,  dwelling  units  are  categorised  on  the  basis  of  institutional  settings,  such  as 
public  housing,  private  regulated  rental  housing,  and  owner-occupied  housing,  etc. 
Secondly,  there  are  institutional,  informational  and  income-based  constraints  in  the 
access  to  specific  tenure  and  dwelling  type  of  housing  units.  Thirdly,  government 
subsidies,  such  as  housing  and  rent  allowance  and  non-interest-bearing  state  loans,  are 
explicitly  taken  into  account  in  the  choice  set. 
Fischer  and  Aufhauser  also  employ  a  nested  logit  model  to  estimate  the  three-stage 
housing  choice:  the  choice  of  a  dwelling  unit  given  dwelling  type  and  residential  zone, 
the  choice  of  a  dwelling  type  given  a  residential  zone;  and  the  marginal  choice  of  a 
21 residential  zone.  Their  empirical  results  suggest  that  demographic  variables 
accounted  for  in  the  definition  of  the  household  types  appear  to  have  significant 
impacts  on  housing  choice  behaviour.  Residual  income,  used  as  a  single  explanatory 
variable  as  well  as  its  interaction  with  dwelling  size  and  dwelling  quality,  has  an 
important  influence  on  the  household's  choice  for  dwelling  unit.  Housing  costs 
interacting  with  incomes  appear  to  have  a  strong  influence  on  the  choice  among 
dwelling  types. 
Noted  again  in  Fischer  and  Authauser's  study,  the  use  of  nested  multinomial  logit 
model  appears  to  contain  strong  assumptions  of  the  hierarchical  structure.  The 
authors  are  also  aware  of  this  weakness.  Therefore,  they  suggest  that  `this hierarchy 
only  represents  an  analytical  device  that  reflects  the  relative  degree  of  similarity 
among  choice  alternatives  and  does  not  imply  that  a  household  choosing  a  dwelling 
unit  necessarily  follows  a  path  down  the  tree'  (Fischer  and  Aufhauser  1988,  p.  49). 
This  statement  can  also  be  applied  to  all  hierarchical  choice  models. 
Timmerman  et  al.  (1996)  also  recognise  the  important  influence  of  the  institutional 
structure  of  the  housing  market  on  the  household's  housing  choice.  They  indicate  that 
in  The  Netherlands,  as  well  as  in  most  Western  European  countries,  housing  markets 
are  highly  regulated  by  the  government.  As  a  result,  households,  when  searching  a 
new  home,  will  face  not  only  budget  and  socio-economic  constraints  but  also  the 
institutional  constraints  set  by  the  government.  Unlike  Fischer  and  Aufhauser,  the 
target  household  in  Temmermans  et  at  study  is  the  divorcees  who  represent  one  of  the 
vulnerable  groups  in  the  housing  market  that  face  substantial  constraints.  The  authors 
experiment  with  the  universal  logit  model  to  estimate  the  effects  of  those  constraints 
on  households'  (divorcees')  housing  choice  behaviour  and  residential  preferences.  A 
total  of  16  choices  are  selected  in  the  study;  each  choice  set  varies  in  size  and 
composition  and  represents  different  constraints  on  behaviour,  in  terms  of  the  access 
to  eight  housing  market  segments.  Their  results  suggest  that  dwelling  type  and 
neighbourhood  have  the  most  significant  influences  on  the  divorcee's  housing 
decision.  The  number  of  rooms  and  the  social  environment  also  have  important 
impacts,  while  distance  attributes  are  of  lesser  importance.  The  results  also  indicate 
that  the  importance  of  these  attributes  to  divorcees  is  not  different  from  those  to  other 
groups  in  the  past. 
22 One  of  the  contributions  of  Timmermans  et  al.  study  concerns  the  model  methodology. 
The  universal  logit  model  employed  in  their  study  is  distinguished  from  the  standard 
multinomial  logit  model  in  that  the  former  is  qualified  from  the  assumption  of 
independence  from  irrelevant  alternatives  (HA).  However,  the  parameter  estimates  in 
the  universal  logit  model  are  more  difficult  to  interpret  than  in  the  multinomial  logit 
model.  Another  contribution  of  Timmermans  et  al  study  is  the  emphasis  of  housing 
market  segments  (housing  submarkets)  in  the  housing  choice  process  rather  than  the 
importance  of  price  and  non-priced  constraints,  which  the  authors  intended  to  address 
in  the  study. 
In  fact,  the  importance  of  the  housing  submarket  in  the  housing  choice  process  has 
been  emphasised  by  many  studies.  Maclennan  et  al.  (1987)  emphasise  the  importance 
of  housing  submarkets  for  the  research  of  present  urban  housing  models.  They 
suggest  that  "(housing)  submarkets  are  deemed  to  exist  when  systematic  differences 
exist  in  housing  attribute  prices  over  areas  or  sectors  and  where  variations  show  some 
persistence"  (p.  37).  As  a  result,  the  household's  housing  choice  behaviour  in  the 
housing  market  is  critically  influenced  by  characteristics  of  the  housing  commodity, 
which  are  the  essential  issue  of  the  housing  submarket  and  the  trading  system  used  to 
exchange  housing  assets. 
Based  on  the  concept  of  the  housing  submarket,  Tu  (1994)  estimates  the  household's 
housing  choice  behaviour  under  several  housing  submarkets  divided  by 
neighbourhood  and  dwelling  types.  She  indicates  that  urban  housing  submarket 
structure  is  suitable  for  analysing  disaggregate  housing  choice  behaviour.  In  her  study, 
Tu  also  compares  several  discrete  choice  models  in  estimating  the  housing  choice 
behaviour  in  housing  submarkets.  Her  results  suggest  that  no  discrete  choice  model  in 
her  study  is  superior  to  another  one.  The  multinomial  logit  (NINL)  model  violates  the 
IIA  assumption,  while  the  nested  multinomial  (NMNL)  model  does  not.  However,  the 
MNL  model  provides  better  predictions  of  housing  choice  behaviour  than  the  NMNL 
model  does. 
A  further  study  by  Tu  and  Goldfmch  (1996)  develops  a  new  two-stage  housing  choice 
forecasting  model  based  on  Tu's  (1994)  housing  submarket  structure.  The  authors 
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associated  with  a  dwelling.  These  components  create  a  huge  bundle  of  dwelling 
alternatives.  If  each  dwelling  were  treated  as  an  alternative,  it  would  cause  a  serious 
calculation  problem  and  bias.  To  avoid  this  problem,  the  Tu  and  Goldfinch's  model 
separates  the  joint  choice  behaviour  into  two  stages.  The  first  stage  is  the  choice  of 
the  key  dwelling  components,  which  construct  housing  submarkets;  the  second  stage 
is  the  choice  of  non-key  dwelling  components,  which  distinguish  individual  dwellings 
in  each  housing  submarket.  The  authors  divide  households  into  three  different  age 
groups  to  estimate  their  housing  choice  behaviour.  Their  results  show  that  different 
age  groups  of  households  have  significantly  different  housing  preferences  in  terms  of 
housing  prices,  dwelling  components  and  neighbourhood  quality,  which  are  of  interest 
in  the  study  of  housing  demand  forecasting  as  well  as  in  the  analysis  of  housing 
investment  and  housing  subsidy  policy. 
In  a  review  of  the  above  studies  of  housing  choice  behaviour  a  clear  picture  can  be 
drawn  where  a  household's  housing  decision  can  be  seen  as  a  bundle  of  choices, 
including  the  decisions  of  tenure,  dwelling  type,  neighbourhood  quality  and  location. 
Hierarchy  is  a  way  to  model  housing  choice  behaviour.  In  a  hierarchical  choice  model, 
a  household,  for  instance,  may  first  choose  tenure  then  choose  dwelling  type  and  so  on 
before  choosing  neighbourhood  and  location.  However,  it  is  noted  that  the 
hierarchical  framework  of  housing  choice  is  just  an  analytical  device  that  reflects  the 
relative  degree  of  similarity  among  choice  alternatives.  Therefore,  it  does  not  imply 
that  a  household  should  necessarily  follow  this  kind  of  decision  tree  while  making  a 
housing  decision. 
Furthermore,  in  Britain  and  in  most  Western  European  countries,  the  housing  market 
is highly  regulated  by  the  government.  Thus  the  housing  market  in  these  countries  is 
characterised  as  partly  a  relative  competitive  market  and  partly  a  market  subject  to 
non-priced,  administrative  constraints.  Therefore,  there  are  access  constraints  for 
households  from  entering  certain  types  of  housing  segments.  Due  to  imperfect 
information  in  the  housing  market,  households  need  to  spend  time  and  money  in 
searching  for  a  home,  thus  the  search  costs  should  not  be  ignored  in  the  housing 
decision  process.  The  housing  market  can  also  be  separated  into  several  submarkets 
because  of  imperfect  information  and  the  demand/supply  constraints  in  the  market. 
24 As  a  result,  a  household's  housing  decision  can  be  estimated  under  different 
submarket  conditions,  which  are  based  on  tenure,  dwelling  and  neighbourhood 
components. 
2.2.3  Housing  Demand  and  Tenure  Choice 
In  the  housing  demand  analysis,  the  choice  of  tenure  is  a  kind  of  decision  of  demand 
for  housing  services.  This  subsection  discusses  the  relationship  between  tenure  choice 
and  other  decisions  for  housing  consumption.  In  earlier  literature,  the  analysis  of 
tenure  choice  and  housing  demand  is  separated,  which  means  that  housing  demand  is 
analysed  separately  with  different  demand  specifications  for  renters  and  owners  (see 
de  Leeuw  1971,  Straszheim  1973,  and  Polinsky  1977).  Later  research  (for  example 
Lee  and  Trost  1978,  and  Rosen  1979)  recognised  that  the  discrete  choice  for  tenure 
and  the  continuous  decision  for  housing  demand  are  interdependent,  by  specifying  the 
error  terms  of  the  discrete  and  continuous  decision  models  to  be  correlated  because 
the  same  elements  of  behaviour  are  in  both  models. 
Although  studies  by  Lee-Trost  and  Rosen  have  indicated  that  the  interdependent 
nature  of  the  tenure  choice  and  housing  demand  decision,  they  only  partially  deal  with 
this  interdependence.  Neither  they  nor  earlier  literature  deal  econometrically  with  the 
capital  market  imperfections  that  influence  tenure  choice.  A  study  by  King  (1980) 
recognises  that  the  household's  choice  of  tenure  and  its  demand  for  housing  services 
can  be  seen  as  a  joint  decision  determined  by  a  common  preference  ordering.  In  his 
study,  King  assumes  that  tenure  choice  and  housing  demand  are  based  on 
maximisation  of  the  same  utility  function,  hence  that  both  the  discrete  and  the 
continuous  decision  models  can  involve  some  of  the  same  parameters,  depending 
upon  the  precise  assumptions.  In  this  sense,  joint  estimation  involves  imposing  cross- 
equation  constraints  on  the  parameters  of  the  tenure  choice  and  housing  demand 
equations,  as  well  as  recognising  that  the  error  terms  are  correlated. 
One  of  the  contributions  of  King's  study  is  to  identify  the  importance  of  rationing  in 
the  British  housing  market.  Therefore  his  model  allows  for  estimating  the  impact  of 
non-priced  rationing  on  the  access  to  the  local  authority  rented  market.  King  also 
suggests  that,  because  of  the  government's  high  level  of  intervention  in  the  housing 
market,  there  is  subsidised  social  housing  accounting  for  at  least  one  third  of  total 
25 dwellings  in  the  housing  market,  along  with  the  owner-occupied  sector  and  the 
unsubsidised  private  rented  sector.  Thus  the  choice  of  tenure  in  Britain  is  not  a  simple 
binary  choice  of  owning  and  renting.  Instead,  King  proposes  three  types  of  choice  in 
1980:  (1)  owner-occupation,  (2)  subsidised  renting,  consisting  of  local  authority 
renting  and  unfurnished  (regulated)  private  renting,  and  (3)  unsubsidised  private 
furnished  renting.  By  using  a  cross-sectional  data  set  from  the  Family  Expenditure 
Survey,  King  estimates  the  price  elasticity  of  housing  demand  for  three  alternative 
tenures,  which  is  ranged  between  -0.5  and  -0.65.  In  estimating  tenure  choice,  his 
results  show  that  the  variables  such  as  age,  sex,  and  race  of  the  household  head  which 
represent  constraints  in  the  capital  market,  have  important  influences  on  household's 
tenure  decisions. 
Following  King's  research,  Henderson  and  Ioannides  (1983,1986)  completed  similar 
studies  in  the  US.  They  assume  tenure  choice  and  the  housing  consumption  decision 
as  a  joint  decision  by  using  the  same  behavioural  model  in  analysing  these  discrete 
and  continuous  elements  of  housing  market  behaviour.  Their  models  allow  for  an 
analysis  of  the  role  of  capital  imperfections  and  discriminatory  practices  in 
constraining  housing  consumption  decisions.  They  also  consider  rationing  and 
incomplete  specification  of  ownership  prices  as  important  aspects  of  the  housing 
market.  In  examining  recent  movers  in  36  Standard  Metropolitan  Statistical  Areas 
(SMSAs),  Henderson  and  Ioannides  (1986)  find  that  current  income,  age,  education, 
and  marital  status  have  important  influences  on  households'  tenure  and  housing 
consumption  decisions.  Their  results  suggest  that  people  with  lower  education,  age 
and  current  income  face  an  increased  probability  of  being  denied  a  mortgage,  as  do 
those  who  are  single,  while  race  does  seem  to  have  an  impact  but  not  as  significant. 
Both  King's  and  Henderson-Ioannides'  studies  provide  a  new  insight  into  the 
relationship  between  tenure  choice  and  housing  demand  decisions.  King  highlights 
the  impact  of  non-price  rationing  on  the  household's  choice  for  public  rented  housing. 
Henderson  and  Ioannides  emphasise  the  effect  of  income  tax  advantages  on  the 
household's  home  ownership  decision.  However,  Henderson  and  Ioannides'  studies 
were  carried  out  in  the  US  where  the  housing  market  conditions,  tax  structure  and 
subsidy  policy  are  significantly  different  from  the  UK.  King's  study  is  also  out  of 
date.  In  the  UK,  the  housing  tenure  pattern  has  been  dramatically  changed  over  the 
26 last  two  decades  due  to  the  change  in  housing  policy.  Government  regulations  on  the 
private  rented  sector  have  been  relaxed;  subsidies  to  social  housing  have  been 
significantly  reduced,  and  there  has  been  a  rapidly  growing  owner-occupied  sector  in 
the  housing  market.  Another  weakness  of  King's  study  is  the  rationing  assumption  in 
access  to  three  tenures.  King  assumes  that  a  household  chooses  unconstrained  private 
renting  because  it  is  rationed  in  the  access  to  both  owner-occupation  and  public 
housing.  However,  in  the  real  world,  many  households,  for  instance  young  and  single 
households,  choose  private  renting  for  various  reasons  but  not  only  because  they  are 
constrained  from  entering  owner-occupation  or  social  housing. 
Moreover,  in  the  analysis  of  housing  demand  and  tenure  choice,  some  researchers 
have  been  interested  in  examining  the  income  and  price  effects  on  the  household's 
demand  for  housing  and  tenure  choice.  For  example,  Kent  (1983)  examines  the 
relationship  between  income  and  price  elasticities  and  their  effects  on  housing  demand, 
tenure  choice,  and  household  formation.  In  his  study,  Kent  delineates  three  distinct 
decisions  pertaining  to  the  demand  for  housing:  a  decision  of  household  formation,  a 
decision  of  tenure  and  a  decision  of  how  much  housing  to  consume,  given  the 
household  formation  and  tenure  decisions.  Kent  theoretically  demonstrates  that 
income  and  price  elasticities  can  be  estimated  to  include  one,  two,  or all  three  of  these 
decisions.  Kent's  study,  however,  is  limited  on  theoretical  analysis.  As  he  indicated, 
the  empirical  results  of  some  of  the  income  and  price  elasticities  in  his  study  may  not 
be  available. 
In  contrast  to  Kent's  study,  Gillingham  and  Hagemann  (1983)  evaluate  the  empirical 
importance  of  the  simultaneity  between  tenure  choice  and  consumption  level  decisions 
based  on  the  Lee-Trost  (1978)  model.  In  their  model,  Gillingham  and  Hagemann 
estimate  overall  income  and  price  elasticities  of  housing  demand,  which  incorporate 
the  impacts  of  income  and  price  on  both  tenure  choice  and  consumption  decisions.  By 
examining  the  household  data  drawn  from  the  1972-73  Consumer  Expenditure  Survey 
in  the  US,  they  find  that  the  structures  of  both  tenure  choice  and  housing  demand  vary 
substantially  across  household  types  and  are,  in  general,  non-linear  functions  of 
income  and  price.  Although  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  tenure  choice  is  significantly 
affected  by  variations  across  cities  in  expected  house  price  appreciation,  these 
variations  have  statistically  significant  impacts  on  the  quantity  of  housing  services  the 
27 household  consumed.  The  overall  income  and  price  elasticities  vary  substantially 
across  household  types  in  both  overall  level  and  the  level  of  the  tenure  choice  and 
conditional  demand  components. 
A  similar  study  by  Goodman  (1988)  estimates  the  joint  decision  of  tenure  choice  and 
housing  based  on  the  Lee-Trost  and  the  Rosen  model  structure.  A  major  advance  of 
Goodman's  study  is  that  he  separates  the  consumption  and  the  investment  motives  in 
tenure  choice.  Goodman's  model  emphasises  the  investment  and  consumption 
demands  and  adopts  house  value  to  rental  ratio  to  measure  investment  demand.  The 
hedonic  price  method  is  adopted  to  define  price  indices  for  owners  and  renters  and  to 
define  value-rent  ratios  for  the  investment  components  of  the  housing  purchase. 
Tenure  choice  is  estimated  as  a  function  of  the  relative  prices  of  owning  or  renting, 
value-rent  ratios,  permanent  and  transitory  incomes,  and  socio-demographic  variables. 
Housing  demand  is  estimated  for  both  owners  and  renters. 
Goodman's  study  provides  a  clear  picture  of  the  determinants  and  their  impacts  on 
tenure  choice  and  the  decision  of  housing  demand.  His  empirical  results  show  that 
income  and  price  are  significant  impacts  on  tenure  choice.  Controlling  for  tenure 
choice,  the  effects  of  permanent  and  current  incomes  are  approximately  the  same, 
whereas  they  differ  significantly  on  the  tenure  decision.  Permanent  income  has  a 
greater  influence  on  the  tenure  choice,  while  current  income  provides  more 
satisfactory  demand  estimates.  Many  studies  have  criticised  this,  however,  arguing 
that  using  current  income  would  lead  to  downward  bias  in  estimating  the  income 
elasticity  of  housing  demand  (see  for  example  Reid  1962,  Winger  1968,  de  Leeuw 
1971,  Rosen  1979,  Maclennan  1982). 
Further  research  by  Loikkanen  (1992)  estimates  the  joint  choice  of  tenure  and  housing 
demand  in  Finland.  Similar  to  some  previous  studies,  Loikkanen  uses  the  two-stage 
estimation  procedure  suggested  by  Lee-Trost  and  by  Rosen  in  order  to  estimate  tenure 
choice  and  demand  for  dwelling  size.  The  first  stage  is  probit  estimation  of  the 
probability  of  owning  or  renting;  the  second  stage  is  the  ordinary  least  square 
estimation  of  the  demand  for  dwelling  size.  In  his  study,  Loikkanen  also  emphasises 
rationing  in  the  Finnish  housing  market,  where  there  is  rent  control  in  the  private 
rented  market,  administrative  constraints  in  the  public  rented  market  and  credit 
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market-determined  and  vary  across  regions.  Loikkanen  constructs  the  shadow  price 
(user  cost)  for  different  tenures  based  on  the  market  level.  Loikkanen  also  assumes 
that  tenure  choice  and  demand  for  dwelling  size  are  affected  by  the  rental  market 
shortage,  which  is  a  result  of  rent  control.  He  recognises  that  rent  control  has  a 
negative  impact  on  the  supply  of  private  rented  dwellings.  Thus  the  rental  market 
shortage  is  a  driving  force  to  push  households  in  to  the  owner-occupied  market.  In 
order  to  estimate  the  impact  of  regional  rented  market  disequilibrium  on  tenure  choice 
and  housing  demand,  Loikkanen  constructs  regional  queue  variables.  His  results 
show  that  the  regional  queue  variables  have  significant  influences  on  tenure  choice 
and  owners'  demand  for  dwelling  size.  In  addition  to  queue  variables,  his  results  also 
show  that  the  user  cost  has  an  important  and  significant  impact  on  tenure  choice. 
Loikkanen's  study  highlights  the  importance  of  rationing,  shortage  of  supply  in  the 
private  rented  sector,  and  the  user  cost  in  estimating  tenure  choice  and  housing 
demand.  However,  the  rental  market  disequilibrium  does  not  show  significant 
influences  on  the  renter's  demand  for  dwelling  size.  Neither  does  it  show  that  the 
regional  user  cost  has  a  significant  impact  on  housing  demand.  As  the  author  suggests, 
these  problems  can  be  improved  by  using  more  detailed  regional  data.  In  this  case,  it 
also  implies  a  weakness  of  measuring  endogenous  rationing  factors,  especially  when 
estimating  housing  demand. 
In  summary,  the  above  studies  have  indicated  that  tenure  choice  and  housing  demand 
decisions  are  interdependent.  This  relationship  can  also  link  to  housing  choice,  where 
tenure  choice  is  included  in  the  housing  decision  package,  and  where  tenure  choice 
and  other  housing  decisions  such  as  dwelling  type,  location,  and  neighbourhood  are 
interdependent.  In  the  study  of  tenure  choice  and  housing  demand,  many  previous 
studies  have  addressed  income  and  price  effects,  and  these  studies  estimated  a  variety 
of  income  and  price  elasticities  for  housing  demand.  In  fact,  the  income  and  price 
elasticities  vary  by  the  empirical  data  and  across  countries.  In  Britain,  income  and 
price  elasticities  for  housing  demand  are  slightly  lower  than  those  in  the  US  and  this  is 
probably  because  the  housing  market  in  Britain  is  more  regulated  than  in  the  US  (see 
Meen  1994  and  Ermisch,  Findlay  and  Gibb  1996).  Some  studies,  such  as  King  (1980), 
Fischer  and  Aufhauser  (1988),  and  Loikkanen  (1992),  have  addressed  the  important 
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tenure  choice  would  be  more  important,  particularly  where  there  is  non-price, 
administrative  rationing  in  housing  market,  and  where  households  face  a  choice 
between  the  public  and  private  housing  sectors  (Clapham  and  Kintrea  1984).  As  a 
result,  many  studies  have  emphasised  the  importance  of  tenure  choice  in  the  housing 
choice  study.  The  following  section  is  a  review  of  tenure  choice  studies. 
2.3  Tenure  Choice  and  Its  Determinants 
This  section  analyses  the  household's  tenure  choice  and  its  determinants.  There  are 
two  parts  in  this  section.  The  first  part  reviews  the  studies  of  tenure  choice  model;  the 
second  part  analyses  tenure  choice  and  its  specific  determinants. 
2.3.1  The  Studies  of  Tenure  Choice  Model 
There  have  been  a  large  number  of  studies  that  have  modelled  households'  tenure 
choice  behaviour  in  the  last  three  decades.  Some  studies  assume  that  tenure  choice  is 
made  solely  with  regard  to  the  contemporary  period,  thus  emphasising  the  influence  of 
the  determinants  on  tenure  choice  by  using  cross-sectional  data  sets.  Some  other 
studies  assume  that  tenure  choice  is  made  on  the  basis  of  multiple  periods  and  thus 
address  the  impact  of  the  change  in  determinants  on  tenure  choice  by  using 
longitudinal  data.  As  a  result,  the  analysis  of  tenure  choice  models  can  be  classified 
into  two  categories:  cross-sectional  analysis  and  longitudinal  analysis  of  tenure  choice, 
based  on  the  nature  of  data  and  the  purpose  of  the  study.  They  are  discussed  in  detail 
below. 
2.3.1.1  Cross  Sectional  Analysis  of  Tenure  Choice 
With  regard  to  cross-sectional  analysis  of  tenure  choice,  some  studies  regarding 
housing  demand  and  tenure  choice  have  been  discussed  in  the  last  section.  In  this 
section,  the  focus  is  on  specifying  the  determinants  of  tenure  choice.  In  earlier  studies, 
Struyk  and  Marshall  (1974)  and  Struyk  (1976)  have  examined  the  determinants  of 
homeownership  in  the  Pittsburgh  metropolitan  area  in  the  US.  They  indicate  that 
tenure  choice  is  a  single  and  very  important  of  aspect  of  housing  demand,  thus  the 
determinants  of  tenure  choice  are  essentially  the  same  set  as  those  for  the  demand  for 
housing  services.  In  their  studies,  Struyk  and  Marshall  address  the  income  effect  on 
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based  on  a  long  term  view,  as  is  the  income  prospect,  and  as  a  result  permanent 
income  is  stressed  in  their  studies. 
In  addition  to  household  (permanent)  income,  Struyk  and  Marshall  classify  three  other 
groups  of  determinants:  income  tax  advantages,  household  characteristics,  and  the 
tenure  choice  of  peer  groups.  The  authors  indicate  that  the  reduction  in  federal 
income  tax  as  income  rises  associated  with  the  housing  tax  deduction  is  directly 
related  to  the  income  expended  on  housing.  Other  household  characteristics  include 
family  type  and  size,  age  and  sex  of  household  heads.  An  additional  factor  of  tenure 
choice,  which  has  received  little  attention  in  previous  studies,  is  the  tenure  choice  of 
peer  groups.  Struyk  and  Marshall  suggest  that  middle-age  households  may  be  more 
strongly  influenced  by  the  tenure  choice  of  their  peer  groups  than  younger  or  older 
households,  since  middle-age  households  are  more  likely  to  be  settled  into  jobs  and 
family  responsibilities. 
In  their  tenure  choice  model,  Struyk  and  Marshall  examine  the  impact  of  these 
determinants  on  different  household  groups  divided  on  the  basis  of  family  type  and 
age  of  household  head  by  using  1970  US  Census  sample  data.  Their  results  suggest 
that  the  relationship  between  income  and  the  probability  of  choosing  owner- 
occupation  is  non-linear,  with  the  effect  of  increase  in  income  generally  being  positive 
but  at  a  decreasing  rate  at  the  upper  income  range.  Both  current  income  and 
permanent  income  were  found  to  have  significant  influences  for  all  but  individual 
households.  As  expected,  their  results  show  that  family  size,  age  and  sex  of 
household  heads  are  important  determinants  of  tenure  choice.  Tenure  choice  of  peer 
groups  was  found  to  have  significant  effects  on  middle-aged  households'  tenure 
decisions.  The  effect  of  income  tax  advantages  was  found  to  be  significant  only  for 
younger  and  small-size  households.  As  the  authors  indicate,  the  effects  of  tax  subsidy 
could  be  largely  captured  by  the  income  variables,  as  there  is  a  high  correlation 
between  income  and  tax  subsidy  variables. 
Struyk  and  Marshall's  studies  clearly  delineate  the  determinants  and  their  influences 
on  household  tenure  choice.  However,  there  are  some  criticisms  of  their  studies.  The 
first  criticism  is  that  they  put  both  current  income  and  permanent  income  into  the 
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multicollinearity.  The  authors  explain  that  the  use  of  current  income  can  adequately 
express  the  income  of  younger  and  individual  households,  while  permanent  income  is 
used  in  middle-age  and  large-size  households,  and  the  coefficient  of  correlation 
between  these  two  incomes  in  their  studies  is  low.  This  could,  however,  imply  a 
technical  problem  in  the  calculation  of  permanent  income  and  it  needs  a  further 
discussion. 
The  second  criticism  of  Struyk  and  Marshall's  studies  regards  the  income  tax  subsidy 
rate.  The  authors  calculate  the  federal  income  tax  subsidy  rate  based  on  the  ratio  of 
housing  expenditures  to  permanent  income.  This  income  tax  subsidy  rate,  in  fact, 
could  have  a  high  correlation  with  income  variables.  If  the  subsidy  is  viewed  as  a 
reduction  in  the  relative  price  of  housing,  the  tax  subsidy  effect  would  be  expressed  on 
the  relative  price  of  housing  rather  than  household  income.  Many  studies  of  tenure 
choice  and  housing  demand,  such  as  King  (1980),  Gillingham  and  Hagemann  (1983), 
and  Loikkanen  (1992),  have  demonstrated  the  important  influence  of  the  relative  price 
of  housing  (also  called  the  user  cost  of  housing)  on  household  tenure  choice. 
Unfortunately,  Struyk  and  Marshall's  studies  ignore  the  user  cost  variables.  The  third 
criticism  is  of  the  tenure  choice  of  peer  groups.  In  their  studies,  the  peer  group 
variables  are  associated  with  the  household  head's  education  and  employment  level. 
As  a  result,  it  is  more  likely  the  case  that  the  household  head's  education  and 
employment  status  could  have  more  significant  effects  than  the  peer  groups  on  tenure 
choice. 
Many  studies  of  homeownership  have  employed  a  variety  of  analytical  techniques 
using  the  Struyk  and  Marshall's  approach.  A  similar  study  carried  out  by  Maclennan 
and  Wood  (1981)  examines  the  determinants  of  entry  to  homeownership  in  the  British 
housing  market.  As  discussed  earlier,  the  housing  market  in  the  UK  is  more  regulated 
than  in  the  US.  Thus  a  particular  concern  in  Maclennan  and  Wood's  study  is  the 
discontinuities  in  supply  that  exists  in  the  British  urban  housing  market.  In  this  case, 
housing  tenure  is  associated  with  particular  house  types,  ages  and  locations.  Because 
of  imperfect  information  in  the  housing  market,  a  search  process  is  necessary  for  the 
household  before  buying  a  home.  The  authors  also  indicate  the  existence  of  market 
disequilibrium  at  the  time  of  study  and,  as  a  result,  inflation  is  an  important 
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attached  to  the  qualities  of  ownership  is  influenced  by  peer  group  pressures  and  family 
formation  pressures.  In  their  model,  Maclennan  and  Wood  analyse  the  basic 
determinants  of  homeownership  including  current  household  income,  deposit  capacity, 
family  size,  inflation,  parents'  tenure  status,  the  age  of  the  household  head,  and  stay 
intentions.  A  variety  of  search  variables  are  then  added  to  extend  their  tenure  choice 
model. 
In  a  survey  of  first  time  homebuyers  and  potential  buyers  in  the  private  rented  sector 
in  the  Glasgow  area,  Maclennan  and  Wood  classify  the  sampled  households  into 
several  groups.  In  their  study,  private  tenants  are  categorised  into  temporary  rationed, 
permanent  rationed  and  disinterested  groups  based  on  their  preference  and  income.  A 
series  of  aggregate  and  disaggregate  tests  were  undertaken  both  by  multiple  regression 
and  logit  models  to  examine  the  impact  of  homeownership  determinants  on  these 
different  target  groups.  Their  results  show  that  the  logit  model  has  better  goodness-of- 
fit  than  the  regression  model.  Household  income,  deposit  capacity,  inflation  and 
search  strategies  show  important  influences  on  household  tenure  choice.  The  results 
also  show  a  significant  difference  between  entrants  (first  time  buyers)  and  searchers 
(temporary  rationed  tenants)  in  terms  of  the  coefficient  estimates  of  these 
determinants.  Cheaper  entrants  (lower  income  first  time  homeowners)  have  a  greater 
propensity  to  adjust  price,  location  and  source  of  finance  they  searched  than  other 
entrants  and  searchers. 
In  Maclennan  and  Wood's  study,  the  aggregate  estimation  results  of  tenure  choice 
model  are  insignificant.  As  they  suggest,  it  still  has  room  for  improving  model 
techniques.  Furthermore,  a  neglect  of  local  authority  tenants'  tenure  choice  would 
make  this  study  incomplete.  In  particular,  the  local  authority  housing  sector 
accounted  for  one  third  of  total  dwellings  in  the  British  housing  market  in  1981.  As  a 
result,  to  analyse  tenure  choice  in  the  British  housing  market,  the  local  authority 
rented  sector  should  be  included.  In  the  local  authority  rented  sector,  tenure  choice  is 
primarily  influenced  by  housing  policy,  such  as  the  Right  to  Buy  and  the  allocation 
system.  The  policy  context  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  Three. 
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Doling  (1973)  develops  a  two-stage  model  to  identify  the  determinants  of  tenure 
decision  in  the  local  authority  sector.  Doling  assumes  that  tenure  choice  is  a  two- 
stage  process.  Households  first  evaluate  their  best  attainable  combination  of  a 
physical  structure  and  of  non-housing  goods  in  each  tenure  market.  They  then  choose 
the  most  preferable  of  these  combinations.  The  two-stage  tenure  choice  model  was 
tested  in  the  local  authority  housing  market  by  using  data  from  Derby  on  sales  to 
sitting  tenants  of  council  houses  in  1971.  In  the  first  stage  of  the  model,  Doling 
rations  out  ineligible  sitting  tenants  by  income  and  by  non-purchasers.  If  monthly 
loan  repayments  exceed  gross  weekly  income  of  the  head  of  household,  the  household 
is  identified  as  not  being  able  to  purchase  its  house.  In  the  second  stage,  discriminant 
analysis  is  then  used  to  generate  a  model  producing  the  fewest  tenure 
misclassifications  of  households.  This  objective  is  met  in  a  model  having  five  attitude 
scores,  income,  the  cost  of  buying  and  renting  and  the  number  of  adults  in  the 
household.  In  Doling's  results,  the  signs  of  the  coefficients  in  most  cases  are  as 
expected  and  make  economic  sense.  But  some  cases  have  incorrect  signs  for  their 
coefficients.  This  is  probably  due  to  multi-collinearity  between  variables  and  cases. 
A  recent  study  by  McNabb  and  Wass  (1999)  also  examines  the  tenure  decision  of 
council  tenants  under  the  Right  to  Buy  regime.  The  main  issue  of  McNabb  and 
Wass's  study  is  to  analyse  council  tenants'  decision  about  whether  or  not  to  buy  the 
accommodation  they  currently  rent.  Based  on  Rosen's  (1979)  model,  the  authors 
employ  a  univariate  probit  model  to  examine  the  tenure  decisions  of  council  tenants 
by  using  data  selected  from  the  1986  General  Housing  Survey.  The  variables  in  their 
model  include  house  price  after  1980,  household  income,  life-cycle  effects  on 
preferences  for  both  types  of  housing  tenure,  the  characteristics  of  the  accommodation, 
and  the  quality  of  the  match  between  the  accommodation  and  the  household.  A 
particular  concern  in  McNabb  and  Wass's  study  is  the  price  variable,  which  is  the 
relative  cost  of  owning  measured  by  the  discount  value  of  the  property.  The  discount 
property  value  is  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  RTB  formula  under  the  1984  Housing 
Act.  Their  results  suggest  that  the  discount  price  of  housing  has  a  significant  effect  on 
the  household's decision  to  switch  from  renting  to  owning  under  the  RTB  policy. 
This  implies  that  tenure  transfers  under  the  RTB  are  efficient,  undertaken  by  council 
tenants  on  the  margin  of  owner-occupation.  In  addition,  household  income,  the  age  of 
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determinants  of  tenure  choice  in  the  public  sector.  Regional  effects  are  limited  to 
under-presentation  of  transfers  to  owner-occupation  in  Scotland  and  the  northern 
counties  of  England. 
McNabb  and  Wass'  study  provides  a  clear  analysis  of  council  tenants'  decisions  under 
the  RTB  scheme.  As  the  authors  suggested,  their  results  would  have  implications  to 
the  RTB  policy  as  well  as  the  social  housing  policy.  Both  Doling's  and  McNabb- 
Wass'  studies  focus  on  local  authority  tenants.  The  target  households  of  this  thesis  are 
households  in  all  three  main  tenures.  However,  some  determinants  of  tenure  choice  in 
their  studies  are  still  useful  for  this  thesis. 
2.3.1.2  Longitudinal  Analysis  of  Tenure  Choice 
In  addition  to  cross-sectional  analysis  of  tenure  choice,  researchers  have  emphasised 
longitudinal  analysis  of  tenure  choice  by  using  time  series  data  sets.  Many  studies  of 
longitudinal  analysis  of  tenure  choice  have  been  performed  by  American  researchers 
since  there  are  sufficient  time  series  data  sets  in  the  US.  For  example,  Kent  (1984) 
estimates  a  model  of  tenure  choice  using  the  US  federal  subsidy  program  annual  data 
from  1955  to  1976.  The  aim  of  Kent's  study  is  to  analyse  the  changes  in  owner- 
occupation  rate  and  the  changes  in  homeownership  determinants  during  the  estimation 
period.  Kent's  model  highlights  two  specific  points.  Firstly,  a  simple expression  for 
the  expected  rate  of  return  on  equity  for  a  homeowner  is  developed  and  thus  its 
importance  could  be  tested  in  the  tenure  choice  equation.  Secondly,  the  influence  of 
federal  subsidy  programs  is  also  included  in  the  model.  Other  determinants  of  owner- 
occupation  selected  in  Kent's  model  include  permanent  income,  the  relative  price  of 
owning  or  renting,  assets,  mortgage  loan  conditions  and  household  characteristics. 
Kent's  results  show  that  an  increase  in  expected  return  on  equity  has  the  largest 
quantitative  impact  on  owner-occupation.  In  fact,  an  increase  of  this  variable 
increased  the  demand  for  owner-occupation  by  about  4.5  per  cent  from  1955  to  1976. 
The  federal  housing  subsidy  programmes  have  substantial  effects  on  the  demand  for 
owner-occupation.  The  homeownership  subsidy  programme,  in  its  peak  effect  of 
1973,  increased  the  demand  for  owner-occupation  by  0.87  percentage  points.  In 
contrast,  the  rental  subsidy  programme  reduced  the  demand  for  owner-occupancy  by 
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housing  user  cost  have  important  impacts  on  owner-occupation.  Kent's  results  show 
that  an  increase  of  household  permanent  income  raised  the  demand  for  owner- 
occupation  by  3.5  percentage  points,  while  an  increase  of  the  user  cost  reduced  the 
demand  for  owner-occupancy  by  4  percentage  points  from  1955  to  1976.  Changes  in 
mortgage  payment  constraints  had  little  effect  on  the  demand  for  owner-occupation 
during  the  estimation  period.  This  is  partly  because  of  a  loose  policy  in  mortgage 
credit  rationing  and  a  stable  mortgage  interest  rate  during  this  period. 
Kent's  study  simply  concerns  the  influences  of  the  changes  in  determinants  on  owner- 
occupation  during  the  estimation  period.  However,  in  time  series  analysis  of  tenure 
choice,  another  important  issue  is  to  estimate  the  changes  in  tenure  status  over  years. 
Krumm  (1987)  analyses  tenure  status  change  by  using  data  from  the  Michigan  Panel 
Study  on  Income  Dynamics  for  the  period  1976-1979.  Taking  a  different  approach 
from  other  cross-sectional  studies  of  tenure  choice,  Krumm's  study  focuses  the 
determinants  of  tenure  status  duration  and  the  time  of  their  changes.  Krumm  indicates 
that  households'  differences  in  time-invariant  characteristics  are  systematically  related 
to  differences  in  the  propensities  to  change  tenure  status,  and  thus  estimated  effects  of 
these  variables  on  tenure  choice  at  a  specific  point  in  time  are  likely  to  be  misleading. 
As  a  result,  Krumm  extends  the  choice  pattern  over  a  4-year  period.  A  multinomial 
logit  model  is  employed  to  estimate  the  effect  of  determining  variables  on  tenure 
changes.  The  determinants  in  Krumm's  model  are  classified  into  non-varying 
demographic  variables  and  time-varying  variables.  Non-varying  variables  include  sex, 
race,  and  education  of  household  heads,  while  time-varying  variables  include  income, 
marital  status  of  household  heads,  household  size  and  spouse  employment  conditions. 
The  empirical  results  support  Krumm's  assumption  that  changes  in  time-varying 
variables  have  significant  impacts  on  tenure  status  changes.  The  results  also  suggest 
that  lead  and  lag  in  household  conditions  have  systematic  and  substantial  effects  on 
tenure  status  changes. 
The  determinants  of  tenure  status  changes  in  Krumm's  study  focuses  on  the  household 
demographic  and  socio-economic  characteristics.  In  fact,  other  factors  such  as 
expected  mobility  and  length  of  stay  would  be  important  determinants  in  time  series 
analysis  of  tenure  choice.  A  study  by  Henderson  and  Ioannides  (1989)  estimates  a 
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data  from  the  Panel  Study  of  Income  Dynamics  for  the  period  of  1971-1981.  In  their 
model,  Henderson  and  Ioannides  examine  a  household's  choices  of  owning  or  renting, 
and  consumption  levels  at  the  time  of  moving  into  a  dwelling  unit.  They  also  examine 
how  long  a  household  stays  in  the  dwelling  unit  before  moving  again.  The  vector  of 
dependent  variables  associated  with  a  time  of  moving  includes  tenure  choice,  planned 
length  of  residence  spell  and  housing  consumption.  The  dependent  variables  are 
influenced  by  the  expected  future  path  of  household  income,  the  relative  price  of 
owning  or  renting,  non-housing  consumption  bundles  and  a  number  of  household 
characteristics. 
Henderson  and  Ioannides'  results  suggest  that  in  the  estimation  of  length  of  stay, 
wealthier  and  more  well  educated  households  are  more  mobile,  while  the  age  of  the 
household  head  has  a  quadratic  effect  with  planned  lengths  of  stay  but  is  minimised  at 
about  age  55.  In  the  estimation  of  housing  consumption,  their  results  show  that 
increases  in  planned  length  of  stay  appear  to  reduce  housing  consumption  for  renters. 
After  accounting  for  tenure  choice  and  controlling  for  planned  length  of  stay,  renters 
and  owners  were  found  to  have  similar  demand  function  relationships.  This  implies 
that  renters  and  owners  are  not  particularly  differentiated  by  tastes  but  simply  in  life- 
cycle  circumstances  as  to  when  it  is  optimal  to  own  or  rent.  As  the  authors  state,  these 
findings  are  at  an  initial  stage  and  would  be  of  interest  to  researchers  devoting  further 
analysis  to  this  subject. 
In  Britain,  only  a  few  studies  have  emphasised  time  series  analysis  of  tenure  choice 
because  of  a  lack  of  sufficient  longitudinal  data  sets.  Recently,  a  series  of  studies  by 
Ermisch  and  Di  Salvo  (1996)  and  Di  Salvo  and  Ermisch  (1997)  analyse  the  dynamic 
aspect  of  tenure  choice  by  using  data  from  the  British  Household  Panel  Study  (1991- 
1994)  and  data  for  the  1958  birth  cohort  from  the  National  Child  Development  Study. 
Ermisch-Di  Salvo's  (1996)  model  estimates  the  determinants  of  tenure  transition 
between  three  main  tenures-owner-occupation,  social  renting  and  private  renting. 
The  authors  emphasise  that  surprises  like  partnership  breakup,  acquisition  of  a  partner 
and  spells  of  unemployment  tend  to  have  important  influences  on  tenure  changes  for 
younger  households  from  the  ages  of  16-33. 
37 Ermisch  and  Di  Salvo  employ  multinomial  logit  models  to  estimate  the  influences  of 
these  variables  on  tenure  changes  during  the  estimation  period.  Their  results  show 
that  a  partnership  breakup  reduces  the  probability  of  owners  remaining  in  their  current 
tenure  status.  For  social  tenants,  a  partnership  breakup  has  a  significant  effect  in 
forcing  them  to  return  to  their  parents'  homes.  Their  results  also  suggest  that 
acquisition  of  a  partner  increases  the  probability  of  moving  from  renting  into  owner- 
occupation.  In  contrast,  it  does  not  affect  tenure  transition  from  owner-occupation  to 
social  renting.  Unemployment  has  an  increasing  trigger  effect  on  tenure  transition 
from  both  owner-occupation  and  private  renting  to  social  renting.  In  addition,  the 
authors  indicate  that  the  tenure  transition  rate  is  significantly  influenced  by  household 
income.  Households  with  higher  income  favour  moving  to  owner-occupation  and 
discouraging  flows  to  social  housing.  Both  owners  and  social  tenants  are  more  likely 
to  remain  in  their  tenure  when  house  prices  are  higher. 
A  further  study  by  Di  Salvo  and  Ermisch  (1997)  analyses  the  dynamic  aspect  of  tenure 
choice  for  younger  households  by  using  data  from  the  1958  birth  cohort  collected  in 
the  British  National  Child  Development  Study  (BNCDS).  They  propose  a  risk  hazard 
model  to  estimate  the  younger  household's  first  entry  to  each  of  the  two  major  tenures: 
owner-occupation  and  social  renting.  Their  empirical  results  show  that  lifetime 
earnings,  family  background,  a  person's  spells  of  unemployment,  regional 
unemployment  rate  and  regional  relative  house  prices  were  found  to  have  significant 
impacts  on  entry  into  owner-occupation  or  social  housing.  Households  with  better 
lifetime  earnings  are  more  likely  to  become  owners  and  do  so  earlier  in  their  lives. 
With  respect  to  family  background,  people  with  fathers  in  non-manual  jobs  are  more 
likely  to  become  homeowners  eventually,  although  not  more  quickly,  than  those  with 
fathers  in  manual  jobs.  People  with  middle  class  parents  were  found  to  spend  more 
time  in  private  renting  before  entering  either  owner-occupation  or  social  renting. 
Becoming  a  parent  was  found  to  have  strong  effect  on  pushing  young  households 
toward  social  housing.  The  authors  also  suggest  that  a  person's  spells  of 
unemployment  forces  young  households  to  be  less  likely  to  become  owner-occupiers. 
A  higher  regional  unemployment  rate  and  higher  regional  relative  house  prices  were 
found  to  slow  down  the  speed  of  entry  into  either  owner-occupation  or  social  housing. 
38 Ermisch-Di  Salvo's  studies  show  interesting  findings  about  British  younger 
households'  tenure  decision  behaviour  and  their  studies  can  be  seen  as  a  comer  stone 
for  British  researchers  devoted  to  the  longitudinal  analysis  of  tenure  choice.  In  respect 
to  a  comparison  of  cross-sectional  analysis  and  time  series  analysis  of  tenure  choice, 
as  Ermisch  and  Di  Salvo's  indicated,  time  series  analysis  of  tenure  choice  would  be  a 
better  approach  to  `align'  the  tenure  choice  event,  especially  with  the  determinants, 
such  as  incomes,  prices,  demographic  characteristics,  which  vary  over  time.  Again,  a 
time  series  analysis  of  tenure  choice  needs  a  sufficient  longitudinal  data  set.  However, 
there  is  a  lack  of  sufficient  longitudinal  data  sets  in  Britain,  especially  in  Scotland, 
thus  making  this  kind  of  study  more  difficult. 
2.3.2  Tenure  Choice  and  Specific  Determinants 
In  addition  to  overall  estimation  of  the  determinants  of  tenure  choice  from  both  cross- 
sectional  and  longitudinal  aspects,  a  variety  of  studies  have  addressed  some  specific 
relationships  and  determinants  of  tenure  choice.  These  specific  relationship  and 
determinants  are  mainly  categorised  into  residential  mobility,  rationing,  and  subsidies. 
2.3.2.1  Residential  Mobility  and  Tenure  Choice 
In  a  study  of  expected  mobility  and  tenure  choice,  Boehm  (1981)  recognises  that  a 
household's  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice  is  seen  as  a  joint  choice.  In  this  sense, 
the  probability  that  a  household  makes  a  given  tenure  choice  and  expects  to  move 
should  be  estimated  as  a  simultaneous  system  of  equations.  A  multinomial  logit 
model  is  employed  to  estimate  four  alternative  choices:  own-expected  move,  own- 
expected  stay,  rent-expected  move  and  rent-expected  stay. 
The  data  in  Boehm's  study  is  selected  from  the  panel  data  gathered  by  the  University 
of  Michigan  from  1968  to  1976.  A  subsample  is  then  selected  for  households  who 
moved  and  made  a  tenure  choice  during  one  of  following  three  time  periods:  1969- 
1970,1970-1971,  and  1971-1972.  The  sample  targets  recent  movers  because  their 
relative  costs  of  owning  or  renting  have  significantly  been  adjusted.  Boehm  uses  a 
series  of  house  prices  and  lagged  house  price  variables  to  represent  the  differential 
market  conditions.  In  addition  to  household  demographic  variables,  permanent 
income  and  wealth  are  imputed  in  Boehm's  study  to  estimate  the  life-cycle  effect  on 
tenure  choice  and  expected  mobility.  His  results  show  that  permanent  income,  wealth 
39 and  the  house  price  variables  have  significant  impacts  on  tenure  choice  and  expected 
mobility.  The  age  of  the  household  head  is  statistically  significant  in  determining 
tenure  choice  but  it  becomes  insignificant  in  determining  joint  choice  of  tenure  and 
expected  mobility.  Therefore,  Boehm  questions  whether  the  household  head's  age, 
which  in  previous  studies  had  been  one  of  the  most  significant  variables  in  tenure 
choice  analysis,  is  acting  as  a  proxy.  for  the  expected  mobility  and  wealth  of  the 
household. 
However,  Boehm's  results  could  be  criticised  because  the  age  of  the  household  head 
could  be  correlated  to  household  permanent  income  and  wealth.  Another  argument  is 
the  sample  selection.  Since  Boehm's  sample  focuses  on  recent  movers,  these  sampled 
households  could  be  concentrated  in  certain  age  groups,  for  instance,  the  younger 
households.  Because  younger  households  have  higher  mobility,  the  age  effect  could 
be  insignificant  on  these  households. 
Another  study  by  Krumm  (1984)  also  estimates  the  joint  decision  of  migration  and 
tenure  choice.  In  contrast  to  Boehm's  study,  Krumm  emphasises  the  cost-benefit  of 
migration  decisions  and  tenure  status  choice.  He  indicates  that  the  structural 
dependence  of  the  migration  and  tenure  status  change  comes  from  the  dependence  of 
the  relative  cost  of  owning  or  renting  in  both  periods  and  expected  migration  benefits. 
The  relative  cost  of  owning  or  renting  in  his  definition  is  a  function  of  expected 
migration  benefits  and  all  other  factors  affecting  the  cost.  As  a  result,  the  joint 
decision  of  migration  and  tenure  choice  can  be  seen  as  a  function  of  a  series  of 
benefits  on  migration  and  tenure  status  changes  in  both  periods,  and  a  vector  of  all 
other  factors.  Krumm  employs  a  logistic  model  to  estimate  the  joint  choice  and  each 
of  the  marginal  tenure  status  and  migration  probabilities  by  using  the  data  from  the 
Panel  Study  of  Income  Dynamics  (PSID)  1977-78. 
However,  in  Krumm's  model,  the  net  benefit  does  not  show  expected  significant 
effects  on  migration  and  tenure  status  change.  This  is  the  weakness  in  his  study.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  household  head's  characteristics,  such  as  age,  race  and 
employment  are  found  to  have  most  important  influences.  Other  household 
characteristics,  such  as  household  income  and  spouse's  education,  also  have 
significant  effects.  In  addition,  Krumm  also  indicates  that  change  in  household  size  is 
40 the  main  driving  force  of  migration.  Location  also  has  a  significant  effect  on  the 
migration  decision  and  tenure  choice.  The  most  interesting  finding  in  Krumm's  study 
is  that  the  decision  to  change  tenure  has  substantial  influences  on  the  decision  to 
change  the  household  residence  location.  This  could  explain  the  relationship  between 
the  dwelling's  tenure  type  and  location. 
Similar  studies  performed  by  Ioannides  (1987)  and  loannides  and  Kan  (1996)  use  the 
same  data  as  Krumm  did  from  the  PSID  data  but  different  time  periods.  Ioannides 
(1987)  develops  a  semi-Markov  model  to  estimate  the  simultaneous  decision  of  tenure 
and  length  of  stay  by  using  the  PSID  data  for  1970-81.  The  basic  assumption  of 
Ioannides'  study  is  that  tenure  choice  and  length  of  stay  are  determined  by  the 
household's  socio-economic  characteristics  at  the  time  the  move  and  housing  tenure 
choice  is  made.  The  results  show  that  housing  price  and  household  wealth  play  a 
significant  role  in  determining  the  tenure  choice  and  residential  mobility.  The  author 
indicates  that  higher  wealth  implies  a  higher  likelihood  of  owning,  higher  mobility  for 
renters  and  lower  for  owners.  Housing  price  is  found  to  have  statistically  significant 
effects  but  not  always  as  anticipated.  Other  demographic  characteristics,  such  as  age, 
education,  race,  and  marital  status  of  household  head  and  family  size,  also  have 
important  influences  on  tenure  choice  and  length  of  stay. 
A  recent  study  by  Ioannides  and  Kan  (1996)  employs  a  dynamic  probit  model  to 
estimate  households'  decisions  to  move  and  whether  to  rent  or  own  after  moving  by 
using  the  PSID  data  for  1970-87.  Unlike  Ioannides'  previous  study,  Ioannides  and 
Kan  emphasise  the  impact  of  financial  aspect  of  housing  on  tenure  choice  and 
residential  mobility.  The  housing  financial  factors  involved  in  their  study  are  prices 
for  owning  or  renting,  house  value  and  interest  rate,  while  housing  asset  represents  the 
financial  aspect  of  the  household.  The  authors  also  use  a  series  of  dummy  variables  to 
estimate  the  effect  of  liquidity  constraints  on  tenure  choice  and  mobility.  Their 
results  suggest  that  the  financial  aspect  of  housing  plays  an  important  role  in 
determining  tenure  choice  and  residential  mobility.  Other  variables,  such  as  family 
size  and  liquidity  constraints,  and  changes  in  those  variables,  are  found  to  have 
significant  influences  on  tenure  choice  and  the  decision  to  move. 
41 The  above  studies  indicate  that  the  relationship  between  mobility  and  tenure  choice  is 
interrelated.  On  one  hand,  the  decision  to  move  and  tenure  choice  can  be  seen  as  a 
joint  choice.  On  the  other  hand,  expected  mobility  can  be  seen  as  a  determinant  of 
tenure  choice.  For  instance,  it  is  very  often  the  case  that  households  who  like  to  move 
within  a  short  term  are  more  likely  to  choose  lower  transaction  costs  of  renting 
(especially  private  renting)  rather  than  higher  transaction  costs  of  owning.  In  addition, 
wealth  (or  permanent  income),  housing  prices,  and  household  life-cycle  characteristics 
(for  instance,  age,  race,  education,  marital  and  employment  status)  have  significant 
influences  on  tenure  choice  and  residential  mobility.  Changes  in  these  variables  are 
the  main  forces  pushing  households  to  move. 
2.3.2.2  Rationing  and  Tenure  Choice 
As  discussed  in  the  last  section,  the  rationing  factor  has  been  discussed  in  some 
previous  tenure  choice  studies.  Some  studies  also  emphasise  the  rationing  effect  in 
terms  of  mortgage  rationing  to  homeownership  and  the  administrative  constraints  to 
enter  the  public  rented  sector.  Very  few  studies  discuss  rationing  in  the  private  rented 
sector  in  tenure  choice  analysis? 
(1) Mortgage  Rationing  in  Owner-Occupied  Housing 
Many  studies  regarding  mortgage  rationing  effect  on  tenure  choice  have  been 
produced  by  North  American  researchers.  Linneman  and  Wachter  (1989)  carried  out 
a  typical  study  of  mortgage  constraints  on  individual  homeownership  propensities. 
The  authors  address  the  income  and  wealth  requirements  for  mortgages,  and  develop 
measures  of  the  degree  to  which  a  family  is  constrained  by  mortgage  underwriting 
criteria.  In  their  study,  two  key  mortgage  criteria  are  developed  on  the  basis  of  criteria 
from  the  Federal  Home  Loan  Mortgage  Corporation.  The  first  criterion  is  that  the 
loan-to-value  ratio  should  be  less  than  or  equal  to  0.8;  the  second  criterion  is  that  the 
annual  mortgage  payment  should  be  less  than  or  equal  to  28%  of  the  borrower's 
annual  family  income.  Based  on  these  two  criteria,  a  family's  maximum  home 
purchase  price  can  be  derived. 
2  This  is  probably  because  most  studies  of  rationing  in  private  renting  have  to  focus  on  the  policy 
context,  such  as  rent  control  and  limited  housing  supply  in  this  sector,  or  focus  on  their  economic 
impacts  on  housing  markets.  In  tenure  choice  analysis,  many  researchers  assume  that  the  private  rented 
sector  is  relatively  free  of  rationing,  compared  to  the  other  two  main  tenures. 
42 In  order  to  determine  whether  a  family  is  constrained  by  either  the  income  or  wealth 
criteria,  Linneman  and  Wachter  also  estimate  the  capital  value  of  housing  as  the 
predicted  optimal  home  purchase  price.  They  indicate  that  because  a  family  facing  a 
mortgage  constraint  may  choose  to  purchase  a  home  at  a  price  that  is  less  than  the 
optimal  price,  the  observed  home  purchase  prices  cannot  be  used  in  their  study.  *  By 
comparing  predicted  optimal  purchase  price  with  maximum  purchase  price,  the 
authors  then  set  up  a  series  of  dummy  variables  to  proxy  the  degrees  of  mortgage 
constraints  (high  and  moderate  income  constraints,  and  wealth  constraint).  A  series  of 
mortgage  constraint  variables  along  with  household  income,  relative  cost  of 
ownership  and  a  vector  of  household  characteristics  are  included  in  the  explanatory 
variables  to  estimate  probability  of  homeownership.  Their  results  show  that  wealth 
and  income  constraints  both  reduce  homeownership  propensities.  Wealth  constraint 
shows  a  stronger  impact  when  a  family  applies  the  adjusted  interest  rate  mortgage. 
Linneman  and  Wachter  also  suggest  that  the  impact  of  mortgage  constraints  is  varied 
by  the  fmancial  innovations  and  housing  subsidy  policy,  for  example  the  subsidy  on 
interest  rate  or  downpayment  would  loosen  the  income  and  wealth  constraints  on 
homebuyers. 
A  further  study  by  Duca  and  Rosenthal  (1994)  evaluates  borrowing  constraints  on 
households'  access  to  owner-occupation  by  using  a  different  methodology  from 
Linneman  and  Wachter's  study.  Using  the  data  from  the  1983  Survey  of  Consumer 
Finances,  Duca  and  Rosenthal  divide  households  into  two  groups.  Group  One 
contains  households  whose  tenure  status  is  affected  by  mortgage  constraints,  while 
Group  Two  contains  those  whose  tenure  status  may  be  affected  by  mortgage 
constraints.  Duca  and  Rosenthal  employ  a  binary  probit  model  to  estimate  the 
probability  of  homeownership  using  only  group  one  households.  A  vector  of 
household  socio-economic  characteristics  is  included  in  the  model  to  estimate  the 
influence  of  households'  taste  and  preferences  on  homeownership.  To  consider  the 
age-related  differences  in  tenure  preference,  the  binary  probit  model  is  estimated 
separately  for  households  with  three  different  age  groups:  under  age  35  (Young),  age 
35  through  54  (Middle  age),  and  age  55  and  over  (Older). 
43 The  results  of  the  binary  choice  model  are  then  used  to  predict  the  probability  of 
homeownership  for  all  households,  without  controlling  borrowing  constraints.  '  Thus 
Duca  and  Rosenthal  estimate  the  effect  of  borrowing  constraints  by  comparing  these 
two  model  results.  Their  results  show  that  borrowing  constraints  have  a  significant 
negative  effect  on  the  homeownership  rate.  The  negative  effect  is  shown  to  be  more 
significant  on  young  households  aged  under  35.  They  find  that  homeownership  in 
young  households  tends  to  be  quite  sensitive  to  potential  earnings,  the  costs  of  owning 
or  renting,  and  borrowing  constraints,  especially  the  downpayment  constraint.  Some 
studies  like  Brueckner  (1986)  and  Haurin  et  al.  (1997)  also  emphasise  the  important 
effect  of  downpayment  constraints  on  young  households'  access  to  owner-occupied 
housing. 
In  Britain,  a  number  of  studies  have  discussed  mortgage  credit  rationing.  However, 
many  of  them  analyse  the  impact  of  mortgage  rationing  removal  on  housing  prices 
and  on  the  housing  market.  For  example,  Meen  (1990)  estimates  the  effect  of  the 
ending  of  mortgage  rationing  on  housing  price.  His  results  suggest  that  mortgage 
rationing  in  the  past  had  statistically  significant  effects  on  house  prices  and  that  under 
rationing,  inflation  had  quantitatively  the  largest  impact  on  the  length  of  mortgage 
queues,  rather  than  on  real  house  prices.  A  recent  study  by  Lee  (1995)  examines  the 
impact  of  mortgage  rationing  and  the  removal  of  rationing  on  the  demand  for 
mortgages.  The  results  of  Lee's  study  confirm  Meen's  findings  that  the  removal  of 
mortgage  rationing  is  one  of  the  driving  forces  for  the  house  price  boom  and  an 
increase  in  the  homeownership  rate  during  the  middle  to  late  1980s. 
With  respect  to  tenure  choice  analysis,  only  a  few  studies  in  Britain,  such  as  King 
(1980)  and  Maclennan  and  Wood  (1981),  have  discussed  mortgage  rationing  on 
homeownership.  However,  these  studies  did  not  examine  the  mortgage  rationing 
effect  on  tenure  choice  model  as  American  researchers  did.  Although  there  are 
different  housing  market  and  fmance  market  conditions  between  the  US  and  the  UK, 
the  important  role  of  mortgage  constraints  in  the  access  to  owner-occupied  housing 
should  not  be  ignored  in  tenure  choice  study  in  the  UK.  It  also  indicates  a  need  for 
It  is  a  simulation  of  the  probability  of  homeownership.  In  the  simulation,  the  probability  of 
households  who  want  to  reside  in  owner-occupied  housing  is  calculated  by  using  the  coefficients  from 
the  bivariate  probit  model. 
44 further  research  to  address  this  issue  in  the  UK.  The  American  literature  may  provide 
useful  techniques  in  the  analysis  of  the  mortgage  rationing  effect  on  tenure  choice. 
(2)  Rationing  in  the  Public  Rented  Sector 
Rationing  in  the  public  rented  sector  is  usually  associated  with  housing  policy  and  the 
allocation  system.  The  policy  context  of  rationing  in  the  public  rented  sector  will  be 
discussed  in  the  next  chapter.  In  this  part,  the  academic  research  regarding  the 
rationing  effect  on  the  access  to  the  public  rented  sector  is  addressed.  A  series  of 
studies  by  Clapham  and  Kintrea  discusses  rationing  and  housing  choice  in  the  social 
rented  sector  in  Britain.  Clapham  and  Kintrea  (1984)  state  that,  unlike  the  private 
housing  market,  the  price  mechanism  does  not  work  out  in  the  public  rented  sector, 
and  there  is  no  consistent  relationship  between  rent  levels  and  property  value  and 
location.  Thus  households  who  want  to  enter  council  housing  are  primarily  dependent 
upon  the  allocation  system  rather  than  their  budget  constraints.  The  allocation  system, 
according  to  Clapham  and  Kintrea  (1984),  is  a  kind  of  `bureaucratic  rationing'. 
Because  the  allocation  process  is  rarely  instantaneous  but  relies  on  queuing,  the  ability 
to  wait  has  been  the  main  factor  in  getting  access  to  good  quality  council  houses 
(ibid.  ).  The  authors  also  indicate  that,  in  the  waiting  list,  most  applicants  have  little 
power  to  express  their  preferences  and  make  the  choice  of  housing  and  location. 
"This  lack  of  power,  however,  does  not  mean  that  the  household  is  a  passive  agent,  it 
does  not  bargain  with  the  local  authority  but  interacts  with  it"  (ibid.,  p.  266). 
Therefore,  the  household  should  have  the  right  to  respond  to  the  actions  of  the 
authority  and  make  choices  in  order  to  achieve  its  preferences. 
As  a  result,  Clapham  and  Kintrea  (1984)  develop  a  housing  choice  model  for  the  local 
authority  rented  sector.  The  model  in  fact  has  been  used  in  previous  studies  to  clarify 
the  choice  process  in  the  private  sector.  The  reason  for  Clapham  and  Kintrea  adopting 
this  model  is  that  `it  frees  the  analysis  from  the  mechanistic  confines  of  the 
institutional  approach  (rationing)  and  enables  the  interaction  between  the  bureaucracy 
and  the  individual  household  to  be  examined'  (ibid.,  p.  266).  Therefore,  Clapham  and 
Kintrea's  housing  choice  model  in  the  local  authority  rented  sector  concerns  the 
applicants'  choices  and  preferences.  They  suggest  that  the  applicants  should  express 
their  preferences  on  the  local  authority  housing  application  form,  and  that  the  housing 
allocator  should  evaluate  their  applications  on  the  basis  of  the  applicants'  resources 
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Kintrea  also  suggest  that  the  likelihood  of  the  applicant  entering  the  local  authority 
rented  sector  is  determined  by  income,  wealth,  socio-economic  group,  present  housing 
circumstances,  parental  tenure  and  the  applicant's  life  cycle  stage.  Among  these 
factors,  the  lower  the  income,  wealth  and  socio-economic  groups,  the  higher 
likelihood  of  entering  the  local  authority  housing  sector.  Similarly,  the  poorer  the 
housing  circumstances,  the  higher  likelihood  to  enter  this  sector.  The  authors  also 
suggest  that  parental  tenure  in  any  tenure  is  likely  to  have  a  positive  influence  on 
children's  tenure. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  these  determinants  are  useful  in  constructing  the  rationing 
variable  of  entry  into  the  local  authority  rented  sector.  A  further  study  by  Clapham 
and  Kintrea  (1986)  examines  some  of  these  factors  in  the  allocation  process.  In  an 
analysis  of  per  capita  income,  socio-economic  group,  and  the  degree  of  social 
segregation  in  the  public  housing  allocation  process  in  the  city  of  Glasgow,  Clapham 
and  Kintrea  find  that  income  has  a  direct  and  significant  impact  on  the  allocation  of 
housing  area  popularity.  They  indicate  that  the  likelihood  of  accepting  the  first  offer 
is  related  to  income.  Lower  income  households  were  found  to  have  less  ability  to  wait, 
thus  they  are  more  likely  to  accept  the  first  offer  or  accept  the  dwelling  located  in  less 
popular  areas.  On  the  other  hand,  higher  income  households  have  more  ability  to  wait 
until  they  receive  an  offer  of  higher  quality  and  better  location  of  dwelling.  However, 
Clapham  and  Kintrea  state: 
Although  income  is  related  to  ability  to  wait,  it  is  clearly  not  income 
per  se  which  determines  the  propensity  to  reject  houses  and  wait  for  a 
better  offer.  Instead,  income  may  determine  the  ability  to  afford 
suitable  property  while  waiting  or  enjoying  an  adequate  life-style 
outside  the  home  (1986,  p.  64). 
In  fact,  the  measure  of  per  capita  income  in  Clapham  and  Kintrea's  study  barely 
reflects  the  distribution  of  household  sizes.  A  weakness  is  that  it  does  not  take  into 
account  the  varying  needs  of  households  at  different  life-cycle  stages.  In  addition  to 
income,  other  factors  such  as  homelessness,  unemployment,  long-term  sickness,  and 
lone  parenthood  may  have  important  influences  on  the  allocation  process,  even  though 
these  factors  are  still  related  to  income.  To  model  the  household's  tenure  choice 
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for  the  social  rented  sector. 
2.3.2.3  Subsidy  Effects  on  Tenure  Choice 
Housing  subsidy  has  been  discussed  by  many  studies  as  an  important  determinant  of 
tenure  choice  (see  for  example  Struyk  1976,  King  1980,  Henderson  and  Ioannides 
1983,  and  Rothenberg  et  al.  1991).  There  are  also  quite  a  few  studies  emphasising  the 
tax  subsidy  effect  on  owner-occupiers.  However,  previous  research  paid  little 
attention  to  the  rental  subsidy  effect  on  tenants'  tenure  decisions.  In  a  discussion  of 
tax  subsidies  to  homeowners,  Rosen  (1979)  provides  a  clear  analysis  of  the  federal 
income  tax  effect  on  homeownership  decisions  in  the  US.  Based  on  Laidler  (1969) 
and  Aaron's  (1972)  framework,  Rosen  assumes  that  changes  in  income  tax  subsidy 
would  alter  the  relative  price  of  housing  services  and  household  income,  so  as  to 
influence  the  propensity  of  homeownership.  As  a  result,  Rosen  estimates  housing 
demand  and  tenure  choice  equations,  taking  care  to  adjust  price  and  income  terms  for 
the  federal  income  tax.  His  results  suggest  that  changes  in  relative  price  and  income 
have  significant  effects  on  households'  demand  for  housing  services  and  tenure  choice. 
In  addition,  Rosen  also  simulates  the  efficiency  and  distributional  effects  of  the 
implicit  income  tax  subsidy  for  owner-occupiers  under  four  alternative  tax  regimes. 
His  results  suggest  that  both  removing  the  federal  tax  benefits  for  owner-occupiers 
and  replacing  the  current  system  with  a  25%  tax  credit  would  have  significant  impacts 
on  higher  income  groups  in  terms  of  changes  in  their  housing  consumption. 
Rosen's  study  shows  an  interesting  finding  in  the  effect  of  the  marginal  tax  bracket  on 
homeownership  decisions.  However,  some  studies,  such  as  Rosen  and  Rosen  (1980) 
and  Linneman  (1985),  have  argued  that  the  marginal  tax  bracket  is  not  a  sufficient 
statistic  for  homeownership.  Lineman  develops  a  net  full  cost  model  to  examine  the 
marginal  tax  bracket  effect  on  homeownership  decisions.  Two  special  cases  are 
specified  in  Linneman's  homeownership  model.  The  municipal  band  analogy  case 
assumes  that  consumers  do  not  sort  into  homogeneous  housing  markets  and  only  a 
small  number  of  consumers  will  be  indifferent  in  terms  of  owning  or  renting.  In 
contrast,  the  efficient  market  proposition  case  assumes  that  the  heterogeneous 
consumers  are  sorted  into  a  series  of  internally  homogeneous  housing  quality  markets. 
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insignificant  impacts  on  homeownership  decisions  in  both  cases. 
Linneman's  study  has,  however,  been  criticised  because  he  ignores  capital  gains  tax  in 
his  model  and  his  estimation  for  a  landlord's  self  production  costs  could  have  some 
bias  (Capone  1995).  Instead,  Capone  develops  a  net-present-value  model  to  estimate 
the  homeownership  decision  for  low-  and  moderate-income  households  by  using 
different  tax  brackets.  Capone's  results  concur  with  Linneman's  study  suggesting  that 
tax  benefits  have  important  impacts  on  households  who  want  to  own  a  moderate 
priced  home,  except  for  single  individuals,  whereas  families  with  children  have  a 
higher  probability  to  change  tenure  from  renting  to  owning. 
Whether  or  not  a  significant  statistic,  tax  subsidy  to  owner-occupiers  should  be 
included  in  the  determinants  of  tenure  choice,  especially  in  the  UK.  A  large  number 
of  studies  on  housing  subsidy  between  tenures  in  Britain  has  been  carried  out  over  the 
past  two  decades  in  Britain  (for  example,  see  Rosenthal  1977,  Robinson  1981, 
Ermisch  1984,  Hills,  1991,  Hancock  and  Munro  1992,  and  Walker  and  Marsh  1993). 
Whilst  most  of  these  studies  address  both  the  comparisons  and  the  distributional  effect 
of  housing  subsidies  between  tenures,  only  a  few  of  them  estimate  the  subsidy  effect 
on  tenure  choice.  Thus,  we  have  seen  a  need  for  this  kind  of  research.  Moreover,  in 
tenure  choice  analysis,  housing  subsidies  should  not  only  include  the  tax  benefits  to 
owner-occupiers  but  also  account  for  rental  subsidies  to  social  tenants  in  tenure  choice, 
and  they  are  addressed  in  this  thesis.  The  comparison  and  distributional  effect  of 
housing  subsidy  between  tenures  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  later  chapters. 
In  summary,  this  section  has  reviewed  the  tenure  choice  studies  and  the  determinants 
of  tenure  choice.  Tenure  choice  analysis  can  be  classified  into  two  categories:  cross- 
sectional  analysis;  and  longitudinal  analysis  of  tenure  choice,  based  on  the  nature  of 
the  data  and  the  purpose  of  the  study.  The  cross-sectional  analysis  of  tenure  choice 
estimates  the  household's  tenure  decision,  based  on  their  contemporary  tastes  and 
preferences,  while  the  longitudinal  analysis  of  tenure  choice  addresses  the  changes  in 
tenure  choice  behaviour  over  multiple  periods.  The  above  studies  of  the  tenure  choice 
model  have  indicated  basic  determinants  of  tenure  choice.  These  basic  determinants 
can  generally  be  categorised  into  three  groups:  household  demographic  characteristics, 
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Household  characteristics  include  the  age,  sex,  race,  and  marital  status  of  the 
household  head,  and  the  household  size  (or  number  of  dependent  children  in  a 
household).  The  household  socio-economic  characteristics  basically  consist  of 
household  income,  wealth  and  employment  status.  The  relative  cost  of  housing  is  the 
user  cost  of  owning  or  renting. 
In  addition  to  these  basic  determinants,  studies  have  indicated  that  some  specific 
relations  and  determinants  have  significant  influences  on  tenure  choice.  Decisions  to 
move  and  tenure  choice  are  interdependent,  thus  they  can  be  seen  as  a  joint  choice. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  expected  mobility  can  also  be  seen  as  a  determinant  of  tenure 
choice.  The  rationing  factors,  such  as  mortgage  rationing  in  the  owner-occupied 
sector  and  the  administrative  rationing  in  the  public  housing  sector,  have  significant 
effects  on  households'  access  to  these  two  sectors.  Housing  subsidies,  such  as  tax 
subsidies  to  owner-occupiers  and  rental  subsidies  to  social  tenants,  play  an  important 
role  in  altering  (reducing)  the  user  cost  of  housing,  thus  it  affects  households'  tenure 
decisions.  However,  in  Britain  there  appears  to  be  a  lack  of  study  in  estimating  the 
impacts  of  these  determinants  on  tenure  choice  and  this  is  what  this  thesis  seeks  to 
address. 
2.4  Summary 
In  this  chapter,  the  theoretical  analysis  of  housing  tenure  choice  begins  with  an 
interpretation  of  the  definition  of  housing  tenure.  From  a  broader  view,  housing 
tenure  can  be  seen  as  a  whole  range  of  financial,  social,  political  and  economic 
relations  surrounding  housing.  As  a  result,  the  choice  of  housing  tenure  is  a 
complicated  decision.  The  definition  of  tenure  choice  in  this  chapter  focuses  on  the 
economic  interpretation.  From  an  economic  viewpoint,  housing  tenure  choice 
represents  a  consumer's  ability  (budget  constraints)  matching  his/her  preferences  for 
different  tenures. 
The  economic  theory  of  tenure  choice  is  based  on  the  consumer  choice  theory  and 
housing  demand  theory.  The  standard  model  of  consumer  choice  applying  to  housing 
has  to  be  modified  in  order  to  fit  the  specific  characteristics  of  housing  commodity 
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a  bundle  of  choices  which,  for  example,  include  the  decisions  of  tenure,  dwelling  type, 
neighbourhood  and  location.  Previous  studies  have  indicated  that  these  choices  are 
interrelated  and  that  hierarchy  is  a  way  to  organise  these  choices.  Among  housing 
choice  studies,  Quigley  (1985)  develops  a  well-established  hierarchical  housing 
choice  model,  which  has  three  stage  choices.  The  first  stage  is  to  choose  dwelling  unit, 
then  to  choose  neighbourhood  and  public  services.  Börsch-Supan  and  Pitkin's  (1988) 
study  suggests  that  the  hierarchical  structure  of  the  nested  logit  model  provides  better 
estimation  results  of  housing  choice  than  the  multinomial  logit  model  does. 
Furthermore,  it  is  noted  that  the  hierarchical  housing  choice  model  involves  a  strong 
assumption  of  the  tree  structure,  which  reflects  the  relative  degree  of  similarity  among 
these  choice  alternatives. 
The  housing  market  in  Britain  and  in  most  Western  European  countries  is 
characterised  as  comprising  a  relatively  competitive  part  of  the  market  and  a  part  of 
the  market  subject  to  non-priced,  administrative  constraints.  There  are  constraints  on 
households  entering  certain  types  of  housing  segments.  Clark  and  Onaka  (1985)  and 
Fischer  and  Aufhauser  (1988)  have  provided  well-established  results  of  housing 
choice  in  the  regulated  housing  market.  These  studies  also  indicate  the  importance  of 
non-price  rationing  factors  in  housing  choice  analysis.  Moreover,  studies  like 
Maclennan  et  al.  (1987)  and  Tu  (1996)  suggest  that  the  housing  market  can  also  be 
separated  into  several  submarkets  because  of  the  imperfection  of  market  information 
and  the  demand  or  supply  constraints  in  the  market.  As  a  result,  the  household's 
housing  decision  can  be  estimated  in  different  submarkets,  based  on  tenure,  dwelling, 
and  neighbourhood  components. 
In  the  housing  demand  analysis,  previous  studies  (see  for  example  King  1980, 
Henderson  and  Ioannides  1983)  have  indicated  that  the  household's  tenure  choice  and 
housing  consumption  decisions  are  interdependent.  In  other  words,  the  discrete  nature 
of  tenure  choice  and  the  continuous  housing  consumption  decision  can  be  seen  as  a 
joint  decision.  King  (1980)  provides  an  important  empirical  analysis  of  tenure  choice 
and  housing  demand  in  Britain.  However,  King's  study  should  be  treated  with  caution 
because  current  housing  market  characteristics  and  tenure  categories  are  dramatically 
different  from  King's  study  two  decades  ago.  Moreover,  in  a  series  of  housing 
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between  public  and  private  housing;  in  the  public  housing  sector,  particularly  the 
tenure  is  usually  attached  to  certain  dwelling  types,  neighbourhood  and  location  (see 
Clapham  and  Kintrea  1984,1986). 
Tenure  choice  analysis  can  generally  be  categorised  into  the  cross-sectional  analysis 
and  the  longitudinal  analysis  of  tenure  choice,  depending  upon  the  nature  of  data  and 
the  purpose  of  study.  Studies  such  as  Kent  (1984),  Di  Salvo  and  Ermisch  (1997)  have 
emphasised  that  the  longitudinal  analysis  of  tenure  choice  is  a  better  approach  to 
estimate  the  effect  of  changes  in  the  determinants  over  time  on  the  household's  tenure 
choice  behaviour.  It  is  unquestionable  that  the  cross-sectional  analysis  of  tenure 
choice  provides  a  simple  way  to  estimate  the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour  in  a 
given  time  period  which  avoids  complicated  data  matching  and  the  problem  of 
autocorrelation  happening  in  time  series  data  (Koop  2000).  In  particular,  while  some 
areas  like  Scotland  do  not  have  sufficient  longitudinal  data,  the  cross  sectional 
analysis  of  tenure  choice,  as  this  thesis  intends  to  do,  is  currently  the  best  alternative 
approach. 
It  has  been  seen  that  many  studies  have  employed  hierarchical  choice  models  to 
estimate  tenure  choice  and  other  decisions  such  as  residential  mobility,  dwelling  type 
and  location.  There  is  also  a  debate  about  whether  the  hierarchical  choice  model,  such 
as  the  nested  multinomial  logit  model,  or  the  multinomial  logit  model  provides  a 
better  estimation  result  of  the  household's  housing  decision  behaviour  (see  for 
example,  Börsch-Supan  and  Pitkin  1988  and  Tu  1994).  Since  the  multinomial  logit 
model  has  a  weakness  of  violating  the  IIA  assumption,  more  recent  studies  have 
adopted  the  nested  logit  model  to  estimate  the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour. 
However,  there  is  an  opportunity  to  employ  these  two  types  of  model  in  this  thesis  in 
order  to  compare  the  robustness  of  these  two  models  in  estimating  the  household's 
tenure  choice  behaviour  in  Scotland. 
With  respect  to  tenure  choice  determinants,  studies  like  Struyk  and  Marshall  (1976), 
Maclennan  and  Wood  (1981)  have  delineated  some  important  determinants  of  tenure 
choice,  which  can  be  classified  into  three  basic  groups:  household  demographic 
characteristics,  such  as  household  age,  size,  gender  and  marital  status;  household 
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and  the  user  cost  of  housing.  In  addition  to  these  basic  determinants,  several  specific 
determinants,  such  as  expected  mobility,  mortgage  rationing  and  housing  subsidies, 
have  significant  influences  on  tenure  choice.  These  determinants  are  also  included  in 
the  tenure  choice  models  of  this  thesis.  It  is  noted  that  mobility  decision  and  tenure 
choice  is  interrelated  and  they  can  be  seen  as  a  joint  choice,  particularly  in  the 
longitudinal  analysis  of  tenure  choice  and  residential  mobility  (for  example  see 
Boehm  1981,  Ioannides  1987,  and  Ioannides  and  Ken  1996).  Although  this  thesis 
adopts  a  cross  sectional  analysis  of  tenure  choice,  the  interdependent  relationship 
between  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice  will  be  examined  in  the  thesis. 
In  a  review  of  tenure  choice  literature,  a  gap  has  been  seen  in  estimating  the  rationing 
effect  and  the  housing  subsidy  effect  on  tenure  choice.  Mortgage  rationing,  as  stated 
before,  is  an  important  determinant  of  homeownership.  Equally  important,  the  non- 
price,  administrative  rationing,  such  as  the  allocation  system,  plays  an  important  role 
in  the  admission  to  enter  the  social  rented  sector.  There  is  a  lack  of  research  in 
estimating  the  effect  of  social  housing  rationing  on  the  household's  tenure  decision 
behaviour.  Regarding  the  housing  subsidy  effect,  the  majority  of  studies  has 
emphasised  the  effect  of  tax  advantages  on  homeownership.  There  obviously  is  a  lack 
of  an  analysis  in  estimating  the  effect  of  below  market  rent  subsidies  and  the  effect  of 
fair  rent  subsidies  on  the  household's  tenure  decision.  These  gaps  will  be  filled  in  this 
thesis. 
Finally,  the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour  and  the  determinants  of  tenure 
choice  are  shaped  by  the  housing  market  conditions.  The  next  chapter  will  discuss  the 
housing  tenure  pattern  and  the  housing  market  conditions  in  Scotland. 
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MARKFT  STRUCTURE  IN  SCOTLAND 
The  last  chapter  provides  us  with  a  review  of  the  tenure  choice  theory  and  empirical 
studies  of  tenure  choice.  The  determinants  of  tenure  choice  are  also  identified  from 
the  literature  review.  The  characteristics  of  tenure  choice  determinants  are  shaped  by 
the  housing  market  conditions  as  well  as  the  household's  tenure  and  socio-economic 
structure.  To  clarify  the  characteristics  of  tenure  choice  determinants  in  Scotland  as  a 
preparation  work  of  modelling  Scottish  households'  tenure  choice  behaviour,  there  is 
a  need  to  analyse  Scotland's  housing  development.  In  particular,  housing  in  Scotland 
has  developed  a  different  pattern  from  the  rest  of  Great  Britain  over  the  last  several 
decades.  This  chapter  discusses  Scotland's  housing  development,  with  an  emphasis 
on  housing  tenure  and  housing  market  structure,  rationing  and  housing  subsidy.  This 
chapter  is  organised  into  five  sections.  The  first  section  reviews  the  housing  tenure 
structure.  The  second  section  analyses  housing  market  conditions.  The  third  section 
discusses  rationing  in  the  housing  market.  The  fourth  section  discusses  housing 
subsidies  to  help  with  housing  costs  and  the  last  section  is  a  brief  summary. 
3.1.  Housing  Tenure  Structure 
Different  local  economic  activities  and  demographic  developments  have  left  different 
patterns  in  terms  of  the  age  and  types  of  dwellings  in  the  housing  stock.  State 
intervention  in  the  housing  sector  and  the  exercise  of  local  political  power  have  also 
profoundly  affected  the  patterns  of  housing  development  (Murie  1996a).  These 
differences  are  reflected  in  tenure  structure.  In  other  words,  tenure  can  be  seen  not 
only  as  an  outcome  but  also  a  parameter  of  policy  development.  This  section  analyses 
the  long-term  tenure  patterns  in  Scotland  when  compared  with  the  rest  of  Great 
Britain.  Since  housing  tenure  in  Britain  is  measured  on  the  basis  of  dwelling  stock, 
the  Scottish  dwelling  characteristics  between  tenures  are  also  discussed  in  this  section. 
3.1.1  Long  Term  Housing  Tenure  Patterns 
Over  several  decades,  Scottish  housing  has  developed  in  a  different  way  from  housing 
in  the  rest  of  Great  Britain  and  this  has  been  most  apparent  in  the  different  tenure 
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between  Scotland  and  England/Wales.  Historically,  Scotland  has  a  lower  rate  of 
owner-occupied  dwellings  compared  with  England  and  Wales.  In  1971,  Scotland's 
owner-occupied  dwellings  only  accounted  for  31%  of  the  total  housing  stock,  while 
England  and  Wales  both  had  more  than  half  of  the  housing  stock  for  owner- 
occupation.  The  most  dramatic  changes  in  tenure  mix  in  Britain  have  taken  place  in 
the  1980s.  There  was  a  rapid  increase  in  owner-occupied  housing  during  this  period. 
Between  1981  and  1989,  the  homeownership  rate  in  both  England  and  Wales 
increased  about  eight  percentage  points,  while  Scotland  experienced  a  more  dramatic 
increase  in  the  homeownership  rate  up  to  13  percentage  points.  The  higher  percentage 
growth  in  Scotland's  owner-occupied  housing  is  partly  because  of  the  lower  starting 
point  for  homeownership,  and  is  partly  influenced  by  a  relatively  stable  economic  and 
housing  market  growth  and  the  national  housing  policy  (Wilcox  et  al.  1998). 
In  Britain,  the  growth  of  homeownership  in  the  1980s  was  mainly  affected  by  a  series 
of  government  policies.  For  example,  fmancial  markets  were  deregulated  in  the  mid- 
1980s.  The  release  of  mortgage  rationing  along  with  income  growth  have  encouraged 
the  demand  for  owner-occupation  and  thus  promoted  a  market  boom  in  the  late  1980s 
(Meen  1989).  The  mortgage  interest  tax  relief  provided  substantial  tax  advantages  to 
homeowners.  The  Right  to  Buy  scheme  offered  a  big  discount  price  for  sitting  council 
tenants  to  buy  their  homes.  These  are  the  important  driving  forces  to  increase  the 
homeownership  rate  over  the  last  two  decades.  The  growth  of  Scotland's  owner- 
occupied  housing  in  the  1980s  was  the  result  of  the  Right  to  Buy  and  related  policies 
and  new  house  building,  which  were  contributory  factors  to  almost  equal  extents 
(Murie  1996a). 
In  the  1990s,  RTB  policy  and  new  house  building  continued  to  contribute  to  a  rapid 
increase  in  Scotland's  homeownership.  Between  1990  and  1998,  Scotland's 
homeownership  rate  increased  by  10  percentage  points,  while  the  homeownership  rate 
in  both  England  and  Wales  increased  by  less  than  one  percentage  point.  In  fact  a 
relatively  stable  economy  in  the  1990s  has  been  one  of  major  factors  for  the  growth  of 
new  built  owner-occupied  dwellings  in  the  Scottish  housing  market  (Wilcox  et  al. 
1998).  The  continuous  market  boom  in  the  Scottish  housing  market  also  reveals 
different  market  conditions  in  terms  of  house  prices,  housing  starts  and  housing 
54 transactions  from  the  rest  of  Britain.  They  are  discussed  in  the  later  section. 
Although  Scotland  experienced  a  rapid  growth  in  owner-occupied  housing  in  the  past 
two  decades,  its  homeownership  rate  is  still  the  lowest  among  the  three  countries.  By 
1998,  the  homeownership  rate  in  Scotland  accounted  for  61.3%,  while  it  was  68%  and 
71.5%  in  England  and  Wales  respectively.  Since  the  national  housing  policy  has 
aimed  to  continue  to  promote  owner-occupied  housing,  there  may  be  room  for 
increasing  Scotland's  homeownership  rate  in  the  future  but  the  growth  rate  will  not  be 
as  fast  as  in  the  last  two  decades. 
The  historical  importance  of  the  public  housing  sector  is  greater  in  Scotland  than  in 
England  and  Wales.  '  In  the  1970s,  Scotland's  public  dwellings  accounted  for  half  of 
the  total  housing  stock,  while  in  both  England  and  Wales  public  dwellings  accounted 
for  less  than  30%  of  their  housing  stock.  Since  the  1980s,  council  housing  stock  in 
Britain  has  rapidly  reduced  primarily  due  to  the  Right  to  Buy  scheme.  The  decrease  in 
council  dwellings  in  Scotland  is  more  significant  than  that  in  England  and  Wales. 
This  implies  a  successful  Right  to  Buy  scheme  in  Scotland.  Between  1980  and  1998, 
more  than  300,000  public  dwellings  were  sold  to  sitting  tenants  under  the  RTB 
scheme  in  Scotland,  which  accounted  for  17%  of  the  total  RTB  sales  in  Britain 
(Wilcox  2000). 
Accompanying  the  Right  to  Buy  scheme,  a  large  number  of  council  dwellings  were 
sold  to  housing  associations  under  the  Large  Scale  Voluntary  Transfer  scheme  after 
1989  and  this  accelerated  the  reduction  in  council  dwellings.  In  Scotland,  between 
1989  and  1998,  there  were  more  than  88,000  public  dwellings  transferred  from  local 
authorities,  Scottish  Homes  and  New  Town  Development  Corporations  to  local 
housing  associations  (Taylor  1998).  Because  of  the  successful  exercise  of  RTB  and 
LSVT  schemes  with  a  very  low  level  of  new  building  and  acquisition,  Scotland's 
public  housing  stock  reduced  significantly  over  the  past  two  decades  (Murie  1996a). 
By  1998,  Scotland's  public  housing  stock  only  accounted  for  26.6%  of  the  total 
dwellings.  Nevertheless,  the  share  of  public  housing  stock  in  Scotland  still  remained 
the  highest  among  three  countries  and  was  about  10  percentage  points  higher  than  that 
in  England  and  Wales  by  1998. 
The  public  housing  sector  in  Scotland  includes  local  authorities,  new  towns  and  Scottish  Homes  (now 
Communities  Scotland). 
55 The  sale  of  council  dwellings  and  stock  transfers  may  have  speeded  the  residualisation 
process  in  the  public  rented  sector  (Murie  1996a).  Many  affluent  council  tenants  have 
become  owner-occupiers  under  the  RTB  scheme.  Moreover,  the  stock  transfer 
scheme  has  transferred  many  better  quality  council  dwellings  to  local  housing 
associations.  In  this  environment,  council  housing  has  been  dominated  by  lower 
income  groups  who,  in  many  cases,  are  living  in  lower  quality  dwellings.  The  rise  of 
income  inequality  in  the  public  rented  sector  has  become  a  critical  issue  in  Britain.  In 
Scotland,  the  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  provides  rich  data  which  can  be  used 
to  examine  the  income  inequality  between  tenures.  This  issue  will  be  analysed  in 
Chapter  Seven. 
The  one  part  of  the  rented  sector  which  has  expanded,  with  government  sponsorship 
since  1979,  is  the  housing  association  sector.  The  expansion  has  taken  place  both 
though  new  building  and  stock  transfers,  and  has  only  been  partly  offset  by  sales  of 
properties  (Murie  1996a).  In  spite  of  its  expansion,  housing  association  stock  only 
forms  a  small  proportion  of  the  total  housing  stock.  By  1998,  the  share  of  housing 
association  dwellings  accounted  for  5.3%  of  the  total  housing  stock  in  Scotland, 
compared  to  5%  and  4%  in  England  and  Wales,  respectively.  It  is  of  interest  to  note 
that  Scotland's  housing  association  sector  remains  much  smaller  and  there  are  no 
equivalents  of  the  large  English  housing  associations  (ibid.  ).  The  new  financial 
regime  for  the  housing  association  sector  established  in  1988  has  had  substantial 
impacts  on  changing  their  role  and  also  promoting  their  expansion.  In  Scotland,  the 
financial  regime  did  not  lead  to  such  significant  impacts  as  it  did  in  England, 
particularly  in  terms  of  the  rent  level  (Wilcox  et  al.  1998).  The  new  financial  regime 
of  the  housing  association  sector  and  its  impact  is  discussed  in  Section  Four. 
In  Britain,  the  private  rented  sector  also  experienced  a  decline  over  the  last  several 
decades.  The  government's  strong  rent  policy  is  the  key  factor  for  the  decline  in  this 
sector.  Rent  control  and  large  scale  slum  clearance  have  been  the  driving  forces  to 
limit  the  supply  of  private  rented  dwellings  (Freeman  et  al.  1996).  Equally  important, 
the  tax  and  subsidy  system  favouring  owner-occupiers  and  social  tenants  is  another 
key  factor  explaining  the  small  size  of  this  sector.  In  Scotland,  in  contrast  to  a 
growing  owner-occupied  housing  and  a  strong  social  rented  sector,  private  rented 
56 dwellings  have  declined  substantially.  This  may  imply  that  Scottish  households  are 
more  likely  to  stay  in  the  social  housing  sector  than  the  private  rented  sector,  and 
regard  social  renting  as  a  substitute  for  private  renting.  The  share  of  private  rented 
dwelling  in  the  total  housing  stock  is  the  lowest  among  the  three  countries  in  Britain. 
After  the  deregulation  of  private  rents  in  1989,  the  private  rented  sector  appeared  to  be 
reviving  in  England  and  Wales  but  it  only  had  positive  impact  on  Scotland's  private 
renting  in  1990/91.  After  that,  Scotland  suffered  continuous  decline  in  the  proportion 
of  private  rented  dwellings.  By  1998,  Scotland's  private  rented  dwellings  only 
accounted  for  6.7%  of  the  total  housing  stock,  compared  to  11.1%  and  8.5%  in 
England  and  Wales  respectively. 
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00 til 3.1.2  Tenure  and  Housing  Characteristics 
In  addition  to  the  long-term  housing  tenure  pattern,  another  important  subject  in  the 
analysis  of  housing  tenure  structure  is  the  dwelling  characteristics  compared  with 
housing  tenure,  since  the  housing  tenure  is  measured  on  the  basis  of  dwelling  units. 
Table  3.2  presents  dwelling  characteristics  by  tenures  in  Scotland  based  on  the 
Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  in  1996.  Houses  have  been  the  dominant  dwelling 
type  in  Scotland,  accounting  for  62%  of  the  total  dwellings  in  1996.  Dwelling  type  is 
significantly  different  between  owner-occupation  and  social  renting.  In  the  owner- 
occupied  sector,  about  three  quarters  of  dwellings  were  houses,  while  tenements  and 
four-in-a-block  flats  were  dominant  dwelling  types  in  the  social  rented  sector  in  1996. 
Dwelling  type  in  the  private  rented  sector  is  significantly  varied  between  unfurnished 
and  furnished  renting.  More  than  half  of  private  unfurnished  renting  and  87%  of  tied 
accommodation  were  houses,  while  72%  of  furnished  renting  were  flats  in  1996. 
In  Scotland,  more  than  60%  of  dwellings  were  built  after  the  Second  World  War, 
while  21%  were  built  before  1919.  Similarly,  most  dwellings  in  the  owner-occupied 
sector  and  the  public  rented  sector  were  built  after  1945.  The  difference  is  that  there 
were  27%  of  owner-occupied  dwellings  built  before  1919,  compared  to  only  3%  of 
public  dwellings  being  built  before  1919.  The  market  boom  and  the  growth  of  new 
built  dwellings  have  contributed  to  an  increase  in  the  share  of  dwellings  built  after 
1982  in  the  owner-occupied  sector.  Dwelling  age  of  the  housing  association  sector  is 
significantly  diverse.  As  the  government  aimed  to  expand  the  housing  association 
sector,  a  large  number  of  new  dwellings  have  been  built  since  the  late  1980s.  As  a 
result,  this  increases  the  share  of  association  dwellings  built  after  1982  which 
accounted  for  39%  of  the  total  housing  association  dwellings  in  1996.  In  contrast  to 
new  construction,  a  quarter  of  association  dwellings  were  built  before  1919,  and  many 
of  these  dwellings  are  rehabilitated  tenements  and  flats  located  in  the  inner  city 
providing  for  elderly  people  and  those  with  special  needs  (Murie  1996a).  Dwelling 
age  of  the  private  rented  sector  is  very  old  with  fewer  new  constructions  compared  to 
other  tenures.  More  than  70%  of  private  furnished  rented  dwellings  and  about  half  of 
unfurnished  and  tied  accommodations  were  built  before  1919,  while  less  than  10%  of 
private  rented  dwellings  were  built  after  1982.  This  is  the  result  of  the  long  term 
decline  of  this  sector. 
59 In  1996,  about  two  thirds  of  dwellings  in  Scotland  had  4  or  5  rooms.  Dwellings  with 
4-5  rooms  were  the  dominant  size  in  the  owner-occupied  sector  and  the  public  rented 
sector.  About  80%  of  housing  association  dwellings  had  3  or  4  rooms.  To  some 
extent,  dwelling  size  is  correlated  to  household  characteristics  and,  in  this  case,  the 
above  results  may  imply  different  patterns  of  household  size  and  household  type 
between  the  public  rented  sector  and  the  housing  association  sector.  Similar  to 
housing  association  dwellings,  most  private  unfurnished  and  furnished  rented 
dwellings  had  less  than  5  rooms  in  1996.  In  contrast,  most  tied  accommodations  are  a 
larger  size.  Around  80%  of  tied  accommodations  had  5  or  more  rooms.  With  respect 
to  dwelling  location,  most  dwellings  in  the  owner-occupied  sector  and  the  social 
rented  sector  were  located  in  urban  areas,  while  there  were  substantial  proportions  of 
private  unfurnished  and  tied  accommodation  located  in  rural  areas  of  Scotland. 
In  brief,  there  has  been  a  rapid  increase  in  owner-occupied  housing  over  the  last  two 
decades  in  Scotland.  Owner-occupied  dwellings  are  dominated  by  houses  with  4  to  5 
rooms  and  most  of  them  were  built  after  Second  World  War,  including  a  substantial 
amount  of  new  construction  after  1982.  The  historical  importance  of  Scotland's 
public  rented  sector  significantly  comprises  flats  and  tenements  in  the  urban  areas. 
The  independent  housing  association  sector  is  relatively  small  and  young  in  terms  of 
dwelling  size  and  age.  The  government's  policy  to  expand  the  housing  association 
sector  is  a  key  force  for  a  rapid  increase  in  new  built  dwellings  after  1989.  The  long- 
term  state  intervention  in  the  private  rented  sector  has  resulted  in  the  small  size  of  this 
sector.  Most  furnished  rented  dwellings  which  are  very  old  and  of  a  smaller  size  are 
located  in  the  inner  city.  On  the  contrary,  many  unfurnished  rented  dwellings  and  tied 
accommodation  are  located  in  rural  areas  and  are  a  larger  size. 
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N 3.2  Housing  Market  Conditions 
We  have  thus  seen  a  significant  change  in  tenure  mix  in  Scotland  over  the  last  several 
decades.  The  change  in  tenure  pattern  has  had  substantial  impacts  on  the  housing 
market.  This  section  briefly  discusses  the  difference  of  housing  market  conditions 
between  Scotland  and  the  rest  of  Great  Britain  in  terms  of  new  house  building,  house 
prices  and  housing  transactions. 
3.2.1  New  House  Building 
New  house  building  plays  an  important  role  in  stimulating  housing  market  activities  as 
well  as  economic  activities.  According  to  Wilcox  (2000),  almost  20,400  new 
dwellings  were  completed  in  Scotland  in  1998,  adding  nearly  0.9%  to  the  housing 
stock.  The  number  of  Scotland's  housing  starts  was  about  20,200  dwellings  in  1998, 
and  accounted  for  11.4%  of  the  total  of  Great  Britain's  housing  starts.  Figure  3.1 
reveals  the  level  of  new  house  building  (housing  start)  in  Scotland  and  in  Great  Britain 
as  a  whole  between  1985  and  1998. 
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Figure  3.1  New  House  Building  in  Scotland  and  Great  Britain  1985-1998 
(Index,  1993=100) 
Source:  Based  on  Wilcox  (2000),  Table  19e  and  19f. 
63 Scotland's  new  house  building  experienced  a  smoother  growth  during  the  market 
boom  in  the  late  1980s.  Housing  starts  in  Scotland  reached  its  high  level  in  1989,  one 
year  later  than  that  for  the  rent  of  Great  Britain.  The  market  recession  beginning  in 
the  early  1990s  had  less  influence  on  Scotland's  new  housing  construction.  It  is 
striking  that  new  house  building  in  Scotland  experienced  a  greater  fluctuation  in  the 
mid-1990s  than  in  the  late  1980s.  New  house  building  in  Scotland  reached  its  highest 
level  in  1994.  About  25,100  new  dwellings  were  built  in  that  year.  Then  housing 
starts  suffered  a  decline  to  some  degree.  The  recent  boom  and  slump  of  Scotland's 
new  house  building  was  partly  affected  by  private  market  conditions  and  partly  by  the 
housing  association  activities  since  housing  associations  have  been  the  main  suppliers 
of  new  social  dwellings  in  the  1990s  (Wilcox  et  al.  1998). 
In  Scotland,  the  tenure  division  of  new  house  building  has  significantly  changed  over 
the  last  two  decades.  Figure  3.2  shows  the  tenure  share  in  Scotland's  new  house 
building  between  1985  and  1998.  It  shows  a  clear  picture  that  the  share  taken  by  the 
public  sector  was  dramatically  reduced  after  1989.  In  1990,  there  were  about  1,600 
dwellings  built  by  the  public  sector.  By  1998,  public  sector  housing  starts  had 
dropped  to  50  dwellings,  accounting  for  only  0.2%  of  total  housing  starts  (Wilcox 
2000).  The  estimates  of  the  local  authority  housing  need  vary  widely.  Studies  have 
suggested  that  the  current  level  of  production  is  well  below  the  requirement  to  meet 
the  local  authority  housing  need  (Meen  et  al.  2001).  In  contrast,  the  number  of 
housing  starts  taken  by  housing  associations  has  been  significantly  increased  after 
1989  and  reached  its  peak  of  5,400  dwellings  in  1995.  It  is  evident  that  a  rapid  boom 
in  Scotland's  housing  starts  in  the  mid-1990s  was  partly  boosted  by  the  new 
housebuilding  in  the  housing  association  sector.  Recently,  the  number  of  new 
construction  in  the  housing  association  sector  has  slightly  declined.  Nevertheless,  the 
share  constantly  remained  at  16%-18%  of  the  total  housing  starts  in  Scotland  between 
1997  and  1998. 
New  house  building  in  the  private  sector  has  been  growing  steadily  over  recent 
decades.  This  is  partly  a  result  of  a  rapidly  growing  demand  for  owner-occupied 
housing  during  these  years.  As  discussed  above,  Scotland's  new  private  house 
building  also  experienced  less  fluctuation  than  the  rest  of  Great  Britain  in  the  last  two 
decades.  Scotland's  private  housing  starts  reached  a  high  level  in  1989  and  then  had  a 
64 slight  slump  during  the  market  recession  in  the  early  1990s.  After  recovering  from  the 
recession,  private  housing  starts  reached  another  high  level  of  19,450  dwellings  in 
1994.  After  that,  the  number  of  new  private  house  building  fell  slightly  but  remained 
fairly  constant  at  between  16,500  to  19,000  dwellings  per  year  between  1995  and 
1998. 
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Figure  3.2  Tenure  Shares  in  New  House  Building  in  Scotland,  1985-1998 
Source:  Based  on  Wilcox  (2000),  Table  19e 
3.2.2  House  Prices 
House  prices  have  always  been  an  important  indication  of  housing  market  conditions. 
House  prices  in  Scotland  have  shown  a  different  trend  from  the  rest  of  the  UK  over 
the  last  two  decades.  Figure  3 
.3  shows  that  house  prices  in  Scotland  were  more  stable 
than  at  the  UK  level  over  the  past  twenty  years.  '  According  to  Council  of  Mortgage 
Lenders'  (CML)  data,  the  UK  housing  market  experienced  a  price  boom  during  the 
late  1980s.  House  prices  reached  their  peak  in  1989.  Many  factors  determined  the 
price  boom  during  this  period.  As  Meen  (1996)  pointed  out,  the  liberalisation  of  the 
mortgage  finance  sector  is  undoubtedly  one  of  the  major  causes,  in  addition,  the 
increase  in  real  income  in  the  mid-1980s  also  contributed  to  the  house  price  boom. 
House  price  data  is  available  at  the  UK  level.  Most  comparisons  in  this  chapter  are  based  on  Great 
Britain  level  data. 
65 The  economic  recession  beginning  in  the  1990s,  however,  caused  a  great  fluctuation 
in  the  UK  housing  market.  House  prices  changed  from  boom  to  slump  between  1989 
and  1990,  and  continued  to  decline  until  the  mid-1990s.  During  1990  to  1994,  falling 
house  prices  and  reduced  housing  transactions  along  with  rising  unemployment  had 
together  slowed  down  the  recovery  from  the  market  recession  (Murie  1996a).  The 
consequences  had  been  rising  mortgage  arrears  and  repossessions  at  their  highest  level, 
and  many  owner-occupiers  also  having  negative  equity  (ibid.  ). 
All  of  the  above  problems  existed  in  the  UK  housing  market.  However,  they  did  not 
happen  in  the  Scottish  housing  market.  House  prices  in  Scotland  experienced  a 
smoother  boom  than  the  rest  of  the  UK  during  the  late  1980s.  The  economic  recession 
in  the  early  1990s  did  not  have  such  a  strong  impact  on  the  Scottish  housing  market. 
While  house  prices  in  the  UK  level  declined  in  the  recession,  Scotland's  house  prices 
continued  to  grow  by  15  percentage  points  between  1990  and  1993.  However,  the 
impact  of  the  market  recession  was  a  reduction  in  housing  starts  and  the  number  of 
housing  transactions  in  the  Scottish  housing  market.  As  discussed  earlier,  a  stable 
economy  and  a  constant  growth  of  the  demand  for  owner-occupied  housing  may  have 
contributed  to  the  continuous  growth  of  Scotland's  house  prices  during  the  recession. 
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Figure  3.3  Average  House  Prices  in  Scotland  and  the  UK,  1980-1999 
(Mix  adjusted  index,  1993=100) 
Sources:  Compendium  of  Housing  Finance  Statistics,  Council  of  Mortgage  Lenders, 
derived  from  the  DOE/BSA  5%  sample  survey.  Based  on  Wilcox  (2000),  Table  43b. 
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X After  recovering  from  recession  in  the  early  1990s,  house  prices  in  Scotland  continued 
to  grow  smoothly  over  the  second  half  of  1990s,  while  housing  markets  in  the  rest  of 
the  UK  were  likely  to  have  another  price  boom,  specifically  after  1996.  An  analysis 
of  CML  data  suggests  that  between  1996  and  1999,  house  prices  in  Scotland  increased 
nearly  15  percentage  points  compared  to  44  percentage  points  in  the  UK  as  a  whole. 
By  1999,  the  average  house  price  in  Scotland  was  £69,368  compared  to  an  average  of 
£83,845  at  the  UK  level  (see  Table  3.3).  With  respect  to  the  volatility  of  house  prices, 
according  to  CML  data,  Scotland  had  the  lowest  volatility  of  house  prices  at  around 
7%,  compared  to  about  15%  at  the  UK  level  over  the  1968-2000  (Meen  et  al.  2001). 
Table  3.3  also  shows  a  breakdown  of  prices  by  dwelling  size  in  Scotland  compared  to 
the  UK  as  a  whole  between  1998  and  1999.  In  Scotland,  the  prices  for  6  room 
dwellings  had  the  biggest  increase  (7.3%),  followed  by  5  room  dwellings  with  a  5% 
increase  between  1998  and  1999.  In  contrast,  the  prices  for  3  room  dwellings  had 
declined  by  nearly  8%.  In  the  UK  level,  the  prices  for  7  more  room  dwellings  had  the 
biggest  increase,  by  nearly  12%,  followed  by  6  room  dwellings  with  an  11%  increase 
in  prices  between  1998  and  1999. 
Table  3.3  Average  House  Prices  by  Dwelling  Size  in  Scotland  and  the  UK,  1998- 
1999  (£) 
Dwelling 
Size 
Scotland 
1998  1999 
% 
change 
United 
1998 
Kingdom 
1999 
% 
'change  2  rooms  or  less  40,076  46,026  14.8  48,047  51,504  7.2 
3  rooms  47,884  44,155  -7.8  53,254  54,660  2.6 
4  rooms  52,296  54,269  3.8  56,192  61,191  8.9 
5  rooms  64,325  67,686  5.2  64,661  70,343  8.8 
6  rooms  79,226  85,001  7.3  76,449  84,689  10.8 
7  rooms  or  more  124,701  129,770  4.1  126,651  141,409  11.7 
All  type  average  64,083  69,386  8.3  81,991  92,717  13.1 
Sources:  DETR/CML  5%  Sample  Survey  of  Mortgage  Lenders.  Analysis  and  adopted 
from  Wilcox  (1999)  and  (2000)  Tables  43a,  44. 
Notes:  Figures  for  2  room  dwellings  should  be  treated  with  particular  caution  due  to 
very  small  sample  sizes 
Rooms  include  kitchens  but  no  bathrooms,  lobbies,  landings  or  sculleries. 
Figures  are  for  sales  to  all  purchasers,  with  the  exception  of  sitting  tenants. 
3.2.3  Housing  Transactions 
In  addition  to  new  house  building  and  house  prices,  housing  transactions  are  also  an 
important  indication  of  housing  market  conditions.  Table  3.4  presents  the  number  of 
67 private  housing  sales  in  Scotland  and  the  rest  of  Great  Britain  from  1990  to  1997. 
Unfortunately,  the  latest  data  for  Scotland  is  only  available  up  to  November  1997. 
Thus  the  data  can  not  present  recent  transaction  activities  in  the  Scottish  housing 
market.  '  The  economic  recession  during  the  early  1990s  did  not  have  a  strong 
influence  on  Scotland's  house  prices  but  it  did  impact  on  housing  transactions.  The 
number  of  housing  transactions  in  Scotland  and  the  rest  of  Great  Britain  reduced 
significantly  in  the  early  1990s. 
Between  1993  and  1996,  the  number  of  private  housing  sales  in  Scotland  and  the  rest 
of  Great  Britain  continued  to  decline  but  at  a  slower  rate.  In  1997  there  was  a  quick 
increase  in  housing  transactions  in  Great  Britain  level.  A  rapid  increase  in  the  number 
of  housing  transactions  along  with  rising  house  prices  implies  that  the  housing  market 
in  Great  Britain,  particularly  in  England  would  "heat  up"  to  experience  another  boom 
like  the  late  1980s.  However,  this  evidence  would  not  be  confirmed  until  more  up-to- 
date  data  was  collected.  In  Scotland,  the  housing  market  would  not  be  as  "hot"  as  the 
level  in  the  rest  of  Great  Britain,  since  the  number  of  housing  transactions  and  house 
prices  increased  slowly  in  1997. 
Table  3.4  Private  Housing  Transactions  in  Great  Britain,  1990-1997 
Year  Dwellin 
(1000) 
Scotland 
gs  Index 
(1993=100) 
Great  Britain 
Dwellings  Index 
(1000)  (1993=100) 
1990  142  115  1,425  115 
1991  133  107  1,358  110 
1992  131  106  1,162  94 
1993  124  100  1,238  100 
1994  125  101  1,239  100 
1995  110  89  1,159  94 
1996  100  81  1,223  99 
1997  101  82  1,398  113 
Source:  Wilcox  et  al.  (1998),  Table  6.6a 
Note:  Scotland  data  for  1997  is  only  for  the  eleven  months  to  November. 
In  summary,  the  Scottish  housing  market  has  shown  different  conditions  from  the  rest 
of  Great  Britain  over  the  last  two  decades.  Housing  markets  in  England  and  Wales 
experienced  a  great  fluctuation  during  the  late  1980s  and  the  early  1990s.  The  picture 
6  According  to  Gibb's  (2001)  study  of  CML  data,  Scottish  private  housing  transactions  were  about 
123,000  in  1999. 
68 for  Scottish  housing  market  was  of  much  greater  stability.  House  prices  in  Scotland 
grew  steadily  without  significant  fall  back  during  the  past  two  decades.  The  Scottish 
housing  market  was  much  less  affected  by  the  recession  beginning  in  the  early  1990s 
and  consequently  had  negligible  negative  equity.  Housing  starts  and  rates  of  housing 
transactions  in  Scotland  were  decreased  less  significantly  than  the  rest  of  Great  Britain 
during  the  market  recession.  In  general,  Scotland  does  not  show  the  volatility  of  the 
housing  market  in  England  and  Wales,  and  the  `ripple  effect'  stops  at  the  border  (Gibb 
2001). 
Many  factors  could  explain  different  housing  market  conditions  between  Scotland  and 
the  rest  of  Great  Britain.  One  of  the  most  important  factors  is  that  the  housing  market 
is  deeply  influenced  by  local  economic  activities  and  by  local  housing  demand  and 
supply.  Gibb  (2001)  indicates  that  economic,  behavioural  and  institutional  reasons 
can  be  seen  as  attributes  to  the  Scottish  housing  market's  stability.  Another  important 
factor  is  housing  policy.  Connecting  to  housing  tenure,  housing  market  is  also  viewed 
as  an  important  policy  tool.  For  example,  homeownership  supports  and  underpins 
area  regeneration,  while  rental  housing  can  provide  wider  choices  other  than  owner- 
occupation  and  support  wider  housing  flexibility  (ibid.  ).  Housing  policy  and  the 
subsidy  programmes  play  important  roles  in  subsidising  households  as  well  as  housing 
suppliers  or  placing  constraints  in  the  housing  market.  The  following  two  sections 
will  discuss  rationing  and  subsidies  in  the  Scottish  housing  market  compared  to  the 
rest  of  Great  Britain. 
3.3  Rationing  in  the  Housing  Market 
Rationing  in  the  housing  market  can  generally  be  divided  into  price  mechanism  and 
non-price  mechanism.  From  an  economic  viewpoint,  price  constraints  are  related  to 
the  prices  of  housing  services  and  the  household's  budget  constraints.  Non-price 
constraints  are  mainly  the  administrative  rationing  imposed  by  the  market  controller. 
In  Scotland,  as  well  as  the  rest  of  Great  Britain,  rationing  in  the  housing  market 
mainly  consists  of  price  and  non-price  constraints  towards  entry  into  the  three  main 
tenures:  the  owner-occupier  sector,  the  social  housing  sector  and  the  private  rented 
sector. 
69 3.3.1  Rationing  in  the  Owner-Occupied  Sector 
As  the  house  is  a  commodity  that  is  expensive  in  relation  to  incomes,  most  households 
need  to  obtain  a  mortgage  to  buy  their  own  home.  Thus  mortgage  finance  can  be  seen 
as  the  most  significant  constraint  to  households  who  want  to  be  homeowners.  In 
Scotland  and  the  rest  of  Great  Britain,  the  mortgage  lenders,  mainly  building  societies 
and  banks,  often  impose  some  rationing  to  mortgage  borrowers  in  order  to  secure  their 
loans.  The  rationing  includes  price  and  non-price  constraints.  Before  the  1980s,  the 
most  significant  constraint  was  the  credit  rationing  set  by  building  societies. 
Before  the  mid-1980s,  the  building  societies  enjoyed  tax  advantages  which  allowed 
them  to  offer  a  better  net  return  on  saving  rates  than  their  banking  competitors  (Gibb 
and  Munro  1991).  Because  of  these  competitive  advantages  in  the  saving  market, 
building  societies  could  offer  cheaper  mortgages  to  borrowers  and,  as  a  result,  demand 
for  mortgages  was  frequently  greater  than  the  supply.  Therefore,  many  building 
societies  then  implemented  credit  rationing  by  reducing  the  mortgage  loan  to  value 
ratio,  by  reducing  income  to  value  ratio  for  potential  borrowers,  by  imposing  saving 
conditions  on  borrowers  and  also  by  tightening  up  lending  rules  on  older  properties 
and  those  in  less  desirable  neighbourhoods  (ibid.  ). 
Building  societies'  credit  rationing  created  inflexibility  in  the  financial  market  and  had 
a  significant  impact  on  many  potential  homebuyers.  Many  homebuyers,  particularly 
in  the  marginal  income  level,  found  it  difficult  to  obtain  a  mortgage  from  building 
societies.  This  went  against  the  government's  policy  to  promote  homeownership  in 
Great  Britain.  In  the  mid-1980s,  the  government  deregulated  the  mortgage  market  so 
that  building  societies  could  face  more  competition  from  banks  and  other  financial 
institutions.  As  Maclennan  and  Gibb  (1990)  suggest,  the  deregulation  of  the  financial 
sector  has  had  a  fundamental  effect  on  the  mortgage  market.  Price  competition  has 
removed  the  historical  mortgage  rate  fixing  cartel  and  quantity  constrained  queuing 
for  mortgage  and,  at  the  same  time,  has  enabled  households  to  borrow  more  against 
the  value  of  housing  asset  (ibid.  ).  In  other  words,  the  mortgage  constraint  since  the 
mid-1980s  has  been  focused  on  price  mechanism,  which  mainly  depends  upon  house 
prices,  borrowers'  incomes,  mortgage  interest  rates  and  inflation. 
70 In  order  to  safeguard  their  loans,  many  building  societies  and  banks  have  imposed 
some  criteria  towards  mortgage  borrowers.  The  most  common  criteria  are:  house 
price  to  income  ratio,  loan  to  house  price  ratio  and  loan  to  income  ratio.  These  criteria 
have  been  used  by  the  Council  of  Mortgage  Lenders  to  estimate  housing  affordability 
for  homebuyers.  To  some  extent,  these  affordability  measures  do  reflect  some 
conditions  of  mortgage  constraints  to  homebuyers.  Many  building  societies  and  banks 
have  used  these  measures  as  the  norms  for  their  lending  criteria.  In  many  cases,  these 
mortgage  criteria  apply  differently  to  first  time  buyers  and  former  homeowners. 
Figure  3.4  to  Figure  3.6  present  these  three  common  mortgage  criteria  to  first  time 
buyers  and  former  homeowners  in  Scotland  compared  to  the  UK  level. 
In  Scotland  and  the  UK  level,  the  price  to  income  ratio  for  former  homeowners  is 
significantly  higher  than  that  for  first  time  buyers.  This  is  probably  because  former 
homeowners  usually  have  higher  incomes  and  savings  thus  they  can  purchase  higher 
price  homes  than  first  time  homebuyers  and  also  former  homeowners  can  obtain 
capital  gains  from  their  previous  houses.  For  example,  in  Scotland  1997,  the  average 
house  prices  purchased  by  former  homeowners  were  £78,287  and  their  average  annual 
incomes  were  £27,197,  while  the  average  house  prices  purchased  by  first  time  buyers 
were  far  lower  at  £38,613  and  their  average  annual  incomes  were  £17,827  (Wilcox  et 
al.  1998).  Although  these  figures  represent  a  big  gap,  the  price  to  income  ratio  for 
both  first  time  buyers  and  former  homeowners  in  Scotland  remained  stable  and  was 
less  affected  by  the  house  price  boom  and  slump  than  the  rest  of  the  UK  in  the  past 
two  decades.  The  price  to  income  ratio  for  former  homeowners  in  the  UK  level  was 
significantly  affected  by  market  boom  and  recession  during  the  late  1980s  and  the 
early  1990s. 
With  respect  to  loan  to  house  price  ratio  (or  called  loan  to  value  ratio  LTV),  first  time 
buyers  have  higher  ratio  than  former  homeowners.  Over  the  past  fifteen  years,  the 
loan  to  house  price  ratio  for  first  time  buyers  in  Scotland  was  similar  to  the  UK 
average  except  in  recent  years.  The  recent  house  price  boom  (between  1997  and  1999) 
in  the  UK  as  a  whole  has  resulted  in  a  quicker  reduction  in  loan  to  house  price  ratio 
than  that  in  Scotland.  Compared  to  former  homeowners,  the  loan  to  price  ratio  for 
first  time  buyers  was  likely  to  be  affected  by  housing  market  conditions  in  Scotland 
and  the  rest  of  the  UK. 
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Figure  3.4  House  Price  to  Income  Ratio  in  Scotland  and  the  UK,  1986-1999 
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Figure  3.5  Loan  to  House  Price  Ratio  in  Scotland  and  the  UK,  1986-1999 
FT  Buyer:  first  time  buyer;  F  Owner:  former  homeowner 
Source:  Council  of  Mortgage  Lenders,  Housing  Finance 
72 2.4 
2.2 
2 
1.8 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
FTC  buyer  Scotland  -  -U-  -  FT  buyer  UK 
-ý--  F  Owner  Scotland  -  -x-  -F  Owner  UK 
Figure  3.6  Loan  to  Income  Ratio  in  Scotland  and  the  UK,  1986-1999 
FT  Buyer:  first  time  buyer;  F  Owner:  former  homeowner 
Source:  Council  of  Mortgage  Lenders,  Housing  Finance 
At  the  UK  level,  the  loan  to  income  ratio  for  first  time  buyers  was  higher  than  for 
former  homeowners.  This  is  probably  because  former  homeowners  had  historically 
higher  price  to  income  ratio  and  lower  loan  to  price  ratio.  As  a  result,  this  makes  a 
lower  loan  to  income  ratio  for  former  homeowners  than  for  first  time  buyers.  In 
Scotland,  the  conditions  are  different  from  the  UK  level.  The  loan  to  income  ratio  for 
Scotland's  first  time  buyers  was  much  lower  than  for  former  homeowners  during  the 
late  1980s.  It  is  noted  that  lower  loan  to  income  ratio  for  first  time  buyers  does  not 
simply  mean  that  homeownership  for  first  time  buyers  is  more  affordable  than  for 
former  homeowners.  The  interpretation  of  the  above  situation  would  be  complicated. 
It  depends  upon  average  house  prices  and  incomes  between  first  time  buyers  and 
former  homeowners.  Since  the  1990s,  the  loan  to  income  ratio  for  first  time  buyers 
has  steadily  increased  and  it  has  been  very  close  to  former  homeowners'  level  in 
recent  years.  This  raises  the  possibility  that  Scotland's  first  time  buyers  have  found  it 
more  difficult  to  buy  their  homes  in  recent  years  than  a  decade  ago. 
3.3.2  Rationing  in  the  Social  Rented  Sector 
As  the  aim  of  social  housing  is  to  make  affordable  homes  available  to  households  in 
greatest  housing  need,  the  process  of  obtaining  access  to  the  social  rented  sector  is 
,  e:  me 
.  -ar  ,, 
-  x-  .- 
x-  --x-  --X-  --x-  - 
73 very  different  to  the  private  rented  sector  or  the  owner-occupied  sector.  The  access 
constraint  to  social  housing  is  not  the  price  mechanism  but  the  non-price, 
administrative  mechanism.  The  concept  of  rationing  in  the  social  housing  sector  is 
different  from  the  common  concept  applied  to  the  private  housing  market.  Social 
housing  rationing  can  be  treated  as  a  positive  rationing  which  sets  to  help  households 
in  greatest  housing  need.  That  is  to  say,  if  households  are  in  low-income,  vulnerable 
groups,  they  would  have  higher  opportunities  to  enter  the  social  housing  sector  than 
households  with  higher  income  and  better  socio-economic  status. 
In  Britain,  the  gatekeeper  of  the  social  housing  sector  is  the  allocation  system.  The 
allocation  system  applies  to  new  entry  tenants  registered  on  the  waiting  list  and  to 
existing  tenants  for  rehousing.  To  a  certain  extent,  the  allocation  system  can  be 
viewed  as  a  `bureaucratic  rationing'  in  the  social  housing  sector  (Clapham  and  Kintrea 
1984,  Somerville  2001).  Studies  have  criticised  that  the  need-based  allocation  system 
fails  to  provide  a  realistic  solution  on  the  conflict  between  needs  and  aspirations  and 
inevitably  disadvantages  those  who  are  least  able  to  choose  (Clapham  and  Kintrea 
1986,1991,  and  Cowan  2001).  The  recent  English  Housing  Green  Paper  in  2000 
proposed  a  reform  for  the  allocation  system.  The  proposal  offers  a  more  customer 
choice  based  letting  system,  with  an  emphasis  on  the  supply  of  proper  information  to 
applicants  to  ensure  housing  choices  are  well  informed  (Smith  2000).  It  is  expected 
that  the  social  landlords  will  move  away  from  entirely  needs-based  housing  allocation 
system  to  schemes  which  offer  a  degree  of  flexibility  and  a  local  base  system 
(National  Housing  Federation  2000). 
In  addition  to  the  allocation  system,  most  social  landlords  have  other  restrictions  on 
households  who  register  on  the  waiting  list  or  apply  for  rehousing.  Table  3.5  presents 
some  restrictions  imposed  by  local  authorities  and  housing  associations  in  Scotland. 
There  is  a  strong  feeling  that  housing  associations  were  more  exclusive  in  their 
policies  than  local  authorities  because  they  do  not  want  `problem  tenants'  (Scott  et  al. 
2000).  Tenants  with  rent  arrears  and  people  involved  in  anti-social  behaviour  are  the 
group  most  restricted  by  local  authorities  and  housing  associations.  There  are  some 
differences  between  local  authorities  and  housing  associations.  In  addition  to  the 
above  two  most  restricted  groups,  local  authorities  are  more  likely  to  have  restrictions 
on  people  living  outside  the  area,  probably  because  of  their  policy  of  local  connection. 
74 Housing  associations  are  more  likely  to  have  eligibility  restrictions  on  homeowners 
. 
and  households  who  were  intentionally  homeless.  There  are  almost  no  restrictions  on 
tenants  of  other  landlords. 
Table  3.5  Restrictions  on  Eligibility  for  Waiting  Lists  and  for  Rehousing  in  Local 
Authorities  and  Housing  Associations  in  Scotland 
Local  Authorities  Housing  Associations 
Group  Restriction  on  Restriction  on  Restriction  on  Restriction  on 
waiting  lists  rehousing  waiting  lists  rehousing 
Home  owners  0  6  1  15 
Tenants  with  rent  15  78  21  59 
arrears 
People  living  outside  33  13  2  1 
the  area 
People  responsible  13  39  18  33 
for  anti-social 
behaviour 
People  prey.  evicted  19  59  34  48 
for  anti-social  behav. 
Households  previous.  3  16  7  17 
homeless 
Tenants  of  other  1  0  0  0 
social  landlords 
Source:  Scott  et  al.  (2000). 
In  contrast  to  the  restrictions  on  accessing  the  social  rented  sector,  some  types  of 
households  are  more  likely  to  enter  the  social  housing  sector.  Generally  speaking, 
households  with  socio-economic  disadvantages  are  more  likely  to  enter  the  social 
housing  sector,  since  the  allocation  system  very  often  sets  priorities  for  those  types  of 
households.  A  survey  by  Hardin  (1997)  found  that  three  types  of  households:  single 
adults  without  children,  older  persons  and  lone  parents,  accounted  for  the  majority  of 
new  tenants  in  the  Scottish  social  rented  sector.  Housing  associations  had  a  higher 
proportion  of  older  persons  and  single  adults  without  children  among  their  new 
tenants  than  local  authorities  and  Scottish  Homes.  Local  authorities  and  Scottish 
Homes  had  a  higher  proportion  of  lone  parents  than  housing  associations. 
Hardin  (1997)  also  found  that  an  average  of  30%  of  new  tenants  were  unemployed  in 
the  social  rented  sector.  Scottish  Homes  had  a  significant  higher  proportion  of 
unemployed  new  tenants  (39%)  than  local  authorities  (27%)  and  housing  associations 
75 (28%).  Local  authorities  had  a  higher  proportion  of  new  tenants  reported  to  be  long- 
term  sick  when  compared  with  housing  associations  and  Scottish  Homes. 
Furthermore,  households  who  were  previously  homeless  also  accounted  for  an 
important  proportion  of  new  social  tenants.  Local  authorities  had  the  highest 
percentage  (26%)  of  new  tenants  who  were  previously  registered  as  homeless 
compared  with  14%  in  Scottish  Homes  and  10%  in  housing  associations. 
3.3.3  Rationing  in  the  Private  Rented  Sector 
The  private  rented  sector  in  Scotland  is  relatively  small  in  size  but  it  remains  an 
important  part  of  the  housing  system,  particularly  for  young  people,  students,  new 
households  and  those  who  need  to  be  mobile  (Kemp  2000).  Access  to  private  renting 
is  relatively  easy  compared  to  owner-occupation  and  social  renting,  however,  some 
low-income  households  have  difficulty  in  entering  this  sector.  Rationing  in  private 
renting  primarily  depends  upon  the  rents  and  the  deposit.  In  addition  to  rent  and 
deposit  constraints,  there  are  some  rationing  conditions,  such  as  the  regulated  tenancy 
and  private  landlords'  letting  preferences,  in  the  Scottish  private  rented  market. 
After  the  deregulation  of  private  renting  on  1  January  1989,  most  private  tenants  now 
are  either  in  assured  tenancies  or  new-style  short  assured  tenancies.  There  are  still 
some  tenants  in  regulated  tenancies,  however,  the  number  of  private  regulated  tenants 
only  accounted  for  a  small  proportion  in  the  private  rented  sector.  By  1998,  about  9% 
of  private  tenants  were  in  regulated  tenancies  in  England  (Wilcox  1999).  It  is 
estimated  that  the  percentage  of  Scotland's  private  regulated  tenants  could  be  close  to 
England's  figures.  For  tenants  in  regulated  tenancies,  many  of  them  are  elderly 
people  and  are  on  low  incomes,  paying  fair  rents,  living  in  old  and  poor  quality 
accommodation,  and  renting  unfurnished  housing  (Kemp  2000).  Since  many  older 
tenants  die  or  leave  this  tenancy,  this  sub-segment  of  the  market  has  gradually 
declined. 
Moreover,  some  constraints  may  come  from  private  landlords.  For  example,  private 
landlords'  letting  preferences  could  make  it  difficult  for  some  households  to  rent 
accommodation.  According  to  Kemp  and  Rhodes'  (1994)  survey  of  private  landlords 
in  Scotland,  private  landlords  would  most  prefer  to  let  to  households  who  are  in  work 
or  self-employed,  while  they  would  least  prefer  to  let  to  unemployed  people  or 
76 students.  With  regard  to  private  landlords'  preferences  on  household  types  (see  Table 
3.6),  30%  of  responding  landlords  would  most  prefer  to  let  to  couples  with  no  children, 
while  36%  of  respondents  would  least  prefer  young  single  people.  There  are  also  14% 
and  11  %  of  responding  landlords  showing  their  least  preferences  on  lone  parents  and 
couples  with  young  children  respectively.  However,  there  are  about  one  third  of 
responding  private  landlords  who  do  not  have  any  letting  preference. 
Table  3.6  Private  Landlords'  Most  and  Least  Preferred  Types  of  Tenants- 
Household  Type 
Most  preferred  Least  Preferred 
No  preference  35  29 
Young  single  people  5  36 
Middle-aged  single  people  7  1 
Lone  parents  0  14 
Couple  with  no  children  30  1 
Couple  with  young  children  8  11 
Couple  with  older  children  8  2 
Elderly  people  7  6 
Sample  base  401  401 
Source:  Kemp  and  Rhodes  (1994). 
In  addition  to  preferences  on  household  types,  many  private  landlords  have  preferred 
to  let  to  tenants  who  do  not  receive  Housing  Benefit.  Kemp  and  Rhodes  (1994)  found 
that  67%  of  private  individuals  and  51%  of  agents  prefer  tenants  who  are  not  on 
Housing  Benefit.  In  terms  of  asking  the  reasons  why  landlords  prefer  to  let  to  tenants 
who  are  not  on  Housing  Benefits,  many  landlords  experienced  that  tenants  on  Housing 
Benefit  did  not  look  after  the  property,  they  did  not  always  pay  the  rent  and/or  spent 
the  housing  benefit  money  on  other  things  (ibid.  ). 
A  recent  government  policy  called  `access  schemes'  aims  to  help  tenants  to  gain 
access  to  the  private  rented  sector  (Rugg  1995).  Access  schemes  can  lower  the  price 
rationing  for  low-income  tenants  or  homeless  people  by  way  of  providing  rent  in 
advance  or  deposit  guarantees  to  landlords  (Kemp  2000).  In  England,  access  schemes 
have  shown  some  successful  influences  on  preventing  or  alleviating  homelessness 
(and  hence  social  exclusion)  in  a  highly  cost-effective  manner  (Randall  and  Brown 
1994).  These  schemes  have  lately  been  introduced  in  Scotland,  and  are  expected  to 
play  a  vital  role,  as  they  did  in  England. 
77 In  summary,  this  section  discusses  the  rationing  conditions  in  the  three  main  tenure 
sectors  in  Scotland.  For  most  homebuyers,  mortgage  finance  is  the  main  constraint  to 
enter  the  owner-occupied  sector.  After  the  deregulation  of  the  financial  market  in  the 
mid-1980s,  mortgage  rationing  has  been  focused  on  the  price  mechanism.  The  price 
to  income  ratio,  loan  to  price  ratio  and  loan  to  price  ratio  are  the  three  common  criteria 
for  many  building  societies  and  banks  to  evaluate  mortgage  borrowers'  liability.  To 
some  extent,  these  three  criteria  can  be  seen  as  a  rationing  index  for  homebuyers.  It  is 
noted  that  these  ratios  only  indicate  the  possibility  of  households  to  be  constrained  by 
mortgages.  In  the  real  world,  some  households  can  still  obtain  a  mortgage  even  if 
they  are  disqualified  by  these  ratios.  In  the  social  rented  sector,  the  allocation  system 
acts  as  the  gatekeeper  for  households  applying  to  this  sector.  Under  the  allocation 
system,  households  with  socio-economic  disadvantages  and  with  special  needs  would 
have  priority  on  the  waiting  list  as  well  as  applying  for  rehousing.  Access  to  private 
renting  is  relatively  easy  except  for  regulated  tenancy  and  some  tied  housing. 
Rationing  in  private  renting  mainly  depends  upon  the  rent  and  deposit.  However, 
some  types  of  households  such  as  young  single  people  or  households  in  receipt  of 
Housing  Benefit  may  find  it  difficult  to  rent  a  home  because  of  private  landlords' 
letting  preferences. 
3.4  Help  with  Housing  Costs 
This  section  discusses  housing  subsidies  to  help  with  housing  costs  across  tenures  in 
Scotland.  Housing  subsidies  addressed  in  this  section  are  the  government's 
expenditures  on  housing  subsidy  programmes  to  households  and  housing  suppliers  in 
different  tenures. 
3.4.1  Housing  Subsidies  to  Owner-Occupiers 
Most  housing  subsidies  to  owner-occupiers  are  through  the  tax  system  and  are  called 
tax  expenditures.  '  Since  the  1990s,  the  focus  of  housing  subsidies  has  been  switched 
from  general  subsidies  to  means  tested  subsidies.  The  most  significant  changes  are 
7  Tax  expenditure  is  a  means  by  which  the  government  can  encourage  particular  activities  without 
appearing  to  spend  money,  and  usually  by  giving  a  tax  allowance,  which  reduces  net  tax  paid  by  an 
equal  amount. 
78 phasing  out  of  mortgage  interest  tax  relief  and  a  growth  of  expenditures  on  income 
support  for  mortgage  interest  payments. 
3.4.1.1  Mortgage  Interest  Tax  Relief 
Mortgage  interest  tax  relief,  known  as  MIRAS-mortgage  interest  relief  at  source 
from  1990,  was  a  general  subsidy  available  to  all  mortgaged  owners  and  gave 
exemption  from  paying  income  tax  on  any  income  used  to  pay  the  interest  payments 
on  a  mortgage  (on  the  first  £30,000  of  the  mortgage)  (Gibb  and  Munro  1991).  In 
Scotland,  the  cost  of  MIRAS  increased  dramatically  due  to  a  rapid  growth  of  owner- 
occupation  during  the  late  1980s  and  reached  a  peak  at  £530  millions  in  1990/91  (see 
Table  3.7).  After  that,  the  cost  of  MIRAS  rapidly  reduced  due  to  the  government's 
policy  to  drive  the  cost  down  and  to  phase  out  this  programme  gradually.  In 
combination  with  the  maximum  eligible  mortgage  of  the  first  £30,000,  the  British 
goverment  also  reduced  the  basic  rate  of  tax  relief  from  25%  in  1988/89  to  10%  in 
1998/99  till  its  end  in  April  2000.  The  average  tax  relief  for  Scotland's  mortgaged 
owners  was  reduced  from  its  peak  of  £790  in  1990/91  to  £170  in  1998/99. 
Table  3.7  Recipients  and  Costs  of  Mortgage  Interest  Tax  Relief  in  Scotland, 
1988/89-1998/99 
Year  Basic  rate  Total 
costs 
£m 
Recipients 
(000s) 
Average 
tax  relief 
£  per  annum) 
UK  Average 
tax  relief 
£  per  annum) 
1988/89  25  370  640  580  585 
1989/90  25  470  660  710  735 
1990/91  25  530  670  790  800 
1991/92  25  420  680  620  630 
1992/93  25  340  700  490  530 
1993/94  25  300  720  420  430 
1994/95  20  260  780  330  340 
1995/96  15  200  830  240  260 
1996/97  15  180  840  210  230 
1997/98  15  200  860  230  250 
1998/99  10  150  870  170  180 
Sources:  Wilcox  et  al.  (1998),  Wilcox  (2000) 
Since  the  cutback  of  the  basic  rate  in  the  1990s,  MIRAS  had  had  less  influence  on 
house  prices,  especially  in  response  to  lower  interest  rates  in  recent  years  (Wilcox 
1999).  Therefore,  the  abolition  of  this  tax  relief  from  April  2000  would  have  less 
impact  on  house  prices  and  on  most  existing  owners'  mortgaged  costs.  The  only 
homebuyers  likely  to  face  a  short-term  increase  in  mortgage  costs  would  be  the 
minority  with  fixed  interest  rate  mortgages  (ibid.  ).  In  addition,  the  abolition  of 
79 MIRAS  could  have  an  impact  on  low-income  homeowners  in  Scotland  and  this  will 
be  discussed  in  Chapter  Seven. 
3.4.1.2  Income  Support  for  Mortgage  Interest  Payments 
Unlike  MIRAS  which  was  available  to  all  mortgaged  homeowners,  Income  Support 
for  Mortgage  Interest  Payments  (ISMI)  is  a  means  tested  subsidy  provided  to  those  on 
income  support  -  unemployed,  elderly,  sick,  disabled  people  and  other  vulnerable 
groups  (Gibb,  Munro  and  Satsangi  1999).  In  the  mid-1990s,  the  government 
introduced  reforms  for  ISMI,  which  reduced  the  mortgage  ceiling  to  £100,000  and 
lengthened  the  waiting  period  for  new  and  existing  borrowers  before  they  are  eligible 
for  limited  and  subsequently  full  Income  Support  (ibid.  ).  Under  the  new  rules 
introduced  in  October  1995,  existing  mortgage  borrowers  who  make  a  new  claim  for 
ISMI  receive  no  support  for  2  months  before  moving  onto  16  weeks  of  50  per  cent 
support  (and  full  support  thereafter),  while  new  mortgage  borrowers  receive  no 
support  for  9  months  before  moving  onto  50  per  cent  support  (and  a  full  support  only 
after  a  further  16  weeks)  (ibid.  ). 
Table  3.8  Mortgage  Interest  Taken  into  Account  for  Income  Support  in  Scotland, 
1990-1999 
Year  Claimants 
(000s) 
£  Per  week  £  Per  week 
(Great  Britain 
1990  14  32.64  34.33 
1991  18  35.33  44.41 
1992  19  32.59  44.02 
1993  22  27.74  41.92 
1994  24  25.51  37.81 
1995  24  28.15  39.16 
1996  23  26.73  36.98 
1997  20  24.27  33.62 
1998  20  28.20  37.16 
1999  19  25.33  32.93 
Source:  Wilcox  (2000). 
After  the  economic  recession  and  the  rise  of  unemployment  in  the  early  1990s,  the 
number  of  mortgaged  owner-occupiers  who  claimed  ISMI  rose  significantly.  Table 
3.8  shows  that  the  number  of  ISMI  claimants  in  Scotland  reached  a  peak  at  24,000 
persons  in  1994  as  well  as  in  1995.  The  introduction  of  new  rules  after  October  1995 
had  impacts  on  reducing  the  number  of  claimants  and  the  average  ISMI.  The  number 
of  ISMI  claimants  reduced  from  24,000  to  19,000  between  1995  and  1999,  and  the 
average  subsidy  was  also  cutback  from  £28.15  to  £25.33  per  week  during  the  same 
80 period.  These  new  rules  may  suggest  that  owner-occupiers  will  be  more  vulnerable  to 
repossession  if  they  become  unemployed  in  the  future.  While  the  intention  of  these 
changes  is  to  improve  work  incentives,  the  effect  is  still  being  observed. 
3.4.1.3  Other  Tax  Exemptions 
Despite  the  abolished  mortgage  interest  tax  relief,  homeowners  can  still  benefit  from 
some  tax  exemptions.  The  most  important  one  is  the  exemption  from  capital  gains  tax. 
Since  1988/89  capital  gains  tax  has  been  levied  on  realised  gains  at  the  appropriate 
marginal  tax  rate  for  income  tax  on  transactions  (Hills  1991).  Capital  gains  tax 
applied  in  the  UK  is  indexed  for  inflation,  and  is  thus  not  applied  to  the  full  cash 
increases  in  asset  values  (ibid.  )  Each  taxpayer  including  each  married  couple  from 
1990/91  is  allowed  his/her  first  £6,500  (now  increased  to  £7,100  in  1999/00)  for 
exemption  (Wilcox  2000). 
All  these  features  above  have  reduced  the  relative  value  of  owner-occupiers' 
exemption  from  the  tax.  Most  homeowners  are  completely  exempt  and  private 
landlords  pay  capital  gains  tax  at  a  lower  effective  rate  than  their  ostensible  income 
tax  rate  (Hills  1991).  As  a  result,  capital  gains  tax  exemption  on  owner-occupied 
housing  represents  a  significant  subsidy.  However,  as  it  is  a  tax  exemption  rather  than 
a  payment,  the  subsidy  cost  is  difficult  to  estimate  and  it  fluctuates  considerably, 
depending  upon  housing  market  conditions  and  hence  the  numbers  of  homes  sold 
(Holmans  and  Whitehead  1998).  The  estimated  value  of  capital  gains  tax  exemption 
was  £1.4  billion  in  the  UK  as  a  whole  in  1998/99  (Wilcox  2000). 
Moreover,  owner-occupiers  also  benefit  from  imputed  rents  which  are  the  returns 
generated  from  their  properties  or  called  the  values  of  living  in  the  dwelling.  While 
private  landlords  have  been  taxed  on  their  income  from  rents,  owner-occupiers' 
imputed  rental  values  are  untaxed  since  1963  (Hills  1991).  Although  it  could  have 
some  technical  difficulty  in  taxing  imputed  rents  in  the  current  income  tax  system,  the 
untaxed  imputed  rental  values  should  be  treated  as  a  kind  of  tax  subsidies  (in 
economic  term)  to  owner-occupiers,  if  we  see  housing  subsidies  on  the  basis  of  tenure 
neutrality  (see  Hills  1991,  Holmans  and  Whitehead  1998).  The  measurement  of 
untaxed  imputed  rents  as  well  as  the  capital  gains  tax  exemption  to  owner-occupiers  in 
Scotland  is  discussed  in  Chapter  Five. 
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In  the  current  subsidy  system,  there  are  several  subsidy  schemes  available  to  public 
and  private  tenants.  Housing  Benefit  (HB)  is  undoubtedly  the  most  important  subsidy 
to  help  with  tenants'  housing  costs.  Housing  Benefit  is  a  means  tested  subsidy,  so 
applicants  must  have  relatively  low  incomes  to  qualify.  The  current  Housing  Benefit 
scheme  was  introduced  in  1988,  following  a  rationalisation  of  the  means  test 
requirements  for  different  types  of  benefits.  In  that  year,  the  means  test  was  made  as 
the  same  as  for  income  support  (for  unemployed  households)  and  family  credit  (for 
low-income  working  households)  (Harriott  and  Matthews  1998). 
Table  3.9  presents  Housing  Benefit  to  tenants  in  Scotland  over  the  last  decade.  It 
clearly  shows  that  Housing  Benefit  plays  an  important  role  in  subsidising  tenants  in 
terms  of  the  number  of  claimants  and  average  Housing  Benefit.  It  is  undoubtedly  the 
case  that  the  local  authority  rented  sector  has  the  highest  number  of  Housing  Benefit 
claimants  since  this  sector  remains  the  second  largest  tenure  in  Scotland.  It  was  found 
that  more  than  three  quarters  of  new  council  tenants  and  about  70%  of  new  housing 
association  tenants  received  full  or  partial  Housing  Benefit  between  1995  and  1997 
(Hardin  1997,  SFHA  1998).  Since  the  1990s,  the  number  of  Housing  Benefit 
claimants  in  council  housing  has  reduced,  probably  because  many  council  tenant 
claimants  have  been  transferred  to  the  housing  association  sector  under  the  Large 
Scale  Voluntary  Transfer  scheme.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  partly  because  the  rise  in 
incomes  and  employment  or  the  age  cohort  effect  in  council  housing.  It  is  noted  that 
the  number  of  private  tenants  in  receipt  of  Housing  Benefit  has  steadily  reduced  after 
1996,  which  Wilcox  (2000)  claims  that  because  of  the  introduction  of  local  reference 
rent  and  the  single  room  rent  in  1996.  The  local  reference  rent  and  single  room  rent 
set  up  the  rent  ceiling  for  people  who  want  to  claim  Housing  Benefit  in  the  private 
rented  sector.  As  a  result,  many  private  tenants  have  a  restriction  of  the  amount  of 
new  rent  that  is  eligible  for  Housing  Benefit. 
In  Scotland,  the  average  amount  of  Housing  Benefit  received  by  private  tenants  is 
much  higher  than  social  tenants.  In  1999,  eligible  council  tenants  received  an  average 
Housing  Benefit  of  £34.4  per  week  to  pay  for  their  rents,  which  only  accounted  for 
two  third  of  the  amount  (£53.9)  received  by  private  tenants.  This  may  indicate  a  big 
82 rent  gap  between  social  renting  and  private  renting  as  Housing  Benefit  usually  covers 
partial  or  full  rents.  Furthermore  the  average  amount  of  Housing  Benefit  received  by 
private  tenants  has  been  significantly  increased  in  the  1990s,  partly  because  of  a  rapid 
increase  in  private  rents.  In  addition,  a  steady  increase  in  the  average  Housing  Benefit 
to  eligible  tenants  in  both  the  public  and  the  private  rented  sectors  may  reflect  a  fact 
that  the  benefit  recipients  have  increasingly  depended  upon  the  state  benefit. 
Table  3.9  Housing  Benefit  to  Tenants  in  Scotland,  1988-1999 
Number  of  Recipients  (000s)  Average  Weekly  HB  (E) 
Year  Council  HA  Private  Council  HA  Private 
tenants  tenants  tenants  tenants  tenants  tenants 
1988  496  -  -  13.76  -  - 
1989  478  -  -  15.75  -  - 
1990  467  -  -  17.71  -  - 
1991  466  -  -  19.87  -  - 
1992  461  17  61  22.13  25.40  36.90 
1993  458  28  57  23.79  27.10  41.20 
1994  450  32  68  24.84  31.30  44.00 
1995  434  40  70  26.25  32.90  47.30 
1996  424  54  68  28.60  33.40  51.80 
1997  405  63  65  31.90  34.00  50.30 
1998  388  75  57  32.70  35.80  51.60 
1999  375  80  52  34.40  38.20  53.90 
Sources:  Wilcox  et  al.  (1998),  Wilcox  (1999),  (2000). 
Notes:  Separate  statistics  for  housing  association  tenants  receiving  Housing  Benefit 
have  only  been  collected  since  May  1992. 
All  figures  are  for  the  May  of  the  year.  The  early  figures  probably 
underestimate  the  number  of  housing  association  cases. 
In  Scotland,  the  average  amount  of  Housing  Benefit  received  by  council  tenants  is  not 
significantly  different  from  housing  association  tenants.  However,  in  England,  the 
average  Housing  Benefit  received  by  housing  association  tenants  is  much  higher  than 
the  benefit  received  by  council  tenants.  According  to  the  Department  of  Social 
Security  in  1999,  housing  association  tenants  in  England  received  an  average  Housing 
Benefit  of  £54.6  per  week  compared  to  £40  for  council  tenants.  In  the  same  year, 
housing  association  tenants  in  Scotland  received  an  average  of  £38.2  per  week 
compared  to  £34.2  per  week  for  council  tenants.  This  reflects  different  rent  levels  and 
the  different  developments  of  the  housing  association  sector  between  England  and 
Scotland.  While  the  rent  level  and  the  development  of  the  housing  association  sector 
83 in  England  have  gradually  caught  up  with  the  private  rented  sector,  Scottish  housing 
associations  still  retain  a  close  relationship  with  the  local  authority  rented  sector. 
In  addition  to  Housing  Benefit  subsidy  to  tenants,  social  tenants  also  benefit  from  the 
below  market  rent  subsidies  if  we  treat  housing  subsidies  on  the  basis  of  tenure 
neutrality.  Private  regulated  tenants  also  benefit  from  below  market  fair  rent  subsidies 
under  the  concept  of  tenure  neutrality.  However,  it  is  difficult  to  measure  these 
subsidies  in  real  terms.  The  measurement  of  below  market  rent  subsidies  to  social 
tenants  and  private  regulated  tenants  is  discussed  in  Chapter  Five. 
3.4.3  Housing  Subsidies  to  Social  Housing  Suppliers 
Housing  subsidies  to  social  landlords  can  primarily  be  divided  into  general  subsidies 
to  local  authority  dwellings  and  capital  grants  to  housing  associations. 
3.4.3.1  General  Subsidies  to  Local  Authority  Dwellings 
The  central  government's  general  subsidies  to  local  authorities  are  to  reduce  the  cost 
of  local  authority  rented  dwellings.  These  subsidies  primarily  go  into  the  Housing 
Revenue  Account  (HRA).  The  1989  Housing  Act  introduced  a  new  financial  regime 
to  local  authorities  in  England  and  Wales  (activated  from  1990/9  1)  which  gives  more 
controlling  power  to  local  authorities  over  their  rents  and  expenditures  on  their 
dwellings  (Gibb,  Munro  and  Satsangi  1999).  On  the  other  hand,  central  government 
withdrew  general  subsidies  to  local  authority  dwellings.  The  gap  due  to  the  subsidy 
cutback  was  bridged  by  local  authorities'  revenue  income  primarily  through 
increasing  council  rents.  Therefore  we  have  seen  a  sharp  reduction  in  central 
government's  general  subsidies  (though  exchequer  subsidy  and  rate  fund  transfer)  in 
England  and  Wales,  specifically  subsidies  have  become  negative  (refund  from  local 
authorities'  revenue  account)  after  1994/95  (see  Table  3.10). 
However,  the  new  financial  regime  for  local  authorities  did  not  apply  to  Scottish  local 
authorities.  In  Scotland,  there  has  been  no  reform  for  the  local  authority  financial 
regime  to  date.  The  Scottish  local  authority  financial  system  currently  operating  bears 
more  similarity  to  the  English  system  of  the  1980s  than  that  of  the  1990s  (Gibb, 
Munro  and  Satsangi  1999).  The  central  government  continued  to  provide  a  large 
amount  of  funding  to  subsidise  Scottish  council  dwellings.  Even  though  the  central 
84 government's  general  subsidies  have  rapidly  reduced  since  mid-1990,  these  subsidies 
still  remained  positive  subsidies  (expenditures)  in  Scotland  rather  than  negative 
subsidies  (refund)  in  England.  By  1999/2000,  Scottish  local  authorities  received  £11 
million  from  the  central  government  to  subsidise  their  dwellings  compared  to  -£960 
millions  to  English  local  authorities. 
Table  3.10  General  Subsidies  to  Local  Authority  Housing  in  Scotland,  Compared 
to  England,  1988/89-1999/00 
(Em) 
Scotland  England 
Year  Exchequer  Rate  fund  Total  net  Exchequer  Rate  fund  Total  net 
subsidy  transfer  subsidy  subsidy  transfer  subsidy 
1988/89  55  25  80  535  309  844 
1989/90  65  10  76  636  83  719 
1990/91  58  8  67  1,156  -19  1,137 
1991/92  56  -1  55  873  -19  852 
1992/93  47  -1  47  508  -25  483 
1993/94  36  -2  34  121  -17  104 
1994/95  24  -2  23  -108  -19  -127 
1995/96  22  -3  19  -408  -28  -436 
1996/97  19  -2  17  -481  -44  -525 
1997/98  16  0  16  -563  -47  -610 
1998/99  13  0  13  -740  -65  -805 
1999/00  11  0  11  -884  -76  -960 
Source:  Wilcox  (2000) 
3.4.3.2  Subsidies  to  Housing  Associations 
Subsidies  to  housing  associations  are  mainly  through  capital  funding.  The  most 
important  capital  grant  to  housing  associations  is  known  as  the  housing  association 
grant  (HAG)  in  Scotland  (now  called  the  Social  Housing  Grant  in  England  and  Wales 
following  the  1996  Housing  Act).  The  Housing  Act  1988  and  Housing  (Scotland)  Act 
1988  introduced  a  new  financial  regime  to  housing  associations.  Under  the  new 
regime,  the  amount  of  HAG  is  determined  before  the  housing  association  scheme 
development,  and  would  not  cover  the  over-run  costs.  The  grant  rate  also  is  set  up  as 
a  fixed  percentage  of  the  development  costs.  In  other  words,  housing  associations 
need  to  manage  risks  in  their  schemes  and  need  to  seek  private  funds  to  bridge  the  gap 
between  the  public  funds  and  the  operating  costs  (Best  1997). 
In  Scotland,  housing  associations  registered  with  Scottish  Homes  are  eligible  for 
applying  Housing  Association  Grant.  Housing  associations  usually  bid  for  HAG  on 
the  basis  of  costs  against  agreed  limits  for  certain  types  of  development  and  an 
85 acceptable  rent  level  (Gibb  et  al.  1999).  The  capital  funds  need  to  be  scrutinised  by 
Scottish  Homes,  and  the  amount  of  scrutiny  is  based  on  housing  associations' 
performance  and  regulation  ratings  (ibid.  ).  Then  the  rest  of  the  capital  cost  for 
housing  associations'  development  scheme  needs  to  be  raised  from  private  financial 
institutions,  such  as  banks  and  building  societies.  In  England,  housing  associations 
registered  with  Housing  Corporation  are  eligible  for  Social  Housing  Grant.  The 
process  for  housing  associations'  bidding  for  SHG  is  similar  to  Scotland,  except  for 
some  small  housing  associations  and  associations  located  south  of  the  border  (ibid.  ). 
Table  3.11  Capital  Grants  to  Housing  Associations  in  Scotland,  Compared  to 
England,  1989/90-1998/99 
Scotland  England 
Year  Programme  Grant  rate  Programme  Grant  rate 
£m  %  £m  % 
1989/90  203  -  1,034  75 
1990/91  195  -  1,234  75 
1991/92  220  -  1,732  73 
1992/93  255  85  2,369  72 
1993/94  263  84  1,843  67 
1994/95  268  81  1,530  62 
1995/96  279  79  1,183  58 
1996/97  256  74  1,068  56 
1997/98  174  70  702  56 
1998/99  165  66  621  54 
Sources:  Wilcox  et  al.  (1998),  Wilcox  (2000). 
Notes:  Consistent  Scottish  figures  for  the  year  to  1991/92  are  not  available. 
In  Scotland  no  separate  HAG  rent  figures  exist  before  1992. 
In  order  that  housing  associations  can  be  self-sufficient  in  their  development  schemes, 
the  HAG  (and  SHG)  rate  has  reduced  annually  since  1990s.  Between  1992/93  and 
1998/99,  the  target  HAG  rate  was  reduced  from  85%  to  66%  in  Scotland  and  from 
72%  to  54%  in  England,  thus  the  capital  funding  has  been  sharply  cut  back  in  both 
countries  (see  Table  3.11).  In  other  words,  many  Scottish  housing  associations 
needed  to  borrow  one  third  of  capital  costs  from  the  private  sector  in  1998/99.  To 
cover  rising  private  loans,  many  housing  associations  have  increased  their  rents,  and 
this  may  explain  why  there  has  been  a  rapid  increase  in  housing  association  rents  in 
the  1990s. 
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The  government's  subsidies  to  private  housing  providers  have  primarily  depended 
upon  tax  incentives  and  capital  grants.  In  Scotland,  two  main  subsidies  have  been 
provided  to  private  housing  suppliers  to  help  with  their  rented  dwellings  over  the  last 
decade.  These  two  subsidy  schemes  are  the  Business  Expansion  Scheme  (BES)  and 
Grants  for  Rent  and  Ownership  (GRO). 
The  Business  Expansion  Scheme  was  originally  set  up  to  help  new  manufacturing 
companies  to  raise  venture  capital.  From  1988  to  1993,  the  BES  was  extended  to 
unquoted  companies  letting  assured  tenancies,  thus  providing  tax  incentives  for 
individuals  to  buy  shares  in  companies  letting  in  the  newly  deregulated  market  (Crook 
and  Kemp 
, 
1996).  Under  the  BES,  assured  tenancy  companies  can  raise  up  to  £5 
million  in  a  tax  year.  Individuals  who  buy  shares  in  these  assured  tenancy  companies 
can  get  income  tax  relief  up  to  £40,000  in  any  one  tax  year  and  are  eligible  for  capital 
gains  tax  relief  on  any  chargeable  real  gains  arising  from  the  disposal  of  their  shares  in 
the  future  (ibid.  ).  The  BES  also  has  regulations  for  shareholders  as  well  as  assured 
tenancy  companies.  Shareholders  must  hold  their  shares  for  at  least  five  years  and  the 
companies  must  let  on  assured  tenancies  for  at  least  four  years  (ibid.  ).  Between  1988 
and  1993,  there  were  £119  million  invested  in  BES  assured  tenancy  companies  in 
Scotland  (Wilcox  et  al.  1998). 
GRO  grant,  introduced  in  1990,  is  a  deficit  subsidy  for  private  operating  in  Scotland 
and  the  grant  is  available  through  Scottish  Homes  that  has  no  parallel  in  England. 
GRO  grant  is  designed  to  provide  private  builders  with  a  secured  and  pre-determined 
rate  of  return  on  agreed  projects  so  that  they  will  build  in  areas  that  they  would  not 
otherwise  consider  to  be  attractive  (Gibb,  Istephan  and  Kemp  1997).  In  other  words, 
the  grant  is  used  to  correct  problems  of  market  failure  in  declining  areas.  The  grants 
are  mainly  used  to  support  three  types  of  projects  (Munro  and  Gibb  1996,  p.  100): 
"  In  rural  areas,  where  speculative  building  has  been  seen  as  too  risky  or  as 
too  costly; 
"  To  provide  low-cost  housing  in  pressured  market  areas  where  new  houses 
are  generally  beyond  the  reach  of  lower  income  purchases; 
"  To  contribute  towards  tenure  diversification  in  large  estates  and  renewal  in 
urban  areas,  through  either  new-build  or  rehabilitation. 
87 The  GRO  grant  for  market  rented  housing  is  now  discontinued.  The  grant  for  owner- 
occupation  has  been  suspended.  Between  1990/91  and  1995/96,  Scottish  Homes 
funded  211  projects  (2,126  dwellings)  for  market  rented  sector  through  the  GRO  grant 
(Gibb,  Istephan  and  Kemp  1997). 
3.4.5  A  Comparison  of  Housing  Subsidies  across  Tenures 
A  review  of  public  expenditures  on  housing  subsidies  in  the  1990s  shows  a  clear 
picture  of  a  reduction  in  fiscal  support  for  general  subsidies  but  a  large  increase  in 
means  tested  assistance  towards  housing  costs,  principally  in  the  form  of  Housing 
Benefit  and  also  through  income  support  for  mortgage  interest  payments.  These 
changes  have  significantly  influenced  housing  subsidies  to  households  across  tenures 
in  Scotland  (see  Figure  3.7). 
Due  to  a  diminishing  mortgage  interest  tax  relief,  the  average  amount  of  subsidies  to 
owner-occupiers  have  been  sharply  reduced.  Meanwhile  income  support  help  with 
mortgage  interest  payments  has  fallen  since  the  mid-1990s.  This  has  been  partly  the 
result  of  falling  unemployment  and  interest  rates,  and  partly  due  to  the  new 
restrictions  to  ISMI  introduced  in  October  1995  (Wilcox  1999).  On  the  contrary,  the 
cost  of  Housing  Benefit  to  council  tenants  and  private  tenants  has  steadily  increased. 
In  particular,  the  growth  rate  of  Housing  Benefit  to  private  tenants  was  faster  than  that 
to  council  tenants.  This  is  partly  a  result  of  a  rapid  increase  in  private  rents  in  recent 
years.  In  1997  and  1998,  average  subsidies  (mainly  ISMI)  to  owner-occupiers  were 
lower  than  to  council  tenants  in  receipt  of  Housing  Benefit,  let  alone  the  higher 
Housing  Benefits  received  by  private  tenants.  For  example,  in  1998,  eligible  owner- 
occupiers  received  average  subsidies  £31.5  per  week  (£28.2  from  ISMI)  compared  to 
£32.7  and  £51.6  per  week  of  Housing  Benefit  to  eligible  council  tenants  and  private 
tenants  respectively.  However,  one  should  note  that  the  number  of  ISMI  claimants 
only  accounted  for  a  very  small  proportion  (2%  in  1998)  of  total  mortgaged 
homeowners  compared  to  more  than  half  of  social  tenants  and  one  third  of  private 
tenants  in  receipt  of  Housing  Benefit. 
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Figure  3.7  Housing  Subsidies  to  Households  across  Tenures,  1990-1998 
Sources:  Wilcox  et  al.  (1998),  Wilcox  (2000) 
Notes:  MIRAS:  mortgage  interest  relief  at  source;  ISMI:  income  support  for  mortgage 
interest;  HB:  Housing  Benefit 
Moreover,  the  housing  subsidies  presented  above  are  the  government  expenditures 
direct  to  households  to  reduce  their  housing  costs.  To  some  extent,  these  subsidies 
can  be  called  cash-flow  subsidies,  as  Hancock  and  Munro  (1992)  suggest.  In  a 
discussion  of  the  distributional  effect  of  housing  subsidies  between  tenures,  studies 
have  emphasised  economic  subsidies  rather  than  cash  flow  subsidies  (see  for  example 
Rosenthal  1977,  Robinson  1981,  Hills  1991,  Maclennan,  Gibb  and  More  1991,  and 
Hancock  and  Munro  1992).  As  Hills  suggests,  economic  subsidies  to  owner- 
occupiers  consist  of  capital  gains  tax  exemption  and  untaxed  imputed  rents.  For  social 
tenants,  economic  subsidies  include  the  below  market  rent  subsidies.  The  concept  of 
economic  subsidies  is  used  in  this  thesis  to  model  the  subsidy  effect  on  households' 
tenure  decisions.  As  O'Sullivan  (1984)  suggests,  the  definition  of  formal  subsidy  (or 
called  economic  subsidy  in  this  thesis)  is  theoretically  more  acceptable,  and  the 
measures  of  (economic)  subsidy  have  more  effective  impacts  on  housing  finance 
system.  Also,  these  measures  are  consistent  with  household  reallocation  decisions  as 
well  as  tenure  shift.  The  distributional  effect  of  economic  subsidies  as  well  as  cash 
now  subsidies  between  tenures  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  Seven. 
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Over  the  last  two  decades,  housing  in  Scotland  has  developed  in  a  different  pattern 
from  housing  in  the  rest  of  Great  Britain,  and  this  has  been  shown  in  different  tenure 
structure  and  housing  market  conditions.  The  growth  of  owner-occupied  housing  in 
Scotland  is  significantly  faster  than  in  England  and  Wales.  The  historical  importance 
of  Scotland's  public  rented  sector  is  greater  than  the  other  two  countries.  Housing 
associations  in  Scotland  are  relatively  young  and  small  in  size  compared  to  housing 
associations  in  England.  Scotland's  share  of  private  renting  dwellings  to  the  total 
housing  stock  is  the  lowest  among  the  three  nations,  and  there  is  a  substantial  number 
of  private  unfurnished  and  tied  housing  located  in  rural  Scotland. 
The  change  in  tenure  pattern  in  Scotland  has  influenced  its  housing  market.  Unlike 
the  housing  market  in  England  and  Wales,  which  suffered  a  great  fluctuation  during 
the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s,  the  Scottish  housing  market  had  much  greater  stability. 
We  have  seen  a  steady  growth  of  private  new  house  building  over  the  last  two  decades. 
A  stable  economy  and  continuously  growing  demand  for  owner-occupied  housing 
have  led  the  Scottish  housing  market  to  be  less  fluctuating  than  the  housing  markets  in 
England  and  Wales.  House  prices  in  Scotland  grew  steadily  and  housing  transactions 
remained  more  stable  than  in  the  other  two  countries. 
In  addition,  there  are  some  rationing  factors  which  influence  households'  tenure 
preferences  and  housing  market  conditions.  In  the  owner-occupied  sector,  mortgage 
finance  is  the  main  constraint  for  most  homebuyers.  After  deregulation  of  the 
financial  market,  the  mortgage  rationing  has  been  focused  on  price  mechanism.  The 
price  to  income  ratio,  loan  to  price  ratio  and  loan  to  income  ratio  are  the  three 
common  criteria  for  building  societies  and  banks  to  evaluate  mortgage  borrowers' 
liability.  Since  Scotland  has  a  stable  housing  market,  these  three  ratios  have  been  less 
fluctuating  than  those  in  the  rest  of  the  UK.  The  allocation  system  acts  as  the 
gatekeeper  of  the  social  rented  sector.  Scotland's  social  housing  allocation  system 
presents  its  unique  characteristics  to  mainly  house  people  with  socio-economic 
disadvantages  and  in  special  needs.  Rationing  in  the  private  rented  sector  mainly 
depends  upon  the  rent  and  deposit.  However,  due  to  some  private  landlords'  certain 
90 letting  preferences,  young  and  single  people  or  households  in  receipt  of  Housing 
Benefit  may  have  difficulty  in  renting  a  home  in  Scotland. 
Housing  subsidies  also  play  an  important  role  in  the  changes  in  tenure  mix  and 
housing  market  conditions.  There  has  been  a  switch  of  the  government's  housing 
subsidy  policy  from  general  subsidies  to  means  tested  subsidies  in  the  last  decades. 
The  most  significant  changes  have  been  the  phasing  out  mortgage  interest  tax  relief 
and  a  rapid  increase  in  Housing  Benefit  expenditures.  In  Scotland,  the  average 
Housing  Benefit  to  social  tenants  was  higher  than  the  average  mortgage  interest  tax 
relief  and  income  support  for  mortgage  payments  to  owner-occupiers  in  recent  years. 
The  unique  financial  system  in  the  Scottish  social  rented  sector  also  continues  to 
benefit  social  tenants.  It  is  noted  that  the  use  of  economic  subsidies  rather  than  cash 
flow  subsidies  is  more  appropriate  in  estimating  the  household's  tenure  decision  as 
well  as  the  distributional  effect  of  housing  subsidies  between  tenures. 
The  discussions  above  provide  us  with  an  analysis  of  the  Scottish  tenure  structure  and 
the  housing  market  conditions  which  differ  from  the  rest  of  Great  Britain.  These 
unique  characteristics  in  the  Scottish  housing  market  should  help  to  construct  the 
explanatory  variables  of  the  tenure  choice  models  in  Chapter  Five.  In  particular,  the 
three  mortgage  ratios  can  be  used  to  construct  the  mortgage  rationing  variable;  the 
criteria  of  the  allocation  system  can  apply  to  the  social  housing  rationing  variable  in 
the  tenure  choice  models.  In  economic  terms,  housing  subsidies  are  more  suitable  in 
estimating  the  housing  subsidy  effect  on  households'  tenure  choice  behaviour  than, 
housing  subsidies  in  cash  terms.  Moreover,  the  analysis  of  Scottish  tenure  patterns 
and  the  housing  market  conditions  in  this  chapter  can  provide  some  expectations  to 
the  estimation  results  of  Scottish  households'  tenure  choice  behaviour  as  discussed  in 
Chapter  Six  and  also  to  the  outcome  of  policy  analysis  derived  from  the  1996  Scottish 
House  Condition  Survey  covered  in  Chapter  Seven.  Further  chapters  will  focus  on 
tenure  choice  model  development,  data  and  variables  applied  to  the  tenure  choice 
models  and  an  analysis  of  the  model  results. 
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In  this  chapter,  two  models  with  different  structures  are  developed  in  order  to  estimate 
the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour.  The  first  model  discusses  a  one-level  choice 
model  analysing  the  household's  tenure  choice  and  its  determining  factors.  The 
second  model  consists  of  a  hierarchical  choice  structure  to  estimate  the  household's 
move-stay  decision  and  tenure  choice.  This  chapter  is  organised  into  three  sections. 
The  first  section  discusses  the  one-level  choice  model  of  tenure  choice.  The  second 
section  is  the  hierarchical  choice  model  of  mobility  and  tenure  choice,  and  a  brief 
summary  forms  the  last  section. 
4.1  The  Model  of  Tenure  Choice 
As  discussed  in  chapter  two,  tenure  choice  theory  is  derived  from  the  theories  of 
consumer  choice  and  housing  demand.  The  structure  of  the  tenure  choice  model  in 
this  chapter  is  based  on  a  consumer  choice  and  housing  demand  model.  The  first  part 
of  this  section  discusses  the  theoretical  framework  of  the  tenure  choice  model.  The 
multiple  tenure  choice  function  is  then  derived  and,  finally,  a  multinomial  logit 
functional  form  is  selected  to  estimate  household  tenure  choice  behaviour 
4.1.1  Theoretical  Framework 
The  theoretical  framework  of  the  tenure  choice  model  is  illustrated  in  Figure  4.1.  In 
this  structure,  a  household's  housing  demand  decision  and  its  tenure  choice  are 
interdependent,  which  has  been  discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  Two.  More  attention 
will  be  paid  to  tenure  choice  in  this  chapter.  The  choice  of  tenure  in  Britain  can 
simply  be  classified  into  three  main  groups:  owner-occupation,  social  renting,  and 
private  renting. 
The  household's  tenure  choice  is influenced  by  a  variety  of  factors.  Summarised  from 
Chapter  Two  and  Chapter  Three,  this  framework  suggests  that  a  household's  tenure 
decision  is  influenced  by  the  household's  socio-economic  characteristics,  expected 
mobility,  previous  tenure  status,  location,  neighbourhood  quality,  the  user  cost  of 
capital,  housing  subsidies  and  rationing  factors.  The  household's  socio-economic 
92 characteristics  generally  include  the  household  head's  age,  sex,  marital  status, 
employment,  income  and  also  the  size  of  household.  The  user  cost  of  capital  is  the 
relative  cost  of  owning  or  renting.  Moreover,  in  Britain  the  household's  tenure  choice 
is  deeply  influenced  by  housing  policy  and  subsidy  programmes.  For  example, 
income  related  assistance  would  change  households'  housing  costs  and  their  budget 
constraints,  thus  altering  their  tenure  decisions.  The  detailed  measurement  of  these 
variables  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  Five. 
Consumer  Choice 
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Figure  4.1  The  Structure  of  the  Tenure  Choice  Model 
In  addition  to  those  factors,  households  could  face  some  constraints  in  accessing 
different  tenures.  As  discussed  in  previous  chapters,  mortgage  rationing  factors,  for 
example  the  loan-to-value  ratio,  the  loan-to-income  ratio  and  price-to-income  ratio 
imposed  by  banks  and  building  societies,  are  the  most  common  constraints  to 
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the  allocation  schemes  applied  in  the  social  rented  sector,  constrain  some  household's 
ability  to  access  this  sector.  As  stated  in  Chapter  Three,  the  allocation  system  in  the 
social  rented  sector  is  to  encourage  households  in  low-income  and  in  special  needs  to 
have  more  opportunities  to  live  in  affordable  homes.  In  certain  contexts, 
administrative  rationing  does  set  priorities  to  limit  some  households'  access  to  social 
housing.  Compared  to  owner-occupation  and  social  renting,  households  are  less 
constrained  to  enter  or  leave  the  private  rented  sector,  except  for  the  rent  and  deposit 
constraints.  In  Britain,  the  private  rented  sector  plays  an  important  transitional  role 
between  owner-occupation  and  social  renting. 
4.1.2  Tenure  Choice  Function 
Based  on  the  model  framework,  the  tenure  choice  function  is  derived  from  a  standard 
housing  demand  function.  Thus  tenure  choice  can  be  seen  as  a  function  of  a  vector  of 
determining  variables,  as  expressed  in  equation  (1). 
Ti  =  [H,  M,  C,  S,  PT,  L,  N,  R]  (1) 
where  T  denotes  choice  for  tenure  j;  H  is household  characteristics;  M  is  household's 
expected  mobility;  C  is  the  user  cost  of  capital;  S  is  housing  subsidy,  PT  is  previous 
tenure  status,  L  is  location,  N  is  neighbourhood  quality  and  R  is  the  rationing  factor. 
Further,  the  tenure  choice  function  is  assumed  to  satisfy  the  principle  of  consumer 
choice  behaviour  so  that  a  household  chooses  a  tenure  alternative  in  that  the  level  of 
utility  derived  from  the  choice  is  maximised  subject  to  budget  constraints.  The 
maximum  utility  function  for  household  i  choosing  tenure  j  is  expressed  as: 
Ui,  =V  [H,  M,  C,  S,  PT,  L,  N,  R]+E  (2) 
=V';;  +Eli  (3) 
where  V  *U  is  the  deterministic  component  of  the  utility  of  household  i  choosing  tenure 
j  alternative,  and  si  is  an  error  term.  The  model  of  tenure  choice  is  formulated  on  the 
basis  of  equation  (3). 
94 Then,  based  on  the  random  utility  function,  the  probability  of  a  household  i  choosing 
tenure  alternative  j  can  be  expressed  as: 
Pu  =  Pr(U.  >  Uj 
for  i#  J',  j,  j'E  J 
(4) 
Where,  j  andj'=l,...  J.  J  denotes  the  set  of  alternatives  available  to  household  i.  In 
this  case  J=3,  denoting  three  main  tenures. 
Substitution  of  equation  (3)  into  equation  (4)  yields: 
P  =, 
)4V,  +su  >  vi,  +Eý,  ) 
=Prsiý,  <v  +E;  y  -r'  .  (5) 
Subject  to  the  logical  condition  assuming  that  the  sum  of  all  J  choice  probabilities 
J 
should  be  exactly  equal  to  1,  denoting  as  P,  =1. 
The  actual  calculation  of  the  choice  probabilities  depends  heavily  upon  the 
assumption  of  the  probability  distribution  of  the  error  term  E,  (Maddala  1983).  Based 
on  above  conditions,  it  is  necessary  to  find  a  suitable  discrete  choice  model  in  order  to 
analyse  the  multiple  tenure  choice  function. 
4.1.3  The  Discrete  Choice  Model 
The  model  of  tenure  choice  in  this  chapter  contains  a  multiple-choice  function  and 
also  the  choice  for  tenure  is  a  discrete  choice  rather  than  a  continuous  choice. 
Therefore,  a  discrete  choice  model  is  employed  to  estimate  the  probability  of  a 
household  choosing  a  tenure  alternative  among  three  tenures.  The  model  selection 
and  the  derivation  of  model  functional  form  and  the  test  of  independence  of  irrelevant 
alternative  property  are  discussed  below. 
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As  stated  in  Chapter  Two,  a  wide  range  of  discrete  choice  models  have  been 
developed  to  estimate  tenure  choice  behaviour  during  the  past  two  decades.  Among 
discrete  choice  models,  the  multinomial  logit  model  (MNL),  the  multinomial  probit 
model  (MNP),  and  the  nested  multinomial  logit  model  (NMNL)  are  the  most  widely 
used  models  in  housing  decision  and  tenure  choice  analysis,  as  discussed  in  Chapter 
Two.  Among  these  three  types  of  models,  the  MNL  model  provides  a  convenient 
simple  form  for  the  probabilities  without  any  requirement  of  multivariate  integration. 
Furthermore,  the  likelihood  function  for  the  multinomial  logit  specification  is  globally 
concave,  which  allows  for  an  easy  computation  (McFadden  1973).  Because  of  its 
simple  structure,  the  interpretation  of  the  MNL  model  is  more  straightforward  than  the 
NMNL  model  and  the  MNP  model. 
However,  the  MNL  model  has  a  widely  known  limitation  which  regards  the  violation 
of  independence  from  irrelevant  alternative  (IIA)  property.  According  to  Hausman 
and  McFadden  (1984),  the  IIA  property  states  that  "the  ratio  of  the  probabilities  of 
choosing  any  two  alternatives  is independent  of  the  attributes  of  any  other  alternatives 
in  the  choice  set"  (p.  1219).  Many  housing  researchers  have  pointed  out  that  the  IIA 
property  can  easily  be  violated  in  the  MNL  model  of  housing  choice  (see  for  example, 
Boehm  1982,  Quigley  1985,  Bursch-Supan  and  Pitkin  1988,  and  Tu  and  Goldfinch 
1996).  They  indicate  that  in  the  housing  choice  analysis,  the  relative  probability  of  a 
buyer  choosing  two  dwelling  alternatives  might  be  influenced  by  the  existence  of  the 
third  dwelling,  and  thus  it  violates  the  IIA  property  of  using  the  MNL  model. 
The  multinomial  probit  (MNP)  model  is  an  alternative  model  which  satisfies  the  IIA 
assumption.  But  the  use  of  the  MNP  model  has  been  limited  due  to  the  requirement 
that  multivariate  normal  integrals  must  be  evaluated  to  estimate  the  unknown 
parameters  (Hausman  and  McFadden  1984).  Because  of  its  complexity,  the  MNP 
model  does  not  provide  a  specification  test  as  convenient  as  the  MNL  model.  Another 
model  maintaining  the  IIA  property  is  the  nested  multinomial  logit  model  (NMNL), 
which  has  been  widely  applied  to  many  housing  choice  studies  (see  Quigley  1985, 
Börsch-Supan  and  Pitkin  1988,  Tu  and  Goldfinch  1996).  The  NMNL  model  requires 
an  assumption  of  a  hierarchy  level  (two  or  more  levels)  of  choice  alternatives,  which 
is  only  suitable  for  a  model  with  a  hierarchical  choice  framework. 
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choice  behaviour  among  three  tenures.  Thus  this  model  contains  a  one-level  choice 
framework  and  it  does  not  require  an  assumption  of  hierarchical  choices.  As  a  result, 
the  multinomial  logit  model  is  suitable  for  the  first  model  of  tenure  choice.  However, 
this  model  needs  to  overcome  the  IIA  problem. 
4.1.3.2  Multinomial  Logit  Model  Functional  form 
The  functional  form  of  the  multinomial  logit  model  can  be  derived  on  the  basis  of 
equation  (5).  According  to  Maddala  (1983),  if  the  residuals  e  are  identically  and 
independently  distributed,  the  cumulative  distribution  function  (CDF)  of  is 
expressed  as: 
F(,  6,  <.  a.  )  =  exp(-  E')  (6) 
the  probability  density  function  (PDF)  is  as: 
(E, 
ý)  =  exp(-Eli  -eEir 
) 
ýýý 
Then  equation  (5)  can  be  written  as: 
Py  =PI(Eý,  <Ey  +Vy  -V,  )  for  all  j 
= 
fflF(c, 
+Vd  -VV,  )  "f  (Ej)deij  (8) 
where  F(")  and  f  (")  are  given  by  equation  (6)  and  (7),  respectively.  Now 
fJF(e,  +Vy  -J,  )-f(Ey)=JJexpE-e-6'-v1+yll)exp(-c,  -e7"') 
j'#I 
. 
i'#J 
V.  0 
=ex  E,  ý  -e 
ýy  1+Zepy  (9) 
p#  fe 
If  we  let 
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eY  4  =1  l+ýey  =1 
ý4 
y 
then  equation  (8)  can  be  expressed  as: 
Pi  =f  exp(  e-e 
(--l- 
l)ýeu 
=  exp(-  AJJ  exp(  g  *,  _e-e*y 
ý£ 
=exp(-; 
VU 
e 
e 
yJ' 
j=l 
where  6  *y  =6u  -A;  ý 
(io) 
(11) 
Equation  (11)  is  the  general  functional  form  of  the  MNL  model.  Where,  VV  is  a  vector 
of  explanatory  variables  describing  tenure  choice  and  J  represents  all  tenure  choice 
alternatives.  In  this  thesis,  J=3  denoting  three  tenures.  Equation  (11)  is  interpreted 
as  the  probability  of  household  i  when  faced  with  J  choice  set  with  V  vector  of 
explanatory  variables,  will  choose  j  tenure  alternative. 
The  general  functional  form  of  the  MNL  model  in  equation  (11)  can  also  be  expressed 
as: 
P,  j= 
[exr('ci)}/[±exir'.  )] 
(12) 
forj,  j'=1....  J 
If  we  let 
Vg  7  akX  X13) 
98 where  Xk  denotes  a  variable  of  kth  attribute  specific  to  household  i,  and  /3k  is  a 
corresponding  taste  parameter  to  be  estimated,  then  equation  (12)  can  be  rewritten  as: 
Pj  = 
[ex(ßJkXk')l  2: 
eX 
2:  ßj, 
kXik  (14) 
k  j'=1  k 
for  all  j j'=1...  J. 
The  log  likelihood  method  is  employed  to  estimate  the  multinomial  logit  model  as 
presented  in  equation  (15).  According  to  Greene  (2000),  the  log  likelihood  function 
can  be  derived  by  defining,  for  each  household,  dy  1  if  tenure  alternative  j  is  chosen 
by  household  i,  and  di  =O  if  not,  for  the  J+1  possible  outcomes.  Then,  for  each  i,  one 
and  only  one  of  the  d,  's  is  one. 
J 
1nL  = 
ZEdy  1nP 
i  j=0 
Then  the  first  derivatives  are: 
(is) 
ö1nL 
_ 
ýr 
a 
l;  -i 
}, 
forj=l,..  J  (16) 
The  second  derivative  matrix  has  Y  blocks,  each  K  by  K. 
a21nL 
-E  [  (j  )  ]ý  '  (17)  afliafl,  i=l 
where  16=1)  equals  1  if  j  equals  1  and  0  if  not. 
4.1.3.3  Testing  the  Independence  of  Irrelevant  Alternative  Property 
The  functional  form  of  the  MNL  model  implies  the  necessary  and  sufficient 
characterisation,  termed  the  independence  of  irrelevant  alternative  property,  which 
means  that  the  ratio  of  probabilities  of  choosing  any  two  alternatives  is  independent  of 
the  attributes  or  the  availability  of  a  third  alternatives,  presented  as  follows:  (Hausman 
and  McFadden  1984) 
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where  iEScC  and 
P(S  z,  C,  ß)  =  1:  P(.  jlz,  C,  ß)  (19) 
JEA 
where  C=  {1....  }  is  a  full  choice  set;  S  is  a  subset  of  C;  i  j,  are  alternatives  in  C;  z  is  a 
K-vector  of  explanatory  variables  describing  tenure  choice;  ß  is  aK  -vector  parameters 
to  be  estimated. 
With  respect  to  testing  the  IIA  property,  Hausman  and  McFadden  (1984)  suggest  an 
alternative  specification-error  test  for  the  11A  property.  They  indicate: 
If  a  subset  of  the  choice  set  truly  is  irrelevant,  omitting  it  from  the 
model  altogether  will  not  change  parameter  estimates  systematically. 
Inclusion  of  these  choices  will  be  inefficient  but  will  not  lead  to 
inconsistency.  But  the  remaining  odds  ratios  are  not  truly  independent 
of  these  alternatives,  the  parameter  estimates  obtained  when  these 
choices  are  eliminated  will  be  inconsistent  (quoted  from  Greene  2000,  p. 
865) 
Greene  (2000)  states  that  assuming  c  is  the  full  choice  set,  and  s  is  a  proper  subset  of  c. 
Let  j6,  be  the  parameter  estimate  obtained  by  maximum  likelihood  estimation  on  the 
full  choice  set  c,  and  V,  denotes  the  estimate  covariance  matrix.  Let  8,  and  V,  be  the 
corresponding  estimates  for  maximum  likelihood  estimation  applied  to  the  restricted 
A 
choice  set  s.  Under  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  IIA  property  holds,  /  -,  ß,  is  a 
consistent  estimator  of  zero.  Under  the  alternative  specification  where  the  IIA  fails,  it 
is  not  zero.  Under  the  null  hypothesis,  has  an  estimated  covariance  matrix 
V, 
- 
V,.  Thus,  the  statistic  is: 
2  (/ 
AAAAjAA 
x  -Vas  -ý13c) 
(V 
-Vý) 
(i-i 
c  (20) 
100 The  statistic  is  asymptotically  distributed  as  chi-square  with  degree  of  freedom  equal 
to  the  rank  of  V, 
- 
V,. 
Another  specification  test  of  IIA  property  suggested  by  Hausman  and  McFadden  is  to 
apply  the  nested  logit  model  (currently  called  nested  multinomial  logit  model).  The 
nested  multinomial  logit  model  provides  an  optimal  test  procedure  for  1IA  property. 
Studies  like  Hausman-McFadden  (1984)  and  Quigley  (1985)  indicate  that  the 
parameter  of  inclusive  values  can  be  used  to  test  the  IIA  property  in  the  nested 
multinomial  logit  model.  The  test  of  IIA  property  in  the  nested  multinomial  logit 
model  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  section. 
In  summary,  this  section  introduces  a  model  to  analyse  the  household's  tenure  choice 
behaviour.  In  Britain,  the  household's  tenure  choice  can  be  simply  classified  into 
three  alternatives:  owner-occupation,  social  renting  and  private  renting.  Based  on  this 
structure,  a  multinomial  logit  model  is  employed  to  estimate  the  multiple  tenure 
choice  function.  The  multinomial  logit  model  provides  a  simple  functional  form  and 
allows  for  easy  computation.  Because  of  its  simple structure,  the  interpretation  of  the 
multinomial  logit  model  is  more  straightforward  than  other  discrete  choice  models. 
As  a  result,  the  multinomial  logit  model  is  suitable  for  the  first  model  to  directly 
interpret  the  influence  of  the  determinants  on  tenure  choice.  However,  the 
multinomial  logit  model  has  its  weakness  in  terms  of  violating  the  11A  assumption. 
Therefore,  the  multinomial  logit  functional  form  of  tenure  choice  model  needs  to  be 
improved.  A  model  with  more  complex  functional  form  than  the  MNL  model  is 
introduced  in  the  following  section. 
4.2  The  Model  of  Mobility  and  Tenure  Choice 
As  an  improvement  of  the  first  model,  the  second  model  provides  a  decision  tree  to 
analyse  the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour  given  its  moving/stay  decision.  The 
theoretical  framework,  the  hierarchical  level  of  mobility  and  tenure  choice  function 
and  the  selection  of  the  hierarchical  choice  model  and  its  functional  form  are 
discussed  in  turn. 
101 4.2.1  Theoretical  Framework 
As  discussed  in  Chapter  Two,  the  relationship  between  the  household's  decision  to 
move  and  the  choice  of  tenure  is  interdependent.  Some  studies  have  suggested  that 
the  household's  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice  is  a  joint  choice  (see  for  example 
Boehm  1981,  Zorn  1988,  Ioannides  and  Kan  1996).  Some  applied  a  hierarchical 
choice  function  to  estimate  the  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice  (see  Clark  and 
Onaka  1985,  Deurloo,  Dieleman  and  Clark  1987).  This  chapter  assumes  that  a 
household's  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice  can  be  seen  as  a  hierarchical  choice 
function.  The  structure  of  the  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice  is  illustrated  in 
Figure  4.2.  In  this  framework,  a  household's  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice  can 
be  divided  into  two  levels.  The  upper  level  is  the  household's  decision  to  move  or 
stay;  the  lower  level  is  the  choice  for  three  alternative  tenures,  and  the  stay.  It  is  noted 
that  the  stay  in  the  lower  level  is  a  degenerated  branch  from  the  upper  level. 
The  household's  mobility  decision  is  influenced  by  a  variety  of  factors.  Summarised 
from  Chapter  Two,  housing  dissatisfaction  is  one  of  the  most  important  factors 
triggering  households  to  move  (Clark  and  Onaka  1985).  For  many  households,  the 
housing  dissatisfaction  may  come  from  their  dissatisfaction  with  housing  and 
neighbourhood  quality.  Households  in  different  life-cycle  stages  would  have  different 
housing  demand,  thus  triggering  them  to  move  and  sometime  to  change  their  tenure 
status  (Clark  and  Dieleman  1996).  As  a  result,  this  thesis  assumes  that,  from  a  cross- 
sectional  perspective,  households'  socio-economic  characteristics,  such  as  age,  sex, 
marital  status,  household  size,  income  and  employment  status,  as  well  as 
neighbourhood  quality  have  important  effects  on  households'  likeliness  to  move  or 
stay.  Furthermore,  as  stated  in  Chapter  Two,  searching  and  moving  costs  are  also 
important  factors  while  households  consider  moving.  However,  searching  and 
moving  costs  to  some  degree  are  difficult  to  identify  from  housing  costs.  Again,  the 
detailed  measurement  of  variables  affecting  mobility  and  tenure  choice  will  be 
discussed  in  Chapter  Five. 
With  respect  to  the  tenure  choice  level,  this  framework  assumes  that  a  household's 
choice  for  a  tenure  alternative  is  made  following  its  decision  to  move.  This  shows  that 
the  decision  to  move  and  the  choice  of  a  tenure  alternative  are  interrelated.  In  other 
words,  the  variables  influencing  mobility  decisions  are  interrelated  with  the  variables 
102 of  tenure  choice.  In  this  model,  the  variables  affecting  households'  tenure  choice  are 
the  same  as  the  first  model  which  not  only  includes  the  household  socio-economic 
characteristics  but  also  includes  the  housing  and  neighbourhood  attributes  such  as 
location,  dwelling  type,  and  neighbourhood  quality.  More  importantly,  housing 
subsidy  and  rationing  effects  will  be  examined  in  this  model.  It  is  assumed  that  some 
variables  could  affect  both  the  decision  to  move  and  the  choice  of  tenure,  and  this  will 
be  examined  in  the  later  chapters. 
103 c  ý' 
-0 
o0 
c  0 
öö  öcä 
U 
x 
U 
o 
0 
b 
O 
aý U_ 
O 
CJ 
O 
C 
4) 
H 
b 
O 
cd 
O 
t 
v 
w 
O 
O 
I- 
0 
C/D 
cl) 
H 
rr 
V 4.2.2  Mobility  and  Tenure  Choice  Function 
It  is  assumed  that  the  household's  mobility  and  tenure  decision  is  derived  from  the 
housing  demand  function.  Thus  the  utility  function  of  mobility  and  tenure  choice  is 
presented  in  equation  (21). 
UU  =V[M,  T]+Ec  (21) 
where  U.  denotes  the  total  utility  for  a  household  to  choose  moving  and  choose 
alternative  tenure  j;  V  is  the  measurable  utility  function;  M  is  a  vector  of  variables  to 
determine  household's  mobility;  T  is  a  vector  of  variables  to  determine  tenure  choice; 
sJ  is  an  error  term. 
However,  the  total  utility  function  in  equation  (21)  does  not  exactly  express  the 
hierarchical  relationship  between  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice,  as  shown  in 
Figure  4.2.  In  order  to  express  the  hierarchical  choice  function,  the  total  utility  of 
mobility  and  tenure  choice  in  equation  (21)  can  be  separated  into  two  utility  functions, 
as: 
Uy'  =  Uik  +Uin  (22) 
where  U; 
1  _ 
V[  M]  +  9tik  (23) 
Ufn  =VLTJ+  Pin  (24) 
Where  k  denotes  a  choice  whether  to  move  or  stay,  n  denotes  a  choice  of  tenure 
alternative,  M  and  T  are  the  same  as  in  equation  (21),  zc  and  cp  are  error  terms.  The 
model  of  mobility  and  tenure  choice  is  formulated  on  the  basis  of  equation  (23)  and 
equation  (24). 
Based  on  a  random  utility  function,  the  probabilities  of  a  household  i  choosing  to 
move/stay  and  choosing  a  tenure  alternative  can  be  expressed  as: 
Pik  =  Pr(Uik  >  U; 
k, 
) 
for  all  k;  -*,  k  and  k'  eK  (25) 
Pn  =  Pr(U1,  >  Ui,,.  )  for  all  men,  n  and  We  N  (26) 
105 where  K  denotes  a  set  of  mobility  decision;  N  denotes  a  set  of  tenure  choice. 
4.2.3  Hierarchical  Choice  Model 
The  model  contains  a  two-level  decision  tree,  thus  a  hierarchical  choice  model  is 
employed  to  estimate  the  probability  of  the  household's  move/stay  decision  and  tenure 
choice.  The  selection  of  the  hierarchical  model,  the  derivation  of  the  model  functional 
form  and  the  test  of  independence  from  irrelevant  alternative  property  are  discussed  as 
follows. 
4.2.3.1  The  Selection  of  Hierarchical  Choice  Model 
Among  hierarchical  choice  models,  the  nested  multinomial  logit  (NMNL)  model  has 
been  widely  applied  to  housing  choice  study,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  Two.  Compared 
with  the  multinomial  logit  model,  the  nested  multinomial  logit  model  does  not  need  an 
assumption  about  the  error  terms,  which  allows  the  nested  multinomial  logit  model  to 
have  a  variety  of  applications  (Tu  1994).  Maddala  (1983)  indicates  that  the  nested 
multinomial  logit  model  can  be  derived  from  the  assumption  that  the  residuals  (or 
error  terms)  have  a  generalised  extreme-value  distribution.  Therefore,  the  NMNL 
model  allows  for  a  general  pattern  of  dependence  among  the  choices  and  avoids  the 
problem  of  the  11A  property  that  occurred  in  the  MNL  model.  In  simple  terms,  the 
NM1VL  model  contains  two  or  more  levels  of  choice  sets  and  the  choices  between 
different  levels  or  between  different  branches  within  the  same  level  are  independent 
from  other  alternatives,  and  thus  satisfying  the  IIA  property.  Referring  to  our  model, 
the  choice  to  stay  and  the  choice  of  tenure  alternatives  are  independent  and  irrelevant, 
and  therefore  satisfy  the  IIA  property.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  necessary  to  test  the 
HA  property  for  the  choice  among  three  tenures. 
However,  one  critical  weakness  of  the  NMNL  model  is  that  the  structure  contains  a 
strong  assumption  in  terms  of  the  hierarchical  choice  level.  For  instance,  Zorn  (1988) 
and  Ioannides  and  Kan  (1996)  have  argued  that  a  household's  mobility  decision  and 
tenure  choice  is  made  simultaneously  rather  than  a  hierarchical  choice  set.  Therefore, 
it  should  be  noted  that  the  hierarchical  framework  of  mobility  decision  and  tenure 
choice  is  just  an  analytical  device  that  reflects  the  relative  degree  of  similarity  among 
choice  alternatives  (Fischer  and  Aufhauser  1988). 
106 4.2.3.2  The  Nested  Multinomial  Logit  Model  Functional  Form 
The  nested  multinomial  logit  model  functional  form  is  derived  on  the  basis  of 
equation  (23)  and  (24),  and  these  two  equations  can  be  rewritten  as: 
Unk  =  Vnk  +  Cnk  (27) 
where  U￿k  denotes  the  utility  for  a  household's  decision  to  move  or  stay  (k)  and  to 
chose  a  tenure  alternative  (n);  V￿k  is  a  function  of  all  the  measurable  characteristics 
and  e  is  an  error  term.  According  to  Greene  (2000),  if  it  is  assumed  that  s,,  k  is 
independently  and  identically  distributed  with  CDF  given  in  equation  (6)  and  (7),  then 
the  probability  for  a  household  choosing  to  move/stay  (k)  and  choosing  a  tenure 
alternative  (n)  is  expressed  as: 
K  Nk 
Pnk  =  eV^k  1:  1:  eV^k 
k=1  n=t 
(28) 
where  K  and  N  denote  a  set  of  mobility  decisions  and  a  set  of  tenure  choices, 
respectively.  Equation  (28)  is  the  general  functional  form  of  the  nested  multinomial 
logit  model  of  mobility  and  tenure  choice. 
Further,  it  is  assumed  that 
1nk  xnk  +  ayk  (29) 
where  Xnk  denotes  a  vector  of  observed  attributes  that  vary  with  both  mobility  and 
tenure  choice;  yk  is  a  vector  of  attributes  that  vary  only  with  mobility;  a'  and  8'  are 
vectors  of  parameters  to  be  estimated. 
It  can  be  written 
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The  inclusive  value  for  the  kth  branch  is  defined  as: 
Nk 
Ik  =In 
E  epx^& 
n=1 
Then,  after  cancelling  terms  and  using  this  result,  the  equation  (30)  follows  as: 
P=  eJPX  elk  n/k 
K 
Pk  -_  e"  +rkIk 
ZecIYk+zklk 
k=1 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
where  Tk  is  the  parameter  to  be  estimated  in  the  inclusive  value.  Greene  (2000) 
indicates  that  rk  equals  to  one,  the  NMNL  model  reduces  to  the  MNL  model.  The 
NLML  model  arises  if  0<  Tk  <1.  In  fact,  the  parameter  Tk  can  be  used  to  test  the  IIA 
property  and  this  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  part  of  this  section. 
With  respect  to  the  estimation  method,  the  full  information  maximum  likelihood 
(FIML)  method  is  a  better  approach  to  estimate  the  nested  multinomial  logit  model. 
As  Greene  (2000)  indicates,  in  the  FIML  estimation,  the  entire  NMNL  model  is 
estimated  in  a  single  pass  instead  of  a  two-step  estimation.  The  joint,  full-information 
maximum  likelihood  approach  is  more  efficient  than  the  two-step,  limited  information 
maximum  likelihood  approach.  The  FIML  estimates  are  obtained  by  maximising  the 
full  log  likelihood  for  the  NMNL  model.  The  log  likelihood  is: 
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j:,  1n  Pn,  k  +  1n  Pk  (34) 
4.2.3.3  Testing  the  Independence  of  Irrelevant  Alternative  Property 
There  are  two  methods  to  test  the  IIA  property  in  the  nested  multinomial  logit  model. 
The  first  method  is  to  apply  the  Hausman-McFadden's  statistic  of  the  IIA  property,  as 
shown  in  equation  (20).  In  the  model  of  mobility  and  tenure  choice,  the  inclusive 
value  parameter  tir  is  fixed  equal  to  one  in  the  stay  branch(shown  in  equation  (33)), 
then  the  nested  multinomial  logit  form  would  reduce  to  multinomial  logit  form  (or  so 
called  condition  logit  form  in  Greene  (2000)).  Then  the  Hausman-McFadden's 
statistic  can  apply  to  test  the  lIA  property  in  the  tenure  choice  branch.  This  method  is 
an  alternative  way  to  test  the  1TA  property  in  the  MNL  model  of  tenure  choice. 
The  second  method  is  to  estimate  the  inclusive  value  parameter  Tk.  Studies  such  as 
Hausman-McFadden  (1984),  Quigley  (1985)  and  Greene  (2000)  suggest  that  in  the 
NMNL  model,  the  inclusive  value  parameter  Tk  should  be  between  0  and  1  to  satisfy 
the  random  utility  property,  and  also  if  0<ik<1  and  statistically  significant,  the  NMNL 
model  satisfies  both  random  utility  property  and  the  HA  property. 
In  summary,  this  section  introduces  a  hierarchical  choice  model  to  analyse  the 
household's  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice.  The  two-level  choice  model  of 
mobility  and  tenure  choice  provides  a  substitute  for  the  multinomial  logit  model  of 
tenure  choice,  and  it  also  relaxes  the  problem  of  IIA  property  occurred  in  the  MNL 
model.  Among  the  hierarchical  choice  models,  the  nested  multinomial  logit  model  has 
been  widely  applied  to  housing  and  tenure  choice  studies.  The  full  information 
maximum  likelihood  (FIML)  method  is  employed  to  estimate  the  parameters  of  the 
NMNL  model.  With  respect  to  the  test  of  HA  property,  the  Hausman-McFadden's 
statistic  can  be  applied  to  test  this  assumption  in  the  NMNL  model.  The  inclusive 
value  parameter  can  also  be  used  to  test  the  IIA  property.  While  the  inclusive  value 
lies  between  0  and  1,  the  NMNL  model  satisfies  both  the  IIA  property  and  the  random 
utility  function. 
109 4.3  Summary 
Two  tenure  choice  models  with  different  structures  are  developed  in  this  chapter.  The 
first  model  contains  a  simple  one-level  choice  set.  The  tenure  choice  splits  into  three 
choices:  owner-occupation,  social  renting  and  private  renting.  A  multinomial  logit 
(MNL)  model  is  chosen  to  estimate  the  three-choice  function.  The  MNL  model 
provides  a  simple  and  convenient  functional  form  to  estimate  the  choice  probabilities. 
The  maximum  log  likelihood  approach  is  applied  to  estimate  the  parameters  of  the 
MNL  model.  However,  the  MNL  model  has  a  widely  known  weakness  in  terms  of 
violating  the  IIA  property.  The  rejection  of  the  RA  property  in  the  MNL  model 
implies  that  the  estimation  of  tenure  choice  could  be  bias  (Greene  2000).  As  a  result, 
the  MNL  model  should  be  treated  with  caution. 
The  second  model  estimates  the  household's  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice. 
This  model  contains  a  two-level  choice  structure,  which  assumes  that  the  household's 
choice  for  different  tenures  is  made  under  its  decision  to  move.  The  hierarchical 
choice  model  of  mobility  and  tenure  choice  provides  an  alternative  way  to  relax  the 
11A  problem  and  without  breaking  the  tenure  choice  structure  presented  in  the  first 
model.  Thus,  the  two-level  choice  model  can  be  seen  as  a  substitute  of  the  first  model. 
A  nested  multinomial  logit  (NMNL)  model  is  selected  to  estimate  the  probability  of  a 
household  choosing  to  move/stay  and  the  probability  of  choosing  a  tenure  alternative. 
The  full  information  maximum  likelihood  approach  is  applied  to  estimate  the 
parameters  of  the  NMNL  model.  In  the  NMNL  model,  the  inclusive  value  parameter 
is  an  indication  for  the  IIA  property.  Since  the  inclusive  value  parameter  is  between  0 
and  1,  the  NMNL  model  satisfies  both  the  IIA  property  and  the  random  utility 
function. 
Due  to  the  I1A  problem  in  the  MNL  model,  it  is  expected  that  the  NMNL  model 
would  provide  robust  results  in  the  estimation  of  the  household's  mobility  decision 
and  tenure  choice.  The  MNL  model  in  this  thesis  can  be  treated  as  a  pilot  model  to 
test  the  initial  influence  of  the  explanatory  variables  on  tenure  choice.  Unlike  the 
NMNL  model  requiring  specific  data  arrangement  and  variable  interactions  in  the 
specification,  the  MNL  model  is  useful  to  estimate  the  direct  relationship  between  the 
explanatory  variables  and  the  choice  alternatives.  Then  the  initial  results  in  the  MNL 
110 model  are  examined  in  the  NMNL  model.  The  data  and  variables  applied  to  the  two 
tenure  choice  models  and  an  analysis  of  estimation  results  of  the  two  models  will  be 
discussed  in  Chapter  Five  and  Chapter  Six  respectively. 
111 CHAPTER  FIVE  DATA  AND  VARIABLES 
This  chapter  discusses  the  empirical  data  and  variables  applied  to  the  two  tenure 
choice  models.  This  chapter  is  organised  into  five  sections.  The  first  section 
introduces  the  data  used  in  the  two  tenure  choice  models.  The  second  section 
describes  the  variables  applied  to  the  multinomial  logit  form  of  tenure  choice  model. 
The  third  section  discusses  the  variables  applied  to  the  nested  multinomial  logit  form 
of  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model.  The  fourth  section  analyses  the  properties  of  the 
data  and  variables  applied  to  the  two  tenure  choice  models  including  the  selection  of 
the  explanatory  variables  and  the  correlation  analysis  of  these  explanatory  variables. 
The  last  section  is  a  brief  summary. 
5.1  The  Data 
In  this  section,  the  data  selection,  the  content  of  the  chosen  data  set,  and  the  strengths 
and  the  weaknesses  of  applying  the  chosen  data  set  to  the  two  tenure  choice  models 
are  discussed  in  turn. 
5.1.1  Data  Selection 
Two  types  of  quantitative  data  are  generally  applied  in  research:  primary  data  and 
secondary  data.  The  selection  of  these  two  types  of  data  sets  depends  upon  a  variety 
of  factors,  for  instance,  the  scope,  objectives,  and  methodology  of  the  research.  In  the 
field  of  housing  and  tenure  choice,  many  studies  have  used  secondary  data  set  to 
examine  their  choice  models  because  it  saves  much  time  and  money  compared  to 
using  primary  data.  More  importantly,  many  secondary  data  sets  are  carried  out  by 
the  public  sector  or  by  large  private  organisations  which  usually  have  sufficient 
financial  ability  to  provide  a  large,  detailed  and  better  quality  data  set.  However,  the 
main  weakness  of  using  secondary  data  set  is  that  it  is  not  designed  for  the  research.  It 
is  very  often  the  case  that  the  data  set  does  not  contain  all  of  the  information  the 
research  needs.  Therefore,  it  is  important  to  select  a  data  set  to  meet  the  research 
objectives  and  an  imputation  of  the  data  set  is  necessary  under  this  circumstance. 
112 To  model  the  household's  tenure  choice,  it  is  expected  that  the  empirical  data  set 
should  contain  a  variety  of  household  attributes.  Also,  the  data  set  containing  a  larger 
sample  size  would  be  better  to  examine  the  tenure  choice  model.  As  a  result,  this 
thesis  adopts  secondary  data  set  applied  to  the  two  tenure  choice  models.  Several 
points  should  be  noted  in  the  selection  of  secondary  data  set.  First,  in  order  to 
examine  the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour,  the  chosen  data  set  should  be  a 
household  survey  data  set  containing  the  household's  tenure  status,  social-economic 
attributes,  and  the  dwelling  and  neighbourhood  conditions  in  which  the  household 
resides.  For  example,  the  household's  social-economic  characteristics  are  important 
variables  to  interpret  the  households'  tenure  decision  behaviour,  while  the  physical 
dwelling  and  neighbourhood  conditions  are  important  factors  to  estimate  the  capital 
value  of  the  property. 
Second,  to  estimate  the  household's  choice  between  three  tenures,  the  data  set  should 
contain  information  on  three  tenures  and  also  the  tenure  structure  should  represent  a 
normal  distribution  to  the  population  in  a  defined  area.  Third,  the  sample  size  of  the 
data  set  should  be  large  enough  in  order  to  provide  the  maximum  degree  of  freedom  in 
the  two  tenure  choice  models.  The  data  for  the  multinomial  logit  model  and  the 
nested  multinomial  logit  model  should  be  divided  into  several  subgroups  by  tenures 
and  by  move-stay  mode.  Each  subgroup  should  reach  a  minimum  number  of  valid 
observations  in  order  to  avoid  sampling  bias. 
Based  on  above  criteria,  this  thesis  chooses  the  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey 
(SHCS)  to  be  the  empirical  data  set  for  the  two  tenure  choice  models.  The  discussion 
of  the  SHCS  1996  is  as  follows., 
5.1.2  The  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey 
The  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (SHCS)  is  the  second  national 
comprehensive  survey  of  house  conditions  in  Scotland,  which  is  directed  by  a  steering 
group  chaired  by  Communities  Scotland,  previously  known  as  Scottish  Homes.  The 
first  survey  was  carried  out  in  1991.  The  1996  SHCS  is  a  cross  sectional  survey, 
which  aims  to  describe  both  the  physical  condition  of  the  dwelling  stock  and  the 
socio-economic  characteristics  of  the  household  residing  in  the  dwelling.  Thus,  this 
survey  consists  of  two  important  components:  an  internal  and  external  physical 
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in  the  dwelling.  Through  the  comprehensive  survey,  the  results  offer  both  the  public 
sector  and  the  private  sector  a  better  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  the 
characteristics  of  resident  households  and  house  conditions  in  Scotland. 
The  1996  SHCS  for  socio-economic  interviews  began  in  February  1996  and  finished 
in  August  1996.  The  fieldwork  for  the  physical  inspection  started  in  May  1996  and 
ended  in  September  1996.  Some  important  components  of  the  survey  methodology 
are  discussed  as  follows. 
"  Sampling 
The  1996  SHCS  was  based  on  several  discrete  samples  of  addresses.  The  main 
elements  of  the  sample  consisted  of  a  systematic  random  sample  drawn  from  the 
December  1995  Postal  Address  File  (PAF)  and  a  systematic  random  sample  drawn 
from  all  core  addresses  sampled  from  the  SHCS  1991  (the  longitudinal  or  panel 
component).  In  addition  to  these  two  core  components,  there  were  boosted  samples  in 
eight  local  authority  areas,  an  additional  boosted  sample  of  housing  association 
properties  and  boosted  samples  from  private  rented  dwellings. 
"  Response  Rates 
In  the  socio-economic  interview,  a  total  of  31,795  addresses  were  issued  to  the 
interviewers,  of  which  28,573  were  found  to  be  valid  addresses.  Of  the  28,573  valid 
addresses,  19,892  addresses  had  responses,  accounting  for  70  per  cent  of  the  total 
valid  addresses.  The  overall  response  rate  for  the  physical  inspection  was  81  per  cent. 
A  total  of  17,918  full  dwelling  inspections  were  achieved,  of  which  16,481  dwellings 
also  completed  a  full  household  interview. 
"  Sample  Size 
The  1996  SHCS  data  set  contains  a  total  of  18,158  cases  of  household  socio-economic 
interview,  accounting  for  91  per  cent  of  the  total  samples  (19,892).  According  to  the 
1996  SHCS  main  report,  cases  issued  from  the  special  local  authority  boost  samples 
and  from  the  private  rented  boost  samples  were  not  included  in  the  current  data  set. 
On  this  basis,  the  number  of  cases  for  which  a  full  physical  inspection  and  a  full 
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dwelling  samples  (16,481). 
"  Imputation 
The  1996  SHCS  data  set  inevitably  contains  missing  value  cases  in  both  the  socio- 
economic  interview  and  the  physical  inspection.  Therefore,  imputation  was  carried 
out  to  make  up  the  missing  value  cases.  According  to  the  1996  SHCS  user  guide, 
when  the  level  of  missing  data  was  1  per  cent  or  less,  the  missing  data  was  not  then 
combined  with  other  responses  to  produce  compound  measures.  Where  the  level  of 
missing  data  was  more  than  1  per  cent,  imputation  was  carried  out.  In  the  1996  SHCS 
data  set,  imputation  was  applied  to  the  main  financial  variables  such  as  income,  rent, 
mortgage  and  fuel  payments.  The  specific  methods  used  in  the  survey  were  hot  deck 
imputation,  defined  as  "where  the  sample  is  divided  into  subgroups  (imputation 
classes)  based  on  the  relevant  characteristics,  and  predictive  mean  matching  where  a 
statistical  model  was  constructed  and  the  value  selected  from  those  with  a  similar 
predicted  value"  (1996  SHCS  User  Guide,  p.  20).  The  advantage  of  imputation  is  that 
it  provides  a  complete  data  set  without  too  many  missing  value  cases.  However,  the 
drawback  is  that  the  data  imputation  may  not  reflect  the  real  household  information 
and  dwelling  conditions. 
"  Weighting 
There  are  several  weighting  procedures  in  the  1996  SHCS.  The  weighting  samples 
provide  information  about  the  total  stock  and  vacancy  rate  estimated  from  the  survey. 
This  thesis  does  not  need  to  present  this  kind  of  information  in  the  tenure  choice 
models.  As  a  result,  this  thesis  uses  unweighted  data  to  estimate  the  household's 
tenure  choice  behaviour  in  Scotland. 
5.1.3  Applying  the  1996  SHCS  into  Tenure  Choice  Analysis 
The  1996  SHCS  data  set  contains  more  than  18,000  cases,  and  this  survey  inevitably 
contains  missing  value  cases  and  inappropriate  cases,  which  would  be  excluded  in  our 
sample.  Furthermore,  this  thesis  also  excludes  320  private  rent  free  cases  from  the 
data  set.  In  the  1996  SHCS,  most  rent-free  cases  in  the  private  rented  sector  were  tied 
accommodation  provided  by  employers,  thus  these  cases  should  not  be  included  in  our 
sample,  otherwise  the  average  private  rental  value  in  the  sample  could  be 
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total  of  13,114  observations  are  available  for  the  sample  of  MNL  tenure  choice  model. 
The  number  of  observations  available  for  the  sample  of  NMNL  mobility  and  tenure 
choice  model  reduces  to  13,012  due  to  a  different  type  of  data  arrangement  required 
by  this  model.  The  two  tenure  choice  models  contain  different  functional  forms,  thus 
involving  different  types  of  data  arrangement.  The  data  arrangement  and  the  variable 
interactions  for  the  two  tenure  choice  models  will  be  discussed  in  the  second  and  the 
third  sections. 
The  main  advantage  of  applying  the  1996  SHCS  data  to  the  two  tenure  choice  models 
is  that  the  survey  contains  a  large  sample  size  with  rich  information  about  the 
household's  socio-economic  characteristics  and  dwelling  conditions.  Generally,  the 
larger  the  sample  size  of  a  data  set,  the  less  sampling  bias  occurs.  The  1996  SHCS 
contains  variables  from  various  aspects,  which  provide  important  information  to 
analyse  the  household's  tenure  decision  behaviour.  The  socio-economic  interview 
contains  variables  describing  the  household's  tenure  status,  income,  age,  gender, 
ethnic  origin,  employment  and  household  size.  These  are  basic  variables  in  the  tenure 
choice  model.  Further,  the  interview  contains  information  about  households'  tenure 
aspiration,  previous  tenure  and  mobility  aspiration  and  also  the  date  of  the  household 
moving  into  the  current  address.  These  variables  are  useful  in  estimating  households' 
tenure  preferences  and  mobility  decisions.  The  house  purchase  prices,  gross  rents  and 
housing  costs  are  also  important  variables  to  construct  the  housing  user  cost,  housing 
subsidy  and  rationing  variables.  The  physical  dwelling  inspection  contains  a  variety 
of  dwelling  attributes  and  neighbourhood  variables.  These  are  important  to  estimate 
capital  values  of  the  property. 
The  1996  SHCS  data  set,  of  course,  is  not  specifically  designed  for  tenure  choice 
analysis.  There  are  some  weaknesses  in  applying  the  data  to  the  two  tenure  choice 
models.  One  of  the  most  serious  problems  is  that  it  lacks  sufficient  locational  data. 
Although  the  1996  SHCS  provides  Post  Address  File  (PAF)  containing  the  current  and 
the  previous  postcode  addresses  for  each  surveyed  household,  there  are  many  missing 
value  cases  in  the  previous  location  variable,  thus  making  it  difficult  to  analyse 
households'  mobility  behaviour.  Further,  the  survey  does  not  contain  location- 
distance  data,  such  as  the  distance  from  home  to  city  centre  and  to  working  place. 
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the  dwelling  (see  for  example  Rosen  1974,  Linneman  1980,  Quigley  1982). 
In  addition  to  locational  data,  the  survey  does  not  contain  the  information  about  the 
changes  in  household  attributes,  for  instance  the  changes  in  household  size, 
employment,  and  income.  As  stated  in  Chapter  Two,  the  changes  in  household 
attributes  have  substantial  influences  on  the  household's  mobility  decision  (also  see 
Boehm  1981  and  Ioannides  1987).  Such  data  containing  the  changes  in  household 
attributes  may  not  be  collected  in  a  cross-sectional  survey  like  the  1996  SHCS.  It  has 
raised  an  argument  as  to  whether  longitudinal  data  or  cross  sectional  data  is  more 
suitable  for  tenure  choice  analysis.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  Two,  the  use  of 
longitudinal  data  or  cross  sectional  data  in  tenure  choice  analysis  mainly  depends 
upon  the  purpose  of  the  study.  Some  studies  have  used  time  series  data  to  estimate  the 
influences  of  changes  in  determinants  over  time  on  the  household's  tenure  choice. 
Some  other  studies  have  assumed  that  the  household's  tenure  decision  is  made  solely 
on  the  basis  of  the  contemporary  period,  thus  emphasising  the  influence  of 
determinants  on  tenure  choice  (in  the  contemporary  period)  by  using  cross  sectional 
data,  as  this  thesis  intends  to  do.  The  cross  sectional  analysis  of  tenure  choice  indeed 
provides  a  simple  approach  to  estimate  the  household's  tenure  decision  behaviour  in  a 
given  time  period  which  avoids  a  complicated  process  of  data  matching  and  the 
autocorrelation  problem  happening  in  time  series  data  (Koop  2000). 
Although  there  has  been  increasingly  used  panel  data  in  tenure  choice  analysis  in 
Britain  (see  for  example,  Ermisch  and  Di  Salvo  1996,  Di  Salvo  and  Ermisch  1997, 
Andrew  2000),  a  cross  sectional  analysis  of  tenure  choice  in  Scotland  remains  the  best 
alternative  approach  in  a  short  term.  In  particular,  there  is  no  appropriate  panel  data  in 
Scotland  now  suitable  for  tenure  choice  analysis.  Under  this  circumstance,  the  1996 
SHCS  is  the  best  alternative  data  to  be  used  in  this  thesis.  From  a  long-term 
viewpoint,  the  use  of  1996  SHCS  data  to  estimate  Scottish  households'  tenure 
decisions  is  a  start.  Further  steps  will  connect  the  1996  SHCS  with  the  1991  SHCS  or 
the  forthcoming  2002  SHCS  to  analyse  the  change  in  Scottish  households'  tenure 
choice  behaviour  during  these  periods. 
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The  variables  applied  to  the  multinomial  logit  form  of  tenure  choice  model  consist  of 
original  variables  and  derived  variables  from  the  1996  SHCS  and,  also,  some  variables 
are  imputed  by  this  thesis.  The  dependent  variable  to  be  estimated  in  the  tenure  choice 
model  is  the  household's  existing  tenure  status,  which  is  grouped  into  three  tenures: 
owner-occupation,  social  renting,  and  private  renting.  Table  5.1  presents  the 
household's  tenure  composition  to  be  analysed  in  the  model.  About  52  per  cent  of 
households  in  the  sample  are  owner-occupiers,  while  42.5  per  cent  of  households  are 
social  tenants.  Private  tenants  only  account  for  5.4  per  cent  of  the  sample. 
Table  5.1  The  Household's  Tenure  Composition 
Tenure  No.  of  Valid  Observation  Percentage  (%) 
Owner-Occupation  6,829  52.1 
Social  Renting  5,578  42.5 
Private  Renting  707  5.4 
Total  13,114  100.0 
Source:  Sampled  from  the  1996  SHCS 
The  explanatory  variables  of  the  tenure  choice  model  come  from  several  categories 
including  the  household's  demographic  characteristics,  employment  status,  previous 
tenure,  expected  mobility,  location,  dwelling  type,  neighbourhood  quality,  income, 
user  cost,  subsidy  and  rationing  variables.  The  descriptive  statistics  and  expected 
signs  of  these  variables  are  reported  in  Table  5.2.  The  full  definition  of  variables  used 
in  this  chapter  is  listed  in  Appendix  A.  5.1 
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the  Tenure  Choice  Model 
Variable  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Exp.  Sign 
0-0 
Exp.  Sign 
SR 
Exp.  Sign 
PR 
Age  51.28  17.72  +  +  - 
Agesq  2943.45  1898.49  -  -  + 
Ndepch  0.58  0.96  +  +  - 
Marry  0.58  0.49  +  +  - 
Male  0.69  0.46  +  -  + 
Fullwork  0.45  0.50  +  -  - 
Partwork  0.05  0.21  +  -  - 
Unemploy  0.06  0.24  -  +  + 
House  0.63  0.48  +  -  ? 
Prevown  0.29  0.45  +  -  - 
Prevsoc  0.37  0.48  -  +  ? 
Prevprv  0.15  0.35  ?  ?  + 
Likmov2  0.12  0.33  -  -  + 
Urban  0.80  0.40  ?  ?  ? 
Affown  0.12  0.32  +  -  - 
Prvtcity  0.11  0.31  -  -  + 
Poorcnl  0.10  0.30  -  +  - 
Lnperinc  9.20  0.46  +  -  - 
Lnucc_1  7.88  0.52  -  -  - 
Lnuccn  1  7.28  0.80  -  -  - 
Ratmort  0.45  0.50  -  +  + 
Ratsoc 
---- 
0.62 
- 
0.48  +  -  + 
j 
iYumy;  wumver  or  ooservanons:  13114. 
00:  Owner-Occupation;  SR:  Social  Renting;  PR:  Private  Renting. 
"+":  Positive  Effect;  "-":  Negative  Effect;  "?  ":  Cannot  Determine 
Source:  Sampled  from  the  1996  SHCS. 
"  Household  Demographic  Characteristics 
Household  characteristics  such  as  household  heads'  age,  sex,  race,  marital  status  and 
household  size  are  found  to  be  important  determinants  of  tenure  choice  (see  Struyk 
and  Marshall  1976,  Li  1977,  Henderson  and  Ioannides  1986,  Kleinman  and 
Whitehead  1987,  Gyourko  1998,  and  McNabb  and  Wass  1999).  In  the  MNL  tenure 
choice  model,  household  characteristics  include  the  household  head's  age  (AGE), 
marital  status  (MARRY=1),  gender  (MALE=1),  and  the  number  of  dependent 
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children  in  the  household  are  correlated.  This  thesis  adopts  the  number  of  dependent 
children  in  the  household  because  this  variable  can  not  only  present  the  household  size 
but  also  implies  different  levels  of  housing  demand  at  the  household's  life  cycle  than 
the  household  size  variable  does.  The  household  head's  race  has  been  an  important 
determinant  of  tenure  choice  in  American  studies  (Struyk  and  Marshall  1976  and 
Gyourko  and  Linneman  1997).  However,  in  our  sample,  nearly  99  per  cent  of 
household  heads  were  white.  In  this  case,  we  would  ignore  this  variable  in  the  tenure 
choice  model.  In  Table  5.2,  the  average  age  of  the  head  of  household  was  around  51 
years  old.  Married  household  heads  accounted  for  58  per  cent  of  the  sample,  while 
the  average  number  of  dependent  children  in  a  household  was  only  0.58.  This  reveals 
that  the  majority  of  households  in  the  sample  were  married  couples  with  an  average  of 
less  than  one  dependent  child.  In  addition,  male  household  heads  accounted  for  70  per 
cent  of  the  sample. 
A  number  of  North  American  studies  have  indicated  that  the  homeownership  rate  is 
found  to  increase  with  the  age  of  household  head  (see  Struyk  and  Marshall  1976  and 
Fallis  1985).  However,  in  Britain,  Kleinman  and  Whitehead  (1985)  point  out  that 
there  is  a  significant  non-linear  relationship  between  homeownership  and  the  age  of 
the  household  head  in  the  cross  sectional  analysis.  This  result  partly  comes  from  a 
cohort  effect.  The  homeownership  rate  declines  in  older  generations  because  many 
older  households  can  obtain  a  secure  tenancy  from  the  social  rented  sector.  Therefore, 
to  capture  the  non-linear  relationship  between  the  household  head's  age  and  tenure, 
the  age-squared  of  the  household  head  is  included  in  the  model.  It  is  expected  that  the 
age-square  of  household  heads  has  an  opposite  sign  to  the  age  of  household  heads. 
In  the  household's  life  cycle,  married  households  with  children  tend  to  have  stronger 
likelihood  to  choose  secure  tenancies  (see  Clark  and  Onaka  1983,  Dieleman  and 
Everaers  1994,  and  Clark  and  Dieleman  1996).  In  Britain,  owner-occupation  and 
social  housing  are  considered  to  be  more  secure  tenures  than  private  renting.  As  a 
result,  it  is  expected  that  married  household  heads  with  dependent  children  would  like 
to  choose  owner-occupation  and  social  renting.  In  contrast,  younger  and  single 
household  heads  and  adult-only  households  have  relatively  unstable  incomes  and 
employment,  and  that  makes  them  more  likely  to  change  their  residing  places. 
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shorter  terms  of  tenancy,  such  as  private  renting.  Moreover,  it  is  often  the  case  that 
male  household  heads  may  have  higher  incomes  and  better  economic  status  than 
female  household  heads.  Hence,  it  is  expected  that  male  household  heads  would  have 
stronger  likelihood  to  be  owner-occupiers,  while  female  household  heads  are  more 
likely  to  choose  the  lower  costs  of  social  housing.  However,  it  could  be  difficult  to 
tell  whether  male  or  female  household  heads  are  more  likely  to  choose  private  renting. 
"  Employment  Status  and  Expected  Mobility 
The  household  head's  employment  status  is  also  an  important  determinant  of  tenure 
choice.  Household  heads  having  better  jobs  usually  imply  that  they  have  higher 
incomes,  thus  making  them  more  capable  homeowners.  To  examine  the  impact  of 
employment  status  on  tenure  choice,  this  thesis  uses  three  dummy  variables  to  present 
three  types  of  employment  status:  full-time  work  (FULLWORK=1),  part-time  work 
(PARTWORK=1),  and  unemployment  (UNEMPLOY=1).  The  selection  of  the 
employment  status  variables  from  the  original  variables  in  the  1996  SHCS  is 
discussed  in  the  fourth  section  of  this  chapter.  Table  5.2  shows  that  45  per  cent  of 
household  heads  in  the  sample  had  a  full-time  job;  only  5  per  cent  of  household  heads 
had  a  part  time  job.  The  unemployed  household  heads  accounted  for  6  per  cent  of  the 
sample.  It  is  expected  that  household  heads  who  have  full-time  or  part-time  jobs 
would  have  stronger  likelihood  (positive  sign)  to  choose  owner-occupation.  In 
contrast,  unemployed  household  heads  would  be  more  likely  to  be  tenants  in  either  the 
social  housing  sector  or  the  private  rented  sector. 
With  regard  to  the  household's  expected  mobility,  it  is  very  often  the  case  that 
households  who  expect  to  move  in  the  future  are  more  likely  to  choose  renting  than 
owning.  Owner-occupation  generally  has  higher  transaction  costs  than  social  renting 
or  private  renting.  Therefore,  households  who  are  likely  to  move  in  the  short  run 
would  be  more  likely  to  choose  the  lower  transaction  costs  of  renting.  In  Britain, 
studies  have  indicated  that  households  in  the  social  housing  sector  are  less  likely  to 
move  partly  because  the  existing  allocation  system  makes  it  difficult  for  social  tenants 
to  relocate  their  homes  (see  Kintrea  and  Clapham  1986,  Harriot  and  Matthews  1998). 
As  a  result,  households  who  are  likely  to  move  in  the  future  would  be  more  likely  to 
choose  private  renting  than  social  renting.  To  examine  the  impact  of  the  household's 
121 expected  mobility  on  tenure  choice,  this  thesis  uses  a  dummy  variable  to  present  the 
household  head's  likeliness  to  move  within  two  years  (LIKEMOV2=1).  Table  5.2 
shows  that  the  majority  of  household  heads  in  the  sample  were  likely  to  stay,  while 
only  12  per  cent  of  household  heads  were  likely  to  move  within  two  years.  It  is 
expected  that  household  heads  who  are  likely  to  move  within  two  years  would  be 
more  likely  to  choose  private  renting  than  the  other  two  tenures. 
"  Previous  Tenure  and  Location 
The  household's  previous  tenure  status  has  an  important  influence  on  their  current 
tenure  decision.  This  thesis  uses  three  dummy  variables  to  present  the  household's 
previous  tenure  status:  previous  owner-occupation  (PREVOWN=1),  previous  social 
renting  (PREVSOC=1),  and  previous  private  renting  (PREVPRV=1).  The  selection 
of  the  previous  tenure  status  variables  from  the  original  variables  in  the  1996  SHCS  is 
discussed  in  the  fourth  section  of  this  chapter.  It  is  noted  that  according  to  the  user 
guide  of  the  1996  SHCS,  Table  5.2  shows  average  29  per  cent  of  households  in  the 
sample  were  previously  owner-occupiers,  while  37  per  cent  of  households  were 
previously  social  tenants  and  15  per  cent  of  households  were  previously  private 
tenants.  In  the  sample,  households  who  were  previously  social  tenants  have  higher 
percentage  points  than  households  who  were  previously  owners.  This  properly 
matches  the  trend  of  tenure  changes  in  Scotland  over  the  past  two  decades.  As 
discussed  in  Chapter  Three,  the  Right  To  Buy  policy  is  the  major  driving  force  for  the 
tenure  changes  from  social  renting  to  owner-occupation  over  the  last  two  decades.  It 
is  expected  that  households  who  were  previously  owners  or  social  tenants  would  be 
more  likely  to  stay  in  the  same  tenure  while  making  a  tenure  decision.  As  many 
households  see  private  renting  as  a  transitional  tenure  between  social  renting  and 
owner-occupation,  it  would  be  difficult  to  tell  the  expected  sign  in  terms  of 
households  who  were  previously  private  tenants  on  tenure  choice. 
Location  is  also  an  important  determinant  of  the  household's  tenure  choice.  In  Britain, 
there  exist  spatial  concentrations  of  certain  tenure  types  of  dwellings.  For  example,  a 
large  number  of  owner-occupied  dwellings  are  located  in  suburban  areas  due  to  the 
result  of  suburbanisation.  In  contrast,  many  social  rented  and  private  rented  dwellings 
are  located  in  the  inner  city  area  where  it  is  convenient  to  access  public  transport  and 
other  public  facilities.  Meanwhile,  in  some  cities  such  as  Glasgow,  there  are  large 
122 housing  estates  located  in  the  periphery.  Therefore  households  are  likely  to  consider 
location  while  making  their  tenure  choice.  Due  to  data  limitations,  this  thesis  uses  a 
simple  urban-rural  indicator  (URBAN=1)  to  proxy  location  variable  in  the  tenure 
choice  model.  Table  5.2  shows  that  80  per  cent  of  households  live  in  urban  areas. 
Due  to  data  limitations,  it  would  be  difficult  to  tell  the  expected  sign  of  the  urban-rural 
indicator  to  the  three  alternative  tenures.  The  use  of  an  urban/rural  indicator  would  be 
too  simple  to  interpret  the  complex  spatial  concentration  of  certain  tenure  types  of 
dwellings  in  Scotland. 
"  Dwelling  Type  and  Neighbourhood  Quality 
Dwelling  type  and  neighbourhood  quality  are  also  important  determinants  of  tenure 
choice.  In  Britain,  dwelling  type  is  usually  associated  with  tenure  type.  The 
relationship  between  dwelling  type  and  tenure  is  interdependent.  For  example,  owner- 
occupied  dwellings  are  predominately  houses,  while  most  social  rented  dwellings  are 
flats.  Therefore,  from  the  tenure  choice  perspective,  a  household's  tenure  choice  is 
deeply  influenced  by  dwelling  type.  To  examine  the  effect  of  dwelling  type  on  tenure 
choice,  this  thesis  uses  a  dummy  variable  to  present  a  simple  dwelling  type,  house  or 
flat  (HOUSE=1).  It  is  expected  that  households  who  live  in  houses  would  be  more 
likely  to  choose  owner-occupation.  In  contrast,  households  who  live  in  flats  would  be 
more  likely  to  choose  social  renting  or  private  renting.  However,  there  are  many 
privately  rented  houses  located  in  rural  Scotland,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  Three. 
Similar  to  dwelling  type,  the  relationship  between  neighbourhood  quality  and  tenure 
type  is  interdependent.  It  is  very  often  the  case  that  high  quality  neighbourhoods 
predominately  consist  of  owner-occupied  housing.  In  contrast,  many  council  estates 
are  located  in  low  quality  neighbourhoods.  In  the  1996  SHCS  data  set,  the  most 
suitable  variable  to  present  the  neighbourhood  quality  is  the  ACORN  group  variable. 
The  ACORN  group  variable  presents  different  levels  of  neighbourhood  quality  which 
are  associated  with  tenure  types.  Drawn  from  the  ACORN  group  variable,  this  thesis 
therefore  constructs  three  dummy  variables  to  represent  three  different  levels  of 
neighbourhood  quality:  whether  the  household  is  in  high  quality  neighbourhood 
predominated  by  affluent  owners  (AFFOWN=1);  whether  in  medium  quality 
neighbourhoods  predominated  by  private  tenants  in  the  inner  city  (PRVTCITY=1); 
and  whether  in  low  quality  neighbourhoods  predominated  by  the  poorest  council 
123 tenants  (POORCNL=1).  The  selection  of  the  neighbourhood  quality  variables  from 
the  ACORN  group  variable  is  discussed  in  the  fourth  section  of  this  chapter.  It  should 
be  noted  that  the  neighbourhood  quality  is  not  necessarily  associated  with  tenure  types. 
These  variables  are  the  best  alternative  variables  used  in  the  1996  SHCS  data.  Since 
the  neighbourhood  quality  variables  connected  to  tenure  types,  it  is  expected  that 
households  in  high  quality  neighbourhoods  (predominately  affluent  owners)  would  be 
likely  to  choose  owner-occupation.  Households  in  medium  quality  neighbourhoods 
(predominantly  inner  city  private  tenants)  would  be  likely  to  choose  renting, 
specifically  private  renting  rather  than  owner-occupation,  since  most  dwellings  in  the 
neighbourhood  are  privately  rented.  Households  in  lower  quality  neighbourhoods 
(predominantly  the  poorest  council  tenants)  would  be  more  likely  to  choose  social 
renting.  It  would  be  important  to  identify  the  impact  of  the  neighbourhood  quality 
variables  which  are  not  predominant  in  the  neighbourhood. 
"  Household  Income 
As  discussed  earlier,  the  1996  SHCS  data  set  does  not  contain  all  the  variables  needed 
for  the  analysis.  Therefore,  this  thesis  needs  to  construct  some  variables.  The  first 
variable  to  be  estimated  is  household  income.  Previous  research  has  indicated  that  the 
household's  tenure  decision  is  based  on  long  term  and  multiple  periods  rather  than 
current  and  single  period  (see  Struyk  and  Marshall  1974,  Fallis  1985,  Clark  and 
Dieleman  1996).  For  the  household  income  variable,  the  long  term  income  has  a 
stronger  influence  on  tenure  decision  than  the  current  income.  This  model  thus  adopts 
the  household  long-term  income  as  the  household  income  variable  which  is  presented 
by  log  value  (LNPERINC).  A  multiple  linear  regression  function  is  established  to 
estimate  household  long  term  income.  The  estimation  results  are  shown  in  Table  5.3. 
The  dependent  variable  is  log  annual  household  income.  In  the  1996  SHCS,  the 
household  income  was  defined  as  the  annual  net  income  of  the  head  of  household  and 
partner.  The  log  annual  household  income  is  explained  by  household  heads' 
demographic  characteristics,  whether  in  long  term  illness,  self-employment,  socio- 
economic  group  and  location.  The  household  head's  demographic  variables  include 
age,  age  square  (explaining  non-linear  relationship  between  income  and  age),  marital 
status,  sex,  race  and  the  number  of  dependent  children.  According  to  the  1996  SHCS 
user  guide,  the  socio-economic  group  is  established  for  the  head  of  household  only 
124 and  can  only  be  estimated  for  those  individuals  who  were  in  or  had  been  in 
employment  during  the  interview  period.  The  household  head's  socio-economic 
group  is  classified  into  six  different  subgroups:  professional/managerial  jobs; 
employers  and  managers;  intermediate/junior  non-manual  jobs;  skilled  manual 
workers;  semi-skilled  manual  workers;  and  non-skilled  manual  workers. 
Unfortunately,  the  1996  SHCS  data  set  does  not  contain  the  household  head's 
education  variable,  which  has  been  indicated  by  many  studies  as  an  important  variable 
in  order  to  explain  the  household's  permanent  income  (see  for  example  Struyk  and 
Marshall  1974  and  Laakso  and  Loikkanen  1995).  The  use  of  the  household's  head's 
socio-economic  group  to  some  degree  can  represent  the  household  head's  educational 
level  in  the  household  long-term  income  model. 
Table  5.3  Estimation  Results  of  the  Household  Long  Term  Income  Model 
Variable  Coefficient  t-stat 
Constant  8.193  155.9 
Age  0.018  13.65 
Agesq  -0.0002  -19.55 
Marry  0.514  48.28 
Ethnics  0.166  4.09 
Male  0.056  4.87 
Ndepchgp  0.055  12.36 
Sick 
-0.101  -10.69 
Selfemp  0.173  7.61 
Prof  0.761  33.46 
Empman  0.488  27.15 
Interjun  0.368  22.91 
Skill  0.197  11.99 
Semiskil  0.09  5.38 
Unskill  0.057  2.93 
Urban  0.022  2.35 
Adjusted  RZ  0.47 
F  value  1053.4 
No.  of  obs  18,040 
Notes:  The  sample  size  is  based  on  the  total  observations  (18,158)  of  the  1996  SHCS 
excluding  missing  value  cases.  The  definition  of  variables  is  listed  in 
Appendix  A.  5.1 
The  estimation  results  shown  in  Table  5.3  are  then  used  to  calculate  the  predicted 
household  long-term  income  applied  to  the  tenure  choice  model.  The  predicted 
125 household  long  term  income  by  tenures  is  shown  in  Table  5.4.  It  is  clear  that  owner- 
occupiers  have  the  highest  average  long  term  income,  while  social  tenants  had  the 
lowest  average  long  term  income.  The  average  long-term  income  of  private  tenants  is 
shared  between  owner-occupiers  and  social  tenants.  The  household  long-term  income 
is  expected  to  have  a  positive  effect  on  owner-occupation.  This  means  that  while 
household  long-term  income  increases,  households  are  more  likely  to  own  rather  than 
to  rent  their  homes. 
Table  5.4.  Predicted  Household  Long  Term  Income  by  Tenures 
Tenure  Average  Annual 
Amount  £ 
No.  of  Valid 
Observation 
Owner-Occupation  12,762  6,829 
Social  Renting  8,731  5,578 
Private  Renting  10,223  707 
Total  10,911  13,114 
"  User  Cost  of  Capital 
The  second  important  variable  to  be  measured  is  the  user  cost  of  capital,  which  is  also 
presented  by  log  value  (LNUCC_1).  The  user  cost  in  this  thesis  is  measured  in 
nominal  terms.  '  For  owner-occupiers,  user  cost  is  to  calculate  the  capital  cost  of  the 
property.  Based  on  Gibb  and  Mackay  (1999),  the  user  cost  for  owner-occupiers  is 
defined  as: 
UC0  =[(1-t)*i+d+a-g]*Ph  (35) 
where  t  denotes  a  household's  marginal  tax  rate,  i  is  the  nominal  mortgage  interest 
rate,  d  is  the  depreciation  rate,  a  is  the  property  tax  rate,  g  is  the  expected  annual  rate 
of  nominal  house  price  increase  and  P`'  is  the  current  market  value  of  the  property. 
Here,  the  household's  marginal  tax  rate  is  assumed  to  be  zero'  and  the  property  tax 
rate  is  based  on  the  council  tax  rate.  The  average  nominal  mortgage  interest  rate  in 
1996  is  6.7%.  Based  on  Hills'  (1991)  estimation,  the  depreciation  rate  is  set  at  1.2%, 
8  The  use  of  nominal  user  cost  would  be  convenient  to  calculate  the  user  cost  for  tenants  (the  rent)  since 
the  1996  SHCS  data  set  only  identifies  the  gross  rent  for  tenants. 
126 and  the  long  term  nominal  house  price  increase  rate  is  set  at  3.7%1°  annually.  The 
current  market  value  of  the  dwelling  is  measured  by  the  hedonic  price  index.  The 
estimation  results  of  the  hedonic  price  model  are  reported  in  Table  5.5. 
Table  5.5  Estimation  Results  of  the  Hedonic  Price  Model 
Variable  Coefficient  t-stat 
Constant  6.580  47.85 
Detach  0.347  17.54 
Dwagel  -0.123  -5.95 
Dwage3  -0.096  -3.55 
Dwage5  0.073  3.47 
Lntfa  0.875  28.04 
Fullheat  0.110  5.19 
Urban  0.110  5.46 
Prospown  0.074  4.34 
Poorcnl  -0.240  -4.11 
Graff  -0.135  -4.66 
Dparking  0.039  1.99 
Vacsite  -0.097  -3.60 
Yr94  0.038  1.99 
Yr95  0.058  2.98 
Adjusted  R2  0.53 
F  value  175.55 
No.  of  obs.  2,596 
Notes:  The  sample  size  is  based  on  owner-occupiers  who  moved  within  recent  five 
years.  The  definition  of  variables  is  listed  in  Appendix  A.  5.1 
In  the  hedonic  price  model,  the  dependent  variable  is  log  house  purchase  price.  The 
log  house  purchase  price  is  explained  by  dwelling  conditions,  location,  neighbourhood 
conditions  and  the  year  of  purchase  of  the  current  dwelling.  The  dwelling  conditions 
include  dwelling  type,  age,  total  floor  area  and  heating  condition.  The  locational 
variable  is  presented  by  the  urban/rural  indicator.  The  neighbourhood  conditions 
include  whether  or  not  the  property  has  graffiti  and  vandalism,  vacant  site,  adequate 
parking  space  and  two  different  levels  of  neighbourhood  quality  (i.  e.  whether  the 
neighbourhood  is  dominated  by  prosperous  owners  or  by  the  poorest  council  tenants). 
As  Gibb  and  Mackay  (1999)  suggested,  due  to  its  erosion  in  the  1990s  and  recent  termination,  the 
MIRAS  is  treated  as  a  "lump  sum"  tax  relief  to  mortgaged  owners,  which  does  not  affect  their  user 
costs  at  the  margin  but  only  affects  their  disposable  income. 
1  The  3.7  per  cent  of  annual  nominal  capital  gains  increase  rate  is  estimated  on  the  accrual  basis. 
127 Unfortunately,  the  1996  SHCS  data  set  does  not  contain  the  distance  variable  such  as 
the  distance  to  the  Central  Business  District  (CBD),  nor  does  it  contain  some  dwelling 
condition  variables  such  as  the  number  of  bathrooms.  In  fact,  studies  have  suggested 
that  the  distance  variable  and  the  number  of  bathrooms  in  the  dwelling  are  important 
variables  to  estimate  the  hedonic  price  (see  for  example,  Rosen  1974,  Linneman  1980 
and  Quigley  1982).  Therefore,  it  may affect  the  goodness-of-fit  of  the  hedonic  price 
model. 
It  is  noted  that  the  sample  selection  in  the  hedonic  price  model  is identified  as  owner- 
occupiers  and  those  who  have  been  moved  in  recent  five  years.  Therefore,  the  model 
could  contain  a  dual  sample  selection  bias  as  suggested  by  Ermisch,  Findlay  and  Gibb 
(1996).  According  to  a  study  by  Ermisch,  Findlay  and  Gibb,  the  difference  between 
the  hedonic  house  price  adjusted  for  sample  selection  bias  and  the  unadjusted  hedonic 
house  price  is  about  3.75%.  In  this  thesis,  the  difference  could  not  significantly  affect 
the  results  of  the  tenure  choice  models  because,  after  deflated  by  natural  log,  the 
difference  between  adjusted  hedonic  prices  and  unadjusted  hedonic  prices  is 
minimised.  In  the  hedonic  price  model,  it  is  found  that  the  year  of  moving  into  current 
dwelling,  specifically  the  last  two  years,  have  important  influences  on  our  hedonic 
price  index.  The  estimation  results  of  hedonic  price  model  are  then  applied  to  all  three 
tenure  sample  base  (13,114).  The  break  down  of  the  hedonic  price  by  tenures  is 
presented  in  Table  5.6. 
Table  5.6  Hedonic  Prices  of  the  Property  by  Tenures 
Tenure  Average  Hedonic 
Price  (E) 
No.  of  Valid 
Observation 
Owner-Occupation  52,630  6,829 
Social  Renting  33,911  5,578 
Private  Renting  42,556  707 
Total  44,125  13,114 
Moreover,  the  estimated  market  value  for  social  rented  property  could  be 
overestimated  if  it  is  based  on  the  purchase  price  of  owner-occupied  property.  For 
example,  it  may  not  be  certain  that  the  estimated  hedonic  price  would  take  adequate 
account  on  very  poor  council  housing  neighbourhoods.  In  addition,  there  are  different 
128 demand  characteristics  between  social  renting  and  owner-occupation  (Hancock  and 
Munro  1992).  Several  studies  have  attempted  to  make  this  adjustment.  For  instance, 
Maclennan,  Gibb  and  More  (1991)  adopt  the  bottom  half  of  hedonic  prices  applying  to 
social  rented  property;  Hills  (1991)  uses  20  per  cent  discount  of  hedonic  prices 
applying  to  local  authority  property.  This  thesis  is  aware  of  this  issue  and  makes 
adjustment  by  putting  the  neighbourhood  quality  variables  into  the  hedonic  price 
model.  As  discussed  earlier,  the  neighbourhood  quality  variables  are  the  ACORN 
group  variables  which  are  associated  with  tenure  types.  Therefore,  the  estimated 
hedonic  price  can  be  distinguished  in  different  quality  levels  of  neighbourhoods. 
The  housing  user  cost  for  renters  is  usually  the  gross  rent.  However,  the  rent  in  the 
social  rented  sector  is  subsidised  and  cannot  represent  the  true  cost  of  rented  dwellings. 
Therefore,  this  thesis  measures  the  user  cost  of  social  renting  on  the  basis  of  the 
economic  rent,  that  is,  the  rent  is  assumed  to  be  charged  at  the  open  market  level. 
Based  on  Hills'  (1991)  definition,  the  economic  rent  in  the  social  rented  sector  is 
estimated  as  follows: 
UC,  =(m+r+d-g)*P'  (36) 
where  m  denotes  maintenance  and  repair  costs;  r  is  the  nominal  rate  of  return  on 
property;  d,  g,  and  P"  are  defined  as  the  same  as  in  equation  (35).  However  the 
maintenance  and  repair  costs  in  Hills'  calculation  for  local  authority  tenants  is  based 
on  real  costs.  Due  to  data  restrictions,  this  thesis  sets  the  maintenance  and  repair  costs 
as  a  certain  percentage  of  the  rented  property  value.  In  this  case,  m+r  is  set  at  7.8% 
of  property  values,  which  is  based  on  the  average  index  of  private  rents  and  yields  to 
the  private  landlords  in  Scotland,  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  1996,  as  measured  by  the 
Joseph  Rowntree  Foundation  (see  Rhodes  and  Kemp  1997). 
The  user  cost  for  private  renters  is  the  gross  rent  at  the  market  level.  The  breakdown 
of  the  average  user  cost  by  tenures  is  reported  in  Table  5.7.  Owner-occupiers  had  the 
highest  user  cost,  as  owning  a  home  was  expensive.  '  In  contrast,  the  user  cost  for 
social  tenants  was  the  lowest  because  it  reflected  the  property  value  of  the  social 
rented  stock.  With  respect  to  the  expected  sign,  the  user  cost  is  expected  to  have  a 
negative  effect  to  each  tenure. 
129 Table  5.7  User  Costs  by  Tenures 
User  Costs  \ 
Tenures 
Average  Annual 
Amount  £ 
Percentage  of 
Capital  Value  (%) 
No.  of  Valid 
Observations 
Owner-occupiers  3,531  6.7  6,829 
Social  tenants  2,374  7.0  5,578 
Private  tenants  3161  7.4  707 
"  Housing  Subsidy 
The  third  important  variable  to  be  estimated  is  the  housing  subsidy.  The  form  of 
housing  subsidy  in  this  thesis  is  estimated  in  economic  terms.  The  definition  of  the 
housing  subsidy  in  economic  terms  (from  now  on  called  economic  subsidy)  is  based 
on  O'Sullivan's  (1984)  formal  subsidy  or  Hills'  (1991)  first  round  subsidy. 
According  to  O'Sullivan's  interpretation,  the  formal  subsidy  is  defined  as  `the  amount 
of  the  original  purchase  price  of  a  commodity  an  economic  unit  (normally  the  state) 
undertakes  to  fund  itself  if  another  economic  unit  (the  consumer)  purchases  it'  (1984, 
p.  120).  The  economic  subsidy  in  this  thesis  is  also  based  on  a  tenure  neutrality 
framework,  which  treats  housing  as  both  a  consumption  and  an  investment  commodity 
in  all  tenures  equivalently.  Under  the  tenure  neutrality  concept,  the  economic  subsidy 
for  owner-occupiers  is  defined  as  the  difference  of  tax  expenditures  between  owner- 
occupiers  and  private  landlords.  As  Hills  suggests,  compared  to  private  landlords,  the 
tax  advantage  to  owner-occupiers  comes  from  untaxed  imputed  rents  and  untaxed 
capital  gains,  as  shown  in  equation  (37): 
So  =(CG+IR)*t,  (37) 
where  CG  denotes  the  nominal  capital  gains,  IR  is  the  imputed  rent  and  t,  is  the 
marginal  income  tax  rate.  The  capital  gains  (CG)  are  calculated  as  the  long  term 
annual  nominal  capital  gains  rate  (3.7%)  multiplied  by  hedonic  prices  (Hills  1991). 
For  mortgaged  owners,  the  imputed  rent  (IR)  is  set  as  the  net  equity  multiplied  by  the 
long-term  rate  of  net  return  on  property.  The  net  equity  is  defined  as  the  purchase 
price  minus  mortgage  debts.  The  net  rate  of  return  on  property  is  set  at  5.5%,  which  is 
based  on  the  long-term  government  bond  rate.  For  outright  owners,  the  imputed  rent 
(IR)  is  estimated  as  the  economic  rent.  The  definition  of  economic  rent  is  the  same  as 
130 in  equation  (36).  The  marginal  rate  of  income  tax  (t)  is  set  at  the  benchmark  income 
tax  rate  (24%)  in  1996/97. 
Based  on  the  tenure  neutrality  framework,  the  economic  subsidy  to  social  tenants  is 
defined  as  the  difference  between  the  rent  charged  in  the  open  market  and  the  below 
market  rent  charged  by  the  social  landlords,  as  shown  in  equation  (38): 
Ss  =ER  -  GR  (38) 
where  ER  denotes  the  economic  rent,  as  defined  in  equation  (36);  GR  is  the  gross  rent 
charged  by  the  social  landlords. 
Renters  in  the  private  rented  sector  do  not  receive  any  economic  subsidy  if  they  pay 
the  market  rent.  The  subsidy  stems  from  tenants  paying  below  market  fair  rents  in  the 
regulated  tenancy.  In  this  case,  the  economic  subsidy  to  tenants  in  the  regulated 
tenancy  is  the  difference  between  the  market  rent  (estimated  economic  rent)  and  the 
fair  rent,  as  shown  in  equation  (39). 
Sp  =ER-FR  (39) 
where  ER  denotes  the  economic  rent,  as  defined  in  equation  (36);  FR  is  the  fair  rent. 
Unfortunately,  the  1996  SHCS  does  not  identify  whether  a  household  is  paying  a  fair 
rent  or  not.  Therefore,  this  thesis  attempts  to  impute  the  fair  rent  variable.  According 
to  the  advice  of  the  experts",  private  tenants  could  possibly  pay  fair  rents  under  the 
following  conditions,  if  private  tenants  are: 
1.  more  than  45  years  old 
2.  living  in  unfurnished  properties 
3.  living  in  tenement  or  four-in-a-block  dwellings 
4.  living  in  urban  areas. 
The  annual  average  amount  of  economic  subsidy  broken  down  by  tenures  is  reported 
in  Table  5.8.  The  economic  subsidy  tends  to  reduce  the  user  cost.  Thus,  the  net  user 
"  It  is  difficult  to  find  the  document  or  reports  for  the  characteristics  of  households  in  regulated  tenancy 
in  Scotland.  Therefore,  this  thesis  asks  for  the  advice  of  the  experts. 
131 cost  (presented  by  log  value  LNUCCN  1)  is  derived  by  the  user  cost  subtracting  the 
economic  subsidy.  In  other  words,  the  economic  subsidy  effect  can  be  expressed  on 
the  difference  between  the  user  cost  and  the  net  user  cost.  In  the  tenure  choice  model, 
the  intention  is  to  estimate  the  subsidy  effect  between  the  user  cost  and  the  net  user 
cost.  The  economic  subsidy  effect  by  tenures  is  shown  in  Table  5.9. 
Table  5.8.  Economic  Subsidies  by  Tenures 
Subsidy  Average  Annual 
Amount  £ 
Percentage  of 
Capital  Value  % 
No.  of  Valid 
Observations 
Owner-occupiers  834  1.6  6,829 
Social  tenants  638  1.9  5,578 
Private  tenants  (all)  21  0.05  707 
Private  tenants  in  un- 
regulated  tenancy 
0  0.0  662 
_  Private  tenants  in 
regulated  tenancy 
472  1.1  45 
Table  5.8  shows  that  owner-occupiers  received  the  highest  amount  of  economic 
subsidies.  In  contrast,  most  private  tenants  do  not  receive  any  economic  subsidies. 
However,  the  economic  subsidies  to  private  tenants  in  the  regulated  tenancy  are  higher 
than  the  subsidies  to  social  tenants.  Furthermore,  it  is  of  interest  to  see  the  impact  of 
economic  subsidies  on  the  user  cost  among  the  three  tenures.  Under  the  economic 
subsidy  effect,  the  difference  between  owner-occupiers'  net  user  costs  and  social 
tenants'  net  user  costs  is  reduced.  In  contrast,  private  tenants  have  the  highest  net  user 
cost  than  the  other  two  tenures.  Thus,  the  changes  in  user  costs  under  the  economic 
subsidy  effect  could  have  important  impacts  on  households'  tenure  decisions. 
Table  5.9  Economic  Subsidy  Effect  by  Tenures 
(£  Der  annum) 
User  Cost  UC/CV  Economic 
Subsidy 
Net  User 
Cost 
NUC/CV 
Owner-occupiers  3,531  6.7  834  2,697  5.1 
Social  tenants  2,374  7.0  638  1,735  5.1 
Private  tenants  3,161  7.4  21  3,140  7.3 
UC  =  user  cost;  NUC  =net  user  cost;  CV=  capital  value. 
132 "  Rationing  Variables 
Rationing  variables  are  measured  by  two  types  of  constraints:  mortgage  rationing 
(RATMORT=l)  and  social  housing  rationing  (RATSOC=1).  The  construction  of  the 
proxy  variable  of  mortgage  rationing  is  based  on  three  criteria:  price-to-income  ratio 
(PTI),  loan-to-value  ratio  (LTV),  and  loan-to-income  ratio  (LTI),  which  are  the  most 
common  criteria  set  by  banks  and  building  societies,  as  stated  in  Chapter  Three.  In 
this  thesis,  the  house  price  or  the  house  value  is  measured  as  the  hedonic  price.  The 
household  income  is  measured  as  the  household  long  term  income.  Mortgaged 
owners,  if  they  have  more  than  two  of  the  following  conditions,  could  find  it  difficult 
to  get  a  mortgage. 
1.  PTI>3.0 
2.  LTV>0.9 
3.  LTI>2.23 
Potently,  renters  in  both  the  social  rented  sector  and  the  private  rented  sector,  if  their 
price-to-income  ratio  (PTI)  is  greater  than  3.0,  could  be  constrained  by  mortgages. 
These  constraint  conditions  are  based  on  the  average  ratio  for  first  time  buyers  in 
Scotland  1996  (see  Council  of  Mortgage  Lenders  1997).  The  results  of  the  mortgage 
constraint  by  tenures  are  shown  in  Table  5.10.  It  shows  that  17%  of  existing  owner- 
occupiers  were  not  qualified  for  these  mortgage  ratios  and  were  potentially 
constrained  from  mortgages.  In  contrast,  more  than  three  quarters  of  public  and 
private  tenants  were  potentially  constrained  from  mortgages.  It  is  noted  that  Table 
5.10  only  shows  the  general  information  of  the  mortgage  constraint  breaking  down  by 
tenures.  In  fact,  the  mortgage  constraint  not  only  varies  by  tenures  but  also  varies  by 
some  other  household  demographic  characteristics,  such  as  the  household  head's  age 
and  gender.  Since  the  intention  is  to  estimate  the  impact  of  the  mortgage  constraint  on 
tenure  choice,  the  focus  here  is  on  tenure  rather  than  other  factors.  In  this  case,  it  can 
be  assumed  that,  if  households  were  constrained  from  mortgages,  they  would  be 
constrained  to  choose  either  social  renting  or  private  renting. 
133 Table  5.10  Mortgage  Rationing  by  Tenures 
Rationed  Not  Rationed  Total 
Owner-occupiers  1,121  5,708  6,829 
(16.4%)  (83.6%)  (1000/0) 
Social  Tenants  4,228  1,350  5,578 
(75.8%)  (24.2%)  (1000/0) 
Private  Tenants  555  152  707 
(78.5%)  (21.5%)  (1000/0) 
Total  5,904  7,210  13,114 
(45%)  (55%)  100% 
The  social  housing  rationing  can  be  treated  as  a  reverse  concept  of  rationing,  which  is 
different  from  common  rationing.  The  aim  of  social  housing  is  to  provide  affordable 
homes  to  low  income  households  with  special  needs.  That  is  to  say,  households  with 
socio-economic  disadvantages  should  not  be  rationed  from  this  sector.  In  other  words, 
households  who  have  higher  income  and  better  socio-economic  status  could  be 
rationed  from  social  housing.  Drawing  from  Chapter  Three,  this  thesis  establishes 
five  reverse  rationing  criteria  as  follows.  Whether  the  household  is/has: 
1.  experienced  long  term  illness, 
2.  unemployment 
3.  retired 
4.  a  lone  parent 
5.  more  than  50%  of  incomes  from  state  benefits 
If  a  household  had  more  than  one  of  the  above  conditions,  the  household  could  not  be 
constrained  from  entering  the  social  rented  sector,  otherwise  it  is  constrained  from  this 
sector.  These  rationing  variables  can  be  treated  as  a  simulation  applying  to 
households  in  all  three  tenures.  The  results  of  social  housing  rationing  are  shown  in 
Table  5.11.  It  shows  that  about  80%  of  owner-occupiers  and  70%  of  private  tenants 
are  potentially  constrained  from  entering  the  social  housing  sector.  In  contrast,  most 
social  tenants  (60%)  qualify  for  the  rationing  conditions  and  are  not  potentially 
constrained  from  accessing  this  sector.  Furthermore,  it  is  assumed  that  if  households 
are  rejected  by  social  renting,  they  would  choose  either  owner-occupation  or  private 
renting. 
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Rationed  Not  Rationed  Total 
Owner-occupiers  5,449  1,380  6,829 
79.8%  (20.2%)  (100%) 
Social  Tenants  2,228  3,350  5,578 
(39.9%)  (60.1%)  (1000/0) 
Private  Tenants  483  224  707 
(68.3%)  (31.7%)  (100%) 
Total  8,160  4,954  13,114 
(62.2%)  (37.8%)  (100%) 
In  summary,  this  section  describes  the  variables  applied  to  the  multinomial  logit  form 
of  the  tenure  choice  model.  The  household's  demographic  attributes,  employment 
status,  previous  tenure  status,  expected  mobility,  and  dwelling  and  neighbourhood 
conditions  can  be  derived  from  the  data  set.  These  variables  are  expected  to  have 
substantial  influences  on  tenure  choice.  This  thesis  also  constructs  some  variables 
including  household  long  term  income,  user  cost,  housing  (economic)  subsidy  and 
rationing  variables.  The  use  of  long  term  income  implies  that  the  household's  tenure 
decision  is  based  on  long  term,  multiple  periods  rather  than  a  current  and  single  period. 
The  user  cost  presents  the  relative  cost  of  owning  and  renting.  The  economic  subsidy 
effect  is  expressed  as  the  difference  between  the  user  cost  and  the  net  user  cost,  while 
the  rationing  effect  is  a  simulation  of  households'  access  constraints  to  different 
tenures. 
5.3  The  Variables  of  Mobility  and  Tenure  Choice  Model 
The  variables  applied  to  the  NMNL  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model  are  drawn  from 
the  last  MNL  tenure  choice  model.  However,  the  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model 
contains  a  two-level  nested  multinomial  logit  form  that  requires  specific  data 
arrangement  and  variable  interactions.  In  the  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model,  each 
individual  household  in  the  sample  faces  four  possible  choices:  to  stay;  to  move  and 
choose  owner-occupation;  to  move  and  choose  social  renting;  and  to  move  and  choose 
private  renting.  For  each  household,  the  choice  which  the  household  has  made  is 
observed.  Thus,  the  data  of  each  household  observation  is  expanded  to  four  rows  - 
135 one  row  for  each  possible  choice.  In  our  case,  the  data  matrix  for  the  mobility  and 
tenure  choice  model  consists  of  52,048  rows  with  13,012  household  observations.  " 
The  model  of  mobility  and  tenure  choice  consists  of  a  two-level  decision  tree,  thus  the 
variables  also  split  into  two  levels-the  mobility  decision  level  and  the  tenure  choice 
level,  described  as  follows. 
"  Variables  in  the  Mobility  Decision  Level 
In  the  mobility  decision  level,  the  sample  firstly  is  divided  into  recent  movers  and 
stayers.  The  recent  movers  are  defined  as  households  who  moved  in  the  last  two  years. 
The  results  of  recent  movers  and  stayers  by  tenures  are  reported  in  Table  5.12.  Of  the 
total  13,012  household  observations,  1,425  households  moved  in  the  last  two  years, 
accounting  for  11  per  cent  of  the  sample.  Among  recent  movers,  social  tenants 
account  for  44  per  cent  of  the  movers;  owner-occupiers  also  account  for  37  per  cent  of 
the  movers.  Private  tenants  only  account  for  less  than  20  per  cent  of  the  movers. 
Regarding  the  mover/stayer  distribution  between  tenures,  only  8  per  cent  of  owner- 
occupiers  and  11  per  cent  of  social  tenants  moved  in  the  last  two  years.  As  discussed 
in  Chapter  Three,  it  is  not  surprising  to  see  that  owner-occupation  and  social  renting 
are  the  two  stable  tenures  in  Scotland.  In  contrast,  households  in  the  private  rented 
sector  are  highly  mobile.  Around  40  per  cent  of  private  tenants  in  the  sample  moved 
in  the  last  two  years. 
Table  5.12  Movers  and  Stayers  by  Tenures 
Movers  Stayers  Total 
Owner-occupation  525  6,258  6,783 
(7.7%)  (92.3%)  (100%) 
(36.8%)  (54%)  (52.1%) 
Social  renting  620  4,902  5,522 
(11.2%)  (88.8%)  (100%) 
(43.5%)  (42.3%)  (42.4%) 
Private  renting  280  427  707 
(39.6%)  (60.4%)  (100%) 
(19.6%)  (3.7%)  (5.5%) 
Total  1,425  11,587  13,012 
(11.0%)  (89.0%)  (100%) 
(100%)  (100%)  100% 
'2  The  sample  originally  has  13,114  observations,  the  same  as  in  the  MNL  tenure  choice  model  but 
some  observations  were  excluded  in  the  variable  interactions.  Thus  the  total  number  of  observations  in 
the  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model  reduces  to  13,012. 
136 Note:  the  first  percentage  is  the  row  percentage;  the  second  percentage  is  the  column 
percentage. 
The  dependent  variable  to  be  estimated  in  the  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model  is  the 
household's  move-stay  and  tenure  status  (ACHOICE).  Based  on  the  model  structure 
(see  Figure  4.2  in  Chapter  Four),  the  dependent  variable  contains  four  different 
statuses:  stay,  move  to  choose  owner-occupation;  social  renting;  and  private  renting. 
For  each  individual  household,  if  the  household  is  a  stayer,  it  is  marked  as  "stayer".  If 
the  household  is  a  recent  mover,  it  is  specifically  assigned  to  its  current  tenure  status. 
According  to  Table  5.12,  the  dependent  variable  contains  11,587  stayers,  525  mover- 
owners,  620  mover-social  tenants,  and  280  mover-private  tenants. 
The  explanatory  variables  in  the  mobility  decision  level  come  from  several  categories 
including  the  household's  demographic  characteristics,  employment  status,  income, 
and  neighbourhood  quality  conditions.  In  fact,  these  variables  may  influence  both  the 
mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice.  As  discussed  in  previous  chapters,  the 
household's  demographic  and  socio-economic  characteristics  such  as  age,  sex,  marital 
status,  number  of  dependent  children,  employment  and  income  data  would  represent 
different  household  life  cycle  stages,  thus  generating  different  housing  demand.  The 
household  characteristics  can  also  be  used  to  present  housing  attributes  such  as  the 
dissatisfaction  of  housing  size,  type  and  quality.  As  a  result,  these  variables  would 
influence  the  household's  likeliness  to  move.  It  is  noted  that  these  explanatory 
variables  in  the  mobility  decision  level  interact  with  the  "stay"  choice,  denoting  the 
relationship  between  these  variables  and  stay  choice  and  thus  separating  from  the 
tenure  choice  level.  The  expected  signs  of  these  interacted  variables  are  reported  in 
Table  5.13.  The  descriptive  statistics  and  the  definition  of  the  original  variables  are 
reported  in  Table  5.2  and  Appendix  A.  5.1,  respectively. 
137 Table  5.13  The  Expected  Sign  of  Explanatory  Variables  in  the  Mobility  Decision 
Level 
Original  Variable:  Interacted  Variable  Expected  Sign 
Age  (interacted  with  stay):  Ageheads  + 
Marry  (interacted  with  stay):  Marrys  + 
Male  (interacted  with  stay):  Males  + 
Ndepch  (interacted  with  stay):  Ndepchs  + 
Unemploy  (interacted  with  stay):  Unemps  - 
Lnperinc  (interacted  with  stay):  Lnincs  + 
Affown  (interacted  with  stay):  Affowns  + 
Prvtcity  (interacted  with  stay):  Pvcitys  - 
Poorcnl  (interacted  with  stay):  Porcnls  ? 
A  number  of  studies  have  indicated  that  older  and  married  household  heads  with 
dependent  children  are  less  likely  to  move  than  younger  and  single  individuals  and 
adult-only  couples  (see  Clark  and  Onaka  1985,  Zorn  1988,  Clark  and  Dieleman  1996). 
As  a  result,  it  is  expected  that  while  age  increases,  household  heads'  would  be  more 
likely  to  stay  rather  than  to  move.  Married  household  heads  and  male  household 
heads  are  also  expected  to  be  likely  to  stay.  Households  with  more  dependent 
children  would  be  more  likely  to  stay.  While  income  increases,  the  household  would 
be  more  stable  and  thus  it  is  likely  to  stay,  given  other  conditions  in  constant.  It  is 
expected  that  unemployed  household  heads  would  be  more  likely  to  move.  Since 
unemployed  households  are  likely  to  have  lower  incomes,  they  would  be  more  mobile. 
Regarding  the  neighbourhood  quality,  it  is  expected  that  households  located  in  high 
quality  neighbourhoods  in  which  affluent  owners  predominate,  would  be  more  likely 
to  stay.  In  contrast,  households  located  in  inner  city  neighbourhoods  where  they  are 
predominated  by  private  tenants  could  be  influenced  by  their  neighbour  households 
and  thus  would  be  expected  to  be  more  mobile.  Households  located  in  the  lowest 
quality  council  housing  neighbourhoods  would  be  less  likely  to  stay.  However,  it  is 
very  often  the  case  that  households  in  the  lowest  quality  neighbourhood  may  not  be 
able  to  afford  to  move. 
138 0  Variables  in  the  Tenure  Choice  Level 
The  explanatory  variables  in  the  tenure  choice  level  are  drawn  from  the  MNL  tenure 
choice  model.  As  a  requirement  of  the  nested  multinomial  logit  model,  the 
explanatory  variables  in  the  tenure  choice  level  are  interacted  with  three  choices: 
owner-occupation,  social  renting  and  private  renting  in  order  to  estimate  the 
coefficients  among  three  tenure  alternatives.  According  to  Greene  (1998),  if  the  rule 
is  set  as  if  the  explanatory  variable  is  measured  for  the  individual,  such  a  variable  can 
only  be  incorporated  in  the  nested  multinomial  logit  model  by  using  the  equivalent  of 
dummy  variable  interaction  terms.  Otherwise,  the  variable  is  the  same  for  all  choices, 
and  its  coefficients  cannot  be  estimated. 
In  the  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model,  the  explanatory  variables  of  households' 
demographic  characteristics,  employment  status,  income,  previous  tenure,  location, 
dwelling  type,  neighbourhood  quality  and  rationing  variables  are  all  measured  for  the 
individual,  which  means  that  these  variables  are  not  different  across  tenures. 
Therefore,  these  variables  need  to  be  interacted  with  three  dummy  variables  of  tenure 
alternatives.  One  exception  is  that  the  user  cost  in  the  model  is  measured  as  an 
attribute  across  tenures  not  for  the  individual.  In  the  data  matrix,  each  household 
observation  faces  four  possible  choices  -  three  tenure  alternatives  and  stay,  and 
therefore  each  choice  would  be  assigned  to  its  specific  user  cost  in  order  to  examine 
the  effect  on  each  tenure.  Since  the  data  matrix  is  unable  to  specify  the  user  cost  for 
each  individual,  this  thesis  considers  that  the  user  cost  not  only  varies  across  tenures 
but  also  varies  across  areas  in  Scotland.  As  a  result,  the  user  cost  in  the  model  is 
measured  by  the  average  cost  across  tenures  and  across  all  32  unitary  authorities  in 
Scotland.  The  estimation  results  of  the  user  cost,  the  net  user  cost  and  the  economic 
subsidy  across  tenures  and  across  all  32  unitary  authorities  are  reported  in  Appendix 
A.  5.2. 
Moreover,  this  thesis  sets  owner-occupation  as  the  default  tenure  in  estimating  the 
household's  comparative  choice  behaviour  between  social  renting  and  owner- 
occupation,  and  between  private  renting  and  owner-occupation.  "  As  a  result,  the 
"  The  default  tenure  can  be  changed  in  the  model.  This  thesis  sets  owner-occupation  as  the  default 
tenure  because  most  households  see  homeownership  as  the  ideal  tenure,  compared  to  social  renting  and 
private  renting.  Furthermore,  in  the  pre-test  model,  this  thesis  found  that  the  estimation  results  based 
139 variables  interacted  with  owner-occupation  will  not  be  shown  in  the  model.  The 
expected  sign  of  the  explanatory  variables  (interacted  with  social  renting  and  with 
private  renting)  is  reported  in  Table  5.14. 
Table  5.14  the  Expected  Sign  of  Explanatory  Variables  in  the  Tenure  Choice  Level 
Original  Variables:  Interacted  Variables  Expected  Sign 
Lntcost  (log  user  cost):  attribute  - 
Lnatcost  (log  net  user  cost):  attribute  - 
Age  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Agehsoc  - 
Age  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Agehprv  - 
Ndepch  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Ndepsoc  ? 
Ndepch  (interacted  with  private  renting)  Ndepprv  - 
Marry  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Marrysoc  ? 
Marry  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Marryprv  - 
Male  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Malesoc  - 
Male  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Maleprv  ? 
Fullwork  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Fullsoc  - 
Fullwork  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Fullprv  - 
Partwork  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Partsoc  - 
Partwork  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Partprv  - 
Unemploy  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Unempsoc  + 
Unemploy  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Unempprv  ? 
Prevown  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Pvownsoc  - 
Prevown  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Pvownprv  - 
Prevsoc  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Pvsocsoc  + 
Prevsoc  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Pvsocprv  ? 
Prevprv  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Pvprvsoc  ? 
Prevprv  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Pvprvprv  + 
House  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Housoc  - 
House  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Housprv  . 
? 
on  owner-occupation  as  the  default  tenure  are  more  reliable  than  the  results  based  on  other  two  tenures 
as  the  default  tenures. 
140 Urban  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Urbansoc  ? 
Urban  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Urbanprv  -? 
Affown  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Afownsoc  - 
Affown  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Afownprv  - 
Poorcnl  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Pocnlsoc  + 
Poorcnl  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Pocnlprv  - 
Prvtcity  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Pvctysoc  ? 
Prvtcity  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Pvctyprv  + 
Lnperinc  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Lnincsoc  - 
Lnperinc  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Lnincprv  - 
Ratmort  (interacted  with  social  renting):  Mratsoc  + 
Ratmort  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Mratprv  + 
Ratsoc  (interacted  with  private  renting):  Sratprv  ? 
The  expected  sign  of  these  explanatory  variables  in  the  tenure  choice  level  is  drawn 
from  the  MNL  tenure  choice  model.  The  variable  interacted  with  social  renting  and 
private  renting  denotes  the  relationship  between  the  variable  and  the  choice  of  social 
renting  or  private  renting  respectively.  As  stated  earlier,  the  user  cost  is  an  attribute 
varying  across  tenures  and  it  is  expected  that  the  user  cost  would  have  a  negative 
effect  on  households'  tenure  choice  under  the  moving  decision.  With  respect  to 
household  demographic  variables,  it  is  expected  that  when  age  increases,  the 
household  would  be  less  likely  to  choose  social  renting  and  private  renting,  compared 
to  owner-occupation,  when  considering  moving.  Married  households  with  dependent 
children  would  be  less  likely  to  choose  social  renting  and  private  renting,  compared 
with  owner-occupation.  Female  household  heads  are  expected  to  be  more  likely  to 
choose  social  renting,  while  it  could  be  hard  to  tell  whether  the  male  or  female 
household  heads  would  be  likely  to  choose  private  renting  or  owner-occupation  when 
making  decisions  about  moving. 
With  respect  to  employment  status,  it  is  expected  that  households  who  have  full  time 
or  part  time  jobs  would  be  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  than  the  other  two 
tenures,  given  their  decisions  to  move.  In  contrast,  unemployed  households  would 
prefer  social  renting  or  private  renting.  When  a  household  considers  moving,  the 
141 household's  previous  tenure  status  may  have  an  important  influence  on  its  current 
tenure  decision.  It  is  expected  that  households  who  were  previously  owners  or  social 
tenants  would  be  more  likely  to  remain  at  the  same  tenure  when  making  a  moving 
decision.  As  discussed  earlier,  many  households  see  private  renting  as  a  transitional 
tenure  between  owner-occupation  and  social  renting.  Therefore,  it  would  be  difficult 
to  decide  those  households  who  were  previously  private  tenants  in  choosing  between 
social  renting  and  owner-occupation. 
As  discussed  in  the  last  section,  dwelling  type  is  usually  associated  with  tenure  type. 
In  Britain,  it  is  very  often  the  case  that  owner-occupied  dwellings  are  dominated  by 
houses,  while  social  rented  dwellings  are  dominated  by  flats  or  tenements.  Therefore, 
it  is  expected  that  households  who  live  in  houses  would  be  likely  to  choose  owner- 
occupation  than  social  renting,  when  considering  moving.  However,  as  discussed  in 
Chapter  Three,  there  are  also  a  number  of  privately  rented  houses  located  in  rural 
areas  of  Scotland.  Thus,  it  could  be  difficult  to  tell  the  sign  in  terms  of  the  dwelling 
type  and  the  choice  between  private  renting  and  owner-occupation.  With  respect  to 
the  location  variable,  as  discussed  in  the  last  section,  the  over-simple  definition  of  the 
urban/rural  indicator  would  not  be  suitable  to  interpret  the  relationship  between  tenure 
and  location. 
Households  who  live  in  a  high  quality  neighbourhood  such  as  the  area  predominated 
by  affluent  owners  is  expected  to  be  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  than  the 
other  two  tenures,  when  they  consider  moving.  In  contrast,  households  in  a  poor 
quality  council  housing  neighbourhood  would  be  more  likely  to  stay  in  the  social 
rented  sector  and  it  is  very  often  the  case  that  those  households  may  not  be  able  to 
afford  to  choose  other  tenures.  It  would  be  difficult  to  anticipate  those  households  in 
the  private  rented  inner  city  neighbourhoods  who  would  choose  social  renting  or 
owner-occupation. 
Household  income  would  have  an  important  impact  on  tenure  choice  when  making 
moving  decisions.  It  is  expected  that  when  long  term  income  increases,  households 
would  be  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  than  the  other  two  tenures,  when 
they  consider  moving.  In  addition,  if  households  are  rationed  from  mortgages,  they 
could  be  forced  to  choose  between  social  renting  and  private  renting.  On  the  other 
142 hand,  if  households  were  constrained  from  the  social  rented  sector,  they  would  choose 
between  owner-occupation  and  private  renting  when  considering  moving. 
In  summary,  the  variables  of  the  NMNL  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model  are  drawn 
from  the  MNL  tenure  choice  model.  The  nested  logit  model  requires  the  explanatory 
variables  to  be  interacted  with  four  possible  choices  -  stay,  owner-occupation,  social 
renting  and  private  renting  in  order  to  estimate  the  coefficients  of  these  choices.  The 
user  cost  in  this  model  is  treated  as  an  attribute  across  tenure.  It  is  measured  by  the 
average  cost  across  tenures  and  across  all  32  unitary  authorities  in  Scotland.  Since  the 
mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice  are  interdependent,  this  thesis  expects  that  some 
variables  such  as  the  household's  age,  sex,  marital  status,  the  number  of  dependent 
children,  employment,  income  and  neighbourhood  quality  would  have  influences  on 
both  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice.  The  model  results  will  be  shown  in  the  next 
chapter. 
5.4  The  Properties  of  the  Data 
This  section  discusses  the  properties  of  the  data  and  variables  applied  to  the  two 
tenure  choice  models.  The  first  part  of  this  section  discusses  the  selection  of  the 
explanatory  variables  of  the  two  tenure  choice  models;  the  second  part  is  the 
correlation  analysis  of  these  explanatory  variables. 
5.4.1  The  Selection  of  the  Explanatory  Variables 
As  discussed  in  the  second  section,  most  explanatory  variables  of  the  two  tenure 
choice  models  are  recoded  or  imputed  from  the  original  variables  of  the  1996  SHCS. 
The  development  of  some  important  variables  including  household  long  term  income, 
the  user  cost,  economic  subsidies  and  rationing  variables  has  been  discussed  in  the 
second  section.  This  part  emphasises  the  process  of  selecting  the  explanatory 
variables  recoded  from  the  original  variables  of  the  1996  SHCS  data.  Among  these 
explanatory  variables,  household  demographic  variables  such  as  household  age, 
gender,  marital  status  and  the  number  of  dependent  children,  can  adopt  the  original 
variables  in  the  1996  SHCS  data  with  only  a  slightly  recoding.  14  It  is  noted  that  the 
14  The  recoding  process  involves  a  simply  change  of  codes  of  the  variable  into  dummy  code  (0  or  1)  and 
a  recode  of  invalid  data  into  missing  value  data. 
143 original  variables  here  mean  that  the  variables  listed  in  the  1996  SHCS  data  set  are 
used  without  any  recoding  or  imputation  by  this  thesis.  Some  dummy  variables  like 
dwelling  type  (house  or  flat),  location  (urban  or  rural)  and  likelihood  of  moving  within 
2  years  can  also  be  directly  recoded  from  the  original  variables  of  the  1996  SHCS  data. 
However,  some  variables  such  as  employment  status,  previous  tenure  status,  and 
neighbourhood  quality  variables  involve  some  complicated  recoding  exercises.  The 
selection  of  these  variables  is  discussed  as  follows. 
"  Employment  Status 
The  employment  status  variables  are  recoded  from  the  ESHOH96  variable  of  the  1996 
SHCS  data.  The  ESHOH96  contains  seven  conditions  of  employment  status  as  shown 
in  Table  5.15.  The  first  four  conditions  are  the  most  common  conditions  describing 
the  household  head's  employment  status  which  have  been  adopted  by  some  tenure 
choice  studies  (see  for  example  Struyk  and  Marshall  1974,  Clark  and  Dieleman  1996). 
The  condition  of  households  with  long  term  sickness  or  disability  is  included  in  the 
development  of  the  social  housing  rationing  variable,  therefore,  it  will  not  be  repeated 
in  the  employment  status  variables.  Under  this  circumstance,  this  thesis  recodes  the 
most  common  four  conditions-full  time  paid  work,  part  time  paid  work,  unemployed 
and  retire  into  four  separate  dummy  variables.  These  four  dummy  variables  describe 
whether  or  not  the  household  head  has/is  (1) full  time  paid  work  (FULLWORK=1),  (2) 
part  time  paid  work  (PARTWORK=1),  (3)  unemployed  (LJNEMPLOY=1),  and  (4) 
retired  (RETIRE=1).  The  frequency  table  of  these  four  dummy  variables  are  shown  in 
Table  5.16. 
Table  5.15  Frequency  Table  of  the  ESHOH96  Variable 
Frequency 
(No.  ) 
Percent 
% 
Valid  Percent 
(0/0) 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1.  Full  time  paid  work  8499  46.8  46.8  46.8 
2.  Part  time  paid  work  801  4.4  4.4  51.2 
3.  Unemployed  1097  6.0  6.0  57.3 
4.  Retire  4957  27.3  27.3  84.6 
5.  Long  term  sick/disabled  1348  7.4  7.4  92.0 
6.  Looking  after  home  1023  5.6  5.6  97.6 
7.  Other  433  2.4  2.4  100.0 
Total  18158  100.0  100.0 
144 Table  5.16  Frequency  Table  of  the  Four  Dummy  Variables  of  Employment 
Status-FULLWORK,  PARTWORK,  UNEMPLOY  and  RETIRE 
Frequency  Percent  Valid  Percent  Cumulative 
(No.  )  (0/0)  (0/0)  Percent 
FULL  WOR 
0  No  9659  53.2  53.2  53.2 
1  Yes  8499  46.8  46.8  100.0 
Total  18158  100.0  100.0 
ARTWORK 
0  No  17357  95.6  95.6  95.6 
1  Yes  801  4.4  4.4  100.0 
Total  18158  100.0  100.0 
UNEMPLOY 
0  No  17061  94.0  94.0  94.0 
1  Yes  1097  6.0  6.0  100.0 
Total  18158  100.0  100.0 
TIRE 
0  No  13201  72.7  72.7  72.7 
1  Yes  4957  27.3  27.3  100.0 
Total  18158  100.0  100.0 
"  Previous  Tenure  Status 
Previous  tenure  status  variables  are  recoded  from  the  variable  of  PREVTEN  in  the 
1996  SHCS  data.  The  frequency  table  of  the  PREVTEN  variable  is  shown  as  Table 
5.17.  Then  PREVTEN  variable  is  recoded  into  three  separate  dummy  variables  based 
on  the  three  main  tenures  adopted  in  this  thesis.  These  three  dummy  variables  are  (1) 
previous  owner-occupiers  (PREVOWN=1),  (2)  previous  social  tenants 
(PREVSOC=1),  and  (3)  previous  private  tenants  (PREVPRV=1).  The  frequency 
tables  of  these  three  dummy  variables  are  shown  in  Table  5.18. 
145 Table  5.17  Frequency  Table  of  the  Previous  Tenure  Variable  (PREVTEN) 
-Frequency 
(No.  ) 
Percent 
% 
Valid  Percent 
(%) 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1.  Owner  occupier  5327  29.3  29.5  29.5 
2.  LA/NT/SH/Other  public  6248  34.4  34.6  64.1 
3.  HA/Housing  coop  315  1.7  1.7  65.8 
4.  Private  renter  2666  14.1  14.8  80.6 
5.  Other  2932  16.1  16.3  96.9 
-9.  Not  applicable  555  3.1  3.1  100.0 
Subtotal  18043  99.4  100.0 
Missing  Value  115  0.6 
Total  18158  100.0 
Table  5.18  Frequency  Table  of  Three  Dummy  Variables  of  Previous  Tenure- 
PREVOWN,  PREVSOC  and  PREVPRV 
Frequency  Percent  Valid  Percent  Cumulative 
(No.  )  %  %  Percent 
REVOWN 
0  No  12161  67.0  69.5  69.5 
1  Yes  5327  29.3  30.5  100.0 
Subtotal  17488  96.3  100.0 
Missing  Value  670  3.7 
Total  18158  100.0 
REVSOC 
0  No  10925  60.2  62.5  62.5 
1  Yes  6563  36.1  37.5  100.0 
Subtotal  17488  96.3  100.0 
Missing  Value  670  3.7 
Total  18158  100.0 
REVPRV 
0  No  14822  81.6  84.8  84.8 
1  Yes  2666  14.7  15.2  100.0 
Subtotal  17488  96.3  100.0 
Missing  Value  670  3.7 
Total  18158 
146 "  Neighbourhood  Quality 
Neighbourhood  quality  variables  are  recoded  from  the  ACORN  group  variable  in  the 
1996  SHCS  data.  As  discussed  in  the  second  section,  the  ACORN  group  variable  is 
the  best  alternative  variable  to  proxy  the  neighbourhood  quality  in  the  1996  SHCS 
data.  The  ACORN  group  variable  divides  neighbourhood  quality  into  eight  different 
groups  associated  with  different  tenure  types  as  shown  in  Table  5.19.  The  explanation 
of  these  groups  in  the  ACORN  group  variable  describes  whether  or  not  the 
neighbourhood  is  predominated  by  (1)  affluent  owners  or  by  seven  other  different 
groups  listed  in  Table  5.19. 
Table  5.19  Frequency  Table  of  ACORN  Group  Variable 
Frequency 
o. 
Percent  Valid  Percent  Cumulative 
Percent 
1.  Affluent  owners  2132 
. 
11.7  11.7  11.7 
2.  Prosperous  owners  3237  17.8  17.8  29.6 
3.  Agricultural  801  4.4  4.4  34.0 
4.  Private  inner  city  tenant  2049  11.3  11.3  45.3 
5.  Better  off  council  tenants  3611  19.9  19.9  65.2 
6.  Less  well  off  council  tenants  2774  15.3  15.3  80.4 
7.  Older  council  tenants  1816  10.0  10.0  90.4 
8.  Poorest  council  tenants  1735  9.6  9.6  100.0 
9.  Unallocated  2  0.0001  0.0  100.0 
Subtotal  18157  100.0  100.0 
Missing  Value  1  0.00006 
Total  18158  100.0 
Because  of  a  lack  of  clear  description  of  these  neighbourhood  conditions  in  the 
ACORN  group  variable,  it  is difficult  for  this  thesis  to  distinguish  a  significant  quality 
difference  between  these  neighbourhood  conditions.  "  Therefore,  this  thesis  adopts 
three  dummy  variables-whether  or  not  the  neighbourhood  is  predominated  by  (1) 
affluent  owners  (AFFOWN=1),  (2)  private  inner  city  tenants  (PRVTCITY=1),  and  (3) 
poorest  council  tenants  (POORCNL=1),  as  shown  in  Table  5.20.  These  three  dummy 
variables  present  a  clear  and  significantly  different  neighbourhood  quality, 
respectively,  and  also  are  associated  with  different  tenure  types.  Thus,  it  is  significant 
147 to  examine  the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour  when  facing  these  three 
extremely  different  neighbourhood  qualities. 
Table  5.20  Frequency  Table  of  Three  Dummy  Variables  of  Neighbourhood 
Quality-AFFOWN,  PRVTCITY  and  POORCNL 
Frequency  Percent  Valid  Percent  Cumulative 
(No.  )  %  (%)  Percent 
FOWN 
0  No  16023  88.3  88.3  88.3 
1  Yes  2132  11.7  11.7  100.0 
Subtotal  18155  100.0  100.0 
Missing  Value  3  0.0002 
Total  18158  100.0 
PR  VTCIT 
0  No  16106  88.7  88.7  88.7 
1  Yes  2049  11.3  11.3  100.0 
Subtotal  18155  100.0  100.0 
Missing  Value  3  0.0002 
Total  18158  100.0 
OORCNL 
0  No  16420  90.4  90.4  90.4 
1  Yes  1735  9.6  9.6  100.0 
Subtotal  18155  100.0  100.0 
Missing  Value  3  0.0002 
Total  18158  100.0 
Based  on  above  analysis  and  the  discussion  in  the  second  section,  a  total  of  23 
explanatory  variables  are  initially  selected  for  the  two  tenure  choice  models.  The 
descriptive  statistics  of  these  explanatory  variables  are  shown  in  Table  5.21.  It  is 
noted  that  the  figures  in  Table  5.21  present  row  descriptive  statistics  of  these  variables 
where  each  variable  has  its  different  number  of  valid  observations.  The  bottom  of  the 
second  column  shows  the  total  valid  observations  of  the  sample  are  13114.  This 
means  that  after  knocking  out  all  missing  value  cases  of  each  household  in  the  sample, 
13  For  example,  it  is  difficult  to  draw  a  clear  line  between  affluent  owners  and  prosperous  owners  and 
also  between  better  off  council  tenants  and  less  well  off  council  tenants. 
148 there  are  13114  observations  containing  full  valid  values  of  these  explanatory 
variables.  This  figure  is  also  the  total  sample  cases  of  the  two  tenure  choice  models. 
Table  5.21  Descriptive  Statistics  of  Initial  Explanatory  Variables  of  the  Tenure 
Choice  Models 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
GE  18064  16.00  102.00  50.9779  17.6175 
GESQ  18064  256.00  10404.00  2909.1003  1889.6365 
EPCH  18158  0  7 
. 
58 
. 
97 
MARRY  18158 
.  00  1.00 
. 
5752 
. 
4943 
MALE  18158 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
6967 
. 
4597 
FULLWORK  18158 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
4681 
. 
4990 
ARTWORK  18158 
. 
00  1.00  4.411  E-02 
. 
2054 
UNEMPLOY  18158  .  00  1.00  6.04111-02 
. 
2383 
TIRE  18158 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
2730  . 
4455 
REVOWN  17488 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
2952  . 
4562 
REVSOC  17488 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
3637  . 
4811 
REVPRV  17488 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
1478  . 
3549 
OUSE  17705 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
6249  . 
4842 
1KMOV2  18158 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
1290  . 
3352 
URBAN  18158 
. 
00  1.00  .  7935  . 
4048 
FOWN  18155 
. 
00  1.00  . 
1174  . 
3219 
RVTC1TY  18155 
. 
00  1.00  .  1128  . 
3164 
OORCNL  18155 
.  00  1.00  9.556E-02  . 
2940 
NPERINC  18040  7.73  10.43  9.2038  . 
4628 
LNUCC-1  15037  5.34  9.55  7.9589  . 
3654 
LNUCN-1  13847  4.82  9.55  7.6562  . 
3994 
TMORT  14450 
.  00  1.00  . 
4487  . 
4974 
TSOC  18158 
. 
00  1.00  .  6398  .  4801 
alid  N  (listwise)  13114 
5.4.2  Correlation  Analysis 
It  is  common  to  fmd  that  explanatory  variables  such  as  those  shown  above  have  some 
degree  of  correlation.  If  some  explanatory  variables  are  highly  correlated,  then  it  is 
very  difficult  to  separate  the  individual  effects  of  these  variables  (Greene  2000).  In 
this  case,  the  multicollinearity  problem  becomes  severe  and  the  estimation  results  of 
the  tenure  choice  models  are  spurious.  As  Green  (2000)  states,  since 
nonexperminental  data  will  never  be  completely  orthogonal  (no  correlation  between 
149 variables),  to  some  extent  multicollinearity  will  always  exist.  To  cope  with  the 
multicollinearity  problem,  one  remedy  is  to  obtain  more  data  and  another  is  to  drop 
variables  suspected  of  causing  the  multicollinearity  problem  (ibid.  ).  Due  to  data 
limitations,  the  approach  used  in  this  thesis  to  improve  multicollinearity  of  the  tenure 
choice  models  is  to  drop  variables  which  are  highly  correlated.  A  correlation  analysis 
of  these  explanatory  variables  can  help  us  to  point  out  some  suspected  variables. 
In  a  correlation  analysis,  the  correlation  coefficient  itself  has  the  following  range  of 
values:  (1)  +1.0  denotes  a  perfect  positive  correlation,  (2)  0.0  denotes  no  correlation, 
(3)  -1.0  denotes  perfect  negative  correlation  (Williams  1992).  With  respect  to  the 
degree  of  correlation  between  variables,  Guilford  (1956)  suggests  a  rough  guide  of  the 
correlation  coefficients  as  follows:  (quoted  from  Williams  1992,  p.  137) 
0.20<  slight;  almost  negligible  relationship 
0.20-0.40  low  correlation;  definite  but  small  relationship 
0.40-0.70  moderate  correlation;  substantial  relationship 
0.70-0.90  high  correlation;  marked  relationship 
>0.90  very  high  correlation;  very  dependable  relationship 
Table  5.22  Correlation  Analysis  of  Some  Explanatory  Variables  with  Moderate  to 
High  Correlation 
Age  Marry  Male  Fullwork  Retire  Lnperinc 
Fullwork  -0.503*  0.402*  0.358*  1.00  -0.575*  0.599* 
Retire  0.743*  -0.201  *  -0.176*  -0.575*  1.00  -0.461* 
Lnperinc  -0.489*  0.797*  0.586*  0.599*  -0.461*  1.00 
Ratsoc  -0.417*  0.323*  0.253*  0.603*  -0.518*  0.516* 
Ratmort  -0.008  -0.404*  -0.291  *  -0.241  *  0.028*  -0.421  * 
Notes:  the  correlation  coefficient  is  the  Pearson  Product-Moment  Correlation 
Coefficient. 
*  significant  at  5%  level. 
Table  5.22  shows  the  correlation  analysis  of  some  explanatory  variables,  which  are 
moderately  or  highly  correlated.  A  full  correlation  table  of  all  explanatory  variables  is 
shown  in  Appendix  A.  5.3.  Apparently,  the  household  head's  age  and  retired 
household  heads  are  highly  correlated.  The  correlation  between  married  household 
head  and  household  long  term  income  is  remarkably  high.  It  is  reasonable  to  see  that 
150 household  long  term  income  has  a  moderate  correlation  to  some  of  the  household 
head's  demographic  variables  and  employment  variables  since  the  estimation  of 
household  long  term  income  is  based  on  these  variables  as  discussed  in  the  second 
section.  In  the  meantime,  the  social  housing  rationing  variable  is  derived  from 
household  income  and  employment  variables.  As  a  result,  the  social  housing  rationing 
variable  has  a  moderate  degree  of  correlation  to  these  variables. 
As  Green  (2000)  suggests,  when  some  explanatory  variables  are  perfectly  or  highly 
correlated,  multicollinearity  becomes  a  serious  problem  to  the  model.  Therefore,  the 
focus  is  on  explanatory  variables  with  high  correlation.  In  this  sense,  there  are  four 
explanatory  variables:  the  household  head's  age,  marital  status,  retired  household 
heads  and  household  long  term  income,  all  of  which  could  possibly  be  dropped  in 
order  to  cope  with  a  severe  problem  of  multicollinearity  in  the  specification.  Among 
these  four  variables,  the  household  head's  age  and  marital  status  are  the  basic 
determinants  of  tenure  choice  and  also  household  long  term  income  is  an  important 
determinant.  Under  this  circumstance,  the  dummy  variable  of  whether  the  household 
head  is  retired  or  not  is  dropped  out  of  the  tenure  choice  models  to  minimise  the 
multicollinearity  problem.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  multicollinearity  can  still 
be  a  problem  distorting  the  estimation  results  of  the  tenure  choice  models,  since  it  still 
exhibits  a  high  degree  of  correlation  between  household  long  term  income  and  the 
household  head's  marital  status. 
Finally,  after  dropping  the  dummy  variable  of  retired  household  heads,  a  total  of  22 
explanatory  variables  are  selected  to  estimate  their  influences  on  households'  tenure 
choice  behaviour.  The  descriptive  statistics  of  these  explanatory  variables  are 
reported  in  Table  5.23. 
151 Table  5.23  Descriptive  Statistics  of  Explanatory  Variables  of  the  Tenure  Choice 
Models 
N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
GE  13114  16.00  97.00  51.2778  17.7229 
GESQ  13114  256.00  9409.00  2943.4499  1898.4888 
EPCH  13114  0  7  .  58 
. 
96 
MARRY  13114 
. 
00  1.00  . 
5778 
. 
4939 
MALE  13114 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
6925 
. 
4615 
FULLWORK  13114 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
4455 
. 
4970 
ARTWORK  13114 
. 
00  1.00  4.598E-02 
. 
2095 
UNEMPLOY  13114 
. 
00  1.00  6.001E-02 
. 
2375 
OUSE  13114 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
6257 
. 
4839 
REVOWN  13114 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
2926 
. 
4550 
REVSOC  13114 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
3730 
. 
4836 
REVPRV  13114 
. 
00  1.00 
.  1462  .  3533 
IKMOV2  13114 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
1246 
. 
3303 
URBAN  13114 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
7989 
. 
4008 
AFFOWN  13114 
. 
00  1.00 
. 
1150  . 
3190 
RVTCITY  13114 
. 
00  1.00 
.  1071  . 
3093 
OORCNL  13114 
. 
00  1.00  9.989E-02 
. 
2999 
NPERINC  13114  7.81  10.43  9.1981  . 
4568 
NUCC  1  13114  5.34  9.49  7.9451  . 
3596 
NUCCN  1  13114  4.82  9.49  7.6690  . 
3796 
PLATMORT  13114 
. 
00  1.00  . 
4502  . 
4975 
TSOC  13114 
.  00  1.00  . 
6222  .  4848 
5.5  Summary 
This  chapter  discusses  the  empirical  data  and  variables  used  in  the  two  different 
structures  of  tenure  choice  models.  The  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  data 
set  contains  large  samples  and  rich  information  about  households'  socio-economic 
characteristics  and  dwelling  conditions,  which  are  useful  to  estimate  the  Scottish 
households'  tenure  choice  behaviour.  Inevitably,  the  1996  SHCS  data  set  does  not 
contain  all  the  variables  needed  for  the  two  tenure  choice  models.  Some  important 
variables  are  constructed  in  this  chapter. 
In  the  MNL  tenure  choice  model,  the  dependent  variable  is  the  household's  current 
tenure  status  including  owner-occupation,  social  renting  and  private  renting.  The 
152 explanatory  variables  come  from  several  categories  including  the  household's 
demographic  characteristics,  employment  status,  previous  tenure  status,  location, 
expected  mobility,  dwelling  type  and  neighbourhood  quality  variables.  These 
variables  are  expected  to  have  important  impacts  on  tenure  choice.  This  thesis  also 
constructs  household  long-term  income,  the  user  cost,  housing  (economic)  subsidy 
and  rationing  variables  to  estimate  households'  tenure  decisions.  The  use  of  long  term 
income  implies  the  household's  tenure  decision  is  based  on  long  term  and  multiple 
periods  instead  of  the  current  and  single  period.  The  housing  user  cost  presents  the 
relative  cost  of  owning,  social  renting  and  private  renting.  The  economic  subsidy 
reduces  the  user  cost,  thus  the  effect  can  be  expressed  by  estimating  the  difference 
between  the  user  cost  and  the  net  user  cost.  The  mortgage  rationing  and  social 
housing  rationing  variables  are  developed  by  simulating  households'  access 
constraints  into  the  owner-occupied  sector  and  the  social  rented  sector  respectively. 
In  the  NMNL  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model,  the  dependent  variable  is  the 
household's  move-stay  and  tenure  status  including  stay,  owner-occupation,  social 
renting  and  private  renting.  If  a  household  has  moved  within  two  years,  the  household 
is  defined  as  a  recent  mover  and  is  assigned  to  its  current  tenure  status.  The 
explanatory  variables  of  the  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model  are  drawn  from  the  first 
tenure  choice  model.  As  a  requirement  of  the  nested  logit  model,  the  explanatory 
variables  need  to  be  interacted  with  four  possible  choices  in  order  to  estimate  the 
interactive  coefficients  of  these  four  alternative  choices.  One  exception  is  the  user 
cost  variable  which  is  treated  as  an  attribute  across  tenures.  To  emphasise  the  area 
variation,  the  user  cost  in  the  model  is  measured  by  the  average  cost  across  tenures 
and  across  all  32  unitary  authorities  in  Scotland. 
The  household's  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice  are  interdependent.  Hence,  it  is 
expected  that  some  variables  such  as  the  household's  age,  sex,  marital  status,  the 
number  of  dependent  children,  employment,  household  long-term  income  and 
neighbourhood  quality  would  have  influences  on  both  mobility  decision  and  tenure 
choice.  These  variables  will  be  examined  in  the  next  chapter.  Moreover,  in  the 
discussion  of  the  properties  of  the  data,  this  thesis  explains  the  process  of  selecting  the 
explanatory  variables,  in  particular  the  employment  status  variables,  previous  tenure 
status  variables  and  the  neighbourhood  quality  variables  which  are  recoded  from  the 
153 original  variables  in  the  1996  SHCS.  A  correlation  analysis  of  these  explanatory 
variables  is  also  discussed  in  this  chapter.  In  order  to  minimise  the  multicollinearity 
problem,  this  thesis  drops  some  improper  variables  which  involve  a  high  degree  of 
correlation.  Thus,  it  would  help  to  select  appropriate  explanatory  variables  applied  to 
the  two  tenure  choice  models.  Finally,  it  would  be  of  interest  to  analyse  the  influences 
of  these  appropriate  explanatory  variables  on  the  household's  tenure  choice  and  also 
to  compare  the  estimation  results  of  the  two  tenure  choice  models.  The  next  chapter  is 
the  analysis  of  model  results. 
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This  chapter  analyses  the  estimation  results  of  the  two  tenure  choice  models.  There 
are  three  sections  in  this  chapter.  The  first  section  interprets  the  estimation  results  of 
the  multinomial  logit  form  of  tenure  choice  model.  The  second  section  analyses  the 
estimation  results  of  the  nested  multinomial  logit  form  of  mobility  and  tenure  choice 
model.  The  last  section  is  an  overall  analysis  of  the  two  model  results. 
6.1  Estimation  Results  of  the  Tenure  Choice  Model 
The  multinomial  logit  form  of  the  tenure  choice  model  is  run  by  the  LIMDEP 
software  programme.  "  As  discussed  in  Chapter  Four,  the  multinomial  logit  model  is 
estimated  by  the  maximum  likelihood  approach.  In  order  to  analyse  the  economic 
subsidy  effect  and  the  rationing  effect,  this  thesis  examines  three  separate  models 
containing  different  combinations  of  explanatory  variables.  Model  One  is  the  basic 
model  without  economic  subsidy  and  rationing  variables.  Model  Two  estimates  the 
economic  (housing)  subsidy  effect  and  contains  all  the  variables  in  the  first  model 
except  for  the  net  user  cost  variable.  As  discussed  in  the  last  chapter,  the  economic 
subsidy  effect  is  expressed  as  the  difference  between  the  user  cost  and  the  net  user 
cost.  Model  Three  estimates  both  the  economic  subsidy  effect  and  the  rationing  effect, 
and  contains  all  the  variables  of  the  second  model  and  adds  mortgage  rationing  and 
social  housing  rationing  variables.  The  estimation  results  of  these  three  models  are 
discussed  below.  The  full  estimation  results  of  these  three  models  run  by  LIMDEP 
programme  are  reported  in  Appendix  A.  6.1. 
6.1.1  Model  One 
The  estimation  results  of  model  one  are  reported  in  Table  6.1.  The  default  tenure  in 
the  MNL  tenure  choice  model  is  owner-occupation,  the  coefficient  estimates  in  the 
second  column  and  the  fourth  column  of  Table  6.1  are  the  probabilities  of  choosing 
social  renting  and  private  renting,  compared  to  owner-occupation  respectively.  It  is 
important  to  note  that  the  coefficient  estimates  are  the  comparative  coefficients,  which 
16  LIMDEP  is  a  flexible  computer  programme  for  estimating  a  variety  of  models.  Specifically  it  is  very 
powerful  for  discrete  choice  models,  such  as  the  MNL  model  and  the  NMNL  model. 
155 are  compared  to  the  default  tenure  -  owner-occupation.  Table  6.1  shows  that  most 
coefficient  estimates  in  model  one  are  statistically  significant  at  1%  level,  which 
means  that  most  explanatory  variables  have  statistically  significant  influences  (in  the 
99%  confidence  interval)  on  households'  tenure  decisions.  The  model's  overall 
predicted  level  (goodness-of-fit)  is  nearly  80%,  indicating  that  the  model  is  quite 
reliable  and  the  explanatory  variables  have  good  predictions  on  tenure  choice. 
Table  6.1  Estimation  Results  of  the  MNL  Tenure  Choice  Model-Model  One. 
Dependent  Variable  =  Tenure 
Default  tenure  =  Owner-Occupation 
00  =  Owner-Occupation;  SR  =  Social  Renting;  PR  =  Private  Renting 
SROO  PROO 
Variable  Coefficients  Significant 
Level 
Coefficients  Significant 
Level 
Constant  50.25  ***  27.32  *** 
Age  0.047  ***  -0.098.  *** 
Agesq  -0.0008  ***  0.0005  *** 
Ndepch  0.617  ***  0.270  *** 
Marry  1.093  ***  -0.378  ** 
Male  -0.103  Insig  0.296 
Fullwork  -1.007  ***  -0.886  *** 
Partwork  -0.136  Insig  -0.868  *** 
Unemploy  0.986  ***  0.809  *** 
House  -0.483  ***  0.160  Insig 
Prevown  -1.228  ***  -0.405  *** 
Prevsoc  0.722  ***  0.489  *** 
Prevprv  0.289  ***  1.124  *** 
Likmov2  0.197  **  1.310  *** 
Urban  0.066  Insig  -0.808  *** 
Affown  -1.712  ***  0.274 
Prvtcity  -1.775  ***  0.573  *** 
Poorcnl  1.145  ***  0.307  Insig 
LnPerinc  -3.201  ***  -1.169  *** 
LnUcc  1  -2.710  ***  -1.921  *** 
Log  Likelihood  -6703.9 
Predicted  Level  79.2% 
"N  13114 
Notes:  Sigr  iticant  at  1  per  cent  level. 
**  Significant  at  5  per  cent  level. 
*  Significant  at  10  per  cent  level. 
156 Insig  :  Insignificant. 
With  regard  to  the  choice  between  social  renting  and  owner-occupation,  it  is 
surprising  to  see  that  the  household  head's  age  has  a  positive  effect  on  social  renting 
compared  to  owner-occupation.  The  coefficient  of  the  household  head's  age  is 
interpreted  as  when  the  household  head's  age  increases,  say  one  year,  the  probability 
of  the  household  head  choosing  social  renting  increases  5%,  compared  to  owner- 
occupation,  holding  other  variables  constant.  Similar  interpretation  applies  to  other 
explanatory  variables.  The  negative  effect  of  the  age-square  of  household  heads 
explains  that  the  probability  of  choosing  social  renting  increases  at  a  slower  rate. 
However,  it  is  not  expected  that  households  who  have  more  dependent  children  are 
more  likely  to  choose  social  renting  rather  than  owner-occupation.  Nor  is  it  expected 
that  married  household  heads  are  more  likely  to  choose  social  renting  than  owner- 
occupation.  To  some  degree,  the  positive  effects  of  the  household  head's  age,  marital 
status  and  number  of  dependent  children  on  choosing  social  renting  suggest  that,  in 
this  sample,  older  and  matured  households  are  more  likely  to  stay  in  the  social  rented 
sector,  compared  to  owner-occupation.  According  to  the  1996  SHCS  main  report, 
published  by  Scottish  Homes  (1997),  more  than  40%  of  older  households  and  single 
pensioners  stay  in  the  social  rented  sector.  In  contrast,  more  than  40%  of  single  and 
small  adult  households  are  homeowners. 
With  respect  to  the  household  head's  employment  status,  the  results  show  that 
household  heads  who  have  full-time  jobs  have  a  strongly  negative  coefficient  of 
choosing  social  renting  compared  to  owner-occupation.  In  other  words,  households 
having  full  time  jobs  are  much  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  rather  than 
social  renting.  In  contrast,  unemployed  household  heads  have  a  strongly  positive 
coefficient  of  choosing  social  renting  than  owner-occupation.  In  general,  unemployed 
household  heads  have  lower  incomes,  thus  they  are  more  likely  to  choose  lower  costs 
of  social  housing  than  owner-occupation. 
As  expected,  the  model  results  show  that  households  who  live  in  houses  are  more 
likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  than  social  renting.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  Three, 
most  houses  in  Scotland  are  owner-occupied.  Therefore,  it  is  most  likely  the  case  that 
157 households  who  live  in  or  want  to  live  in  houses  could  only  be  owner-occupiers.  With 
respect  to  previous  tenure  status,  the  results  show  that  the  household's  previous  tenure 
status  has  statistically  and  numerically  significant  influences  on  tenure  decision. 
Household  heads  who  were  previously  homeowners  have  a  strongly  negative 
coefficient  of  choosing  social  renting  compared  to  owner-occupation.  In  contrast, 
household  heads  who  were  previously  social  tenants  are  more  likely  to  continue  to 
stay  in  social  housing.  These  results  together  suggest  that  households  are  more  likely 
to  continue  to  choose  the  same  tenure  as  their  previous  one  when  making  their  tenure 
decisions.  In  the  choice  between  social  renting  and  owner-occupation,  the  results 
show  that  households  who  were  previously  private  tenants  are  more  likely  to  choose 
social  renting  compared  to  owner-occupation. 
With  regard  to  expected  mobility,  it  was  found  that  households  who  expect  to  move 
within  two  years  are  more  likely  to  choose  social  renting  compared  to  owner- 
occupation.  This  implies  that  owner-occupiers  could  be  less  mobile  than  social 
tenants  in  Scotland.  In  addition,  the  results  show  that  the  urban/rural  indicator  does 
not  have  a  statistically  significant  influence  on  households'  choice  between  social 
renting  and  owner-occupation.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  Four,  the  simple  definition  of 
the  urban/rural  indicator  in  the  1996  SHCS  cannot  present  the  spatial  concentration  of 
certain  tenure  type  of  dwellings  in  Scotland.  For  instance,  the  spatial  concentration  of 
owner-occupied  dwellings  in  the  suburbs  and  social  rented  dwellings  in  the  inner  city 
and  periphery  could  all  be  defined  as  in  the  urban  area  in  this  urban/rural  indicator. 
Thus,  it  does  not  show  a  clear  relationship  between  location  and  households'  tenure 
decisions. 
Neighbourhood  quality  is  also  found  to  have  a  significant  influence  (numerically  and 
statistically)  on  the  household's  tenure  decision.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  Five,  since 
the  neighbourhood  quality  variables  are  associated  with  tenure  types,  it  is  not 
surprising  to  see  that  households  in  high  quality  neighbourhoods  predominated  by 
affluent  owners  have  a  strongly  negative  coefficient  of  choosing  social  renting, 
compared  to  owner-occupation.  In  general,  households  living  in  the  neighbourhood 
predominated  by  owner-occupied  dwellings  may  not  have  choices  to  other  two  tenures. 
In  this  sense,  households  in  the  poorest  council  housing  neighbourhood  may  not  have 
choices  or  may  not  afford  to  other  two  tenures.  Therefore,  the  results  show  that 
158 households  in  poor  quality  neighbourhoods  which  are  predominated  by  the  poorest 
council  tenants  have  a  strongly  positive  likelihood  of  choosing  social  renting 
compared  to  owner-occupation.  More  importantly,  it  is  of  interest  to  examine  the 
effect  of  the  neighbourhood  quality  variable  on  other  tenures,  which  are  not  the 
predominant  tenure  in  the  neighbourhood.  The  results  show  that  households  in 
medium  quality  inner  city  neighbourhood  predominated  by  private  tenants  are  more 
likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  rather  than  social  renting. 
It  was  found  that  household  long-term  income  has  the  most  substantively  negative 
impact  on  choosing  social  renting  compared  to  owner-occupation,  and  its  coefficient 
magnitude  is  the  biggest  among  the  explanatory  variables.  In  other  words,  when 
income  increases,  households  have  the  strongest  probability  of  choosing  owner- 
occupation  than  social  renting.  The  user  cost,  as  expected,  has  a  strongly  negative 
coefficient  of  choosing  social  renting  compared  to  owner-occupation.  Although  each 
household  has  its  individual  user  costs  associated  with  its  current  tenure,  the  results  of 
the  user  cost  can  generally  be  interpreted  as  in  the  choice  between  social  renting  and 
owner-occupation,  households  in  all  three  tenures  are  more  likely  to  choose  owner- 
occupation  when  the  household's  individual  user  costs  increase.  Moreover,  if  we  look 
at  the  coefficient  magnitudes  of  these  two  explanatory  variables,  the  results  indicate 
that  household  long-term  income  and  the  user  cost  are  the  most  important 
determinants  of  tenure  choice  in  Scotland. 
Regarding  the  choice  between  private  renting  and  owner-occupation,  the  results  show 
that  the  probability  of  choosing  private  renting  declines  with  an  increase  in  the  age  of 
the  household  head.  Married  household  heads  are  less  likely  to  choose  private  renting 
compared  to  owner-occupation.  These  results  together  suggest  that  younger  and 
single  households  are  more  likely  to  choose  private  renting  rather  than  owner- 
occupation.  As  Scottish  Homes  (1997)  indicate,  younger  and  single  households  have 
shorter  length  of  occupancy  and  have  higher  propensity  to  move  than  older  and  large 
family  households.  In  this  sense,  younger  and  single  households  are  more  likely  to 
choose  the  lower  transaction  costs  of  private  renting  rather  than  owner-occupation. 
However,  it  is  not  expected  that  male  household  heads  and  households  having  more 
dependent  children  are  more  likely  to  choose  private  renting  than  owner-occupation. 
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discussed  in  Chapter  Five,  could  be  the  primary  cause  of  these  incorrect  effect. 
The  results  show  that  household  heads  who  have  full  time  or  part  time  jobs  are  less 
likely  to  choose  private  renting  compared  to  owner-occupation.  In  contrast, 
unemployed  household  heads  are  more  likely  to  choose  private  renting  rather  than 
owner-occupation.  In  general,  households  in  better  employment  status  have  higher 
incomes,  thus  it  is  more  likely  for  them  to  choose  secure  tenure  like  owner-occupation 
rather  than  private  renting.  In  this  sense,  unemployed  households  are  more  likely  to 
choose  the  lower  costs  of  private  renting  than  owner-occupation. 
In  respect  of  the  household's  previous  tenure  status,  the  results  suggest  that 
households  are  more  likely  to  choose  the  same  tenure  as  their  previous  one  when 
making  a  tenure  decision.  Households  who  were  previously  private  tenants  have  a 
numerically  and  statistically  strong  probability  of  staying  in  private  renting.  The 
results  also  show  that  households  who  are  likely  to  move  within  two  years  have  a 
strong  probability  of  choosing  private  renting  rather  than  owner-occupation.  This 
result  also  supports  an  earlier  interpretation  that  younger  and  single  household  heads 
are  more  mobile.  Therefore,  they  are  more  likely  to  choose  likely  to  choose  lower 
transaction  costs  of  private  renting  rather  than  owner-occupation. 
With  regard  to  the  urban/rural  location,  the  results  show  that  households  living  in 
urban  areas  are  less  likely  to  choose  private  renting  compared  to  owner-occupation. 
According  to  Scottish  Homes  (1997),  there  is  a  substantial  number  of  privately  rented 
dwellings  located  in  rural  areas  of  Scotland,  thus  households  in  rural  areas  would  have 
higher  propensity  to  live  in  private  renting  dwellings.  As  expected,  households  who 
live  in  neighbourhoods  which  are  predominated  by  inner  city  private  tenants  are  more 
likely  to  choose  private  renting  than  owner-occupation.  In  general,  households  in  the 
neighbourhood  dominated  by  private  renting  dwelling  may not  have  many  choices  to 
other  tenures.  However,  it  is  not  expected  that  households  living  in  neighbourhoods 
predominated  by  affluent  owners  have  a  positive  coefficient  of  choosing  private 
renting  rather  than  owner-occupation.  However,  the  coefficient  is  barely  statistically 
17  In  addition  to  the  multicollinearity  problem,  this  thesis  found  that  the  Limdep  computer  programme  is 
very  sensitive  in  specification  of  the  discrete  choice  models.  Therefore,  a  smaller  sample  size  such  as 
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neighbourhoods  are  found  to  have  statistically  insignificant  coefficient  of  choosing 
owner-occupation  or  private  renting.  As  discussed  above,  the  poorest  council  tenants 
may  not  have  any  choices  or  afford  to  other  tenures. 
The  household  long-term  income  and  the  user  cost  are  found  to  have  strongly  negative 
coefficients  of  choosing  private  renting  compared  to  owner-occupation.  The  results 
suggest  that  when  income  increases,  households  are  more  likely  to  choose  owner- 
occupation  than  private  renting.  To  some  extent,  the  strongly  negative  effect  of  the 
user  costs  on  private  renting  implies  that  households  in  the  private  rented  sector  are 
more  sensitive  to  increases  in  the  user  costs  than  owner-occupiers.  In  this  sense,  when 
the  user  cost  increases,  households  are  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation 
compared  to  private  renting.  Again,  if  the  coefficient  magnitude  is  examined,  the 
results  suggest  that  household  long-term  income  and  the  user  cost  are  the  most 
important  determinants  of  tenure  choice. 
6.1.2  Model  Two 
Model  Two  aims  to  estimate  the  economic  (housing)  subsidy  effect  on  households' 
tenure  decisions.  In  model  Two,  the  user  cost  variable  is  replaced  by  the  net  user  cost. 
As  stated  in  Chapter  Five,  the  net  user  cost  is  derived  by  the  user  cost  subtracting  the 
economic  subsidy.  Other  explanatory  variables  are  the  same  as  Model  One.  The 
goodness-of-fit  of  Model  Two  is  better  than  model  one  indicating  that  the  economic 
subsidy  effect  has  a  significant  influence  on  the  household's  tenure  decision. 
Furthermore,  since  the  only  one  variable  to  be  replaced  in  Model  Two  is  the  net  user 
cost,  the  change  in  the  user  cost  would  alter  coefficients  of  some  other  explanatory 
variables  in  the  model.  This  indicates  that  the  changes  in  coefficient  estimates  of 
other  explanatory  variables  are  affected  by  the  economic  subsidy.  The  estimation 
results  of  Model  Two  are  reported  in  Table  6.2. 
private  tenants  or  a  small  piece  of  difference  in  sample  could  derive  a  significantly  different  result. 
161 Table  6.2  Estimation  Results  of  the  MNL  Tenure  Choice  Model-Model  One  and 
Model  Two. 
Dependent  Variable  =  Tenure 
Reference  tenure  =  Owner-Occupation 
00  =  Owner-Occupation;  SR  =  Social  Renting;  PR  =  Private  Renting 
Model  One  Model  Two 
SR:  OO  PROD  SR:  OO  PR:  OO 
Variable  Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Coefficients  Sig 
Level 
Constant  50.25  ***  27.32  ***  56.31  ***  14.489  *** 
Age  0.047  ***  -0.098  ***  0.016  Innig  -0.098  *** 
Agesq  -0.0008  ***  0.0005  ***  -0.0005  ***  0.0005  *** 
Ndepch  0.617  ***  0.270  ***  0.620  ***  0.226  *** 
Marry  1.093  ***  -0.378  1.113  ***  -0.253  ** 
Male  -0.103  Innig  0.296  -0.159  *  0.232 
Fullwork  -1.007  ***  -0.886  ***  -0.890  ***  -0.671  *** 
Partwork  -0.136  Insig  -0.868  ***  -0.128  Innig  -0.720  *** 
Unemploy  0.986  ***  0.809  ***  1.067  ***  0.911  *** 
House  -0.483  ***  0.160  Innig  -0.606  ***  -0.221 
Prevown  -1.228  ***  -0.405  ***  -1.053  ***  -0.577  *** 
Prevsoc  0.722  ***  0.489  ***  0.793  ***  0.484  *** 
Prevprv  0.289  ***  1.125  ***  0.300  ***  0.972  *** 
Likmov2  0.197  1.310  ***  0.159  1.167  *** 
Urban  0.066  Innig  -0.808  ***  0.016  Innig  -0.917  *** 
Affown  -1.712  ***  0.274  -1.662  ***  0.052  Insig 
Prvtcity  -1.775  ***  0.572  ***  -1.764  ***  0.300 
Poorcnl  1.145  ***  0.308  Innig  1.361  ***  0.435 
LnPerinc  -3.201  ***  -1.169  ***  -3.142  ***  -1.401  *** 
LnUcc  1  -2.710  ***  -1.921  *** 
LnUccn  1  -3.583  ***  -0.831  Innig 
Log  Likelihood  -6703.9  -6366.5 
Predicted  Level  79.2%  81.8% 
N  13114  13114 
Notes:  ***  :  Significant  at  1  per  cent  level. 
**  :  Significant  at  5  per  cent  level. 
*:  Significant  at  10  per  cent  level. 
Insig  . 
Insignificant. 
Affecting  by  the  economic  subsidy  effect,  several  variables  have  changed  their 
statistical  significance.  The  household  head's  age  has  become  statistically 
insignificant  in  choosing  between  social  renting  and  owner-occupation.  Compared  to 
162 Model  One,  female  household  heads  have  stronger  positive  coefficient  of  choosing 
social  renting  than  owner-occupation  but  the  coefficient  is  barely  significant.  In 
general,  low-income  households  and  vulnerable  groups  are  more  likely  to  choose  the 
lower  cost  of  social  renting  rather  than  to  be  homeowner.  According  to  Scottish 
Homes  (1997),  female  household  heads  have  lower  incomes  than  male  household 
heads.  In  this  sense,  female  household  heads  are  more  likely  to  choose  social  renting 
than  owner-occupation. 
It  was  found  that  economic  subsidy  has  a  (statistically  and  numerically)  significant 
influence  on  the  user  cost.  After  subsidy,  the  net  user  cost  turns  out  to  have  a  stronger 
negative  coefficient  when  choosing  social  renting  than  the  user  cost  does.  Moreover, 
influenced  by  the  economic  subsidy  effect,  more  than  half  of  explanatory  variables  in 
Model  Two  have  increased  their  coefficient  magnitudes.  These  results  together 
indicate  that  economic  subsidy  has  a  substantive  effect  on  the  user  cost  as  well  as  on 
the  household's  choice  between  social  renting  and  owner-occupation. 
Regarding  the  household's  choice  between  private  renting  and  owner-occupation, 
Influenced  by  the  economic  subsidy  effect,  male  household  heads  have  less  statistical 
and  numerical  effects  on  choosing  private  renting  compared  to  owner-occupation. 
After  the  subsidy  effect,  households  who  live  in  houses  have  increased  their 
probability  of  choosing  owner-occupation  compared  to  private  renting  but  the 
coefficient  is  barely  statistically  significant.  The  results  show  that  the  net  user  cost 
has  become  statistically  insignificant  in  choosing  between  private  renting  and  owner- 
occupation.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  Five,  after  subsidy,  the  net  user  cost  for  private 
tenants  is  higher  than  the  net  user  cost  for  owner-occupiers  (see  Table  5.9).  This 
dramatic  change  has  impacts  on  reducing  the  statistical  and  numerical  effect  of  the  net 
user  cost  on  choosing  between  private  renting  and  owner-occupation. 
6.1.3  Model  Three 
Model  Three  examines  both  the  economic  subsidy  effect  and  the  rationing  effect  on 
households'  tenure  decisions.  The  mortgage  rationing  and  the  social  housing 
rationing  variables  are  included  in  this  model,  other  explanatory  variables  are  the 
same  as  Model  Two.  The  goodness-of-fit  in  Model  Three  is  better  than  Model  Two, 
which  suggests  that  Model  Three  has  a  better  prediction  on  tenure  choice  than  Model 
163 Two.  This  also  suggests  that  the  two  rationing  factors  have  statistically  significant 
influences  on  tenure  choice.  The  estimation  results  of  Model  Three  are  reported  in 
Table  6.3. 
Table  6.3  Estimation  Results  of  the  MNL  Tenure  Choice  Models-Model  Two 
and  Model  Three. 
Dependent  Variable  =  Tenure 
Reference  tenure  =  Owner-Occupation 
00  =  Owner-Occupation;  SR  =  Social  Renting;  PR  =  Private  Renting 
Model  Two  Model  Three 
SR:  OO  PROO  SROO  PR:  OO 
Variable  Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Constant  56.31  ***  14.489  ***  43.87  ***  8.709  *** 
Age  0.016  Insig  -0.098  ***  0.049  ***  -0.065  *** 
Agesq  -0.0005  ***  0.0005  ***  -0.0006  ***  0.0004  ** 
Ndepch  0.620  ***  0.226  ***  0.649  ***  0.263  *** 
Marry  1.113  ***  -0.253  1.361  ***  0.128  Insig 
Male  -0.159  *  0.232  *  -0.229  0.212  Insig 
Fullwork  -0.890  ***  -0.671  ***  -0.280  ***  -0.514  *** 
Partwork  -0.128  Insig  -0.720  ***  0.430  *  -0.410  Insig 
Uneniploy  1.067  ***  0.911  ***  1.178  ***  1.033  *** 
House  -0.606  ***  -0.221  *  -0.812  ***  -0.336  ** 
Prevown  -1.053  ***  -0.577  ***  -1.299  ***  -0.979  *** 
Prevsoc  0.793  ***  0.484  ***  0.656  ***  0.279  ** 
Prevprv  0.300  ***  0.972  ***  0.117  Insig  0.762  *** 
Likmov2  0.159  1.167  ***  0.339  ***  1.428  *** 
Urban  0.016  Insig  -0.917  ***  -0.185  -1.077 
Affown  -1.662  ***  0.052  Insig  -1.848  ***  -0.165  Insig 
Prvtcity  -1.764  ***  0.300  -1.913  ***  0.202  Insig 
Poorcnl  1.361  ***  0.435  1.462  ***  0.557 
LnPerinc  -3.142  ***  -1.401  ***  -1.486  ***  -0.352  Insig 
LnUcc_1 
LnUccn  1  -3.583  ***  -0.831  Insig  -4.248  ***  -0.801  *** 
Ratmort  3.289  ***  2.920  *** 
Ratsoc  -0.713  ***  -0.261  * 
Log  Likelihood  -6366.5  -5022.8 
Predicted  Level  81.8%  86.4% 
N  13114  13114 
Notes:  ***  :  Significant  at  1  per  cent  level. 
164 **  :  Significant  at  5  per  cent  level. 
*:  Significant  at  10  per  cent  level. 
Insig.:  Insignificant. 
With  respect  to  the  choice  between  social  renting  and  owner-occupation,  once  the 
mortgage  rationing  and  social  rationing  variables  have  been  included,  most 
explanatory  variables  have  increased  their  coefficient  magnitudes.  This  suggests  that 
the  two  rationing  variables  have  substantive  influences  on  other  explanatory  variables, 
which  strengthen  their  influences  on  tenure  choice.  In  particular,  influenced  by  the 
rationing  effect,  the  coefficient  magnitude  of  the  net  user  cost  has  significantly 
increased,  which  turns  out  to  have  a  stronger  negative  probability  of  choosing  social 
renting  compared  to  owner-occupation.  Two  variables,  male  household  heads  and 
households  in  urban  areas  also  have  significantly  increased  their  coefficient 
magnitudes  and  statistical  significance  after  the  rationing  effect. 
Some  variables,  however,  have  significantly  reduced  their  coefficient  magnitudes  and 
the  statistical  significance  level  after  the  rationing  effect.  Influenced  by  the  rationing 
effect,  household  heads  having  full  time  jobs  have  a  less  negative  probability  of 
choosing  social  renting  compared  to  owner-occupation.  Households  who  have  part 
time  jobs  turns  to  have  a  barely  significant  effect  on  choosing  social  renting  after  the 
rationing  effect.  Households  who  were  previously  private  tenants  have  also  become 
statistically  insignificant  in  choosing  between  social  renting  and  owner-occupation 
after  the  rationing  effect.  In  particular,  household  long-term  income  has  significantly 
reduced  its  coefficient  magnitude  after  the  rationing  effect.  To  some  extent,  the 
changes  in  coefficients  of  the  employment  status  and  the  household  long-term  income 
are  probably  affected  by  the  mortgage  rationing  variable  rather  than  by  social  housing 
rationing.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  Four,  the  mortgage  rationing  variable  is  primarily 
derived  from  household  income  and  hedonic  house  prices.  Further,  there  is  a 
moderate  degree  of  correlation  between  household  income  and  the  employment  status 
variables  as  discussed  in  Chapter  Five. 
More  importantly,  the  two  rationing  variables  are  found  to  have  statistically  and 
numerically  significant  influences  on  tenure  choice.  Mortgage  rationing  has  a  strong 
and  significant  role  in  constraining  households  who  are  potentially  not  qualified  for 
mortgages.  In  this  sense,  households  who  are  constrained  from  mortgages  are  more 
165 likely  to  choose  social  renting.  On  the  other  hand,  social  housing  rationing  plays  an 
opposite  role  in  filtering  out  households  with  higher  income  and  better  economic 
status  thus  enabling  low-income  households  and  vulnerable  groups  to  enter  the  social 
rented  sector.  In  this  sense,  households  who  are  potentially  constrained  from  the 
social  housing  sector  are  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation. 
Regarding  the  choice  between  private  renting  and  owner-occupation,  the  results  show 
that  because  of  the  influence  of  the  rationing  effect,  several  variables  have 
significantly  reduced  their  coefficient  magnitudes  and  also  the  statistical  significance 
level.  The  household  head's  gender  and  marital  status  and  household  heads  having 
part  time  jobs  have  become  statistically  insignificant  in  determining  whether  private 
renting  or  owner-occupation  after  the  rationing  effect.  In  contrast,  households  living 
in  houses  have  become  more  significant  and  have  stronger  negative  coefficient  of 
choosing  private  renting  than  owner-occupation  after  the  rationing  effect.  Further,  the 
two  rationing  variables  also  significantly  affect  the  neighbourhood  quality  variables. 
Households  living  in  medium  quality  inner  city  neighbourhoods  predominated  by 
private  tenants  have  become  statistically  insignificant  in  choosing  between  private 
renting  and  owner-occupation.  However,  households  in  the  poorest  council  housing 
neighbourhoods  have  a  stronger  probability  of  choosing  private  renting  compared  to 
owner-occupation  after  the  rationing  effect.  As  discussed  earlier,  influenced  by  the 
two  rationing  variables  (primarily  the  mortgage  rationing  variable),  household  long- 
term  income  has  reduced  its  coefficient  magnitude  and  statistical  significance  level  of 
choosing  between  private  renting  and  owner-occupation. 
As  stated  earlier,  the  mortgage  rationing  plays  a  strong  role  in  filtering  out  households 
who  could  potentially  not  obtain  mortgages.  In  this  case,  households  who  are 
potentially  constrained  from  mortgages  have  a  statistically  significant  and  strong 
probability  of  choosing  private  renting.  However,  households  who  are  potentially 
constrained  from  the  social  rented  sector  are  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation 
than  private  renting  but  the  coefficient  is  barely  statistically  significant  (at  the  10% 
level). 
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Among  these  three  models,  Model  Three  provides  the  best  prediction  on  the 
household's  tenure  choice  behaviour.  Most  explanatory  variables  in  these  three 
models  have  statistically  significant  influences  on  tenure  choice,  indicating  that  tenure 
choice  is  influenced  not  only  by  households'  demographic  and  socio-economic 
attributes  but  also  by  housing  attributes  such  as  dwelling  type,  location  and 
neighbourhood  quality.  In  particular,  the  household  long-term  income  and  the  user 
cost  are  the  most  important  determinants  of  tenure  choice  since  the  coefficient 
magnitudes  of  these  two  variables  are  bigger  than  other  explanatory  variables.  When 
income  increases,  households  have  a  statistically  significant  and  strong  likelihood  of 
choosing  owner-occupation  rather  than  social  renting  or  private  renting.  As  the  user 
cost  increases,  households  have  a  strongly  negative  likelihood  of  choosing  social 
renting  or  private  renting,  compared  to  owner-occupation.  To  some  extent,  this 
implies  that  social  tenants  and  private  tenants  are  more  sensitive  to  increases  in  the 
user  cost  than  owner-occupiers. 
Housing  subsidy  in  economic  terms  is  found  to  have  important  influences  on  tenure 
choice.  After  subsidy,  the  net  user  cost  turns  to  have  a  stronger  negative  likelihood  of 
choosing  social  housing  compared  to  owner-occupation.  In  contrast,  after  subsidy,  the 
net  user  cost  for  private  tenants  is  higher  than  that  for  owner-occupiers.  This  change 
has  reduced  the  influence  (the  coefficient  magnitude  and  statistical  significance  level) 
of  the  net  user  cost  on  households'  choosing  between  private  renting  and  owner- 
occupation.  Furthermore,  the  two  rationing  factors  have  significant  effects  on 
households'  tenure  decisions.  Mortgage  rationing  and  social  housing  rationing  play 
an  important  role  in  filtering  ineligible  households  from  becoming  homeowners  and 
social  tenants  respectively. 
The  multinomial  logit  form  of  tenure  choice  model  however,  has  its  limitations  in 
terms  of  violating  the  HA  assumption.  As  a  result,  the  MNL  model  results  should  be 
treated  with  caution  as  discussed  in  Chapter  Four.  Unlike  the  NML  model,  the  nested 
multinomial  logit  model  holds  the  RA  assumption.  The  next  section  will  analyse  the 
results  of  the  NMNL  form  of  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model. 
167 6.2  Estimation  Results  of  the  Mobility  and  Tenure  Choice  Model 
The  nested  multinomial  logit  form  of  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model  is  estimated 
by  the  full  information  maximum  likelihood  approach,  as  stated  in  Chapter  Four.  Like 
the  last  section,  three  separate  models  containing  different  combinations  of 
explanatory  variables  are  examined  in  this  section  in  order  to  estimate  the  economic 
subsidy  effect  and  the  rationing  effect  on  the  household's  mobility  and  tenure  decision. 
The  estimation  results  of  these  three  models  are  discussed  in  turn.  The  full  estimation 
results  run  by  the  LIMDEP  programme  are  listed  in  Appendix  A.  6.2. 
6.2.1  Model  One 
Model  One  is  the  basic  model  without  subsidy  and  rationing  variables.  The  estimation 
results  of  Model  One  are  reported  in  Table  6.4.  The  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model 
contains  a  two-level  decision  tree.  The  default  tenure  in  the  tenure  choice  level  is 
owner-occupation,  and  in  the  mobility  decision  level  is  stay.  The  overall  prediction 
level  of  the  model  is  81.69%,  indicating  the  model  has  a  good  prediction  percentage 
on  the  household's  mobility  and  tenure  choice  behaviour.  The  coefficient  estimates 
shown  in  the  second  column  of  Table  6.4  are  the  probabilities  of  the  household  being 
influenced  by  the  explanatory  variables  to  choose  social  renting  (the  variable 
interacting  with  social  renting)  and  private  renting  (the  variable  interacting  with 
private  renting),  compared  to  owner-occupation.  Greene  (1998)  states  that  the 
interpretation  of  the  NMNL  model  results  is  complicated  since  the  explanatory 
variables  are  interacted  with  different  possible  choices.  As  a  result,  the  interpretation 
of  the  model  results  focuses  on  the  `sign'  (does  it  have  a  negative  or a  positive  impact 
on  the  relevant  probability)  and  the  statistical  significance  of  the  explanatory  variables. 
The  analysis  of  the  model  results  begins  at  the  lower  level  of  the  model  -  the  tenure 
choice  level.  Before  analysing  the  coefficient  estimates  of  explanatory  variables,  the 
IIA  property  in  the  tenure  choice  level  is  firstly  examined.  As  stated  in  Chapter  Four, 
if  the  inclusive  value  parameter  lies  between  0  and  1  and  is  statistically  significant,  the 
IIA  property  holds  in  this  branch.  In  our  model,  the  inclusive  value  parameter  in  the 
mover  branch  (tenure  choice  branch)  is  0.24  and  is  statistically  significant,  which 
indicates  that  the  IIA  property  holds  in  the  tenure  choice  level.  Moreover,  this  thesis 
also  applies  the  Hausman-McFadden's  statistical  test  for  the  IIA  property  to  the  tenure 
168 choice  level.  The  results  show  that  the  chi-square  value  of  the  Hausman-McFadden's 
test  is  429.6  and  is  statistically  significant,  which  means  that  the  IIA  property  holds  in 
the  tenure  choice  branch.  The  full  results  of  the  IIA  test  are  also  listed  in  Appendix 
A.  6.2. 
Table  6.4  Estimation  Results  of  the  NMNL  Mobility  and  Tenure  Choice  Model- 
Model  One 
Dependent  Variable  =  Achoice 
Default  Tenure  =  "Owner-occupation"  in  the  tenure  choice  level;  "stay"  in  the 
mobility  decision  level 
Lower  Level-Tenure  Choice 
Variable  Coefficient  Significant 
Level 
Constant  -10.505  *** 
Lntcost  -0.494  *** 
Agehsoc  -0.011 
Agehprv  -0.055  *** 
Ndepchsoc  0.312  *** 
Ndepchprv  0.176 
Marrysoc  -0.802  *** 
Marryprv  -0.582  *** 
Malesoc  -0.411 
Maleprv  0.377  Insig 
Fullsoc  -1.759  *** 
Fullprv  -1.584  *** 
Partsoc  -1.217  *** 
Partprv  -2.237  *"* 
Unempsoc  0.781 
Unempprv  0.681  Insig 
Pvownsoc  -1.142  *** 
Pvownprv  -0.153  Insig 
Pvsocsoc  1.604  *** 
Pvsocprv  0.314  Insig 
Pvprvsoc  0.688 
Pvprvprv  1.218  *** 
Houssoc  -1.480  *** 
Housprv  -0.102  Insig 
169 Urbansoc  -0.501  ** 
Urbanprv  -0.876  *** 
Afownsoc  -1.086  *** 
Afownprv  0.050  Insig 
Pvctysoc  -1.676  *** 
Pvctyprv  1.133  *** 
Pocnlsoc  1.484  *** 
Pocnlprv  -0.231  Insig 
Lnincsoc  -0.312  *** 
Lnincprv  -0.850  *** 
Upper  Level-Mobility  Decision 
Variables  Coefficients  Significant 
Level 
Ageheads  0.055  *** 
Marrys  -0.156  Insig 
Ndepchs  0.196  *** 
Males  -0.145  Insig 
Unemps  0.115  Insig 
Lnincs  0.534  *** 
Affowns  -0.017  Insig 
Pvcitys  -0.197 
Porcnls  0.272  ** 
Inclusive  values  I! 
(Stayer) 
1.00  fixed 
Inclusive  values  IZ 
(Mover) 
0.243  *** 
Log  Likelihood  -4893.7 
Predicted 
Level 
81.69% 
No.  Obs  52048 
Notes:  '"'  :  Signthcant  at  1  per  cent  level. 
**  :  Significant  at  5  per  cent  level. 
*:  Significant  at  10  per  cent  level. 
Insig.:  Insignificant. 
With  regard  to  the  coefficient  estimates  of  the  explanatory  variables  in  the  tenure 
choice  level,  the  user  cost,  as  expected,  has  a  negative  effect  on  tenure  choice.  This 
indicates  that,  when  an  increase  in  the  user  cost  of  certain  tenure,  households  are  less 
likely  to  choose  that  tenure.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  Five,  the  user  cost  in  this  model 
is  measured  by  the  average  cost  between  tenures  across  all  32  unitary  authorities.  The 
results  suggest  that  the  user  cost  is  significantly  different  between  tenures  and  across 
170 unitary  authorities.  The  age  of  the  household  head  has  a  negative  coefficient  of 
choosing  social  renting  and  private  renting  compared  to  owner-occupation.  This 
suggests  that  the  probability  of  the  household's  choosing  owner-occupation  increases 
with  the  household  head's  age. 
The  results  show  that  the  probability  of  choosing  social  renting  increases  with  the 
number  of  dependent  children.  According  the  1996  SHCS  sample,  households  having 
less  than  three  dependent  children  have  a  higher  percentage  of  staying  owner- 
occupation  than  in  social  renting.  In  contrast,  households  having  four  and  more 
dependent  children  have  a  higher  percentage  of  staying  in  social  renting  than  in 
owner-occupation.  In  this  case,  it  is  reasonable  to  see  the  model  results  showing  that 
households  having  more  dependent  children  are  more  likely  to  choose  social  renting 
than  owner-occupation.  However,  it  is  not  expected  that  households  having  more 
dependent  children  are  more  likely  to  choose  private  renting  than  owner-occupation 
but  the  coefficient  is  barely  statistically  significant  at  the  10%  level.  The  results  show 
that  married  household  heads  are  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  rather  than 
social  renting  or  private  renting.  In  addition,  female  household  heads  are  likely  to 
choose  social  renting  but  the  coefficient  is  barely  statistically  significant.  If  the 
influences  of  the  household's  demographic  variables  on  tenure  choice  are  examined,  it 
is  clear  to  see  that  older  households,  married  couples  and  adult-only  households  are 
more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  rather  than  social  renting  or  private  renting. 
Household  heads  who  have  full  time  or  part  time  jobs  have  strongly  negative 
coefficients  of  choosing  social  renting  or  private  renting  compared  to  owner- 
occupation.  In  other  words,  household  heads  having  full  time  or  part  time  jobs  are 
much  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  rather  than  other  tenures.  In  contrast, 
unemployed  household  heads  are  more  likely  to  choose  social  renting  but  the 
coefficient  is  barely  statistically  significant.  Households'  previous  tenure  status  is 
found  to  have  an  important  impact  on  tenure  choice.  The  results  show  that  households 
have  a  statistically  significant  and  strong  coefficient  of  choosing  the  same  tenure  as 
their  previous  one  when  making  a  moving  and  tenure  decision. 
Households  living  in  houses  also  have  a  statistically  significant  and  strong  coefficient 
of  choosing  owner-occupation  rather  than  social  renting  but  the  coefficient  is 
171 statistically  insignificant  in  choosing  between  private  renting  and  owner-occupation. 
As  discussed  in  the  last  section,  houses  are  the  dominant  dwelling  type  in  the  owner- 
occupied  sector.  As  a  result,  in  many  cases,  households  who  live  in  or  want  to  live  in 
houses  could  only  be  owner-occupiers  than  tenants.  Scottish  Homes  (1997)  also 
indicate  that  there  is  a  substantial  number  of  private  rented  houses  located  in  the  rural 
areas  of  Scotland.  In  this  case,  households  living  in  houses  may  not  have  a 
statistically  significant  effect  on  choosing  between  private  renting  and  owner- 
occupation.  Regarding  the  urban/rural  location,  the  results  show  that  households 
living  in  urban  areas  are  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  than  social  renting 
or  private  renting.  As  stated  in  the  last  section,  the  simple  urban/rural  location 
variable  cannot  reflect  the  spatial  concentration  of  social  rented  and  owner-occupied 
dwellings  in  the  inner  city,  periphery  and  suburban  areas.  As  expected,  households  in 
rural  areas  are  more  likely  to  choose  private  renting  than  owner-occupation.  As  stated 
above,  there  is  a  substantial  number  of  private  rented  dwellings  located  in  rural  areas, 
compared  to  owner-occupied  dwellings. 
Neighbourhood  quality  is  found  to  have  an  important  influence  on  tenure  choice. 
Since  the  neighbourhood  quality  variables  in  this  thesis  connect  to  tenure  types,  it  is 
not  surprising  to  see  the  results  that  households  living  in  high  quality  neighbourhoods 
predominated  by  affluent  owners  are  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  than 
social  renting.  Households  living  in  medium  quality  inner  city  neighbourhoods 
predominated  by  private  tenants  are  more  likely  to  choose  private  renting  than  owner- 
occupation.  More  importantly,  households  living  in  inner  city  neighbourhoods  have  a 
statistically  significant  and  strong  coefficient  of  choosing  owner-occupation  rather 
than  social  renting.  On  the  other  hand,  households  living  in  the  poorest  council 
housing  neighbourhoods  are  expected  to  have  a  strong  likelihood  of  choosing  social 
renting.  The  household  long-term  income  is  found  to  have  a  statistically  significant 
effect  on  tenure  choice.  When  income  increases,  households  are  more  likely  to 
choose  owner-occupation  than  social  renting  or  private  renting. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  household's  tenure  choice  and  mobility  decision  are 
interdependent.  This  indicates  that  some  variables  could  influence  both  mobility 
decision  and  tenure  choice.  In  the  mobility  decision  level,  the  results  show  that  the 
household  head's  age  and  the  number  of  dependent  children  have  statistically 
172 significant  effects  on  households'  mobility  decisions.  The  results  suggest  that  older 
household  heads  and  households  having  more  dependent  children  are  more  likely  to 
stay.  Moreover,  the  household  long-term  income  also  has  a  remarkable  impact  on 
mobility  decision.  When  income  increases,  households  are  more  likely  to  stay.  As 
expected,  households  living  in  the  inner  city  neighbourhood  predominated  by  private 
tenants  are  more  likely  to  move  than  to  stay.  In  contrast,  households  living  in  the 
poorest  council  housing  neighbourhoods  are  more  likely  to  stay.  In  general,  private 
renting  has  lower  transaction  costs  and  shorter  term  of  tenancy  than  social  renting  or 
owner-occupation.  These  characteristics  are  more  likely  to  attract  lower  income 
households,  and  younger  and  single  households  who  are  more  mobile.  Households  in 
the  social  rented  sector  are  usually  bounded  by  the  allocation  system,  therefore,  it  is 
difficult  for  social  tenants  to  relocate,  compared  with  private  tenants. 
6.2.2  Model  Two 
Model  Two  aims  to  estimate  the  economic  subsidy  effect.  In  this  model,  the  only  one 
variable  replaced  from  Model  One  is  the  net  user  cost.  The  estimation  results  are 
reported  in  Table  6.5.  In  the  tenure  choice  level,  the  net  user  cost  in  Model  Two  has  a 
stronger  negative  coefficient  than  the  user  cost  in  Model  One.  This  indicates  that 
economic  subsidy  has  a  significant  effect  on  the  user  cost  as  well  as  on  tenure  choice. 
A  couple  of  variables  have  their  statistical  significance  level  altered  once  the 
economic  subsidy  variable  is  included.  Influenced  by  the  economic  subsidy  effect, 
married  household  heads  have  less  statistically  significant  likelihood  of  choosing 
owner-occupation  rather  than  social  renting  after  the  economic  subsidy  effect.  In 
contrast,  unemployed  household  heads  turn  out  to  have  stronger  coefficient  of 
choosing  private  renting  than  owner-occupation.  Besides  that,  other  explanatory 
variables  do  not  have  significant  changes  in  their  coefficient  magnitudes  after  the 
economic  subsidy  effect.  This  is  probably  because  the  net  user  cost  is  an  attribute 
measured  for  tenures  not  measured  for  the  individual  household  like  other  explanatory 
variables  do.  Therefore,  the  change  in  the  user  cost  may  not  have  a  significant  impact 
on  other  explanatory  variables. 
173 Table  6.5  Estimation  Results  of  the  NMNL  Mobility  and  Tenure  Choice  Model- 
Model  One  and  Model  Two 
Dependent  Variable  =  Achoice 
Default  Tenure  =  "Owner-occupation"  in  the  tenure  choice  level;  "stay"  in  the 
mobility  decision  level 
Lower  Level-Tenure  Choice 
Model  One  Model  Two 
Variable  Coefficient  Sig. 
Level 
Coefficient  Sig. 
Level 
Constant  -10.505  ***  -12.962  *** 
Lntcost  -0.494  *** 
Lnatcost  -0.830  *** 
Agehsoc  -0.011  *  -0.011 
Agehprv  -0.055  ***  -0.055  *** 
Ndepchsoc  0.312  ***  0.308  *** 
Ndepchprv  0.176  *  0.186 
Marrysoc  -0.802  ***  -0.786  *** 
Marryprv  -0.582  **  -0.429 
Malesoc  -0.411  *  -0.411 
Maleprv  0.377  Insig  0.376  Insig 
Fullsoc  -1.759  ***  -1.761  *** 
Fullprv  -1.584  ***  -1.519  *** 
Partsoc  -1.217  ***  -1.196  *** 
Partprv  -2.237  ***  -2.212  *** 
Unempsoc  0.781  *  0.811  ** 
Unempprv  0.681  Insig  0.719 
Pvownsoc  -1.142  ***  -1.134  *** 
Pvownprv  -0.153  Insig  -0.114  Insig 
Pvsocsoc  1.604  ***  1.609  *** 
Pvsocprv  0.314  Insig  0.305  Insig 
Pvprvsoc  0.688  ***  0.680  *** 
Pvprvprv  1.218  ***  1.197  *** 
Houssoc  -1.480  ***  -1.476  *** 
Housprv  -0.102  Insig  -0.090  Insig 
Urbansoc  -0.501  **  -0.488 
Urbanprv  -0.876  ***  -0.865  *** 
Afownsoc  -1.086  ***  -1.090  *** 
174 Afownprv  0.050  Insig  0.075  Insig 
Pvctysoc  -1.676  ***  -1.754  *** 
Pvctyprv  1.133  ***  1.054  *** 
Pocnlsoc  1.484  ***  1.442  *** 
Pocnlprv  -0.231  Insig  -0.309  Insig 
Lnincsoc  -0.312  ***  -0.295  *** 
Lnincprv  -0.850  ***  -1.111  *** 
Upper  Level-Mobility  Decision 
Model  One  Model  Two 
Variables  Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Ageheads  0.055  ***  0.054  *** 
Marrys  -0.156  Insig  -0.152  Insig 
Ndepchs  0.196  ***  0.192  *** 
Males  -0.145  Insig  -0.139  Insig 
Unemps  0.115  Insig  0.137  Insig 
Lnincs  0.534  ***  0.510  *** 
Affowns  -0.017  Insig  0.018  Insig 
Pvcitys  -0.197  *  -0.153  Insig 
Porcnls  0.272  0.242 
Inclusive  values  Il 
(Stayer) 
1.00  fixed  1.00  Fixed 
Inclusive  values  I2 
(Mover) 
0.243  ***  0.274  *** 
Log  Likelihood  -4893.7  -4881.3 
Predicted 
Level 
81.69%  81.73% 
No.  Obs  52048  52048 
Notes:  ***  :  Significant  at  1  per  cent  level. 
**  Significant  at  5  per  cent  level. 
*  Significant  at  10  per  cent  level. 
Innig.:  Insignificant. 
In  the  mobility  decision  level,  influenced  by  the  economic  subsidy  effect,  households 
living  in  the  inner  city  neighbourhood  predominated  by  private  tenants  have  become 
statistically  insignificant  in  the  mobility  decision.  Households  living  in  the  poorest 
council  housing  neighbourhoods  have  become  less  statistically  significant  in  choosing 
stay.  As  discussed  earlier,  the  explanatory  variables  in  the  mobility  decision  level  are 
interrelated  to  the  variables  in  the  tenure  choice  level.  Therefore,  the  changes  in  the 
coefficient  magnitude  and  statistical  significance  level  of  the  explanatory  variables  in 
175 the  mobility  level  could  be  affected  by  both  the  net  user  cost  and  the  changes  of  other 
explanatory  variables  in  the  tenure  choice  level. 
6.2.3  Model  Three 
Model  Three  estimates  both  the  economic  subsidy  effect  and  the  rationing  effect.  The 
mortgage  rationing  and  social  housing  rationing  variables  are  included  in  this  model. 
Other  explanatory  variables  are  the  same  as  in  Model  Two.  The  estimation  results  of 
model  three  are  reported  in  Table  6.6.  The  goodness-of-fit  of  this  model  still  remains 
at  a  good  prediction  level  (81.74%),  and  is  slightly  better  than  Model  Two.  In  the 
tenure  choice  level,  a  few  variables  have  their  statistical  significance  altered  after  the 
two  rationing  variables  are  included.  The  age  of  the  household  head  has  become 
statistically  insignificant  in  choosing  between  social  renting  and  owner-occupation  but 
it  still  remains  a  significantly  negative  effect  on  choosing  private  renting.  The 
household  head's  marital  status  also  turns  out  to  be  statistically  insignificant  in 
choosing  three  tenure  alternatives.  In  addition,  the  two  rationing  variables  have 
substantial  influences  on  the  household  head's  employment  status.  Influenced  by  the 
rationing  effect,  household  heads  who  have  full  time  or  part  time  jobs  have  a  stronger 
coefficient  of  choosing  owner-occupation  rather  than  private  renting.  Unemployed 
household  heads  have  a  stronger  and  more  significant  likelihood  of  choosing  private 
renting  rather  than  owner-occupation. 
The  household  long-term  income  still  has  a  negative  effect  on  social  renting, 
compared  with  owner-occupation  but  the  coefficient  magnitude  reduces  after  the 
rationing  effect.  More  importantly,  the  results  show  that  mortgage  rationing  and 
social  housing  rationing  have  statistically  and  numerically  significant  effects  on  tenure 
choice.  Households  who  are  potentially  constrained  from  mortgages  have  a  strong 
coefficient  of  choosing  private  renting  or  social  renting.  On  the  other  hand, 
households  who  are  potentially  constrained  from  social  housing  are  more  likely  to 
choose  private  renting  than  owner-occupation. 
With  regard  to  the  mobility  decision  level,  household  long-term  income  becomes 
statistically  insignificant  in  the  mobility  decision  after  the  rationing  effect.  As  stated 
earlier,  the  changes  in  household  long-term  income's  statistical  significance  level  and 
the  coefficient  magnitude  in  the  mobility  decision  level  could  be  influenced  by  both 
176 the  two  rationing  variables  and  the  changes  in  other  explanatory  variables  in  the 
tenure  choice  level. 
Table  6.6  Estimation  Results  of  the  NMNL  Mobility  and  Tenure  Choice  Model- 
Model  Two  and  Model  Three 
Dependent  Variable  =  Achoice 
Default  Tenure  =  "Owner-occupation"  in  the  tenure  choice  level;  "stay"  in  the 
mobility  decision  level 
Lower  Level-Tenure  Choice 
Model  Two  Model  Three 
Variable  Coefficient  Sig. 
Level 
Coefficient  Sig. 
Level 
Constant  -12.962  ***  -6.182  *** 
Lntcost 
Lnatcost  -0.830  ***  -0.892  *** 
Agehsoc  -0.011  -0.006  Insig 
Agehprv  -0.055  ***  -0.044  *** 
Ndepchsoc  0.308  ***  0.297  *** 
Ndepchprv  0.186  *  0.184 
Marrysoc  -0.786  ***  -0.251  Insig 
Manyprv  -0.429  *  -0.322  Insig 
Malesoc  -0.411  *  -0.381  Insig 
Maleprv  0.376  Insig  0.303  Insig 
Fullsoc  -1.761  ***  -1.631  *** 
Fullprv  -1.519  ***  -1.938  *** 
Partsoc  -1.196  ***  -1.119  *** 
Partprv  -2.212  ***  -2.523  *** 
Unempsoc  0.811  **  0.925 
Unempprv  0.719  *  0.967 
Pvownsoc  -1.134  ***  -1.150  *** 
Pvownprv  -0.114  Insig  -0.301  Insig 
Pvsocsoc  1.609  ***  1.481  *** 
Pvsocprv  0.305  Insig  0.239  Insig 
Pvprvsoc  0.680  ***  0.626  *** 
Pvprvprv  1.197  ***  1.131  *** 
Houssoc  -1.476  ***  -1.510  *** 
Housprv  -0.090  Insig  -0.204  Insig 
177 Urbansoc  -0.488  **  -0.524  *** 
Urbanprv  -0.865  ***  -0.924  *** 
Afownsoc  -1.090  ***  -1.116  *** 
Afownprv  0.075  Insig  -0.053  Insig 
Pvctysoc  -1.754  ***  -1.705  *** 
Pvctyprv  1.054  ***  0.998  *** 
Pocnlsoc  1.442  ***  1.348  *** 
Pocnlprv  -0.309  Insig  -0.335  Insig 
Lnincsoc  -0.295  ***  -0.185  *** 
Lnincprv  -1.111  *1*  -0.496  ** 
Mratsoc  1.037  *** 
Mratprv  1.141  *** 
Sratprv  0.718  *** 
Upper  Level-Mobility  Decision 
Model  Two  Model  Three 
Variables  Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Ageheads  0.054  ***  0.051  *** 
Marrys  -0.152  Insig  0.110  Insig 
Ndepchs  0.192  ***  0.225  *** 
Males  -0.139  Insig  -0.125  Insig 
Unemps  0.137  Insig  0.217  Insig 
Lnincs  0.510  ***  -0.051  Insig 
Affowns  0.018  Insig  0.044  Insig 
Pvcitys  -0.153  Insig  -0.141  Insig 
Porcnls  0.242  *  0.286 
Inclusive  values  Il 
(Stayer) 
1.00  Fixed  1.00  Fixed 
Inclusive  values  12 
(Mover) 
0.274  ***  0.334  *** 
Log  Likelihood  -4881.3  -4858.7 
Predicted 
Level 
81.73%  81.74% 
No.  Obs  52048  52048 
Notes:  bigmticant  at  1  per  cent  level 
**  Significant  at  5  per  cent  level. 
*  Significant  at  10  per  cent  level. 
Insig.:  Insignificant. 
178 6.2.4  Summary 
Although  the  goodness-of-fit  of  the  three  models  is  very  close,  the  third  model  is 
slightly  better  than  other  two  models.  In  the  tenure  choice  level,  some  variables  have 
significant  and  determining  influences.  As  expected,  the  user  cost  has  a  negative 
effect  on  tenure  choice,  indicating  that  the  probability  of  choosing  a  certain  tenure 
reduces  with  an  increase  in  the  user  cost  of  that  tenure.  Moreover,  a  statistically 
significant  coefficient  of  the  user  cost  also  indicates  that  the  user  cost  in  our  sample  is 
significantly  different  between  tenures  and  across  unitary  authority  areas.  Economic 
subsidy  plays  an  important  role  in  reducing  the  housing  user  cost  and  also  has  a 
substantive  influence  on  tenure  choice.  The  employment  variables  have  the  most 
determining  influences  on  tenure  choice  since  their  coefficient  magnitudes  are  the 
biggest  among  the  explanatory  variables.  Household  heads  who  have  full  time  or  part 
time  jobs  have  the  strongest  likelihood  of  choosing  owner-occupation.  In  contrast, 
unemployed  household  heads  are  much  more  likely  to  choose  social  renting  or  private 
renting. 
The  household  long-term  income  also  has  an  important  influence  on  tenure  choice. 
When  income  increases,  households  are  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  than 
social  renting  or  private  renting.  As  expected,  the  mortgage  rationing  and  the  social 
housing  rationing  have  robust  effects  on  tenure  choice.  Households  who  are 
potentially  constrained  from  mortgages  are  forced  to  choose  private  renting  or  social 
renting.  Households  who  are  potentially  constrained  from  the  social  rented  sector  are 
more  likely  to  choose  private  renting  rather  than  owner-occupation. 
In  the  mobility  decision  level,  the  results  show  that  the  household  head's  age  and  the 
number  of  dependent  children  are  two  important  determinants.  The  results  suggest 
that  older  households  and  households  having  more  dependent  children  are  more  likely 
to  stay.  The  household  long-term  income  also  plays  an  important  role  in  the  mobility 
decision.  When  their  incomes  increase,  households  are  more  likely  to  stay. 
Households  living  in  poor  council  housing  neighbourhoods  are  more  likely  to  stay  and, 
in  many  cases,  these  households  may  not  afford  to  move.  In  fact,  above  variables  not 
only  play  an  important  role  in  determining  the  household's  mobility  but  also  have 
statistically  and  numerically  significant  influences  on  tenure  choice. 
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This  chapter  analyses  the  estimation  results  of  the  two  tenure  choice  models.  The 
MNL  tenure  choice  model  provides  a  basic  analysis  of  the  determinants  of  tenure 
choice  and  the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  Four, 
due  to  the  rejection  of  the  IIA  assumption,  the  MNL  tenure  choice  model  should  be 
treated  with  caution.  In  this  thesis,  the  MNL  model  can  be  treated  as  a  pilot  model  to 
test  the  initial  influences  of  the  explanatory  variables  on  the  household's  tenure  choice 
behaviour.  Unlike  the  NMNL  model  which  requires  complicated  data  arrangement 
and  variable  interactions,  the  MNL  model  provides  a  simple  approach  to  estimate  the 
influences  of  the  explanatory  variables  on  the  three  tenure  alternatives.  With  respect 
to  the  model  results,  the  MNL  model  has  a  good  prediction  level  and  most  explanatory 
variables  are  statistically  significant.  This  indicates  that  these  explanatory  variables 
have  substantial  influences  on  the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour  in  Scotland, 
and  also  these  explanatory  variables  are  examined  in  the  NMNL  model  to  estimate  the 
household's  tenure  choice  and  mobility  decision  behaviour. 
Compared  to  the  MNL  model,  the  NMNL  model  provides  robust  results  in  estimating 
Scottish  households'  tenure  decisions.  Due  to  its  two  level  hierarchical  structure,  the 
NMNL  model  not  only  interprets  the  relationship  between  mobility  decision  and 
tenure  choice  but  also  examines  the  household's  tenure  choice  behaviour  once  its 
mobility  decision  is  made.  As  a  result,  Scottish  households'  tenure  choice  behaviour 
can  be  concluded  as  follows. 
The  household  demographic  variables  have  substantial  influences  on  tenure  choice. 
The  results  show  that  older  and  married  households  are  more  likely  to  choose  owner- 
occupation,  while  younger  and  single  households  are  likely  to  choose  private  renting. 
Households  having  more  dependent  children  are  found  to  have  a  statistically 
significant  likelihood  of  choosing  social  renting.  Female  household  heads  are  likely 
to  choose  social  renting.  In  addition,  the  household  head's  employment  variables 
have  determining  impacts  on  tenure  choice.  Household  heads  who  have  full  time  or 
part  time  jobs  are  strongly  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation,  while  unemployed 
household  heads  are  more  likely  to  choose  social  renting.  These  results  draw  a  clear 
picture  that  households  in  better  socio-economic  positions  are  more  likely  to  be 
180 homeowners,  while  households  with  socio-economic  disadvantages  are  more  likely  to 
choose  social  renting. 
Furthermore,  households'  previous  tenure  has  a  statistically  and  numerically 
significant  influence  on  their  current  tenure  decision.  It  is  more  likely  the  see  that 
households  will  choose  the  same  tenure  as  their  previous  one  when  making  a  tenure 
decision.  Similar  results  also  apply  to  the  neighbourhood  quality  variables.  As 
expected,  households'  tenure  decisions  are  strongly  influenced  by  their  current 
neighbourhood  environments.  Therefore  they  are  more  likely  to  choose  the  dominant 
tenure  in  the  neighbourhood.  In  particular,  it  is  of  interest  to  see  that  households 
living  in  inner  city  neighbourhoods  have  a  stronger  coefficient  of  choosing  owner- 
occupation  rather  than  social  renting. 
Dwelling  type  and  location  are  usually  associated  with  tenure.  In  Scotland,  most 
houses  are  owner-occupied.  Therefore,  households  who  live  in  or  want  to  live  in 
houses  could  only  be  homeowners.  In  this  sense,  it  is  not  surprising  to  see  that 
households  living  in  houses  are  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  than  social 
renting  or  private  renting.  Moreover,  as  Scottish  Homes  (1997)  indicate,  there  is  a 
substantial  number  of  private  renting  dwellings  located  in  rural  Scotland.  In  this  case, 
the  model  results  show  that  households  living  in  rural  areas  are  more  likely  to  choose 
private  renting  rather  than  owner-occupation.  However,  it  would  be  difficult  to 
estimate  the  household's  decision  on  whether  social  renting  or  owner-occupation 
based  on  the  simple  definition  of  the  urban  area  in  the  1996  SHCS.  It  needs  more 
specific  location  variables  to  present  the  spatial  concentration  of  social  housing  and 
owner-occupied  housing  in  the  inner  city,  the  periphery  and  the  suburban  areas. 
The  household  long-term  income  and  the  user  cost  has  determining  influences  on  the 
household's  tenure  decisions.  When  income  rises,  the  household  is  more  likely  to 
choose  owner-occupation  than  social  renting  or  private  renting.  The  user  cost  has  a 
significantly  negative  impact  on  the  household's  tenure  choice  which  indicates  that 
when  the  user  cost  of  a  certain  tenure  increases,  households  are  less  likely  to  choose 
that  tenure.  Further,  the  statistically  significant  of  the  user  cost  in  the  NMNL  model 
also  suggests  that  the  user  cost  is  significantly  different  between  tenures  and  across  32 
unitary  authorities.  Meanwhile,  the  economic  subsidy  plays  a  distinct  role  in  reducing 
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mortgage  rationing  and  social  housing  rationing  variables  have  statistically  and 
numerically  significant  effects  on  tenure  choice.  Mortgage  rationing  and  social 
rationing  play  an  important  role  as  gatekeeper,  filtering  the  household's  access  to  the 
owner-occupied  sector  and  to  the  social  rented  sector. 
In  addition  to  tenure  decision,  the  household  head's  age,  the  number  of  dependent 
children  and  the  household  long-term  income  have  the  most  determining  influences  on 
the  household's  mobility  decision.  Older  households  and  households  having  more 
dependent  children  are  more  likely  to  stay  at  the  current  status.  When  income  rises, 
households  are  more  likely  to  stay  rather  than  to  move.  It  is  noted  that  these  variables 
not  only  have  significant  impacts  on  mobility  decision  but  also  have  remarkable 
influences  on  tenure  choice. 
Finally,  the  two  models  provide  us  with  a  good  simulation  of  Scottish  households' 
tenure  choice  behaviour.  More  importantly,  the  NMNL  model  presents  robust  results 
in  estimating  households'  mobility  decisions  and  tenure  choice.  The  NMNL  model 
results  also  provide  solid  answers  to  the  main  research  questions  of  this  thesis:  what 
are  the  important  determinants  of  tenure  choice  in  Scotland,  and  to  what  extent  do 
these  determinants  influence  Scottish  households'  tenure  decisions?  Furthermore,  the 
model  results,  to  a  certain  extent,  imply  some  issues  related  to  housing  policy 
development.  The  next  chapter  will  discuss  the  policy  issues  and  implications 
emerging  from  the  tenure  choice  model  results. 
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The  last  chapter  presents  the  robust  results  of  Scottish  households'  tenure  choice 
behaviour.  This  chapter  analyses  some  policy  issues  and  implications  emerging  from 
the  results  of  the  tenure  choice  models.  This  chapter  is  organised  into  four  sections. 
The  first  section  discusses  some  simulations  regarding  the  influences  of  changes  in  the 
income  tax  rate  and  changes  in  the  mortgage  rationing  criteria  on  the  household's 
tenure  choice  behaviour.  The  second  section  *analyses  the  outcome  of  tenure  choice 
and  income  distribution  emphasising  income  inequality  and  tenure  polarisation.  The 
third  section  analyses  the  distribution  of  housing  subsidy  arising  from  the  outcome  of 
tenure  choice  addressing  the  balance  of  housing  subsidies  between  tenures  and  income 
levels.  The  last  section  discusses  some  implications  of  these  issues  for  current 
housing  policy  development. 
7.1  Simulations 
The  results  of  the  two  tenure  choice  models  provide  clear  and  detailed  information 
about  the  important  determinants  of  tenure  choice  and  their  influences  on  Scottish 
households'  tenure  decisions.  From  a  policy  perspective,  it  is  equally  important  to 
discuss  an  issue  concerning  the  influence  of  a  change  in  policy  or  scheme,  such  as  the 
tax  policy  and  the  mortgage  finance  scheme,  on  the  household's  tenure  choice 
behaviour.  To  discuss  this  issue,  this  section  emphasises  two  changes  in  policy  or 
schemes  and  simulates  their  influences  on  tenure  choice.  The  first  simulation  analyses 
the  effect  of  altering  income  tax  rate  on  tenure  choice;  the  second  simulation  examines 
the  effect  of  changes  in  the  mortgage  rationing  criteria  on  tenure  choice.  To  some 
extent,  the  simulations  can  be  used  to  examine  the  robustness  or  sensitivity  of  the  two 
tenure  choice  models. 
7.1.1  Altering  the  Income  Tax  Rate 
A  number  of  studies  have  indicated  that  the  income  tax  effect  plays  an  important  role 
in  tenure  choice,  especially  in  the  homeownership  decision  (see  for  example,  Englund 
and  Persson  1982,  Linneman  1985,  Capone  1995).  Englund  and  Persson  (1982) 
suggest  that  a  change  in  the  income  tax  schedule  affects  housing  demand  in  two  ways. 
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tax  change  also  alters  the  marginal  tax  rate,  therefore  it  affects  the  user  cost  of  housing. 
As  discussed  in  Chapter  Six,  the  user  cost  of  housing  has  a  statistically  and 
numerically  significant  impact  on  the  household's  tenure  decision.  Thus,  a  change  in 
the  user  cost,  for  example,  due  to  a  change  in  the  income  tax  rate,  would  have  an 
impact  on  tenure  choice.  As  a  result,  a  simulation  in  this  section  analyses  the  effect  of 
altering  income  tax  schedule  on  the  user  cost  of  housing  and  also  on  tenure  choice. 
As  stated  in  Chapter  Five,  a  change  in  the  income  tax  rate  has  a  direct  impact  on  the 
user  cost  of  owner-occupiers  (see  Equation  35).  The  user  cost  of  social  renting  or 
private  renting  is  based  on  the  economic  rent.  Therefore,  this  thesis  assumes  that  a 
change  in  the  income  tax  rate  does  not  have  a  direct  impact  on  the  user  cost  of  these 
two  tenures.  Under  this  circumstance,  the  influence  of  a  change  in  the  income  tax  rate 
focuses  on  the  user  cost  of  owner-occupiers.  With  respect  to  the  user  cost  of  owner- 
occupiers,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  Five,  the  marginal  income  tax  rate  is  set  to  be  zero 
because  this  thesis  assumes  that  mortgage  interest  tax  relief  is  treated  as  a  lump  sum 
tax  relief,  which  does  not  affect  the  user  cost  but  only  affects  disposable  income  for 
mortgaged  homeowners.  Therefore,  a  simulation  in  this  section  applies  a  different 
income  tax  rate,  24%-the  benchmark  income  tax  rate  in  1996,  then  to  analyse  the 
influences  of  applying  a  different  income  tax  rate  on  the  user  cost  of  housing  and  on 
tenure  decision.  The  equation  of  the  new  user  cost  of  owner-occupiers  is  shown  in 
Equation  (40): 
UC,  =[(1-0.24)*i+d+a-g]*Ph  (40) 
where  the  household's  marginal  tax  rate  now  is  changed  to  0.24,  i  is  the  nominal 
mortgage  interest  rate,  d  is  the  depreciation  rate,  a  is  the  property  tax  rate,  g  is  the 
expected  annual  rate  of  nominal  house  price  increase  and  P'  is  the  current  market 
value  of  the  property.  The  figures  of  i,  d,  c,  g  and  P'  are  same  in  Chapter  Five. 
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Tax  Rate 
Before  App.  24%  ITR  After  A.  24%  ITR 
User  Costs  \ 
Tenures 
Average 
Annual 
Amount  £ 
%  of 
Capital 
Value 
Average 
Annual 
Amount  (E) 
%  of 
Capital 
Value 
Owner-occupiers  3,531  6.7  2,689  5.1 
Social  tenants  2,237  7.0  2,237  7.0 
Private  tenants  3,161  7.4  3,161  7.4 
Table  7.1  shows  the  user  cost  of  owner-occupiers  before  and  after  applying  24%  of 
income  tax  rate.  After  applying  24%  of  income  tax  rate,  the  user  cost  of  owner- 
occupiers  reduces  from  £3,531  to  £2,689  per  annum.  A  part  of  the  user  cost  of  owner- 
occupiers  has  been  deducted  by  the  increase  in  the  marginal  income  tax  rate.  The  new 
user  cost  of  owner-occupiers  after  applying  24%  of  income  tax  rate  is  lower  than  the 
user  cost  of  private  renting  and  is  close  to  the  user  cost  of  social  renting.  In  this  sense, 
the  reduction  in  the  user  cost  of  owner-occupiers  could  lead  to  homeownership 
becoming  more  attractive.  Moreover,  if  we  take  account  of  economic  subsidies  within 
the  user  cost,  the  net  user  cost  of  owner-occupier  after  applying  24%  of  income  tax 
rate  is  very  close  to  the  net  user  cost  of  social  renting.  In  contrast,  the  cost  gap 
between  owner-occupiers  and  private  tenants  becomes  wider  (see  Table  7.2).  These 
changes  in  the  user  cost  between  tenures  are  examined  in  the  tenure  choice  models. 
Table  7.2  Net  User  Costs  by  Tenures-Before  and  After  Applying  24%  of  the 
Income  Tax  Rate 
Before  App.  24%  ITR  After  App.  24%  ITR 
Tenures  User 
Cost 
Econ. 
Subsidy 
Net 
User 
Cost 
User 
Cost 
Econ. 
Subsidy 
Net 
User 
Cost 
Owner-occupiers  3,531  834  2,697  2,689  834  1,855 
Social  tenants  2,237  638  1,735  2,237  638  1,735 
Private  tenants  3,161  21  3,140  3,161  21  3,140 
Theoretically,  it  is  expected  that  a  reduction  in  the  user  cost  of  owner-occupier  due  to 
an  increase  in  the  marginal  income  tax  rate  would  lead  to  households  preferring 
owner-occupation.  Unfortunately,  the  MNL  model  does  not  provide  expected  results 
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of  the  MNL  model,  the  user  cost  of  housing  and  some  important  explanatory  variables, 
such  as  household  long  term  income  and  employment  variables,  have  either  become 
statistically  insignificant  or  have  presented  a  wrong  sign.  Again,  this  indicates  that  the 
MNL  model  does  not  provides  robust  results  in  estimating  tenure  choice  in  this  thesis. 
The  non-robust  results  in  the  MNL  model  may  be  driven  by  the  multicollinearity 
problem  or  by  the  IIIA  problem  as  discussed  in  previous  chapters.  Under  this 
circumstance,  the  NMNL  model  is  the  best  alternative. 
Table  7.3  shows  two  simulation  results  of  the  NMNL  model  of  mobility  and  tenure 
choice.  The  first  simulation  estimates  the  effect  of  changes  in  the  user  cost,  which  are 
affected  by  a  change  in  the  marginal  income  tax  rate,  on  tenure  choice  and  mobility 
decisions.  The  second  simulation  emphasises  the  effect  of  changes  in  the  net  user  cost 
on  tenure  choice  and  mobility  decisions.  Model  One  is  the  same  basic  model  as  in 
Chapter  Six.  The  full  estimation  results  of  these  simulation  models  run  by  the 
LIlVIDEP  programme  are  reported  in  Appendix  A.  7.1.  In  the  first  simulation,  the  user 
cost  of  housing  shows  statistically  significant  effects  on  tenure  choice  but  the 
magnitude  of  the  coefficient  becomes  smaller  than  that  in  the  original  model  one. 
This  suggests  that  after  applying  a  different  income  tax  rate  (24%)  to  the  user  cost  of 
owner-occupiers,  the  new  user  cost  of  housing  has  become  a  less  significant  influence 
(statistically  and  numerically)  on  the  household's  tenure  decision.  The  new  user  cost 
terms  between  tenures  and  across  32  unitary  authorities  are  also  reported  in  Appendix 
A.  5.2. 
The  simulation  results  are  unlikely  to  fit  into  our  expectation  that  owner-occupation 
would  become  more  attractive  since  an  increase  in  the  income  tax  rate  reduces  the 
user  cost  of  owner-occupiers.  One  should  note  that  the  user  cost  of  housing  in  the 
NMNL  model  is  an  attribute  of  tenure  which  is  estimated  on  the  basis  of  tenures,  not 
on  the  individual  household.  Therefore,  the  effect  of  the  user  cost  in  the  NMNL 
model  is  more  likely  to  reflect  the  general  influence  on  tenure  choice  (whether  or  not 
the  user  cost  is  statistically  and  numerically  significant  between  three  tenures)  rather 
than  to  show  the  household's  preference  for  a  specific  tenure  (i.  e.  either  owner- 
occupation  or  social  renting).  In  this  case,  one  reasonable  explanation  is  that  an 
increase  in  the  income  tax  rate  reduces  the  user  cost  of  owner-occupiers.  The 
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three  tenures,  particularly  between  owner-occupiers  and  social  tenants.  As  a  result, 
the  new  user  cost  of  housing  has  less  statistically  and  numerically  significant  effects 
on  tenure  decision  than  that  in  the  original  Model  One. 
In  the  second  simulation,  the  net  user  cost  of  housing  remains  a  statistically  significant 
influence  on  tenure  choice,  and  the  coefficient  magnitude  becomes  bigger  than  the 
first  simulation.  It  seems  that  the  increase  in  the  magnitude  of  the  coefficient  is  more 
likely  to  be  driven  by  an  economic  subsidy  effect  rather  than  the  effect  of  a  change  in 
the  income  tax  rate.  Moreover,  in  both  simulations,  the  coefficient  estimates  of  other 
explanatory  variables  do  not  show  significant  changes  in  terms  of  their  statistical 
significance  level  and  their  coefficient  magnitudes.  This  suggests  that  the  changes  in 
the  user  cost  of  housing  due  to  the  subsidy  effect  or  the  effect  of  a  change  in  income 
tax  rate  have  minimum  influences  on  other  explanatory  variables  in  the  NMNL  model. 
Table  7.3  The  NMNL  Mobility  and  Tenure  Choice  Model  Results-Simulations 
of  the  User  Cost  and  the  Net  User  Cost 
Dependent  Variable  =  Achoice 
Default  Tenure  =  "Owner-occupation"  in  the  tenure  choice  level;  "stay"  in  the 
mobility  decision  level 
Lower  Level-Tenure  Choice 
Model  One  Simulation  One  Simulation  Two 
Variable  Coefficient  Sig. 
Level 
Coefficient  Coefficient  Sig. 
Level 
Constant  -10.505  ***  -9.181  ***  .  10.427  *** 
Lntcost  -0.494  ***  -0.181  ** 
Lnatcost  -0.290 
Agehsoc  -0.011  *  -0.011  *  -0.011 
Agehprv  -0.055  ***  -0.054  ***  -0.055  *** 
Ndepchsoc  0.312  ***  0.307  ***  0.308  *** 
Ndepchprv  0.176  *  0.167  Insig  0.175 
Marrysoc  -0.802  ***  -0.764  ***  -0.744  *** 
Marryprv  -0.582  **  -0.632  -0.553 
Malesoc  -0.411  *  -0.411  *  -0.411 
Maleprv  0.377  Insig  0.371  Insig  0.373  Insig 
Fullsoc  -1.759  ***  -1.760  ***  -1.764  *** 
187 Fullprv  -1.584  ***  -1.616  ***  -1.592  *** 
Partsoc  -1.217  ***  -1.224  ***  -1.210  *** 
Partprv  -2.237  ***  -2.250  ***  -2.228  *** 
Unempsoc  0.781  *  0.755  *  0.760 
Unempprv  0.681  Insig  0.655  Insig  0.670  Insig 
Pvownsoc  -1.142  ***  -1.129  ***  -1.119  *** 
Pvownprv  -0.153  Insig  -0.162  Insig  -0.143  Insig 
Pvsocsoc  1.604  ***  1.588  ***  1.578  *** 
Pvsocprv  0.314  Insig  0.320  Insig  0.309  Insig 
Pvprvsoc  0.688  ***  0.695  ***  0.695  *** 
Pvprvprv  1.218  ***  1.224  ***  1.222  *** 
Houssoc  -1.480  ***  -1.503  ***  -1.505  *** 
Housprv  -0.102  Insig  -0.114  Insig  -0.111  Insig 
Urbansoc  -0.501  0.457  **  -0.447  ** 
Urbanprv  -0.876  ***  -0.860  ***  -0.850  *** 
Afownsoc  -1.086  ***  -1.092  ***  -1.090  *** 
Afownprv  0.050  Insig  0.042  Insig  0.052  Insig 
Pvctysoc  -1.676  ***  -1.602  ***  -1.619  *** 
Pvctyprv  1.133  ***  1.126  ***  1.101  *** 
Pocnlsoc  1.484  ***  1.487  ***  1.461  *** 
Pocnlprv  -0.231  Insig  -0.238  Insig  -0.280  Insig 
Lnincsoc  -0.312  ***  -0.296  ***  -0.283  *** 
Lnincprv  -0.850  ***  -0.719  ***  -0.860  *** 
Upper  Level-Mobility  Decision 
Model  One  Simulation  One  Simulation  Two 
Variables  Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Ageheads  0.055  ***  0.056  ***  0.055  *** 
Marrys  -0.156  Insig  -0.185  Insig  -0.192  Insig 
Ndepchs  0.196  ***  0.191  ***  0.187  *** 
Males  -0.145  Insig  -0.147  Insig  -0.145  Insig 
Unemps  0.115  Insig  0.098  Insig  0.102  Insig 
Lnincs  0.534  ***  0.620  ***  0.641  *** 
Affowns  -0.017  Insig  0.012  Insig  0.038  Insig 
Pvcitys  -0.197  *  -0.178  *  -0.151  Insig 
Porcnls  0.272  **  0.318  **  0.310  ** 
Inclusive  values 
II(Stayer) 
1.00  fixed  1.00  1.00  Fixed 
188 Inclusive  values 
I  (Mover) 
0.243  ***  0.257  ***  0.276  *** 
Log  Likelihood  -4893.7  -4899.5  -4897.3 
Predicted 
Level 
81.69%  81.66%  81.69% 
No.  Obs  52048  52048  52048 
Notes:  Significant  at  1  per  cent  level. 
**  :  Significant  at  5  per  cent  level. 
*:  Significant  at  10  per  cent  level. 
Insig.:  Insignificant. 
In  this  simulation,  an  increase  in  the  income  tax  rate  reduces  the  user  cost  of  owner- 
occupiers,  and  it  thus  reduces  the  cost  difference  between  tenures,  particularly 
between  owner-occupiers  and  social  tenants.  In  the  NMNL  model,  the  decreased  user 
cost  between  tenures  has  a  less  statistical  and  numerical  influence  on  tenure  choice 
than  the  original  user  cost.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  expected  that  a  reverse  situation 
with  a  decrease  in  the  income  tax  rate,  would  increase  the  user  cost  of  owner- 
occupiers  and  thus  also  enlarge  the  cost  difference  between  tenures.  As  a  result,  the 
increased  user  cost  between  tenures  would  have  a  stronger  influence  on  tenure  choice. 
7.1.2  Altering  Mortgage  Rationing  Criteria 
As  discussed  in  Chapter  Six,  mortgage  rationing  has  a  statistically  and  numerically 
significant  influence  on  tenure  choice.  This  part  of  the  section  aims  to  simulate  the 
effect  of  changes  in  mortgage  rationing  criteria  on  the  household's  tenure  decision. 
The  construction  of  mortgage  rationing  criteria  in  Chapter  Five  is  based  on  three  ratios: 
price-to-income  ratio,  loan-to-value  ratio,  and  loan-to-income  ratio.  This  thesis 
reduces  20%  of  these  three  mortgage  rationing  ratios  and  then  examines  the  effect  of 
these  changes  on  tenure  choice.  The  original  three  mortgage  rationing  ratios  and  a 
20%  reduction  in  mortgage  rationing  ratios  are  shown  in  Table  7.4.  Based  on  these 
new  mortgage  rationing  ratios,  the  new  mortgage  rationing  assumptions  are  as  follows. 
For  mortgaged.  homeowners,  if  they  have  qualified  for  more  than  two  of  these  new 
mortgage  rationing  ratios  (in  Table  7.4),  they  may  find  it  difficult  to  obtain  a  mortgage. 
For  social  tenants  or  private  tenants,  if  their  price  to  income  ratio  is  greater  than  2.4, 
they  could  potentially  be  constrained  by  mortgages.  Outright  owners  are  assumed  not 
to  be  constrained  by  mortgage  rationing. 
189 Table  7.4  Mortgage  Rationing  Ratios  and  20%  Release  of  Mortgage  Rationing 
Ratios 
Mortgage  Rationing  Ratios  20%  Reduction  in  Mortgage  Rationing 
Ratios 
PTI  >  3.0  PTI  >  2.4 
LTV  >  0.9  LTV>0.72 
LTI  >  2.23  LTI  >  1.78 
Table  7.5  Mortgage  Rationing  by  Tenures-A  Simulation  of  20%  Release  of 
Mortgage  Rationing  Ratios 
Original  MRR  20%  Reduction  in  MRR 
Tenures  Rationed  Not  Rationed  Not  Total 
Rationed  Rationed 
Owner-occupiers  1,121  5,708  1,856  4,973  6,829 
(16.4%)  (83.6%)  (27.2%)  (72.8%)  100% 
Social  Tenants  4,228  1,350  5,063  515  5,578 
(75.8%)  (24.2%)  (90.8%)  (9.2%)  (100%) 
Private  Tenants  555  152  645  62  707 
(78.5%)  (21.5%)  (91.2%)  (8.8%)  (100%) 
Total  5,904  7,210  7,564  5,550  13,114 
(45%)  (55%)  (57.7%)  (42.3%)  100% 
Based  on  the  new  mortgage  rationing  assumptions,  a  simulation  of  the  mortgage 
constraint  broken  down  by  tenures  is  shown  in  Table  7.5.  It  is  clear  that  a  20% 
reduction  in  the  three  mortgage  rationing  ratios  leads  more  households  to  be 
constrained  by  mortgages.  After  applying  the  new  mortgage  rationing  ratios,  the 
percentage  of  owner-occupiers  who  could  find  it  difficult  to  get  a  mortgage  increases 
from  16.4%  to  27.2%.  Meanwhile,  more  than  90%  of  social  tenants  and  private 
tenants  would  potentially  be  constrained  by  mortgages  after  applying  the  new 
mortgage  rationing  ratios.  Moreover,  it  is  expected  that  the  changes  in  the  mortgage 
rationing  ratios  would  have  substantive  impacts  on  the  household's  tenure  choice 
behaviour.  The  simulation  results  of  the  NMNL  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model  are 
reported  in  Table  7.6. 
190 Table  7.6  The  NMNL  Mobility  and  Tenure  Choice  Model  Results-Simulation 
of  Mortgage  Rationing  Effect 
Dependent  Variable  =  Achoice 
Default  Tenure  =  "Owner-occupation"  in  the  tenure  choice  level;  "stay"  in  the 
mobility  decision  level 
Lower  Level-Tenure  Choice 
Model  Three  Simulation  Three 
Variable  Coefficient  Sig. 
Level 
Coefficient  Sig. 
Level 
Constant  -6.182  ***  -6.151  *** 
Lnatcost  -0.892  ***  -0.885  *** 
Agehsoc  -0.006  Insig  0.0003  Insig 
Agehprv  -0.044  ***  -0.037  *** 
Ndepchsoc  0.297  ***  0.337  *** 
Ndepchprv  0.184  *  0.216 
Marrysoc  -0.251  Insig  -0.268  Insig 
Marryprv  -0.322  Insig  -0.474 
Malesoc  -0.381  Insig  -0.358  Insig 
Maleprv  0.303  Insig  0.338  Insig 
Fullsoc  -1.631  ***  -1.743  *** 
Fullprv  -1.938  ***  -2.117  *** 
Partsoc  -1.119  ***  -1.119  *** 
Partprv  -2.523  ***  -2.569  *** 
Unempsoc  0.925  **  0.950 
Unempprv  0.967  **  1.004  ** 
Pvownsoc  -1.150  ***  -1.163  *** 
Pvownprv  -0.301  Insig  -0.274  Insig 
Pvsocsoc  1.481  ***  1.540  *** 
Pvsocprv  0.239  Insig  0.289  Insig 
Pvprvsoc  0.626  ***  0.613  ** 
Pvprvprv  1.131  ***  1.101  *** 
Houssoc  -1.510  ***  -1.586  *** 
Housprv  -0.204  Insig  -0.249  Insig 
Urbansoc  -0.524  ***  -0.652  *** 
Urbanprv  -0.924  ***  -1.041  *** 
Afownsoc  -1.116  ***  -1.070  ** 
191 Afownprv  -0.053  Insig  -0.038  Insig 
Pvctysoc  -1.705  ***  -1.768  *** 
Pvctyprv  0.998  ***  0.950  *** 
Pocnlsoc  1.348  ***  1.396  *** 
Pocnlprv  -0.335  Insig  -0.304  Insig 
Lnincsoc  -0.185  ***  -0.091 
Lnincprv  -0.496  **  -0.567  *** 
Mratsoc  1.037  ***  1.856  *** 
Mratprv  1.141  ***  1.707  *** 
Sratprv  0.718  ***  0.786  *** 
Upper  Level-Mobility  Decision 
Model  Three  Simulation  Three 
Variables  Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Coefficients  Sig. 
Level 
Ageheads  0.051  ***  0.051  *** 
Marrys  0.110  Insig  0.127  Insig 
Ndepchs  0.225  ***  0.227  *** 
Males  -0.125  Insig  -0.108  Insig 
Unemps  0.217  Insig  0.205  Insig 
Lnincs  -0.051  Insig  -0.061  Insig 
Affowns  0.044  Insig  0.048  Insig 
Pvcitys  -0.141  Insig  -0.156  Insig 
Porcnls  0.286  *  0.249 
Inclusive  values  Il 
(Stayer) 
1.00  Fixed  1.00  Fixed 
Inclusive  values  I2 
over 
0.334  ***  0.300  *** 
Log  Likelihood  -4858.7  -4826.9 
Predicted 
Level 
81.74%  94.45% 
No.  Obs  52048  52048 
Notes:  ***  :  Significant  at  1  per  cent  level. 
Significant  at  5  per  cent  level. 
*  Significant  at  10  per  cent  level. 
Innig.:  Insignificant. 
In  Table  7.6,  Model  Three  adds  two  rationing  variables  as  in  Chapter  Six.  Simulation 
Three  presents  the  estimation  results  of  the  effect  of  changes  in  mortgage  rationing 
criteria  on  tenure  choice  and  mobility  decisions.  In  the  simulation  model,  the 
coefficient  magnitudes  of  two  mortgage  rationing  variables  have  significantly 
increased,  compared  to  Model  Three.  This  suggests  that  a  20%  reduction  in  the 
192 mortgage  rationing  ratios  has  squeezed  the  mortgage  constraint  conditions  to  the 
households.  As  a  result,  it  leads  to  mortgage  rationing  having  stronger  (numerical) 
effects  on  the  household's  tenure  choice. 
Moreover,  the  changes  in  the  mortgage  rationing  criteria  have  substantive  influences 
on  other  explanatory  variables.  Given  the  influence  of  the  new  mortgage  rationing 
variables,  the  coefficient  magnitudes  of  most  explanatory  variables  have  increased. 
This  means  that  most  explanatory  variables  have  stronger  numerical  influences  on 
tenure  choice  under  the  effect  of  applying  tighter  mortgage  rationing  conditions  to 
households.  In  contrast,  household  long  term  income  has  a  less  influence  (statistical 
and  numerical)  on  the  choice  between  owner-occupation  and  social  tenants.  This 
could  be  affected  by  the  multicollinearity  problem.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  Five, 
there  is  some  moderate  degree  of  correlation  between  the  mortgage  rationing  variable 
and  household  long  term  income.  Furthermore,  in  the  mobility  decision  level,  most 
explanatory  variables  do  not  have  significant  changes  in  their  coefficient  magnitudes 
and  the  statistical  significance  level  under  the  effect  of  changes  in  mortgage  rationing 
criteria. 
In  summary,  this  section  has  discussed  two  simulations  works  in  the  tenure  choice 
model.  The  first  simulation  has  examined  the  effect  of  applying  a  different  income 
tax  rate  to  the  user  cost  of  owner-occupiers  on  the  household's  tenure  choice.  The 
second  simulation  has  analysed  the  effect  of  changes  in  the  mortgage  rationing  criteria 
on  the  household's  tenure  decision.  It  was  found  that  an  increase  in  the  marginal 
income  tax  rate  reduces  the  user  cost  of  owner-occupiers.  The  reduction  in  the  user 
cost  of  owner-occupiers  has  decreased  the  cost  differences  between  tenures  (especially 
between  social  renting  and  owner-occupation).  As  a  result,  the  influence  of  the  user 
cost  of  housing  becomes  less  significant  (statistically  and  numerically)  on  tenure 
choice.  Moreover,  a  20%  reduction  in  the  mortgage  rationing  ratios  presses  more 
constraints  on  households,  thus  it  leads  to  the  mortgage  rationing  having  a  stronger 
numerical  influence  on  the  household's  tenure  choice.  From  a  policy  perspective,  the 
first  simulation  implies  that  a  change  in  the  income  tax  schedule  would  have 
substantial  influences  on  the  user  cost  of  housing,  thus  affecting  the  household's 
tenure  choice.  The  simulation  results  provide  a  direction  of  these  influences  on  the 
user  cost  of  housing  and  tenure  choice.  The  results  in  the  second  simulation  also 
193 imply  a  clear  direction  of  a  change  in  the  mortgage  finance  condition  (tighten  or 
loosen)  in  affecting  (increase  or  decrease  the  mortgage  rationing  effect)  the 
household's  tenure  decision  behaviour. 
7.2  Income  Inequality  and  Tenure  Polarisation 
In  the  last  chapter,  our  model  results  show  that  household  income  is  one  of  the  most 
determinants  of  tenure  choice.  While  income  rises,  a  household  is  more  likely  to 
choose  owner-occupation  than  renting.  This  implies  that  households  with  higher 
incomes  would  favour  owner-occupation,  while  low-income  households  are  more 
likely  to  choose  renting,  especially  social  renting.  From  a  policy  perspective,  it  is  of 
interest  to  discuss  the  tenure  preferences  of  households  in  different  income  levels,  and 
to  explore  some  issues  related  to  tenure  choice  and  income  distribution.  One 
important  issue  is  the  growth  of  income  inequality  between  tenures  and  tenure 
polarisation,  which  has  been  discussed  by  many  studies  over  the  last  two  decades  (see 
for  example,  Bentham  1986,  Atkinson  1993,  and  Hills  1995,1998). 
The  first  part  of  this  section  discusses  income  inequality  between  tenures  and  the 
second  part  analyses  tenure  polarisation  between  income  levels.  The  analysis  is 
primarily  based  on  the  whole  Scottish  average  and  it  also  looks  at  the  urban  level  by 
comparing  the  differences  between  four  major  cities  -  Aberdeen,  Dundee,  Edinburgh 
and  Glasgow. 
7.2.1  Income  Inequality  between  Tenures 
The  analysis  of  income  inequality  starts  with  the  definition  and  measurement  of 
income  for  individuals  or  for  households.  The  classic  definition  of  individual  income 
is  by  Simons  (1938)'$,  which  includes  non-pecuniary  incomes  and  expected  future 
incomes.  A  simple  definition  of  lifetime  consumption  is  that  "income  in  a  given 
period  is  the  amount  a  person  could  have  spent  while  maintaining  his  wealth  intact" 
(Atkinson  1983,  p.  39).  These  income  definitions  involve  the  unrealised  capital  gains, 
imputed  rents,  the  long  run  incomes  and  expected  expenditures.  All  of  these  items  are 
t8  The  Simons,  also  called  Haig-Simons  definition  of  individual  income  is  that  "personal  income  may 
be  defined  as  the  algebraic  sum  of  (1)  the  market  value  of  rights  exercised  in  consumption  and  (2)  the 
change  in  the  value  of  the  store  of  property  rights  between  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  the  period" 
(Simons  1938,  p.  50). 
194 important  and  are  connected  with  housing  consumption.  However,  it  is  unlikely  to 
use  unrealised  and  expected  incomes  as  the  measuring  resources  to  examine  the 
current  problem  of  income  inequality.  Therefore,  it  is  appropriate  to  adopt  the  current 
monetary  income  as  the  measuring  resource. 
The  above  income  definitions  focus  on  individual  income.  Due  to  data  limitations,  the 
income  used  in  this  chapter  is  household  income  drawn  from  the  1996  Scottish  House 
Condition  Survey  (SHCS),  which  is  defined  as  "weekly  net  income  received  by  the 
head  of  household  and  spouse/partner  (where  relevant)  received  from  wages  and 
salaries,  from  benefit  payments  and  from  other  sources  such  as  non-state  pensions, 
alimony  or maintenance  payments"  (Scottish  Homes  1997,  p.  346).  In  measuring  the 
household  income  distribution,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  households'  different 
income  patterns  drawn  from  their  different  household  sizes  and  age-consumption. 
Equivalence  scales  are  commonly  used  to  "calculate  ratios  of  incomes  required  by 
different  household  types  to  achieve  a  similar  standard  of  living,  taking  into  account 
the  economies  possible  in  the  larger  households  from  sharing  of  facilities  such  as 
heating  and  lighting"  (Central  Statistics  Office  1987,  p.  112).  The  approach  taken  is, 
given  the  information  about  the  number  of  people  living  in  the  household  together 
with  the  numbers  and  ages  of  dependent  children,  to  calculate  the  number  of 
`equivalent  adults'  in  the  household  and  to  work  with  measures  of  income  per 
equivalent  adult  (Hancock  1993). 
In  Britain,  there  are  commonly  three  sets  of  equivalence  scales  to  be  applied  in 
examining  the  extent  of  poverty  and  income  inequality  (Central  Statistics  Office  1987). 
The  McClements  scale  is  one  of  the  three  scales  and  is  applied  to  this  chapter  The 
McClements'  equivalence  ratios  for  different  members  of  the  household  are  listed  in 
Appendix  A.  7.2.  Equivalent  income  is  obtained  by  dividing  the  household  income  by 
the  equivalence  scale.  A  comparison  table  of  the  average  household  income  and  the 
equivalent  household  income  broken  down  into  income  quintiles  and  into  tenures  is 
reported  in  Appendix  A.  7.3. 
7.2.1.1  Income  Quintile  Shares  between  Tenures 
In  the  analysis  of  income  inequality,  a  simple  way  is  to  look  at  the  percentage  of 
income  distribution  in  quantile  groups,  called  quantile  shares  (Marsh  1988).  The 
195 quantile  shares  conventionally  considered  are  the  quartiles,  the  quintiles  and  the 
deciles  (ibid.  ).  This  thesis  adopts  the  quintile  group  since  it  is  adopted  by  most 
government  statistical  reports  (see  Central  Statistics  Office  1987).  Table  7.7  shows 
the  quintile  shares  of  the  equivalent  household  income  broken  down  into  five  different 
tenures  in  Scotland,  1996.  It  is  clear  that,  for  all  tenures,  the  income  shares  rise  with 
income  quintile  groups.  This  means  that  the  income  distribution  was  concentrated  on 
higher  income  quintile  groups,  especially  the  top  income  quintile  group  in  Scotland. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  shows  a  significant  income  inequality  in  the  bottom  quintile 
group,  where  the  income  shares  were  not  more  than  10  per  cent  for  all  tenures. 
Between  owner-occupiers,  outright  owners  had  wider  ranges  of  income  shares  than 
mortgaged  owners.  This  explains  that  income  inequality  in  outright  owners  was 
greater  than  in  mortgaged  owners,  especially  between  the  fourth  and  the  top  quintile 
groups.  This  implies  that  there  exists  a  wider  income  inequality  in  older  age  of 
outright  owners  since  many  outright  owners  are  elderly  people.  Further,  between 
renters,  income  inequality  in  private  tenants  was  greater  than  in  social  tenants.  In  the 
social  rented  sector,  there  was  no  significant  difference  of  income  inequality  between 
local  authority  tenants  and  housing  association  tenants.  Nevertheless,  in  the  top 
income  quintile  group,  the  income  share  of  housing  association  tenants  was  slightly 
higher  than  that  of  local  authority  tenants. 
Table  7.7  Quintile  Shares  of  Equivalent  Household  Income  by  Tenures  in 
Scotland,  1996 
Percentage  of  total  income  received  by  the  quintile 
Quintile  Outright  Mortgaged  LA  HA  Private 
Owners  Owners  Tenants  Tenants  Tenants 
Bottom  6.9  8.2  10.0  9.7  6.6 
2°"  11.0  13.6  15.0  14.1  12.4 
3rd  15.5  18.1  18.5  17.9  17.0 
4'h  22.2  23.4  22.5  22.1  23.3 
Top  44.3  36.8  34.0  36.2  40.7 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
Notes:  LA:  Local  Authority;  HA:  Housing  Association 
196 The  above  discussion  presents  the  results  of  income  inequality  on  the  basis  of  the 
Scottish  average.  In  fact,  the  results  of  income  and  tenure  distribution  based  on  the 
average  figures  of  the  whole  Scotland  cannot  reflect  the  local  differences.  Therefore, 
it  is  of  interest  to  compare  the  income  inequality  between  tenures  at  the  city  level, 
especially  in  Scotland's  four  major  cities  -  Aberdeen,  Dundee,  Edinburgh  and 
Glasgow.  Table  7.8  shows  the  quintile  shares  of  the  equivalent  household  income  by 
tenures  in  the  four  cities.  It  is  noted  that  in  Table  7.8,  social  tenants  are  not  split  into 
local  authority  tenants  and  housing  association  tenants  because  the  sample  cases  of 
housing  association  tenants  are  too  small  in  Aberdeen  City  and  Dundee  City. 
Table  7.8  Quintile  Shares  of  Equivalent  Household  Income  by  Tenures  in  Four 
Cities  of  Scotland,  1996 
Percentage  of  total  income  received  by  the  quintile 
Quintile  Outright  Mortgaged  Social  Private 
group  Owners  Owners  Tenants  Tenants 
%)  %  %) 
Aberdeen 
Bottom  7.6  8.6  9.9  4.5 
2°d  11.2  14.0  15.7  9.4 
3`d  15.0  18.3  18.7  16.0 
4`h  22.4  22.4  23.0  25.1 
Top  43.8  36.7  32.7  45.0 
Dundee 
Bottom  7.1  7.1  9.6  4.6 
2°'  11.1  13.3  15.1  10.3 
3'd  17.1  18.7  18.3  18.7 
4`h  23.0  23.8  22.6  24.0 
Top  41.7  37.1  34.4  42.4 
Edinburgh 
Bottom  7.2  7.5  10.0  4.8 
2"  11.1  12.8  15.4  10.6 
3rd  15.2  17.4  19.1  16.3 
4th  22.5  22.4  22.9  24.0 
Top  44.0  39.9  32.6  44.3 
Glasgow 
Bottom  6.9  6.7  9.5  5.0 
2"'  11.5  13.0  14.5  12.0 
3rd  15.7  17.2  18.4  17.7 
4`h  23.2  24.1  22.7  23.2 
Top  42.7  39.0  34.9  42.1 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
197 Similar  to  the  results  in  the  Scottish  average,  income  shares  rose  with  income  quintile 
groups  in  all  four  cities.  Again,  this  implies  that  the  income  distribution  is 
concentrated  in  higher  income  quintile  groups  and  that  there  exists  a  significant 
income  inequality  in  the  bottom  income  quintile  group  in  each  tenure  of  all  four  cities. 
Between  tenures,  income  inequality  in  outright  owners  was  greater  than  in  mortgaged 
owners,  while  income  inequality  in  private  tenants  was  greater  than  in  social  tenants. 
The  income  shares  in  each  tenure  were  similar  between  the  four  cities.  This  indicates 
that  the  four  cities  could  have  a  similar  problem  of  income  inequality  between  tenures, 
although  the  average  income  by  tenures  is  different  between  the  four  cities  (see 
Appendix  A.  7.3).  However,  the  results  need  careful  consideration.  Since  the  results 
are  drawn  from  the  tenure-base  income  distribution,  it  could  raise  the  question:  what 
other  household  characteristics,  such  as  household  type  or  the  household  head's  age, 
are  shaping  the  distribution  of  income  across  cities?  In  addition,  the  housing  policy 
and  the  allocation  system  could  have  substantial  impacts  on  the  tenure-base 
distribution  of  income  across  cities.  All  of  these  need  further  investigation. 
7.2.1.2  Gini  Coefficients  between  Tenures 
Another  measurement  of  income  inequality  emphasises  the  cumulative  income  shares. 
The  results  of  cumulative  income  distribution  are  usually  displayed  by  a  graphical 
form  known  as  a  Lorenz  curve.  The  Gini  coefficient  is  a  summary  measure  of  income 
inequality,  expressed  on  the  Lorenz  curve.  The  Gini  coefficient  is  one  of  the  most 
important  measures  of  income  and  wealth  distributions  in  Britain  (Atkinson  1983). 
The  Gini  coefficient  lies  between  0  (prefect  equality)  and  1  (perfect  inequality), 
although  it  is  sometimes  multiplied  by  100  to  express  the  coefficient  in  percentage 
form.  In  other  words,  the  greater  the  Gini  coefficient  is,  the  larger  amount  of 
inequality.  Table  7.9  shows  the  Gini  coefficients  for  equivalent  household  income 
between  tenures  in  Scotland. 
The  Gini  coefficient  for  all  households  in  Scotland  in  1996  is  0.33.  For  owner- 
occupiers  only,  the  Gini  coefficient  is  0.32,  which  is  not  altogether  different  from  the 
all  household  average.  This  suggests  that  the  income  distribution  of  owner-occupiers 
is  similar  to  that  of  the  all  household  average.  In  the  owner-occupied  sector,  the  Gini 
coefficient  for  outright  owners  is  greater  than  for  mortgaged  owners,  which  indicates 
that  outright  owners  have  greater  inequality  of  income  distribution  than  mortgaged 
198 owners.  As  mentioned  earlier,  this  is  probably  because  many  outright  owners  are 
elderly  people  who  could  have  wider  ranges  of  income  distribution  than  mortgaged 
owners.  For  example,  many  older  outright  owners'  income  sources  primarily  depend 
upon  their  pensions,  while  some  outright  owners  are  very  rich  to  be  in  the  top  income 
group.  Social  tenants  have  the  lowest  Gini  coefficient,  compared  to  owner-occupiers 
and  private  tenants.  On  one  hand,  this  explains  that  social  tenants  have  the  least 
income  inequality.  On  the  other  hand,  social  tenants  have  the  lowest  average 
household  income  and  the  smallest  income  ranges.  These  together  reflect  the  fact  that 
more  uniformly  poor  households  are  in  social  housing,  compared  to  private  renting. 
In  the  social  rented  sector,  housing  association  tenants  have  a  greater  Gini  coefficient 
than  local  authority  tenants,  although  the  quintile  shares  of  income  are  not  much 
different  between  these  two  tenures.  This  implies  that  housing  association  tenants 
have  wider  ranges  of  income  distribution  than  local  authority  tenants. 
Table  7.9  Gini  Coefficients  for  Equivalent  Household  Income  by  Tenures  in 
Scotland,  1996 
Tenures  Equiv.  Household  Income 
(Gini  Coefficients) 
All  Households  0.33 
Owner-Occupiers  0.32 
Outright  Owners  0.37 
Mortgaged  Owners  0.29 
Social  Tenants  0.24 
LA  Tenants  0.24 
HA  Tenants  0.27 
Private  Tenants  0.34 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
Notes:  LA:  Local  Authority;  HA:  Housing  Association 
At  the  four  city  level,  private  tenants  have  much  higher  Gini  coefficients  than  the 
Scottish  average  (see  Table  7.10).  This  explains  that  the  income  inequality  for  private 
tenants  is  very  significant  at  the  city  level,  particularly  in  Aberdeen  City  where  the 
Gini  coefficient  for  private  tenants  is  the  highest  in  the  four  cities.  On  the  other  hand, 
this  may  reflect  the  fact  that  households  in  the  private  rented  sector  are  more 
heterogeneous  at  the  urban  level  in  terms  of  the  income  distribution  and  other 
199 household  characteristics.  Among  the  four  cities,  Edinburgh  City  have  the  highest 
Gini  coefficient  for  all  household  average  and  also  for  owner-occupiers.  This  reveals 
that  income  inequality  in  the  City  of  Edinburgh  is  more  significant  than  the  other  three 
cities.  In  the  last  two  decades,  Edinburgh  has  experienced  a  steady  growth  of 
population  and  socio-economic  activities  making  it  one  of  the  most  prosperous  cities 
in  Britain  (Bailey  et  al.  1999).  Together,  these  draw  a  picture  that  Edinburgh  City 
could  have  more  diverse  development  in  terms  of  tenure  and  income  distributions  than 
the  other  three  cities. 
Table  7.10  Gini  Coefficients  for  Equivalent  Household  Income  by  Tenures  in  Four 
Cities  of  Scotland,  1996 
Cities  and  Tenures  Equiv.  Household  Income 
(Gini  Coefficients) 
Aberdeen 
All  Households  0.34 
Outright  Owners  0.36 
Mortgaged  Owners  0.28 
Social  Tenants  0.23 
Private  Tenants  0.43 
Dundee 
All  Households  0.33 
Outright  Owners  0.36 
Mortgaged  Owners  0.31 
Social  Tenants  0.25 
Private  Tenants  0.40 
Edinburgh 
All  Households  0.37 
Outright  Owners  0.37 
Mortgaged  Owners  0.33 
Social  Tenants  0.23 
Private  Tenants  0.40 
Glasgow 
All  Households  0.33 
Outright  Owners  0.37 
Mortgaged  Owners  0.32 
Social  Tenants  0.25 
Private  Tenants  0.37 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
7.2.2  Tenure  Polarisation 
The  above  analysis  of  income  inequality  has  addressed  the  income  distribution 
between  tenures.  Another  angle  in  the  interpretation  of  tenure  and  income 
200 relationship  is  to  look  at  the  tenure  distribution  between  and  within  income  groups, 
emphasising  the  issue  of  tenure  polarisation. 
The  concept  of  tenure  polarisation  is  derived  from  social  polarisation.  Hamnett's 
(1996)  definition  of  social  polarisation"  can  be  used  to  interpret  tenure  polarisation. 
Tenure  polarisation  can  simply  be  referred  to  as  a  change  in  tenure  distribution  where 
there  is  growth  of  the  bottom  and  top  ends  of  income  groups  concentrating  in  certain 
tenures,  compared  to  middle  income  groups.  Based  on  the  above  interpretation,  a 
comparison  of  multiple  periods  of  tenure  distribution  in  different  income  groups 
would  be  the  best  way  to  analyse  tenure  polarisation  (see  for  example,  Bentham  1986, 
Hills  1998).  Due  to  data  limitations,  this  thesis  can  only  use  single  year  (1996) 
household  survey  data.  Thus,  the  analysis  of  tenure  polarisation  in  this  part  focuses  on 
tenure  distribution  between  and  within  income  quintile  groups. 
Table  7.11  Tenure  Distributions  between  Equivalent  Income  Quintile  Groups  in 
Scotland,  1996  (Percentage  of  households) 
Income 
quintile 
group 
Outright 
Owners 
% 
Mortgaged 
Owners 
(0/0) 
LA 
Tenants 
(0/0) 
HA 
Tenants 
Private 
Tenants 
Bottom  26  8  27  23  28 
2nd  19  10  31  27  20 
3'd  17  16  25  26  18 
4`h  17  28  13  18  20 
Top  21  38  4  7  14 
Total  Obs.  3,288  6,312  5,911  1,222  1,297 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
Table  7.11  shows  the  tenure  distributions  between  equivalent  income  quintile  groups 
in  Scotland,  1996.  The  equivalent  income  ranges  in  each  quintile  are  reported  in 
Appendix  A.  7.3.  In  the  owner-occupied  sector,  outright  owners  are  relatively 
concentrated  in  the  bottom  quintile  groups  and  in  the  top  quintile  group.  Mortgaged 
owners  are  significantly  concentrated  in  the  top  two  quintile  groups,  accounting  for  66 
19  According  to  Hamnett's  interpretation,  social  polarisation  can  be  referred  as  `a  change  in  certain 
social  distributions  such  that  there  is  a  shift  away  from  a  statistically  normal  or  egg-shaped  distribution 
towards  a  distribution  where  the  bottom  and  top  ends  of  the  distribution  are  growing,  relatively  and 
possibly  absolutely,  at  the  expense  of  the  middle'  (1996,  p.  1407). 
201 per  cent  of  total  mortgaged  owners.  In  contrast,  only  8  per  cent  of  mortgaged  owners 
are  located  in  the  bottom  quintile  group. 
Social  tenants  have  apparently  different  patterns  of  income  polarisation  from 
mortgaged  owners.  Nearly  60  per  cent  of  local  authority  tenants  and  a  half  of  housing 
association  tenants  are  located  in  the  bottom  two  quintile  groups,  and  there  also  is  a 
quarter  of  social  tenants  distributed  in  the  third  quintile  group.  In  contrast,  only  4  per 
of  local  authority  tenants  and  7  per  cent  of  housing  association  tenants  are  located  in 
the  top  quintile  group  respectively.  Compared  to  social  tenants,  private  tenants  did 
not  show  a  significant  income  polarisation. 
Furthermore,  if  the  tenure  distributions  within  income  quintile  groups  are  examined, 
the  pattern  of  tenure  polarisation  would  be  more  significant.  Figure  7.1  shows  a  clear 
picture  of  tenure  polarisation,  specifically  for  mortgaged  owners  and  social  tenants, 
within  income  quintile  groups.  The  annex  table  to  Figure  7.1  is  listed  in  Appendix 
A.  7.4.  Social  tenants,  especially  local  authority  tenants,  are  significantly  concentrated 
in  the  bottom  two  quintile  groups  and  the  percentage  rapidly  reduces  in  the  upper 
income  quintile  groups.  In  contrast  to  social  tenants,  mortgaged  owners  are 
apparently  concentrated  in  the  top  two  quintile  groups  and  the  percentage  rapidly 
declines  in  the  lower  income  quintile  groups. 
Figure  7.1  Tenure  Polarisation  in  Scotland,  1996 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
202 At  the  city  level,  the  patterns  of  income  and  tenure  polarisation  are  slightly  different 
from  the  Scottish  average,  partly  because  of  the  sample  selection  and  partly  reflecting 
the  local  differences,  as  stated  earlier.  Table  7.12  shows  the  tenure  distributions 
between  income  quintiles  in  four  cities.  For  all  four  cities,  it  shows  a  clear  pattern  that 
mortgaged  owners  are  significantly  concentrated  in  the  top  two  income  quintile 
groups,  while  social  tenants  are  concentrated  in  the  bottom  two  quintile  groups.  In 
addition,  there  is  a  substantial  proportion  of  local  authority  tenants  distributed  in  the 
third  quintile  group,  particularly  in  Dundee  City  and  Edinburgh  City. 
Table  7.12  Tenure  Distributions  between  Equivalent  Income  Quintile  Groups  in 
Four  Cities  of  Scotland,  1996  (Percentage  of  households) 
Income  Outright  Mortgaged  LA  HA  Private 
quintile  group  Owners  Owners  Tenants  Tenants  Tenants 
Aberdeen 
Bottom  21  6  30  21  38 
2nd  17  5  35  38  19 
3'd  28  18  22  17  9 
4th  11  33  13  17  13 
To  23  39  1  8  21 
TotalObs.  87  210  211  24  47 
Dundee 
Bottom  16  14  24  21  35 
2"  16  13  24  37  14 
3'd  14  12  30  21  14 
4th  23  28  13  13  24 
Top  32  32  9  8  14 
Total  Obs.  57  157  165  52  37 
Edinburgh 
Bottom  24  8  20  26  43 
2nd  22  10  35  34  17 
3`d  20  16  31  24  15 
4th  17  30  12  12  15 
Top  18  37  2  4  10 
Total  Obs.  301  477  209  134  170 
Glasgow 
Bottom  21  11  26  17  28 
2nd  17  7  28  25  15 
3rd  22  11  23  23  21 
4th  17  24  17  22  21 
Top_  1  24  47  6  13  15 
Total  Obs.  215  485  739  386  130 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
203 Notes:  LA:  Local  Authority;  HA:  Housing  Association 
In  both  Aberdeen  City  and  Glasgow  City,  outright  owners  do  not  have  significant 
income  polarisation  between  tenures.  In  Dundee  City  and  Edinburgh  City,  the  pattern 
is  the  opposite.  Outright  owners  in  Dundee  City  are  relatively  concentrated  in  the  top 
two  quintile  groups.  In  contrast,  outright  owners  in  Edinburgh  City  are  concentrated 
in  the  lower  quintile  groups.  The  interpretation  of  this  result  is  complicated,  and  it  is 
related  to  the  demographic  structure  and  socio-economic  development  between  these 
two  cities.  Simply  stated,  the  result  may  reflect  the  fact  that  outright  owners  in 
Edinburgh  City  have  lower  incomes  than  the  other  tenures  in  the  city.  In  contrast, 
outright  owners  in  Dundee  City  have  higher  incomes  than  the  other  tenures.  Further, 
in  all  four  cities,  there  are  substantial  private  tenants  in  the  bottom  income  quintile.  In 
particular,  in  Edinburgh  City,  43  per  cent  of  private  tenants  are  in  the  bottom  quintile. 
Moreover,  Figure  7.2  shows  a  clear  picture  of  tenure  polarisation  between  the  four 
cities.  The  annex  table  to  Figure  7.2  is  listed  in  Appendix  A.  7.4.  In  all  four  cities, 
mortgaged  owners  are  significantly  concentrated  in  the  top  two  quintile  groups.  For 
social  tenants,  the  pattern  of  polarisation  varies  by  cities.  In  Aberdeen  and  Dundee, 
social  tenants  are  significantly  concentrated  in  the  bottom  three  quintile  groups.  But 
in  Edinburgh,  social  tenants  are  relatively  concentrated  in  the  second  and  the  third 
quintile  groups,  while  many  outright  owners  are  distributed  in  the  bottom  quintile 
group.  In  Glasgow,  social  tenants  are  significantly  distributed  in  all  quintile  groups 
except  the  top  quintile  group.  As  stated  earlier,  the  city's  demographic  structure, 
socio-economic  development  and  housing  policy  have  substantial  influences  on 
households'  tenure  and  income  distribution.  For  example,  Edinburgh  City  experienced 
a  steady  growth  of  population  and  economic  activities  in  the  last  twenty  years,  and  it 
is  the  result  of  having  more  heterogeneous  tenure  and  income  distribution  as  well  as 
other  household  characteristics  in  the  city.  Glasgow  City  has  a  historically  strong 
social  housing  sector.  Also,  this  city  has  experienced  a  decline  of  population  and  a 
change  in  economic  development  from  manufacturing  industries  to  service-oriented 
activities  in  the  last  three  decades  (Bailey  et  al.  1999).  The  characteristics  and 
changes  in  demographic  and  economic  developments  have  had  significant  impacts  on 
the  household's  tenure  and  income  distribution  in  Glasgow  City. 
204 In  summary,  this  section  analyses  the  income  inequality  between  tenures  and  the 
tenure  polarisation  in  Scotland  and  the  four  major  cities.  The  results  show  that 
income  inequality  in  mortgaged  owners  is  relatively  smaller  than  in  outright  owners. 
Income  inequality  in  social  tenants  is  smaller  than  in  private  tenants.  However,  if 
tenure  distributions  between  and  within  income  quintile  groups  are  examined,  a 
significant  tenure  polarisation  is  identified  in  that  mortgaged  owners  are  concentrated 
in  the  upper  income  quintile  groups,  while  social  tenants  are  concentrated  in  the  lower 
income  groups.  Together,  these  indicate  that  higher  income  households  are  most 
likely  to  be  owner-occupiers  with  mortgages,  while  low-income  households  are 
concentrated  in  the  social  rented  sector.  In  addition,  it  implies  a  big  income  gap 
between  mortgaged  owners  and  social  tenants. 
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0 N 7.3  The  Balance  of  Housing  Subsidies  between  Tenures 
This  section  analyses  the  distribution  of  housing  subsidies  between  tenures.  From  a 
policy  perspective,  the  distribution  of  housing  subsidies  between  tenures  is  not  a  new 
issue.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  Three,  a  large  number  of  studies  have  addressed  this 
issue  in  the  last  two  decades.  However,  housing  policy  and  subsidy  schemes  have 
been  changed  since  the  1990s.  These  changes  should  have  substantial  influences  on 
the  distribution  of  housing  subsidies  between  tenures,  compared  to  the  1980s. 
The  definition  of  housing  subsidy,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  Five  and  Chapter  Six,  is 
based  on  a  tenure-neutral  framework,  that  is  to  say,  where  the  household  has  to  shape 
the  choice,  the  assistance  including  tax  advantages  and  subsidies  in  economic  or  in 
cash  terms,  has  to  be  neutral  across  tenures  (Hancock  and  Munro  1992).  Based  on  this 
concept,  this  section  considers  that  housing  subsidy  should  ensure  relative  equality  at 
any  given  income  level  across  tenures.  As  a  result,  the  focus  of  this  section  is  not  only 
to  compare  housing  subsidies  between  tenures  but  also  to  compare  subsidies  between 
income  levels  in  Scotland  and  the  four  major  cities. 
In  analysing  the  distribution  of  housing  subsidies  between  tenures,  this  section  first 
compares  the  housing  subsidies  between  owner-occupiers  and  renters.  It  then 
compares  the  subsidies  between  outright  owners  and  mortgaged  owners.  The  third 
part  of  this  section  compares  the  subsidies  among  local  authority  tenants,  housing 
association  tenants  and  private  tenants.  The  final  part  simulates  the  impact  of  MIRAS 
withdrawal  on  the  distribution  of  housing  subsidies  between  tenures.  Since  the 
termination  of  MIRAS  in  April  2000,  academic  researchers  and  policy  makers  have 
been  interested  in  its  withdrawal  effect.  Therefore,  the  simulation  work  (using  the 
1996  SHCS  data)  in  this  section  would  give  some  insights  to  current  housing  policy. 
7.3.1  Housing  Subsidies  between  Owner-Occupiers  and  Renters 
As  discussed  in  Chapter  Five,  housing  subsidies  to  owner-occupiers  primarily  come 
from  tax  advantages.  The  untaxed  capital  gains  and  imputed  rental  incomes  can  be 
seen  as  the  housing  subsidies  in  economic  terms  to  owner-occupiers.  The  mortgage 
interest  relief  at  source  (MIRAS)  used  to  be  a  significant  tax  advantage  to  mortgaged 
owners.  In  addition,  the  income  support  to  mortgage  interest  (ISMI)  has  increasingly 
207 become  an  important  subsidy  to  low-income  and  unemployed  mortgaged  owners,  as 
discussed  in  Chapter  Three.  Unfortunately,  the  SHCS  does  not  contain  the  ISMI 
information.  "  Therefore,  this  chapter  will  not  include  ISMI  in  the  analysis. 
In  economic  terms,  housing  subsidies  to  tenants  primarily  come  from  the  rent  gap 
between  market  rents  and  actual  rents  paid  by  tenants.  For  social  tenants,  the  rent  gap 
subsidies  exist  from  the  differences  between  estimated  market  rents  and  social  rents. 
For  private  tenants  with  regulated  tenancy,  the  rent  gap  subsidies  come  from  the 
differences  between  estimated  market  rents  and  fair  rents.  In  addition  to  rent  gap 
subsidies,  Housing  Benefit  also  plays  an  important  role  in  the  housing  subsidy  to 
tenants.  These  housing  subsidies  are  included  in  our  analysis. 
Table  7.13  shows  the  housing  subsidies  to  owner-occupiers  by  income  quintiles  in 
Scotland  in  1996.  The  tax  advantages  are  apparently  progressive.  In  the  bottom 
quintile,  economic  subsidies  account  for  21  per  cent  of  the  average  income,  while  the 
subsidies  account  for  3  per  cent  in  the  top  quintile.  MIRAS  was  also  progressive, 
however  it  only  accounted  for  a  small  proportion  of  household  income,  and  the 
average  value  was  not  much  different  between  income  quintiles.  The  results,  however, 
suggest  that  the  effect  of  MI  AS  was  significantly  limited. 
Table  7.13  Housing  Subsidies  to  Owner-Occupiers  in  Scotland,  1996  (Weekly  £) 
Equivalent  Mean  Economic  %  of  E.  Sub.  Average  %  of  MIRAS  %  of  Total 
income  Income  Subsidies  to  Mean  MIR.  AS  `  to  Mean  Sub.  to 
quintile  Income  Income  Mean  Income 
Bottom  88.88  18.55  20.9%  3.44  3.9%  24.7% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (1368)  (962)  (350) 
2nd  145.43  17.05  11.7%  3.64  2.5%  14.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (1226)  (887)  (437) 
3rd  195.11  15.75  8.1%  3.91  2.0%  10.1% 
o.  of  obs.  (1589)  (1118)  (768) 
4th  270.73  14.78  5.5%  4.35  1.6%  7.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (2359)  (1667)  (1388) 
Top  482.70  15.62  3.2%  4.88  1.0%  4.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (3058)  (2214)  (1952) 
Total  Avg  283.82  16.03  5.6%  4.36  1.5%  7.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (9600)  (6848)  (4895) 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
Note  a:  for  mortgaged  owners  only 
20  According  to  Wilcox  (2000),  there  were  about  3%  of  mortgaged  owners  in  Scotland  who  received 
ISMI,  and  the  average  weekly  ISMI  was  about  £26.73  in  1996. 
208 Economic  subsidies  to  tenants  are  also  progressive  (see  Table  7.14).  The  rent  gap 
subsidies  account  for  about  15  per  cent  of  average  income  in  the  bottom  quintile, 
while  the  subsidies  are  reduced  to  less  than  2  per  cent  of  average  income  in  the  top 
income  quintile.  Housing  Benefit  is  the  most  significant  subsidy  to  tenants,  especially 
in  lower  income  levels.  In  Table  7.14,  Housing  Benefit  accounts  for  about  30.8  per 
cent  and  19.2  per  cent  of  household  income  in  the  bottom  and  the  second  quintiles 
respectively,  while  in  the  top  income  quintile,  Housing  Benefit  only  accounts  for  8.3 
per  cent  of  average  housing  income.  Although  the  amount  of  Housing  Benefit  rises 
with  income  quintiles,  the  number  of  benefit  recipients  significantly  reduces  in  the 
upper  income  quintiles. 
Table  7.14  Housing  Subsidies  to  Tenants  in  Scotland,  1996  (Weekly  £) 
Equivalent  Mean  Economic  %  of  E.  Sub  Average  %  of  HB  %  of  Total 
Income  Income  Subsidies  to  Mean  HB  to  Mean  Sub.  to 
Quintile  Income  Income  Mean  Income 
Bottom  90.57  13.37  14.8%  27.90  30.8%  45.6% 
o.  of  obs.  (2225)  (1821)  (1163) 
2nd  144.61  12.94  8.9%  27.75  19.2%  28.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (2398)  (1987)  (1454) 
3rd  190.61  11.50  6.0%  29.94  15.7%  21.7% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (2013)  (1688)  (1134) 
4th  262.73  9.79  3.7%  34.00  12.9%  16.7% 
o.  of  obs.  1266  (1010)  (417) 
Top  434.03  7.68  1.8%  36.00  8.3%  10.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (528)  (419)  (115) 
Total  Avg  177.20  12.11  6.8%  29.20  16.5%  23.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (8430)  (6925)  (4283) 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
In  a  comparison  of  subsidies  between  owner-occupiers  and  tenants,  Figure  7.3  shows 
that  the  economic  subsidies  to  tenants  are  lower  than  owner-occupiers  in  lower 
quintile  groups  but  are  very  close  in  upper  quintile  groups.  After  adding  MI  AS  to 
owner-occupiers  (mortgaged  owners  only)  and  Housing  Benefit  to  tenants,  the 
subsidies  gap  is  widened  between  the  two  tenures,  especially  in  lower  income  quintile 
groups.  Apparently,  Housing  Benefit  has  a  significant  effect  on  subsidising  low- 
income  tenants  and,  in  a  certain  aspect,  it  plays  an  important  role  in  reducing  income 
inequality  (Gibbs  and  Kemp  1993),  while  the  effect  of  MIRAS  was  no  longer 
significant  to  owners  (mortgaged  owners).  Counting  on  the  total  subsidies,  tenants  in 
the  bottom  quintile  group  receive  the  highest  proportion  of  subsidies  accounting  for  46 
209 per  cent  of  their  average  income,  while  owner-occupiers  in  the  bottom  quintile  receive 
subsidies  which  account  for  a  quarter  of  their  average  income. 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
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Bottom  2nd  3rd  4th  Top 
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--Owner  --E-Owner+MIRAS  -A  -Renter  -K-Renter+HB 
Figure  7.3  Housing  Subsidies  to  Owners  and  Tenants  in  Scotland,  1996  (Percentage 
to  mean  income) 
Note:  the  subsidy  base  is  the  economic  subsidy 
At  the  city  level,  the  patterns  of  subsidies  to  owners  and  tenants  are  similar  to  the 
Scottish  average  (see  Figure  7.4,  and  annex  tables  are  presented  in  Appendix  A.  7.5). 
It  is  clear  that  Housing  Benefit  plays  a  great  role  in  subsidising  low-income  tenants  at 
the  city  level.  In  the  bottom  income  quintile,  tenants  received  a  higher  proportion  of 
subsidies  than  owner-occupiers.  Among  the  four  cities,  economic  subsidies  to  tenants 
in  Edinburgh  City  are  significantly  lower  than  in  the  other  three  cities.  This  may  reveal 
the  fact  that  the  social  rent  level  and  the  fair  rent  level  in  Edinburgh  City  are  catching 
up  with  the  market  rent  level.  In  Aberdeen  City,  the  subsidies  to  tenants  show  a  big 
gap  between  income  quintile  groups.  Tenants  in  the  bottom  quintile  of  this  city 
receive  the  highest  subsidies  accounting  for  53  per  cent  of  their  average  household 
income,  while  there  is  no  subsidy  to  tenants  in  the  top  quintile  group.  The  result  could 
be  affected  by  sample  selection,  as  there  are  only  seven  valid  observations  of  renter 
households  in  the  top  quintile  group  in  Aberdeen  City  (see  annex  table  in  Appendix 
A.  7.5).  On  the  other  hand,  it  reveals  a  concentration  of  tenants  in  lower  income 
quintile  groups  in  Aberdeen  City. 
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N 7.3.2  Subsidies  between  Outright  Owners  and  Mortgaged  Owners 
In  the  previous  section,  we  have  seen  that  there  are  significantly  different  tenure  and 
income  distributions  between  outright  owners  and  mortgaged  owners  because  of  their 
different  household  characteristics.  For  instance,  many  outright  owners  are  elderly 
people  and  their  income  mainly  depends  upon  their  pensions.  In  fact,  subsidies  to 
outright  owners  and  to  mortgaged  owners  are  different,  which  is  primarily  because  of 
the  capital  value  and  user  costs  of  their  properties.  Table  7.15  shows  the  housing 
subsidies  to  outright  owners  and  mortgaged  owners  in  Scotland.  For  outright  owners, 
the  economic  subsidies  are  progressive.  The  economic  subsidies  are  significant  in  the 
bottom  income  quintile  group,  accounting  for  23  per  cent  of  their  average  household 
incomes.  The  percentage  of  economic  subsidies  reduces  to  4.8  per  cent  in  the  top 
quintile  group. 
Table  7.15  Housing  Subsidies  to  Outright  Owners  and  Mortgaged  Owners  in 
Ccntland_  1996  (Weekly  £) 
Equivalent  Mean  Econ.  Subsidies  %  of  E  Sub  Average  of  MIRAS  %  of  Total 
Income  Income  CGT  IRT  to  Mean  MIRAS  to  Mean  Sub.  to  M 
Quintile  Income  Income  Income 
Outright  Owners 
Bottom  90.86  5.88  15.04  23.0%  -  23.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (862)  (674)  (674) 
2nd  143.50  5.70  14.58  14.1%  -  -  14.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (617)  (511)  (511) 
3rd  193.85  5.94  15.21  10.9%  -  -  10.9% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (551)  (451)  (451) 
4th  266.33  6.17  15.80  8.2%  -  -  8.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (573)  (491)  (491) 
Top  519.63  7.02  17.97  4.8%  -  -  4.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (685)  (566)  (566) 
Total  Avg  237.90  6.15  15.74  9.2%  -  -  9.2% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (3288)  (2693)  (2693) 
Mortgaged  Owners 
Bottom  85.51  5.76  7.37  15.4%  3.44  4.0%  19.  % 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (506)  (288)  (288)  (350) 
2nd  147.38  5.62  7.07  8.6%  3.64  2.5%  1  1.1 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (609)  (376)  (376)  (437) 
3rd  195.78  5.63  6.52  6.2%  3.91  2.0%  8  '°.. 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (1038)  (667)  (667)  (768) 
4th  272.15  5.87  6.01  4.4%  4.35  1.6%  6.0°x, 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (1786)  (1176)  (1176)  (1388) 
Top  472.04  6.60  5.85  2.6%  4.88  1.0%  3.7% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (2373)  (1648)  (1648)  (1952) 
Total  Avg  307.74  6.07  6.22  4.0%  4.36  1.41/,  5.4% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (6312)  (4155)  (4155)  (4895) 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
Notes:  CGT:  untaxed  capital  gains;  IRT:  untaxed  imputed  rents. 
212 The  results  show  that  mortgaged  owners  receive  less  economic  subsidies  than  outright 
owners.  This  is  because  outright  owners  have  higher  imputed  rental  incomes  than 
mortgaged  owners.  For  mortgaged  owners,  part  of  their  imputed  rental  incomes  is 
deducted  by  mortgaged  debts.  Between  income  quintiles,  the  subsidy  effect  is 
significant  in  the  bottom  quintile  group,  accounting  for  15  per  cent  of  average 
household  income,  while  the  percentage  reduces  to  less  than  3  per  cent  in  the  top 
quintile  group.  In  addition  to  economic  subsidies,  mortgaged  owners  also  receive 
mortgage  interest  tax  relief  but  outright  owners  did  not.  As  shown  in  Table  7.15,  the 
average  MIRAS  is  £4.36  per  week,  accounting  for  1.4  per  cent  of  the  average 
household  income  for  mortgaged  owners.  Therefore,  as  shown  in  Figure  7.5,  after 
adding  MIRAS  to  mortgaged  owners,  the  total  subsidies  to  mortgaged  owners  are  less 
than  the  subsidies  to  outright  owners.  Apparently,  the  difference  is  in  the  imputed 
rental  income. 
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Figure  7.5  Housing  Subsidies  to  Outright  Owners  and  Mortgaged  Owners  in  Scotland, 
1996  (Percentage  to  mean  income) 
Note:  The  subsidy  base  in  the  economic  subsidy 
Moreover,  Figure  7.6  shows  a  comparison  of  subsidies  to  outright  owners  and  to 
mortgaged  owners  between  the  four  cities  (the  annex  tables  are  shown  in  Appendix 
A.  7.5).  In  both  Edinburgh  City  and  Glasgow  City,  housing  subsidies  to  outright 
owners  and  to  mortgaged  owners  are  similar  to  the  Scottish  level,  while  the  subsidy 
213 pattern  is  dramatically  different  between  Aberdeen  City  and  Dundee  City.  For 
outright  owners  in  Aberdeen  City,  the  subsidy  gap  between  income  quintiles  is  the 
smallest  among  the  four  cities.  This  suggests  that  the  housing  subsidies  are  not 
significantly  different  between  outright  owners  and  mortgaged  owners  and  between 
income  levels  in  Aberdeen  City.  In  contrast,  there  exists  the  biggest  subsidy  gap  for 
outright  owners  between  income  quintiles  in  Dundee  City.  In  this  city,  outright 
owners  in  the  bottom  quintile  receive  the  highest  subsidies  accounting  for  about  30  per 
cent  of  their  average  household  incomes,  while  in  the  top  quintile  group,  the  subsidies 
only  account  for  less  than  5  per  cent  of  their  average  household  incomes  (also  see 
Appendix  Table  A.  7.5.3).  The  results  imply  that  there  could  be  a  big  gap  for  outright 
owners  in  terms  of  their  property  values  and  user  costs  between  income  quintiles  in 
Dundee  City. 
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N 7.3.3  Subsidies  between  Social  Tenants  and  Private  Tenants 
In  the  social  rented  sector,  as  stated  earlier,  economic  subsidies  come  from  the  rent 
gap  between  estimated  market  rents  and  social  rents  charged  by  social  landlords.  In 
fact,  rent  gap  subsidies  between  local  authority  tenants  and  housing  association  tenants 
are  different  because  of  their  property  quality  and  social  rent  levels.  Table  7.16  shows 
that  the  economic  subsidies  to  both  local  authority  tenants  and  housing  association 
tenants  are  progressive  with  income  rises.  However,  economic  subsidies  to  local 
authority  tenants  are  slightly  higher  than  the  subsidies  to  housing  association  tenants  in 
terms  of  the  average  value  and  the  proportion  to  average  household  income.  These 
results  can  be  explained  from  several  aspects.  Firstly,  the  average  quality  and  property 
value  of  housing  association  dwellings  could  be  higher  than  council  houses  because 
there  have  been  many  new  dwellings  in  the  housing  association  sector  since  1989. 
Hence,  this  implies  that  average  estimate  market  rents  for  housing  association 
dwellings  could  be  higher  than  the  estimated  market  rents  for  council  houses. 
Secondly,  housing  associations  are  free  to  set  up  their  rents  after  1989  and  since  then 
the  rent  level  in  the  housing  association  sector  has  risen  rapidly,  compared  to  the  rent 
level  in  the  local  authority  rented  sector.  Based  on  the  conditions  above,  housing 
association  tenants  receive  less  rent  gap  subsidies  than  local  authority  tenants.  Thirdly, 
the  average  household  income  of  local  authority  tenants  is  lower  than  that  of  housing 
association  tenants  and,  as  a  result,  the  rent  gap  subsidy  has  more  influence  on  local 
authority  tenants  than  housing  association  tenants,  particularly  in  lower  income 
quintile  groups. 
Housing  Benefit  has  become  the  most  important  subsidy  to  social  tenants.  Table  7.16 
shows  that  more  than  half  of  tenants  in  both  the  local  authority  sector  and  the  housing 
association  sector  are  in  receipt  of  Housing  Benefit.  It  also  shows  that  tenants  in  lower 
income  groups  depend  heavily  upon  this  state  benefit.  For  both  local  authority  tenants 
and  housing  association  tenants  in  the  bottom  quintile  and  the  second  quintile  groups, 
the  average  amount  of  Housing  Benefit  accounts  for  about  30  per  cent  and  20  per  cent 
of  their  average  household  income  respectively.  In  addition,  the  average  Housing 
Benefit  received  by  housing  association  tenants  is  slightly  higher  than  that  received  by 
local  authority  tenants.  This  is  probably  because  the  average  rent  level  in  the  housing 
association  sector  is  higher  than  that  in  the  local  authority  rented  sector  so  that  housing 
association  tenants  would  receive  more  benefits  to  cover  their  rents. 
216 Table  7.16  Housing  Subsidies  to  Local  Authority  Tenants  and  Housing 
Association  Tenants  in  Scotland,  1996  (Weekly  £) 
Equivalent  Mean  Economic  %  of  E.  Average  %  of  HB  %  of  Total 
income  Income  Subsidies  Sub.  to  HB  to  Mean  Sub.  to 
Quintile  Mean  Income  Mean 
income  income 
LA  Tenants 
Bottom  92.22  15.74  17.1%  26.79  29.0%  46.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (1589)  (1325)  (935) 
2nd  144.55  14.40  10.0%  26.34  18.2%  28.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (1812)  (1530)  (1140) 
3rd  189.93  13.66  7.2%  27.90  14.7%  21.9% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (1464)  (1236)  (856) 
4th  262.63  13.55  5.2%  28.40  10.8%  16.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (787)  (645)  (272) 
Top  396.06  12.59  3.2%  30.29  7.6%  10.8% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (259)  (217)  (72) 
Total  Avg  168.46  14.38  8.5%  27.13  16.1%  24.6% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (5911)  (4962)  (3275) 
HA  Tenants 
Bottom  94.63  14.43  15.2%  29.63  31.3%  46.6% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (278)  (226)  (164) 
2nd  144.09  13.10  9.1%  28.18  19.6%  28.6% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (327)  (275)  (223) 
3rd  192.00  9.69  5.0%  30.68  16.0%  21.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (316)  (274)  (204) 
4th  260.98  8.17  3.1%  36.04  13.8%  16.9% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (218)  (178)  (99) 
Top  477.00  10.09  2.1%  43.21  9.1%  11.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (83)  (65)  (35) 
Total  Avg  188.69  11.42  6.1%  31.01  16.4%  22.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (1222)  (1018)  (725) 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
As  defined  in  Chapter  Five,  private  tenants  receive  rent  gap  subsidies  only  if  they  are 
in  regulated  tenancy  and  pay  fair  rents.  Private  tenants  in  the  non-regulated  tenancy 
are  supposed  to  pay  market  rents  so  that  they  do  not  receive  any  rent  gap  subsidies. 
Table  7.17  presents  the  housing  subsidies  to  private  regulated  tenants  and  to  non- 
regulated  tenants.  Derived  from  Chapter  Five,  there  are  57  private  tenants  in  the 
sample  who  were  possibly  in  the  regulated  tenancy.  Most  of  these  regulated  tenants 
are  concentrated  in  lower  income  quintile  groups  and  only  two  of  them  are  distributed 
in  the  top  income  quintile  group.  Therefore,  the  effect  of  fair  rent  subsidies  is  much 
more  significant  in  lower  income  groups.  The  average  economic  subsidies  to  private 
regulated  tenants  account  for  about  17  per  cent  of  household  income  in  the  bottom 
217 quintile  group  and  about  14  per  cent  in  the  second  quintile  group,  while  the  percentage 
reduces  to  less  than  1  per  cent  in  the  top  quintile  group. 
Table  7.17  Housing  Subsidies  to  Private  Tenants  in  Scotland,  1996  (Weekly  £) 
Equivalent  Mean  Economic  %  of  E.  Average  %  of  %  of  Total 
income  Income  Subsidies  Sub.  to  HB  HB  to  Sub.  To 
Quintile  Mean  Mean  Mean 
Income  Income  Income 
Private  Reg.  Ten. 
Bottom  83.56  14.13  16.9%  20.31  24.3%  41.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (16)  (16)  (7) 
2nd  144.66  20.33  14.1%  25.41  17.6%  31.6% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (18)  (18)  (9) 
3rd  191.93  15.30  8.0%  13.06  6.8%  14.8% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (11)  (11)  (4) 
4th  253.16  14.99  5.9%  44.31  17.5%  23.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (10)  (10)  (2) 
Top  427.90  0.67  0.2%  0.00  0.0%  0.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (2)  (2)  (0) 
Total  Avg  165.61  16.22  9.8%  23.32  14.1%  23.9% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (57)  (57)  (22) 
Pry.  Non-Reg. 
Ten. 
Bottom  76.04  -  -  42.05  55.3%  55.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (254)  (56) 
2nd  146.40  -  -  47.39  32.4%  32.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (164)  (78) 
3rd  192.75  -  -  53.32  27.7%  27.7% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (167)  (64) 
4th  264.01  -  -  65.22  24.7%  24.7% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (168)  (40) 
Top  475.86  -  -  55.86  11.7%  11.7% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (135)  (8) 
Total  Avg  207.33  -  -  50.89  24.5%  24.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (888)  (246) 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
Table  7.17  shows  that  about  one  third  of  private  tenants  are  in  receipt  of  Housing 
Benefit.  Apparently,  private  tenants  in  lower  income  quintiles  depend  heavily  upon 
this  state  benefit.  For  private  non-regulated  tenants,  the  average  amount  of  Housing 
Benefit  accounts  for  55  per  cent  of  their  average  household  income  in  the  bottom 
quintile,  and  accounted  for  32  per  cent  of  their  average  household  income  in  the 
second  quintile.  In  addition,  the  average  Housing  Benefit  received  by  regulated 
tenants  is  less  than  half  of  the  amount  received  by  non-regulated  tenants.  This  is 
218 probably  because  the  fair  rent  level  is  much  lower  than  the  market  level,  thus  regulated 
tenants  receive  fewer  benefits  to  cover  their  rents  than  non-regulated  tenants  do. 
Figure  7.7  shows  a  comparison  of  housing  subsidies  to  social  tenants  (including  local 
authority  tenants  and  housing  association  tenants)  and  private  tenants.  With  regard  to 
economic  subsidies,  private  regulated  tenants  in  lower  income  quintiles  apparently 
receive  slightly  higher  rent  gap  subsidies  than  local  authority  tenants  and  housing 
association  tenants.  In  the  social  rented  sector,  local  authority  tenants  receive  slightly 
higher  rent  gap  subsidies  than  housing  association  tenants  receive  in  all  income 
quintiles  except  the  top  quintile.  Housing  Benefit  plays  a  significant  role  in 
subsidising  tenants  in  lower  income  quintile  groups.  After  adding  Housing  Benefit, 
the  total  subsidy  to  local  authority  tenants  and  housing  association  tenants  is  about  the 
same  between  income  quintiles.  On  the  other  hand,  private  tenants  in  the  third  and  the 
fourth  quintile  groups  receive  a  slightly  higher  proportion  of  housing  subsidies 
(compared  to  their  average  household  income)  than  social  tenants. 
60.0% 
50.0%  ---- 
40.0% 
30.0% 
20.0% 
10.0% 
0.0% 
Bottom  2nd  3rd  4th  Top 
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Figure  7.7  Housing  Subsidies  to  LA  Tenants,  HA  Tenants  and  Private  Tenants  in 
Scotland,  1996  (Percentage  to  mean  income) 
219 Notes:  the  subsidy  base  in  the  economic  subsidy;  LA:  local  authority;  HA  housing 
association;  PR:  private  renting;  PR-REG:  private  renting  in  regulated  tenancy; 
HB:  Housing  Benefit 
At  the  city  level,  the  results  of  housing  subsidies  to  private  tenants  would  not  be  as 
reliable  as  at  the  whole  Scotland  level  because  of  a  lack  of  sufficient  observations. 
Therefore,  in  Figure  7.8,  subsidies  to  private  tenants  are  presented  by  broken  lines  (the 
annex  tables  are  listed  in  Appendix  A.  7.5).  In  spite  of  unreliable  results,  it  can  be 
identified  that  private  regulated  tenants  are  concentrated  in  Edinburgh  City  and 
Glasgow  City.  Of  the  estimated  total  57  private  regulated  tenants  in  the  sample  of 
Scotland,  34  of  them  are  located  in  Edinburgh  City  and  Glasgow  City. 
The  patterns  of  housing  subsidies  to  social  tenants  are  slightly  different  between  the 
four  cities.  In  Edinburgh  City,  the  average  economic  subsidies  to  social  tenants  are  the 
lowest  among  the  four  cities.  It  also  shows  that  social  tenants  in  Edinburgh  City  have 
the  biggest  gap  between  total  subsidies  (economic  subsidies  plus  Housing  Benefit)  and 
economic  subsidies,  particularly  in  lower  income  quintiles.  The  results  may  reveal  the 
fact  that  the  social  rent  level  in  Edinburgh  City  is  close  to  the  market  rent  level.  In 
contrast,  social  tenants  in  Aberdeen  City  have  the  smallest  difference  between  total 
subsidies  and  economic  subsidies.  Also,  social  tenants  receive  the  highest  amount  of 
economic  subsidies  among  the  four  cities. 
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N 7.3.4  The  Impacts  of  MIRAS  Abolition 
The  mortgage  interest  relief  at  source  (MIRAS)  was  terminated  in  April  2000.  Before 
its  abolition,  MIRAS  was  an  important  tax  advantage  for  mortgaged  owners  during  the 
1980s.  In  the  1990s,  the  changes  in  policy  made  it  clear  that  the  long-term  policy  aim 
was  to  abolish  the  tax  relief.  Therefore,  the  ceiling  of  £30,000  was  maintained  and  the 
basic  rate  of  tax  relief  was  steadily  cut  back  till  termination.  The  abolition  of  MIRAS 
would  have  impacts  directly  on  mortgaged  owners  and  on  house  price  and  other 
housing  market  activities.  From  a  housing  subsidy  viewpoint,  it  would  be  interesting 
to  see  the  impact  of  MIRAS  abolition  on  mortgaged  owners,  especially  on  their 
incomes  and  user  costs.  This  part  of  the  section  simulates  the  impact  of  MIRAS 
abolition  on  mortgaged  owners'  income  and  user  costs  by  using  the  1996  Scottish 
House  Condition  Survey,  although  MIRAS  was  still  in  existence  during  that  period. 
As  discussed  in  the  second  part  of  this  section,  MI  AS  only  accounted  for  a  small 
proportion  of  the  average  household  incomes  for  mortgaged  owners  and  the 
distributional  effect  was  not  significant  between  income  quintiles.  Therefore,  as 
shown  in  Table  7.15,  if  MIRAS  were  abolished  in  Scotland  in  1996,  mortgaged 
owners  would  lose  the  tax  advantages  accounting  for  average  1.4  per  cent  of  their 
household  incomes.  In  the  bottom  quintile  group,  the  effect  of  MIRAS  abolition 
would  be  slightly  significant.  As  shown  in  Table  7.15,  the  amount  of  MIRAS  only 
accounts  for  4  per  cent  of  the  average  household  incomes  for  mortgaged  owners  in  the 
bottom  income  quintile,  while  it  falls  to  1  per  cent  in  the  top  income  quintile. 
Apparently,  the  changes  in  MIRAS  policy  such  as  the  ceiling  setting  and  the  cut  back 
of  basic  rate  in  the  1990s  had  limited  the  MIRAS  effect  on  mortgaged  owners. 
Furthermore,  the  abolition  of  MIRAS  would  have  impacts  on  the  user  costs  of 
mortgaged  owners.  Table  7.18  shows  that  the  average  MIRAS  for  mortgaged  owners 
amounts  to  £4.36  per  week,  and  only  accounts  for  6.4  per  cent  of  the  average  user 
costs  for  mortgaged  owners.  Compared  to  economic  subsidies,  accounting  for  about 
18  per  cent  of  the  average  user  costs,  the  MIRAS  was  not  a  significant  subsidy  to 
mortgaged  owners.  In  addition,  when  examining  the  distribution  of  MIRAS  between 
income  quintiles,  MIRAS  accounts  for  5.3  per  cent  to  5.8  per  cent  of  the  average  user 
costs  from  the  bottom  quintile  to  the  top  quintile.  The  distributional  effect  of  MIRAS 
is  also  not  significant  between  income  quintiles.  As  a  result,  if  MIRAS  were  abolished 
222 in  1996,  the  impact  would  be  very  limited  on  the  user  costs  for  mortgaged  owners  in 
any  given  income  quintile. 
Compared  to  outright  owners,  the  abolition  of  MIRAS  would  have  impacts  on 
increasing  the  gap  of  actual  net  user  costs  between  mortgaged  owners  and  outright 
owners.  Table  7.18  shows  that  the  average  user  costs  for  mortgaged  owners  are  not 
much  different  to  outright  owners  but  outright  owners  receive  more  economic 
subsidies  than  mortgaged  owners  do.  Therefore,  net  user  costs  for  mortgaged  owners 
are  higher  than  for  outright  owners  in  each  income  quintile.  Mortgaged  owners, 
however,  receive  MIRAS  so  it  narrows  the  gap  of  user  costs  between  these  two 
tenures.  With  MIRAS  subsidy,  the  average  actual  user  costs  for  mortgaged  owners 
(see  Column  g  in  Table  7.18)  are  about  10  per  cent  higher  than  the  user  costs  for 
outright  owners.  Without  MIRAS  subsidy,  the  average  net  user  costs  for  mortgaged 
owners  are  about  20  per  cent  higher  than  the  user  costs  for  outright  owners. 
At  the  city  level,  as  shown  in  Figure  7.6,  MI  AS  only  accounts  for  a  small  proportion 
of  household  income  and  there  is  no  significant  difference  between  the  four  cities. 
This  suggests  that  the  abolition  of  MIRAS  would  not  have  much  effect  on  mortgaged 
owners  between  income  levels  in  the  four  cities?  '  With  respect  to  the  impact  on  user 
costs,  mortgaged  owners  in  Glasgow  City  would  face  higher  impacts  of  MIRAS 
abolition  on  their  user  costs  among  the  four  cities  and  this  is  probably  because 
mortgaged  owners  in  Glasgow  City  have  the  lowest  average  user  costs  (see  Table 
7.19).  On  the  other  hand,  the  lowest  user  costs  for  mortgaged  owners  in  Glasgow  City 
indicate  that  mortgaged  owners  in  the  city  could  have  lower  average  property  values 
compared  to  the  other  three  cities.  Finally,  the  abolition  of  MIRAS  increases  the  gap 
of  actual  net  user  costs  between  mortgaged  owners  and  outright  owners.  However,  the 
gap  is  not  significant  between  the  four  cities,  although  the  average  level  of  user  costs 
for  owner-occupiers  is  significantly  different  between  the  four  cities  (the  user  costs 
and  subsidies  for  outright  owners  are  reported  in  Appendix  A.  7.5). 
In  summary,  this  section  analyses  the  distribution  of  housing  subsidies  between 
tenures  and  income  levels.  At  both  the  whole  of  Scotland  level  and  the  city  level,  the 
223 results  indicate  that  housing  subsidies  are  progressive  with  income  rises.  Households 
in  lower  income  groups  receive  a  greater  proportion  of  housing  subsidies  to  their 
income  than  households  in  upper  income  groups.  Compared  to  1980s,  the  focus  of 
housing  subsidy  is  switched  from  owner-occupiers  to  tenants,  particularly  to  social 
tenants.  Housing  Benefit  is  the  most  significant  subsidy  to  tenants  in  both  the  social 
rented  and  the  private  rented  sectors.  The  average  amount  of  Housing  Benefit 
received  by  tenants  is  much  higher  than  the  rent  gap  subsidy  to  tenants.  In  the  owner- 
occupied  sector,  the  difference  of  economic  subsidies  between  outright  owners  and 
mortgaged  owners  primarily  comes  from  the  imputed  rental  income  where  part  of 
mortgaged  owners'  imputed  rental  income  is  deducted  by  their  mortgage  debts. 
MIRAS  only  accounts  for  a  very  small  proportion  of  household  income  for  mortgaged 
owners,  thus  the  abolition  of  this  tax  relief  would  not  have  significant  impacts  on  the 
household  income  and  the  user  costs  of  mortgaged  owners  at  any  income  level. 
21  It  is  noted  that,  in  the  four  cities,  the  figures  in  each  income  quintiles  may  not  be  reliable  because  of  a 
lack  of  sufficient  observations  between  income  quintiles.  Thus,  I  refer  to  the  figures  in  total  average  of 
the  city  rather  than  to  the  figures  in  each  income  quintile. 
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N 7.4  Summary  and  Implications 
Three  issues  have  been  discussed  in  this  chapter.  The  first  issue  has  concerned  some 
simulations  regarding  the  effects  of  changes  in  the  income  tax  rate  and  the  mortgage 
rationing  criteria  on  the  household's  tenure  decision  behaviour.  The  simulation  results 
suggest  that  an  increase  in  the  marginal  income  tax  rate  (24%)  reduces  the  user  cost  of 
owner-occupiers.  The  reduction  in  the  user  cost  of  owner-occupiers  reduces  the  cost 
difference  between  tenures.  Therefore,  the  influence  of  the  new  user  cost  of  housing 
becomes  less  statistically  and  numerically  significant  on  tenure  choice.  The 
simulation  results  also  indicate  that  a  20%  reduction  in  the  mortgage  rationing  ratios 
creates  more  constraints  on  households,  therefore,  it  leads  to  the  new  mortgage 
rationing  variable  having  a  stronger  numerical  effect  on  tenure  choice. 
From  a  policy  perspective,  the  simulation  results  provide  a  clear  indication  of  the 
influences  of  changes  in  policy  or  schemes  on  households'  tenure  decisions.  In 
particular,  the  government's  housing  proposals  aim  to  continue  to  encourage 
homeownership  in  Scotland.  To  some  extent,  the  research  findings  imply  that  an 
increase  in  the  income  tax  rate  reduces  the  user  cost  of  owner-occupiers,  thus  giving 
advantages  to  increase  the  homeownership  rate.  Moreover,  an  increase  in  the 
mortgage  rationing  ratios  creates  fewer  mortgage  constraints  on  homebuyers  and  thus 
promotes  the  owner-occupied  sector. 
The  second  issue  has  concerned  the  outcome  of  tenure  choice  and  income  distribution, 
emphasising  income  inequality  and  tenure  polarisation.  The  results  show  clearly  that 
mortgaged  owners  have  a  smaller  income  inequality  than  outright  owners.  Income 
inequality  in  social  tenants  is  lower  than  in  private  tenants.  However,  there  is  a 
significant  concentration  of  mortgaged  owners  in  upper  income  quintile  groups  and  a 
polarisation  of  social  tenants  in  lower  income  quintile  groups.  For  social  tenants,  the 
results  imply  that  more  uniformly  poor  households  are  concentrated  in  the  social 
rented  sector.  In  fact,  the  concentration  of  unemployed  and  economically  inactive 
people  in  social  housing  could  not  only  cause  a  problem  of  social  exclusion  but  also  a 
problem  of  failure  to  meet  what  social  tenants  want  and  their  aspirations  (Hills  2000). 
As  stated  in  Chapter  Six,  many  low-income  council  tenants  may not  be  able  to  afford 
to  move  or  to  choose  their  council  dwellings. 
228 To  some  degree,  the  sale  of  council  housing  via  the  Right  to  Buy  scheme  could  be 
associated  with  residualisation  and  income  polarisation  in  the  social  rented  sector.  It 
is  the  higher  income  tenants  who  would  be  in  a  better  position  to  buy  council  houses 
thereby  leaving  the  local  authority  sector  increasingly  concentrated  by  low-income 
households  (Bentham  1986).  Furthermore,  the  rigid  allocation  system  is  associated 
with  tenure  polarisation.  Social  tenants  receive  a  rationed  allocation  of  housing  with  a 
fixed  quality  and  price.  Ability  to  move  between  areas  is  highly  constrained  except 
through  very  occasional  transfers,  or  through  leaving  and  losing  the  subsidy  from  the 
social  tenancy,  or  through  exercising  the  Right  to  Buy  and  then  selling  at  a  later  date 
(Hills  2000).  In  this  sense,  tenure  polarisation  exists  in  the  way  that  social  tenants  can 
not  make  choices  over  their  housing  and  location. 
Therefore,  the  policy  proposal  to  reform  the  allocation  system  would  address  a  strong 
customer  focus  with  an  emphasis  on  the  supply  of  proper  information  to  social  tenants 
as  stated  in  the  DETR  Housing  Green  Paper  (DETR  2000).  As  Smith  (2000)  indicates, 
the  concept  of  choice  is  the  core  of  new  allocation  and  letting  proposals  where  social 
landlords  should  provide  better  information  to  applicants,  and  where  the  application 
system  should  be  simple  and  accessible  in  order  to  ensure  that  applicants  should  have 
an  opportunity  to  express  their  opinions  when  seeking  housing. 
In  addition  to  the  social  rented  sector,  the  income  and  tenure  polarisation  in  the 
owner-occupied  sector  implies  a  lack  of  choice  for  people  who  are  owners  or want  to 
be  owners.  Hills  (2000)  indicates  that,  for  people  who  want  to  be  owners,  the 
polarisation  of  choice  exists  in  that  the  only  way  for  people  to  get  into  the  owner- 
occupied  housing  market  is  by  buying  the  whole  property  except  for  a  small  number 
of  shared  ownership  schemes.  Compared  with  the  level  of  Housing  Benefit  offered  to 
tenants,  there  is  little  support  for  low-income  owners  to  help  them  with  their  housing 
costs.  Furthermore,  it  is  difficult  for  elderly  owners  to  realise  part  of  their  housing 
equity  to  provide  either  regular  incomes  or  to  pay  for  care  costs  (ibid.  ).  Thus,  for  poor 
elderly  owners,  the  only  way  to  get  someone  to  care  and  organise  repairs  for  them  is 
by  becoming  a  tenant.  As  a  result,  the  policy  to  assist  low  income  or  elderly  owners 
would  set  out  towards  providing  a  flexible  tenure  which  allows  households  with 
shared  ownership  or  allows  elderly  owners  on  low  incomes  with  houses  in  poor 
229 condition  to  become  tenants  or  shared  owners  with  a  housing  association,  as  stated  in 
the  Scottish  House  Green  Paper  (Scottish  Office  1999). 
Moreover,  the  problem  of  tenure  polarisation  is  associated  with  the  small  size  of  the 
private  rented  sector.  As  Holmans  (1978)  indicates,  the  diminishing  size  of  the 
private  rented  sector  has  resulted  in  the  housing  market  becoming  polarised  between 
the  owner-occupied  and  social  rented  sectors.  The  logic  of  the  argument  is  that  the 
private  rented  housing  market  is  so  small  that  it  is  less  effective  in  meeting  people's 
particular  life  cycle  needs  (Hills  2000).  For  example,  there  is  a  great  need  for  younger 
people  who  are  in  insecure  incomes  and  employment  to  look  for  shorter  term  private 
rented  housing  rather  than  owner-occupation  or  social  housing.  However,  the  small 
size  of  the  private  rented  housing  market  may  not  meet  the  housing  needs  of  younger 
people.  As  a  result,  it  pushes  more  people  into  marginal  owner-occupation  and 
increases  the  pressure  on  the  social  rented  sector.  The  long-term  policy  would  set  out 
to  promote  the  private  rented  sector  through  capital  and  tax  incentives.  As  proposed 
by  the  Housing  Green  Paper,  a  100  per  cent  capital  allowance  for  creating  flats  over 
shops  for  letting  and  a  reform  for  VAT  to  encourage  additional  conversion  of 
properties  for  residential  use  would  be  possible  approaches. 
In  the  third  section,  the  results  show  that  the  housing  subsidy  effect  is  progressive. 
Households  in  lower  income  groups  receive  more  subsidies  than  households  in  upper 
income  groups  do.  With  respect  to  the  distribution  of  housing  subsidies  between 
tenures,  social  tenants  receive  greater  amount  of  subsidies  than  owner-occupiers.  This 
result  is  significantly  different  from  that  in  the  1980s,  when  owner-occupiers  were 
favoured  by  the  government's  housing  policy,  and  a  series  of  policy  and  subsidy 
schemes  were  set  up  to  promote  homeownership  (see  Hills  1991). 
The  housing  policy  and  subsidy  schemes  have  been  changed  dramatically  in  the  1990s. 
One  of  most  significant  changes  for  subsidy  schemes  was  phasing  out  the  mortgaged 
interest  tax  relief.  It  has  been  seen  that  the  government's  expenditures  on  mortgaged 
interest  tax  relief  was  cut  back  sharply  in  the  1990s  and  the  scheme  abolished  in  April 
2000.  As  a  result,  subsidies  to  owner-occupiers,  particularly  to  mortgaged  owners 
have  reduced  sharply.  The  results  also  show  that  the  total  amount  of  subsidies  to 
230 mortgaged  owners  is  less  than  that  outright  owners  receive  in  each  income  quintile 
group. 
Another  important  change  for  housing  subsidy  in  the  1990s  was  a  rapid  increase  in 
Housing  Benefit  expenditures  (see  Wilcox  1999).  As  discussed  in  Chapter  Three,  a 
rapid  increase  in  rents  in  the  social  rented  sector,  particularly  the  housing  association 
sector  after  1989,  has  resulted  in  increasing  the  number  of  social  tenants  depending 
upon  Housing  Benefit  to  cover  their  rents,  thus  enhancing  a  sharp  increase  in  Housing 
Benefit  expenditures.  The  results  in  the  third  section  show  that  about  two  thirds  of 
social  tenants  in  Scotland  in  1996  were  in  receipt  of  Housing  Benefit.  In  particular, 
social  tenants  in  lower  income  groups  depended  heavily  upon  this  state  benefit.  As 
discussed  earlier,  under  the  current  system,  Housing  Benefit  covering  100  per  cent  of 
rents  gives  tenants,  especially  private  tenants,  no  shopping  incentives  to  look  for 
cheaper  accommodation.  This  could  be  one  of  major  reasons  why  the  average  amount 
of  Housing  Benefit  rises  with  income.  The  introduction  of  a  local  reference  rent  limit 
in  the  Housing  Benefit  scheme  since  January  1996  has  allegedly  had  substantial 
effects  on  reducing  the  number  of  Housing  Benefit  claimants,  particularly  private 
tenants,  in  upper  income  levels  (see  Wilcox  et  al.  1998).  In  addition,  some  academic 
researchers  suggest  that  the  long  term  reform  approach  to  enhance  the  shopping 
incentive  to  Housing  Benefit  receipts  should  set  out  to  reduce  the  65  per  cent  rent 
taper  and  to  introduce  a  flat  rate  of  contribution  based  on  20  per  cent  of  average  local 
rents  (see  for  example  Hill  1991,  Kemp  1994,2000). 
Another  concern  arising  from  the  results  in  the  third  section  is  housing  subsidies  to 
low-income  homeowners.  The  results  in  the  third  section  show  that  the  distribution  of 
housing  subsidies  to  owner-occupiers  is  progressive  between  income  levels.  Owner- 
occupiers  in  lower  income  groups  receive  more  subsidies  than  those  in  upper  income 
groups.  Although  the  results  in  the  third  section  do  not  contain  the  Income  Support 
for  Mortgage  Interest  (ISMI)  data,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  Three,  ISMI  has  played  an 
increasingly  important  role  in  subsidising  low  income  mortgaged  owners  in 
unemployment  (see  for  example  Gibb  et.  al  1999,  Pryce  and  Keoghan  1999,  Wilcox 
2000).  However,  the  ISMI  subsidy  declined  sharply  in  the  late  1990s,  partly  because 
of  falling  interest  rates  and  lower  levels  of  unemployment  but  also  because  of  a  series 
231 of  restrictions  on  this  scheme  '  (Burrows,  Ford  and  Wilcox  2000).  On  the  other  hand, 
there  is  no  scheme  in  the  UK  to  provide  a  means  tested  subsidy  to  low-income 
homeowners  in  employment.  If  we  consider  the  equity  of  subsidy,  low-income 
owners  in  employment  or  in  unemployment  should  be  included  in  the  subsidy 
programme.  This  should  be  an  agenda  in  the  government's  housing  subsidy  reform  in 
the  future. 
The  final  concern  is  the  impact  of  MIRAS  abolition.  The  results  of  the  third  section 
indicate  that  the  termination  of  MIRAS  would  not  have  significant  impact  on 
mortgaged  owners  in  terms  of  their  user  costs.  However,  the  abolition  of  MIRAS 
could  have  influences  on  other  things  such  as  mortgaged  interest  rate,  housing  price, 
and  the  dynamics  of  the  housing  market.  These  need  to  be  investigated  in  the  future. 
In  summary,  the  simulation  results  have  suggested  a  direction  of  changes  in  the 
income  tax  rate  and  the  mortgage  rationing  ratios  in  supporting  homeownership.  The 
results  of  the  distribution  of  income  and  housing  subsidies  between  tenures  also  have 
implications  for  current  housing  policy  reform.  For  Housing  Benefit  reform,  the 
emphasises  are  not  only  to  provide  work  incentives  to  working  welfare  recipients  but 
also  to  provide  more  shopping  incentives  to  benefit  recipients  to  look  for  cheaper 
accommodation.  In  the  social  rented  sector,  the  implication  addresses  the  allocation 
system  which  should  provide  more  choices  to  tenants  and  should  encourage  cross 
boundary  and  cross  tenure  applications.  In  the  owner-occupied  sector,  the  focus  is  to 
assist  low-income  and  elderly  homeowners  either  to  secure  their  homeownership  or  to 
offer  flexible  options  to  share  ownership  or  to  sell  properties  to  repay  their  housing 
costs.  Finally,  in  the  private  rented  sector,  the  reform  addresses  provision  of  tax 
concessions  to  encourage  new  investment  and  the  conversion  of  properties  for  rented 
residential  uses. 
I  After  October  1995,  existing  mortgage  borrowers  who  make  a  new  claim  for  ISMI  receive  no  support 
for  2  months  before  moving  onto  16  weeks  of  50  per  cent  support  (and  full  support  thereafter).  New 
mortgage  borrowers  receive  no  support  for  9  months  before  moving  onto  50  per  cent  support  (and  a  full 
support  only  after  a  further  16  weeks.  Borrowers  are  encouraged  to  take  out  private  mortgaged 
protection  payment  insurance  (MPPI)  to  cover  their  mortgage  costs  over  such  a  period. 
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8.1  Summary 
Over  the  last  several  decades,  housing  in  Scotland  has  developed  in  a  different  pattern 
from  housing  in  the  rest  of  Great  Britain.  It  has  been  seen  that  the  growth  of  owner- 
occupied  housing  in  Scotland  is  significantly  faster  than  in  England  and  Wales.  The 
historical  importance  of  Scotland's  public  rented  sector  is  greater  than  in  the  other  two 
nations.  Housing  associations  in  Scotland  are  relatively  young  and  small  in  size 
compared  to  housing  associations  in  England.  The  percentage  of  private  rented 
dwellings  in  Scotland  is  the  lowest  among  the  three  countries.  The  tenure  pattern  to 
some  degree  reflects  the  outcome  of  the  household's  tenure  decision  behaviour. 
Scotland's  unique  tenure  pattern  implies  that  the  Scottish  household's  tenure  decision 
behaviour  is  different  from  the  household's  in  the  rest  of  Britain  and  it  also  inspires 
the  study  of  housing  tenure  choice  in  Scotland. 
To  analyse  the  household's  tenure  choice  in  Scotland,  this  thesis  attempts  to  answer 
three  questions:  what  is  the  nature  of  tenure  choice  and  its  determinants  in  Scotland? 
To  what  extent  do  these  determinants  influence  the  household's  tenure  decision  in 
Scotland?  What  policy  issues  emerge  from  the  model  results  and  what  are 
implications  for  current  housing  policy? 
The  nature  of  housing  tenure  choice  can  be  interpreted  from  a  variety  of  aspects 
depending  upon  who  is  using  it  and  the  purpose  of  the  research.  This  thesis  starts  to 
define  housing  tenure  choice  from  a  broader  perspective.  As  Barlow  and  Duncan 
(1988)  indicated,  housing  tenure  can  be  seen  as  a  whole  range  of  financial,  social, 
political  and  economic  relations  surrounding  housing.  Iri  the  sociological  perspective, 
the  choice  of  housing  tenure  implies  the  housing  class  and  social  relations  to  different 
tenures  (Rex  and  Moore  1967,  and  Gray  1982).  In  the  economic  perspective,  housing 
tenure  choice  presents  a  consumer's  choice  behaviour  by  maximising  his/her  utility  on 
different  tenures  and  choosing  the  tenure  that  yields  the  maximum  utility  subject  to 
the  budget  constraint  (Fallis  1985).  The  interpretation  of  housing  tenure  choice  in  this 
thesis  emphasises  the  economic  approaches. 
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housing  demand  theory.  The  consumer's  decision  for  housing  demand  can  be  seen  as 
a  bundle  of  choices  which,  for  example,  include  the  decisions  of  tenure,  dwelling  type, 
neighbourhood  quality  and  location.  Previous  studies  have  suggested  that  these 
choices  are  interrelated  and  that  hierarchy  is  a  way  to  organise  these  choices.  In  a 
hierarchical  housing  choice  model,  a  household,  for  instance,  may  first  choose  tenure 
and  then  dwelling  type  and  so  on,  to  choose  neighbourhood  and  location.  However,  it 
is  noted  that  the  hierarchical  framework  of  housing  choice  is  just  an  analytical  device 
that  reflects  the  relative  degree  of  similarity  among  choice  alternatives.  Therefore,  it 
does  not  imply  that  a  household  should  necessarily  follow  this  kind  of  decision  tree 
while  making  a  housing  decision.  Moreover,  in  a  series  of  housing  decisions,  tenure 
choice  would  be  more  important  when  a  household  faces  a  choice  between  public  and 
private  housing.  In  the  public  housing  sector  particularly,  the  tenure  is  usually 
attached  to  certain  dwelling  type,  neighbourhood  and  location  (Clapham  and  Kintrea 
1986). 
In  tenure  choice  analysis,  previous  studies  have  indicated  that  the  household's  tenure 
choice  is  not  only  influenced  by  the  household  attributes  but  also  influenced  by 
housing  attributes.  The  household  attributes  generally  include  household  demographic 
characteristics,  household  socio-economic  characteristics  and  the  user  cost  of  housing. 
The  household  demographic  characteristics  generally  include  the  household  head's 
age,  gender,  marital  status  and  the  household  size.  The  household  socio-economic 
characteristics  consist  of  the  household  income,  employment  status,  previous  tenure 
and  likeliness  to  move.  The  user  cost  of  housing  presents  the  relative  cost  of  owning 
or  renting.  The  household's  tenure  choice  is  also  affected  by  housing  attributes  such 
as  dwelling  type,  location,  and  neighbourhood  quality.  In  addition,  as  the 
government's  strong  intervention  in  the  housing  market,  the  housing  subsidy  and  the 
rationing  in  the  admission  to  owner-occupied  sector  and  the  social  housing  sector  have 
important  influences  on  the  household's  tenure  decision  behaviour  in  Scotland  as  well 
as  the  rest  of  Britain.  This  thesis,  therefore,  emphasises  the  impact  of  the  housing 
subsidy  and  rationing  factors  on  the  household's  tenure  choice. 
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two  simulation  models  with  different  structures  are  developed  in  the  thesis.  The  first 
tenure  choice  model  contains  a  simple  one-level  choice  set.  The  tenure  choice  splits 
into  three  choice  alternatives:  owner-occupation,  social  renting  and  private  renting.  A 
multinomial  logit  (MNL)  model  is  chosen  to  estimate  the  three-choice  function.  The 
MNL  model  provides  a  simple  and  convenient  functional  foim  to  estimate  the  choice 
probabilities.  Because  of  its  simple  structure,  the  interpretation  of  the  MNL  model  is 
more  straightforward  than  other  discrete  choice  models.  As  a  result,  the  MNL  model 
is  suitable  for  the  first  model  to  directly  interpret  the  influences  of  the  determinants  on 
tenure  choice.  However,  the  MNL  model  has  a  widely  know  weakness,  which  could 
easily  violate  the  independence  from  irrelevant  alternative  (IIA)  property.  The 
rejection  of  the  RA  property  in  the  MNL  model  implies  that  the  estimation  of  tenure 
choice  could  be  bias.  As  a  result,  the  MNL  model  in  this  thesis  should  be  treated  with 
caution. 
The  second  model  estimates  the  household's  mobility  decision  and  tenure  choice. 
This  model  contains  a  two-level  choice  structure  assuming  that  the  household's  tenure 
choice  is  followed  by  its  decision  to  move.  The  hierarchical  choice  model  of  mobility 
and  tenure  choice  provides  an  alternative  approach  to  solve  the  IIA  problem  without 
breaking  the  tenure  choice  structure  presented  in  the  first  model.  Therefore,  this  two- 
level  choice  model  can  be  seen  as  a  substitute  of  the  first  model.  A  nested 
multinomial  logit  (NMNL)  model  is  employed  to  estimate  the  probability  of  a 
household  choosing  to  move/stay  and  the  probability  of  choosing  a  tenure  alternative 
under  the  influences  of  the  determining  variables.  In  the  NMNL  model,  the  inclusive 
value  parameter  is  an  indication  of  the  IIA  property.  When  the  inclusive  value 
parameter  lies  between  0  and  1,  the  NMNL  model  satisfies  both  the  IIA  property  and 
the  random  utility  function. 
The  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  is  the  data  set  used  in  this  thesis.  This 
data  set  contains  large  samples  and  rich  information  about  households'  socio- 
economic  characteristics  and  dwelling  conditions.  These  are  important  variables  to 
estimate  the  Scottish  households'  tenure  choice  behaviour.  In  the  MNL  tenure  choice 
model,  the  dependent  variable  is  the  household's  current  tenure  status  including 
owner-occupation,  social  renting  and  private  renting.  The  explanatory  variables  come 
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employment  status,  previous  tenure  status,  location,  expected  mobility,  dwelling  type 
and  neighbourhood  quality  variables.  These  variables  are  expected  to  have  important 
impacts  on  tenure  choice.  This  thesis  also  constructs  household  long-term  income,  the 
user  cost  of  housing,  housing  (economic)  subsidy  and  rationing  variables  to  estimate 
their  influences  on  households'  tenure  decisions.  The  use  of  long  term  income  implies 
the  household's  tenure  decision  is  based  on  long  term  and  multiple  periods  rather  than 
a  current  and  single  period.  The  housing  user  cost  presents  the  relative  cost  of  owning, 
social  renting  and  private  renting.  The  housing  (economic)  subsidy  reduces  the  user 
cost  of  housing  and  thus,  its  effect  can  be  expressed  by  estimating  the  difference 
between  the  user  cost  and  the  net  user  cost.  The  mortgage  rationing  and  social 
housing  rationing  variables  are  developed  by  simulating  households'  access 
constraints  into  the  owner-occupied  sector  and  the  social  rented  sector  respectively. 
In  the  NMNL  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model,  the  dependent  variable  is  the 
household's  move-stay  and  tenure  status  including  stay,  move  to  choose  owner- 
occupation,  move  to  choose  social  renting  and  move  to  choose  private  renting.  If  a 
household  has  moved  within  two  years,  the  household  is  defined  as  a  recent  mover 
and  is  assigned  to  its  current  tenure  status.  Otherwise,  the  household  is  defined  as  a 
stayer.  The  explanatory  variables  of  the  mobility  and  tenure  choice  model  are  drawn 
from  the  first  tenure  choice  model.  As  a  requirement  of  the  nested  logit  model,  the 
explanatory  variables  are  interacted  with  four  possible  choices  in  order  to  estimate  the 
interactive  coefficients  for  these  four  alternative  choices.  One  exception  is  the  user 
cost  variable  which  is  treated  as  an  attribute  across  tenures.  Because  of  the 
requirement  of  the  NMNL  model  structure,  the  user  cost  is  measured  not  on  the 
individual  household  basis  but  on  the  tenure  basis.  The  user  cost  in  this  model  is 
measured  by  the  average  cost  across  tenures  and  also  across  all  32  unitary  authorities 
in  Scotland  in  order  to  express  the  regional  variation  of  the  user  cost. 
Due  to  the  IIA  problem  in  the  MNL  model,  it  was  found  that  the  NMNL  model 
provides  robust  results  in  estimating  households'  tenure  choice  and  mobility  decisions. 
The  MNL  model  in  this  thesis  can  be  treated  as  a  pilot  model  to  test  the  initial 
influences  of  the  explanatory  variables  on  tenure  choice.  Unlike  the  NMNL  model 
requiring  specific  data  arrangement  and  variable  interactions,  the  MNL  model 
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three  tenure  alternatives.  With  respect  to  the  model  results,  it  was  found  that  most 
explanatory  variables  in  the  MNL  model  are  statistically  significant.  This  indicates 
that  these  explanatory  variables  have  substantial  influences  on  tenure  choice  in 
Scotland,  and  also  these  explanatory  variables  are  applied  to  the  NMNL  model. 
The  results  of  the  NMNL  model  show  that  the  household  demographic  variables  have 
substantial  influences  on  tenure  choice.  It  was  found  that  older  and  married 
households  are  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation,  while  younger  and  single 
households  are  more  likely  to  choose  private  renting.  Households  having  more 
dependent  children  have  significantly  positive  likelihood  of  choosing  social  renting. 
Female  household  heads  are  more  likely  to  choose  social  renting.  In  addition,  the 
household  head's  employment  variables  have  the  most  determining  influences  on 
tenure  choice.  Household  heads  having  full  time  or  part  time  jobs  are  strongly  likely 
to  choose  owner-occupation,  while  unemployed  household  heads  are  more  likely  to 
choose  social  renting.  These  results  draw  a  clear  picture  that  households  in  better 
socio-economic  positions  are  more  likely  to  be  homeowners,  while  households  with 
socio-economic  disadvantages  are  more  likely  to  choose  social  renting. 
Households'  previous  tenure  has  a  statistically  and  numerically  significant  influence 
on  their  current  tenure  decision.  It  is  more  likely  the  see  that  households  will  choose 
the  same  tenure  as  their  previous  one  when  making  a  tenure  decision.  Similar  results 
also  apply  to  the  neighbourhood  quality  variables.  Households'  tenure  decisions  are 
strongly  influenced  by  their  current  neighbourhood  environments.  Dwelling  type  and 
location  are  usually  associated  with  tenure.  As  Scottish  Homes  (1997)  indicate,  in 
Scotland,  most  houses  are  owner-occupied.  Therefore,  households  who  live  in  or 
want  to  live  in  houses  could  only  be  homeowners.  In  this  sense,  it  is  not  surprising 
that  households  living  in  houses  are  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  than 
social  renting.  Moreover,  Scottish  Homes  (1997)  also  indicate  that  there  are 
substantial  private  renting  dwellings  located  in  rural  areas  of  Scotland.  As  a  result,  the 
model  results  show  that  households  living  in  rural  areas  are  more  likely  to  choose 
private  renting  rather  than  owner-occupation.  However,  it  would  be  difficult  to 
estimate  the  household's  decision  on  whether  social  renting  or  owner-occupation 
based  on  the  simple  definition  of  the  urban  area  in  the  1996  SHCS.  It  needs  more 
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owner-occupied  housing  in  the  inner  city,  the  periphery  and  the  suburban  areas. 
The  household  long-term  income  and  the  user  cost  have  statistically  and  numerically 
significant  influences  on  the  household's  tenure  choice.  When  income  rises,  the 
household  is  more  likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  than  social  renting  or  private 
renting.  The  user  cost  of  housing  has  a  significantly  negative  impact  on  the 
household's  tenure  choice,  indicating  that  when  the  user  cost  of  a  certain  tenure 
increases,  households  are  less  likely  to  choose  that  tenure.  The  housing  (economic) 
subsidy  plays  a  distinct  role  in  reducing  the  housing  user  cost  and  also  has  a 
substantial  effect  on  tenure  choice.  Mortgage  rationing  and  social  housing  rationing 
have  numerically  strong  impacts  on  tenure  choice,  which  play  a  role  as  gatekeeper, 
filtering  the  household's  access  to  the  owner-occupied  sector  and  to  the  social  rented 
sector  respectively.  As  expected,  households  who  are  potentially  constrained  from 
mortgages  are  more  likely  to  choose  social  renting  or  private  renting.  In  contrast, 
households  who  are  potentially  constrained  from  the  social  renting  sector  are  more 
likely  to  choose  owner-occupation  or  private  renting. 
In  addition  to  tenure  decision,  the  household  head's  age,  the  number  of  dependent 
children  and  household  long-term  income  have  important  influences  on  the 
household's  mobility  decision.  Older  households  and  households  having  more 
dependent  children  are  more  likely  to  stay  at  current  status.  When  income  rises, 
households  are  more  likely  to  stay  than  to  move.  It  is  noted  that  these  variables  not 
only  have  significant  impacts  on  mobility  decision  but  also  have  remarkable 
influences  on  tenure  choice. 
The  model  results  provide  us  with  a  better  estimation  of  the  household's  tenure  choice 
behaviour  in  Scotland.  Some  issues  are  derived  from  the  results  of  the  two  tenure 
choice  models.  From  a  policy  perspective,  it  is  of  interest  to  discuss  the  influences  of 
changes  in  policy  or schemes  on  the  household's  tenure  decision.  As  a  result,  the  first 
issue  relates  to  an  analysis  of  two  simulations  of  the  tenure  choice  models.  The  first 
simulation  discusses  the  influences  of  a  change  in  the  income  tax  rate  on  the  user  cost 
of  owner-occupiers  and  also  on  tenure  choice.  The  second  simulation  analyses  the 
effect  of  a  change  in  the  mortgage  rationing  criteria  on  tenure  choice.  It  was  found 
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occupiers  and  thus  it  reduces  the  cost  difference  between  tenures.  Therefore,  the 
simulation  results  show  that  the  new  user  cost  has  become  a  less  statistically  and 
numerically  influence  on  tenure  choice.  Further,  a  20%  reduction  in  the  mortgage 
rationing  ratios  creates  more  constraints  on  households.  Thus,  it  leads  to  the  new 
mortgage  rationing  variable  having  a  stronger  influence  on  tenure  choice. 
The  second  issue  concerns  the  outcomes  of  tenure  choice  and  income  distribution 
emphasising  income  inequality  and  tenure  polarisation  in  Scotland  and  the  four  major 
cities  -  Aberdeen,  Dundee,  Edinburgh  and  Glasgow.  The  results  show  that  income 
inequality  in  mortgaged  owners  is  lower  than  in  outright  owners,  while  income 
inequality  in  social  tenants  is  lower  than  in  private  tenants.  However,  when 
examining  tenure  distribution  between  and  within  income  quintile  groups,  a 
significant  tenure  polarisation  is  shown  in  that  mortgaged  owners  are  concentrated  in 
the  upper  income  quintile  groups,  while  social  tenants  are  concentrated  in  the  lower 
income  groups.  Together,  these  indicate  that  higher  income  households  are  most 
likely  to  be  owner-occupiers  with  mortgages,  while  low-income  households  are 
concentrated  in  the  social  rented  sector.  In  addition,  it  implies  a  big  income  gap 
between  mortgaged  owners  and  social  tenants. 
The  third  issue  concerns  the  distribution  of  housing  subsidies  between  income  levels 
across  tenures.  At  both  the  whole  of  Scotland  level  and  the  four  cities  level,  the 
results  indicate  that  housing  subsidies  are  progressive  with  income  rise.  Households 
in  lower  income  groups  receive  a  greater  proportion  of  housing  subsidies  to  their 
incomes  than  households  in  upper  income  groups.  Compared  to  1980s,  the  focus  of 
housing  subsidy  has  been  switched  from  owner-occupiers  to  tenants,  particularly  to 
social  tenants.  Housing  Benefit  is  the  most  significant  subsidy  to  tenants  in  both  the 
social  rented  and  the  private  rented  sectors.  The  average  amount  of  Housing  Benefit 
received  by  tenants  is  much  higher  than  the  rent  gap  subsidy  to  tenants.  In  the  owner- 
occupied  sector,  the  difference  of  economic  subsidies  between  outright  owners  and 
mortgaged  owners  primarily  comes  from  the  imputed  rental  income  where  part  of 
mortgaged  owners'  imputed  rental  income  is  deducted  by  their  mortgage  debts. 
MIRAS  only  accounts  for  a  very  small  proportion  of  household  income  for  mortgaged 
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household  income  and  the  user  costs  for  mortgaged  owners  in  all  income  levels. 
From  a  policy  perspective,  the  simulation  results  provide  us  with  a  clear  direction  of 
the  influences  of  changes  in  policy  or  schemes  on  households'  tenure  decisions.  In 
particular,  the  government's  housing  proposals  aim  to  continue  to  encourage 
sustainable  homeownership  in  Scotland.  To  some  extent,  the  simulation  results  imply 
that  an  increase  in  the  income  tax  rate  reduces  the  user  cost  of  owner-occupiers,  thus  it 
gives  advantages  to  increase  the  homeownership  rate.  An  increase  in  the  mortgage 
rationing  ratios  creates  fewer  mortgage  constraints  on  homebuyers  and  thus,  it  can 
promote  the  owner-occupied  sector. 
Moreover,  the  results  of  the  distribution  of  income  and  housing  subsidies  between 
tenures  together  draw  a  clear  picture  that  low-income  households  are  significantly 
concentrated  in  the  social  housing  sector  and  these  households  heavily  depend  upon 
Housing  Benefit.  The  rigid  need-based  allocation  system  and  the  small  private  rented 
sector  could  partly  be  the  result  of  tenure  and  income  polarisation  in  the  social  rented 
sector.  On  the  other  hand,  some  low-income  homeowners,  mainly  elderly  and 
outright  owners,  may  find  it  difficult  to  remain  in  homeownership.  These  results  draw 
attention  to  policy  makers  regarding  housing  policy  reform  for  housing  benefit 
scheme,  social  housing  allocation  system,  low-income  homeownership  and  the 
promotion  of  the  private  rented  sector.  The  implications  to  housing  policy  reform 
may  not  be  new  but  I  like  to  address  again.  For  housing  benefit  reform,  the 
emphasises  are  not  only  to  provide  work  incentives  to  working  welfare  recipients  but 
also  to  provide  more  shopping  incentives  to  benefit  recipients  to  look  for  cheaper 
accommodation.  In  the  social  rented  sector,  the  implication  addresses  the  allocation 
system,  which  should  provide  more  choices  to  tenants  and  to  encourage  cross 
boundary  and  cross  tenure  applications.  In  the  owner-occupied  sector,  the  focus  is  to 
assist  low-income  and  elderly  homeowners  either  to  secure  their  homeownership  or  to 
offer  flexible  options  to  share  ownership  or.  to  sell  properties  to  repay  their  housing 
costs.  In  the  private  rented  sector,  the  reform  addresses  on  providing  tax  concessions 
to  encourage  new  investment  and  conversion  properties  for  rented  residential  uses. 
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behaviour  in  Scotland  where  few  studies  have  been  carried  out  on  this  topic. 
Moreover,  the  robust  results  of  the  tenure  choice  models  and  the  results  of  income 
inequality  and  tenure  polarisation  and  the  distribution  housing  subsidies  between 
tenures  can  be  applied  to  many  perspectives.  The  contributions  of  this  thesis  and 
some  suggestions  for  further  research  are  discussed  below. 
8.2  Contributions  and  Further  Research 
The  contributions  of  this  thesis  can  be  classified  into  several  categories.  Theoretically, 
this  thesis  presents  a  clear  and  detailed  review  of  the  tenure  choice  theory  and 
previous  tenure  choice  studies.  A  detailed  discussion  of  the  theory  of  tenure  choice 
assists  with  the  understanding  of  the  different  characteristics  of  tenure  choice  (discrete 
choice)  from  other  housing  consumption  decisions  (continuous  choice),  and  then 
clarifies  the  importance  of  tenure  choice  in  a  bundle  of  housing  decisions.  In  a  review 
of  previous  tenure  choice  studies,  this  thesis  highlights  the  strengths  and  weaknesses 
of  the  study  in  terms  of  theoretical,  methodological  and  empirical  grounds.  In 
addition,  the  discussion  of  the  Scottish  tenure  and  housing  market  context  also  helps 
to  explain  the  changes  in  tenure  patterns  and  the  unique  housing  market  conditions  in 
Scotland  compared  to  the  rest  of  Great  Britain. 
Empirically,  this  thesis  performs  the  leading  study  of  the  household's  tenure  choice 
behaviour  on  the  basis  of  the  whole  of  Scotland.  As  stated  earlier,  Scotland  has 
experienced  a  dramatic  change  in  tenure  structure.  In  particular,  there  has  been  a 
rapidly  growing  owner-occupied  sector  but  a  rapidly  declining  social  rented  sector 
over  the  last  two  decades.  Tenure  pattern,  to  some  degree,  reflects  the  outcome  of  the 
household's  tenure  choice.  With  the  change  in  the  household's  tenure  preference, 
academic  researchers  and  policy  makers  will  be  interested  in  these  questions:  what  are 
the  determining  factors  of  tenure  choice  in  Scotland,  and  to  what  extent  do  these 
factors  influence  the  Scottish  households'  tenure  decisions?  In  this  thesis,  the  robust 
results  of  the  tenure  choice  models  provide  clear  answers  to  these  questions. 
Moreover,  this  thesis  emphasises  two  determinants-housing  subsidy  and  rationing 
factors  that  have  seldom  been  examined  in  previous  tenure  choice  studies.  The 
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statistically  and  numerically  significant  influences  on  tenure  choice. 
In  a  comparison  of  the  MNL  model  and  the  NMNL  model,  this  thesis  demonstrates 
that  the  hierarchical  structure  of  the  NMNL  model  is  more  suitable  for  tenure  choice 
analysis.  The  NMNL  model  has  robust  results  in  the  estimation  of  Scottish 
households'  tenure  decisions  in  this  thesis.  In  contrast,  MNL  model  is  not  a  robust 
model  for  tenure  choice  analysis;  especially,  the  model  fails  in  estimating  the 
simulations  of  the  effect  of  changes  in  some  determinants  on  tenure  choice. 
In  addition  to  the  model  results,  this  thesis  also  performs  a  detailed  analysis  of  the 
issues  regarding  income  inequality  and  tenure  polarisation  and  the  distribution  of 
housing  subsidy  between  tenures  in  Scotland  and  in  its  four  main  cities.  This  is  the 
leading  study  which  sets  out  to  examine  these  issues  at  the  Scottish  and  city  level.  In 
particular,  there  have  been  significant  changes  in  social  housing  policy  and  housing 
subsidy  schemes.  It  is  of  interest  to  analyse  these  issues  in  the  1990s,  compared  to  a 
decade  ago. 
Finally,  there  are  some  suggestions  for  further  research.  In  this  thesis,  the  hierarchical 
NMNL  model  contains  a  two-level  tree  with  four  choices.  In  the  future,  it  would  be  of 
interest  to  develop  the  NMNL,  model  with  more  levels  and  more  choice  and  to 
examine  the  household's  tenure  choice  associated  with  other  housing  decisions  such 
as  the  dwelling  type  and  the  location.  Due  to  data  limitations,  this  thesis  estimates 
Scottish  households'  tenure  decisions  by  using  a  cross-sectional  data  set-the  1996 
Scottish  House  Condition  Survey.  As  stated  in  previous  chapters,  it  has  been  seen  that 
studies  have  increasingly  used  panel  data  in  tenure  choice  analysis  in  recent  years. 
Under  this  circumstance,  the  next  step  will  be  to  connect  the  1996  SHCS  with  the 
1991  SHCS  or  the  forthcoming  2002  SHCS  to  analyse  Scottish  households  tenure 
choice  behaviour  during  these  periods.  This  thesis  also  suggests  that  the  forthcoming 
2002  SHCS  will  contain  more  detailed  and  higher  quality  information  on  location  and 
neighbourhood  data,  thus  it  will  be  helpful  to  have  better  estimation  results  in  the 
tenure  choice  or  housing  choice  study.  Moreover,  some  suggestions  are  derived  from 
the  analysis  of  policy  issues  and  implications,  such  as  a  discussion  of  alternative 
approaches  to  measure  and  income  inequality,  an  analysis  of  the  impacts  of  MIRAS 
242 abolition  on  house  prices  and  the  housing  market,  and  a  detailed  discussion  of  housing 
policy  reform  related  to  income  and  housing  subsidy  distributions.  These  topics  will 
be  discussed  in  further  research. 
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APPENDIX  I  Appendix  to  Chapter  Five 
A.  5.1  Variable  Definitions 
Variables  Definitions 
Tenure  The  household's  tenure  status:  0=owner-occupation;  1=social 
renting;  2=private  renting 
Age  Age  of  the  head  of  household 
A  es  Age  square  of  the  head  of  household 
Nedepch  Number  of  dependent  children  in  the  household 
Marry  Dummy  variable  if  the  head  of  household  is  married  =1 
Male  Dummy  variable  if  the  head  of  household  is  male=t 
Fullwork  Dummy  variable  if  the  head  of  household  has  full  time  job=1 
Partwork  Dummy  variable  if  the  head  of  household  has  part  time  'ob=1 
Unem  lo  Dummy  variable  if  the  head  of  household  is  unemployment=1 
House  Dummy  variable  if  the  head  of  household  live  in  house=1 
Prevown  Dummy  variable  if  previous  tenure  is  owner-oaation=1 
Prevsoc  Dummy  variable  if  previous  tenure  is  social  renting--l 
Prevprv  Dummy  variable  if  previous  tenure  is  private  renting--l 
Likmov2  Dummy  variable  if  the  household  likely  to  move  in  2  years=1 
Urban  Dummy  variable  if  the  dwelling  is  located  in  urban  area---l 
Affown  Dummy  variable  if  the  neighbourhood  is  predominant  of  affluent 
owners=1 
Prvtcity  Dummy  variable  if  the  neighbourhood  is  predominant  of  private 
inner  city  tenants=1 
Poorcnl  Dummy  variable  if  the  neighbourhood  is  predominant  of  the 
poorest  council  tenants=1 
Lnperinc  Log  of  predicted  long  term  household  income 
Lnucc  1  Log  of  user  cost  of  capital 
Lnuccn  1  Log  of  net  user  cost 
Ratmort  Dummy  variable  if  the  household  is  rationed  from  mortgages=1 
Ratsoc  Dummy  variable  if  the  household  is  rationed  from  social  housing=1 
Ethnics  Dummy  variable  if  head  of  the  household  is  white=l 
Ndepchgp,  Group  ed  number  of  dendent  children  in  the  household 
Sick  Dummy  variable  if  the  head  of  household  is  in  long  term 
sickness=1 
Selfemp  Dummy  variable  if  the  head  of  household  is  self-employed=1 
Prof  Dummy  variable  if  the  head  of  household  has  professional  and 
managerial  'ob=1 
Empman  Dummy  variable  if  the  head  of  household  is  employer  or 
manager--l 
Interjun  Dummy  variable  if  the  head  of  household  has  intermediate/junior 
non-manual  job=1 
Skill  Dummy  variable  if  the  head  of  household  is  skilled  manual  work=1 
Semiskil  Dummy  variable  if  the  head  of  household  is  semi-skilled  manual 
244 work=1 
Unskill  Dummy  variable  if  the  head  of  household  is  unskilled  manual 
work=1 
Detach  Dummy  variable  if  the  dwelling  is  detach  house=1 
Dwagel  Dummy  variable  if  the  dwelling  was  built  in  pre-1 
Dwage3  Dummy  variable  if  the  dwelling  was  built  between  1945-1964=1 
Dwage5  Dummy  variable  if  the  dwelling  was  built  in  post  1982=1 
Lntfa  Log  of  the  total  floor  area  of  the  dwelling 
Fullheat  Dummy  variable  if  the  dwelling  has  full  central  heating--l 
Prospown  Dummy  variable  if  neighbourhood  is  predominant  of  prosperous 
owners=1 
Graff  Dummy  variable  if  neighbourhood  has  graffiti  and  vandalism--l 
D  arkin  Dummy  variable  if  neighbourhood  has  adequate  parking  space=1 
Vacsite  Dummy  variable  if  neighbourhood  has  vacant  sites=1 
Yr94  Dummy  variable  if  the  household  purchased  current  home  in 
1994=1 
Yr95  Dummy  variable  if  the  household  purchased  current  home  in 
1995=1 
A.  5.2  The  User  Cost,  Net  User  Cost  and  Economic  Subsidy  between  Tenures 
and  Across  32  Unitary  Authorities  in  Scotland 
1.  UA(10):  Aberdeen  City 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC  of 
Owners 
(24%  of  ITR 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  202  3482.09  2653.84 
Net  User  cost  202  2722.57  1894.32 
Economic  subsidy  202  759.52  759.52 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  164  2352.39  NA 
Net  user  cost  164  1534.05  NA 
Economic  subsidy  164  818.34  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  22  4474.65  NA 
Net  user  cost  22  4466.34  NA 
Economic  subsidy  22  8.31  NA 
Notes:  The  simulation  is  to  apply  24%  of  income  tax  rate  to  the  user  cost  of  owner- 
occupiers. 
NA  denotes  the  simulation  does  not  apply  to  social  tenants  and  private  tenants. 
245 2.  UA(11)  :  Aberdeenshire 
Tenure,  Cost  and  Subsidy  No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  ITR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  251  3865.64  2937.25 
Net  User  cost  251  2940.22  2011.83 
Economic  subsidy  251  925.42  925.42 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  152  2501.61  NA 
Net  user  cost  152  1627.92  NA 
Economic  subsidy  152  873.69  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  25  3060.24  NA 
Net  user  cost  25  3060.24  NA 
Economic  subsidy  25  0.00  NA 
3.  UA(12):  Angus 
Tenure,  Cost  and  Subsidy  No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  171R) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  511  3701.45  2814.99 
Net  User  cost  511  2793.75  1907.29 
Economic  subsidy  511  907.70  907.70 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  272  2231.46  NA 
Net  user  cost  272  1543.65  NA 
Economic  subsidy  272  687.81  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  58  2461.69  NA 
Net  user  cost  58  2404.96  NA 
Economic  subsidy  58  56.73  NA 
4.  UA(13):  Argyll  and  Bute 
Tenure,  Cost  and  Subsidy  No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  rM) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  383  3731.03  2836.16 
Net  User  cost  383  2782.13  1887.25 
Economic  subsidy  383  948.90  948.90 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  231  2319.96  NA 
Net  user  cost  231  1855.93  NA 
Economic  subsidy  231  464.03  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  64  2602.66  NA 
Net  user  cost  64  2602.66  NA 
Economic  subsidy  64  0.00  NA 
246 S.  UA(14):  the  Borders 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  TTR 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  114  3815.88  2899.26 
Net  User  cost  114  2824.01  1907.39 
Economic  subsidy  114  991.87  991.87 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  81  2262.65  NA 
Net  user  cost  81  1584.40  NA 
Economic  subsidy  81  678.25  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  26  2179.96  NA 
Net  user  cost  26  2179.96  NA 
Economic  subsidy  26  0.00  NA 
6.  UA(15):  Clackmannan 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  rIR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  40  3595.88  2735.57 
Net  User  cost  40  2730.63  1870.33 
Economic  subsidy  40  865.25  865.25 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  47  2350.50  NA 
Net  user  cost  47  1691.78  NA 
Economic  subsidy  47  658.72  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  0  NA  NA 
Net  user  cost  0  NA  NA 
Economic  subsidy  0  NA  NA 
7.  UA(16):  Dumbarton  and  Clvdebank 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  ITR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  78  2937.53  2250.52 
Net  User  cost  78  2308.77  1621.76 
Economic  subsidy  78  628.76  628.76 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  120  2302.71  NA 
Net  user  cost  120  1803.11  NA 
Economic  subsidy  120  499.60  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  3  3422.29  NA 
Net  user  cost  3  33422.29  NA 
Economic  subsidy  3  0.00  NA 
247 8.  UA(17):  Dumfries  and  Galloway 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  TTR 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  166  3649.98  2776.12 
Net  User  cost  166  2719.68  1845.83 
Economic  subsidy  166  930.30  930.30 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  126  22429.21  NA 
Net  user  cost  126  1786.29  NA 
Economic  subsidy  126  642.93  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  20  2266.08  NA 
Net  user  cost  20  2266.08  NA 
Economic  subsidy  20  0.00  NA 
9.  UA(18):  Dundee  City 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  I  TR 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  158  3234.85  2470.50 
Net  User  cost  158  2486.89  1722.54 
Economic  subsidy  158  747.96  747.96 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  170  2349.91  NA 
Net  user  cost  170  1964.84  NA 
Economic  subsidy  170  385.08  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  17  3306.13  NA 
Net  user  cost  17  3306.13  NA 
Economic  subsidy  17  0.00  NA 
10.  UA(19):  East  Ayrshire 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
24%  of  ITR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  103  3336.43  2546.12 
Net  User  cost  103  2571.17  1780.86 
Economic  subsidy  103  765.26  765.26 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  137  2406.16  NA 
Net  user  cost  137  1513.62  NA 
Economic  subsidy  137  892.54  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  4  2013.44  NA 
Net  user  cost  4  2013.44  NA 
Economic  subsidy  4  0.00  NA 
248 11.  UA(20):  East  Dumbartonshire 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  rIR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  146  3981.51  3022.19 
Net  User  cost  146  3066.73  2107.40 
Economic  subsidy  146  914.79  914.79 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  45  2523.39  NA 
Net  user  cost  45  1737.37  NA 
Economic  subsidy  45  786.02.  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  8  3983.00  NA 
Net  user  cost  8  3983.00  NA 
Economic  subsidy  8  0.00  NA 
12.  UA(211:  East  Lothian 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  TM 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  462  3601.76  2747.67 
Net  User  cost  462  2793.37  1930.28 
Economic  subsidy  462  817.39  817.39 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  278  2565.47  NA 
Net  user  cost  278  1590.09  NA 
Economic  subsidy  278  975.38  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  30  3335.14  NA 
Net  user  cost  30  3321.18  NA 
Economic  subsidy  30  13.97  NA 
13.  UA(22):  East  Renfrewshire 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  rM) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  76  3960.69  3006.22 
Net  User  cost  76  3112.60  2158.13 
Economic  subsidy  76  848.09  848.09 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  29  2522.42  NA 
Net  user  cost  29  1529.36  NA 
Economic  subsidy  29  993.07  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  4  3807.05  NA 
Net  user  cost  4  3807.05  NA 
Economic  subsidy  4  0.00  NA 
249 14.  UA(23):  Edinburgh  City 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  TTR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  569  33290.09  2509.58 
Net  User  cost  569  2533.99  1753.49 
Economic  subsidy  569  756.10  756.10 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  280  2222.61  NA 
Net  user  cost  280  2164.72  NA 
Economic  subsidy  280  57.89  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  113  4403.11  NA 
Net  user  cost  113  4363.71  NA 
Economic  subsidy  113  39.40  NA 
15.  UA(24):  Falkirk 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  ITR 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  122  3502.43  2667.20 
Net  User  cost  122  2703.07  1867.84 
Economic  subsidy  122  799.36  799.36 
ng  Social 
_  User  cost  137  2433.10  NA 
Net  user  cost  137  1550.34  NA 
Economic  subsidy  137  882.76  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  6  2484.30  NA 
Net  user  cost  6  2484.30  NA 
Economic  subsidy  6  0.00  NA 
16.  UA(25):  Fife 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  rM) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  461  3573.65  2720.26 
Net  User  cost  461  2715.46  1862.07 
Economic  subsidy  461  858.19  858.19 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  300  2482.73  NA 
Net  user  cost  300  1631.51  NA 
Economic  subsidy  300  851.22  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  37  2881.80  NA 
Net  user  cost  37  2881.80  NA 
Economic  subsidy  37  0.00  NA 
250 17.  UA(26):  Glasgow  City 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  Mo 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  487  2965.99  2271.80 
Net  User  cost  487  2331.82  1637.63 
Economic  subsidy  487  634.17  634.17 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  890  2198.30  NA 
Net  user  cost  890  1814.32  NA 
Economic  subsidy  890  383.98  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  77  3710.67  NA 
Net  user  cost  77  3643.06  NA 
Economic  subsidy  77  67.62  NA 
1  S.  UA(27):  Highland 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  I  TR 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  479  3751.91  2858.07 
Net  User  cost  479  2780.37  1880.54 
Economic  subsidy  479  971.54  971.54 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  323  2542.94  NA 
Net  user  cost  323  1852.71  NA 
Economic  subsidy  323  690.23  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  61  2484.07  NA 
Net  user  cost  61  2484.07  NA 
Economic  subsidy  61  0.00  NA 
19.  UA(28):  Inverclyde 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  ITR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  62  3489.54  2659.01 
Net  User  cost  62  2688.81  1858.28 
Economic  subsidy  62  800.73  800.73 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  117  2473.96  NA 
Net  user  cost  117  1790.54  NA 
Economic  subsidy  117  683.42  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  14  2346.35  NA 
Net  user  cost  14  2138.91  NA 
Economic  subsidy  14  207.44  NA 
251 20.  UA(29):  Midlothian 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
24%  of  TTR 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  85  3493.13  2661.93 
Net  User  cost  85  2724.10  1892.89 
Economic  subsidy  85  769.03  769.03 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  61  2417.57  NA 
Net  user  cost  61  1685.56  NA 
Economic  subsidy  61  732.01  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  7  2809.71  NA 
Net  user  cost  7  2809.71  NA 
Economic  subsidy  7  0.00  NA 
21.  UA(30):  Moray 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  rM) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  123  3768.59  2864.82 
Net  User  cost  123  2786.85  1883.08 
Economic  subsidy  123  981.74  981.74 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  61  2489.26  NA 
Net  user  cost  61  1583.06  NA 
Economic  subsidy  61  906.20  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  17  2633.43  NA 
Net  user  cost  17  2633.43  NA 
Economic  subsidy  17  0.00  NA 
22.  UA(31):  North  Ayrshire 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
24%  of  TTR 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  136  3548.52  2902.06 
Net  User  cost  136  2706.70  1860.24 
Economic  subsidy  136  841.82  841.82 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  126  2672.46  NA 
Net  user  cost  126  1657.31  NA 
Economic  subsidy  126  1015.15  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  15  2877.99  NA 
Net  user  cost  15  2858.32  NA 
Economic  subsidy  15  19.68  NA 
252 23.  UA(32):  North  Lanarkshire 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  rIR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  389  3276.75  2502.12 
Net  User  cost  389  2571.73  1797.09 
Economic  subsidy  389  705.03  705.03 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  504  2381.40  NA 
Net  user  cost  504  1666.16  NA 
Economic  subsidy  504  715.24  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  7  1828.62  NA 
Net  user  cost  7  1779.59  NA 
Economic  subsidy  7  49.03  NA 
24.  UA(33):  Orkney  Islands 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
24%  of  I  TR 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  34  4351.57  3294.37 
Net  User  cost  34  3143.65  2086.45 
Economic  subsidy  34  1207.92  1207.92 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  12  2209.41  NA 
Net  user  cost  12  1841.67  NA 
Economic  subsidy  12  367.74  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  3  2553.37  NA 
Net  user  cost  3  2553.37  NA 
Economic  subsidy  3  0.00  NA 
25.  UA(34):  Perthshire  and  Kinross 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  ITR 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  148  3627.76  2759.57 
Net  User  cost  148  2734.55  1866.36 
Economic  subsidy  148  893.22  893.22 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  75  2381.97  NA 
Net  user  cost  75  1610.38  NA 
Economic  subsidy  75  771.59  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  22  2642.62  NA 
Net  user  cost  22  2557.63  NA 
Economic  subsidy  22  84.99  NA 
253 26.  UA(35):  Refrewshire 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  ITR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  182  3409.50  2599.84 
Net  User  cost  182  2651.80  1842.15 
Economic  subsidy  182  757.69  757.69 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  181  2366.56  NA 
Net  user  cost  181  1627.89  NA 
Economic  subsidy  181  738.67  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  6  2268.67  NA 
Net  user  cost  6  1984.76  NA 
Economic  subsidy  6  238.91  NA 
27.  UA(36):  Shetland  Islands 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  I  TR 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  27  4390.50  3322.15 
Net  User  cost  27  3126.44  2058.08 
Economic  subsidy  27  1264.07  1264.07 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  14  2758.63  NA 
Net  user  cost  14  1730.08  NA 
Economic  subsidy  14  1028.55  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  2  3105.96  NA 
Net  user  cost  2  3105.96  NA 
Economic  subsidy  2  0.00  NA 
28.  UA(37):  South  Ayrshire 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  17M) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  151  3641.27  2771.40 
Net  User  cost  151  2790.29  1920.41 
Economic  subsidy  151  850.99  850.99 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  81  2428.56  NA 
Net  user  cost  81  1689.98  NA 
Economic  subsidy  81  738.57  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  7  3227.57  NA 
Net  user  cost  7  3227.57  NA 
Economic  subsidy  7  0.00  NA 
254 29.  UA(38):  South  Lanarkshire 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  ITR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  373  3340.90  2547.91 
Net  User  cost  373  2580.21  1787.22 
Economic  subsidy  373  760.69  760.69 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  333  2346.09  NA 
Net  user  cost  333  1774.45  NA 
Economic  subsidy  333  571.64  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  16  2512.76  NA 
Net  user  cost  16  2466.15  NA 
Economic  subsidy  16  46.61  NA 
30.  UA(39):  Stirling 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
24%  of  ITR) 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  112  3966.46  3012.15 
Net  User  cost  112  2987.69  2033.38 
Economic  subsidy  112  978.77  978.77 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  61  2477.23  NA 
Net  user  cost  61  1863.93  NA 
Economic  subsidy  61  613.31  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  9  5057.58  NA 
Net  user  cost  9  5057.58  NA 
Economic  subsidy  9  0.00  NA 
31.  UA(40):  West  Lothian 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  I  TR 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  157  3444.65  2625.64 
Net  User  cost  157  2704.20  1885.19 
Economic  subsidy  157  740.45  740.45 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  153  2506.06  NA 
Net  user  cost  153  1713.17  NA 
Economic  subsidy  153  792.89  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  4  3147.04  NA 
Net  user  cost  4  3147.04  NA 
Economic  subsidy  4  0.00  NA 
255 32.  UA(41):  Western  Isles 
Tenure,  User  Cost  and 
Subsidy 
No.  of 
Observation 
Average  Per 
Annum  (£) 
Simulation  of  UC 
of  Owners 
(24%  of  ITR 
Owner-Occupation 
User  Cost  42  4139.38  3142.29 
Net  User  cost  42  2926.18  1929.08 
Economic  subsidy  42  1213.21  1213.21 
Social  Renting 
User  cost  17  2237.10  NA 
Net  user  cost  17  1883.72  NA 
Economic  subsidy  17  353.38  NA 
Private  Renting 
User  cost  3  3480.01  NA 
Net  user  cost  3  3480.01  NA 
Economic  subsidy  3  0.00  NA 
Notes:  The  simulation  is  to  apply  24%  of  income  tax  rate  to  the  user  cost  of  owner- 
occupiers. 
NA  denotes  the  simulation  does  not  apply  to  social  tenants  and  private  tenants. 
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N APPENDIX  II  Appendix  to  Chapter  Six 
A.  6.1-Limdep  Programme  Estimation  Results  of  the  MNL  Tenure  Choice 
Model 
1.  The  Results  of  Model  One 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
Multinomial  Logit  Model 
Maximum  Likelihood  Estimates 
Dependent  variable  TENURE 
Weighting  variable  ONE 
Number  of  observations  13114 
Iterations  completed  7 
Log  likelihood  function  -6703.855 
Restricted  log  likelihood  -11289.02 
Chi-squared  9170.324 
Degrees  of  freedom  38 
Significance  level  .  0000000 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Variable  I  Coefficient  I  Standard  Error  I  b/St.  Er.  I  P[I  ZI  >z]  I  Mean  of  XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Characteristics  in  numerator  of  Prob[Y  -  lj 
(Social  Renting:  Owner-Occupation) 
Constant  50.24791211  1.6346222  30.740 
.  0000 
AGE  .  4671342787E-01  .  10361004E-01  4.509  .  0000  51.277795 
AGESQ  -.  7582397682E-03  .  99522440E-04  -7.619  .  0000  2943.4899 
NDEPCH  .  6172550926  .  36213117E-01  17.045 
.  0000  .  57777947 
MARRY  1.093230475  .  11353286  9.629  .  0000  .  57777947 
MALE  -.  1029865761  .  78832454E-01  -1.306  .  1914  .  69246607 
FULLWORK  -1.007446959  .  76757851E-01  -13.125  .  0000  .  44547811 
PARTWORK  -.  1364449811  .  13082059  -1.043  .  2970  .  45981394E-01 
UNEMPLOY  .  9859714088  .  13779831  7.155  .  0000  .  60012201E-01 
HOUSE  -.  4826040041  .  65234123E-01  -7.398  .  0000  .  62574348 
PREVOWN  -1.227903286  .  86088781E-01  -14.263  .  0000  .  29258807 
PREVSOC  .  7223274604  .  70734944E-01  10.212  .  0000  .  37303645 
PREVPRV  .  2887936431  .  84248806E-01  3.428  .  0006  .  14617966 
LIKMOV2  .  1969805827  .  88130799E-01  2.235  .  0254  .  12459966 
URBAN  .  6591858324E-01  .  67700952E-01  .  974  .  3302  .  79891719 
AFFOWN  -1.711723482  .  15164910  -11.287  .  0000  .  11499161 
PRVTCITY  -1.774898297  .  10123991  -17.532  .  0000  .  10713741 
POORCNL  1.144585050  .  11792420  9.706  .  0000  .  99893244E-01 
LNPERINC  -3.201038468  .  16579699  -19.307  .  0000  9.1980788 
INUCC  1  -2.709613098  .  11071091  -24.475  .  0000  7.9451288 
Characteristics  in  numerator  of  Prob[Y  -  21 
(Private  Renting:  Owner-Occupation) 
Constant  27.32364654  2.3988646  11.390 
.  0000 
AGE  -.  9754385289E-01  .  16683263E-01  -5.847  .  0000  51.277795 
AGESQ  .  4771151423E-03  .  16932619E-03  2.818  .  0048  2943.4899 
NDEPCH  .  2695146463  .  56846912E-01  4.741  .  0000  .  57777947 
MARRY  -.  3784616528  .  17553966  -2.156  .  0311  .  57777947 
MALE  .  2956142576  .  12239771  2.415  .  0157  .  69246607 
FULLWORK  -.  8855553865  .  13153024  -6.733  .  0000 
.  44547811 
PARTWORK  -.  8682822751  .  25737080  -3.374  .  0007  .  45981394E-01 
UNEMPLOY  .  8085016664 
.  19234239  4.203  .  0000  .  60012201E-01 
HOUSE  .  1604883054 
.  12675101  1.266  .  2055 
.  62574348 
PREVOWN  -.  4046913038 
.  14425203  -2.805  .  0050  .  29258807 
PREVSOC  .  4886618486 
.  13316360  3.670  .  0002  .  37303645 
PREVPRV  1.124812123 
.  12483259  9.011  .  0000  .  14617966 
LIKMOV2  1.309550231 
.  10623790  12.327  .  0000 
.  12459966 
URBAN  -.  8075052738  .  10808693  -7.471  .  0000  .  79891719 
AFFOWN  .  2742267606 
.  14759565  1.858  .  0632  .  11499161 
PRVTCITY  .  5729863719 
.  13495454  4.246  .  0000  .  10713741 
POORCNL  .  3075541916 
.  24337550  1.264 
.  2063 
.  99893244E-01 
265 LNPERINC  -1.169294876  .  25493020  -4.587  .  0000  9.1980788" 
INUCC  1  -1.921084851  .  14332522  -13.404  .  0000  7.9451288 
2.  The  Results  of  Model  Two-Estimating  Subsidy  Effect 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
Multinomial  Logit  Model 
Maximum  Likelihood  Estimates 
Dependent  variable  TENURE 
Weighting  variable  ONE 
Number  of  observations  13114 
Iterations  completed  7 
Log  likelihood  function  -6366.545 
Restricted  log  likelihood  -11289.02 
Chi-squared  9844.943 
Degrees  of  freedom  38 
Significance  level  .  0000000 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Variable  I  Coefficient  I  Standard  Error  I  b/St.  Er.  I  P[I  ZI  >z]  I  Mean  of  XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Characteristics  in  numerator  of  Prob[Y  -  1] 
(Social  Renting:  Owner-Occupation) 
Constant  56.31048586  1.7096045  32.938 
.  0000 
AGE  .  1562259544E-01  .  10784384E-01  1.449  .  1474  51.277795 
AGESQ  -.  4902808352E-03  .  10294127E-03  -4.763  .  0000  2943.4899 
NDEPCH  .  6197518824  .  38532281E-01  16.084 
.  0000  .  57777947 
MARRY  1.113984115  .  11804028  9.437  .  0000  .  57777947 
MALE  -.  1590040432  .  81289814E-01  -1.956  .  0505  .  69246607 
FULLWORK  -.  8898400202  .  79524990E-01  -11.189  .  0000  .  44547811 
PARTWORK  -.  1278275909  .  13576963  -.  942  .  3464  .  45981394E-01 
UNEMPLOY  1.067399303  .  14267722  7.481  .  0000  .  60012201E-01 
HOUSE  -.  6057921190  .  65239202E-01  -9.286  .  0000  .  62574348 
PREVOWN  -1.053098721  .  90151716E-01  -11.681  .  0000  .  29258807 
PREVSOC  .  7932164063  .  73385409E-01  10.809  .  0000  .  37303645 
PREVPRV  .  2997343197  .  87639992E-01  3.420  .  0006  .  14617966 
LIKMOV2  .  1592010169  .  92125467E-01  1.728  .  0840  .  12459966 
URBAN  .  1581220952E-01  .  69481857E-01  .  228  .  8200  .  79891719 
AFFOWN  -1.662854215  .  15910314  -10.451  .  0000  .  11499161 
PRVTCITY  -1.763701191  .  10477574  -16.833  .  0000  .  10713741 
POORCNL  1.361449408  .  11996497  11.349  .  0000  .  99893244E-01 
LNPERINC  -3.141525272  .  17252973  -18.209  .  0000  9.1980788 
LNUCCN  1  -3.583322618  .  11062862  -32.391  .  0000  7.6690047 
Characteristics  in  numerator  of  Prob[Y  -  2] 
(Private  Renting:  Owner-Occupation) 
Constant  14.48925560  2.2693288  6.385  .  0000 
AGE  -.  9790806785E-01  .  16750115E-01  -5.845  .  0000  51.277795 
AGESQ  .  5032594857E-03  .  16909735E-03  2.976  .  0029  2943.4899 
NDEPCH  .  2258412066  .  55333983E-01  4.081  .  0000  .  57777947 
MARRY  -.  2533318741  .  17470696  -2.450  .  0218  .  57777947 
MALE  .  2319328866  .  12393671  1.871  .  0613  .  69246607 
FULLWORK  -.  6713374413  .  13263082  -5.062  .  0000  .  44547811 
PARTWORK  -.  7202549701  .  25687902  -2.804  .  0050  .  45981394E-01 
UNEMPLOY  .  9108055083  .  19582333  4.651  .  0000  .  60012201E-01 
HOUSE  -.  2217778298  .  12525185  -1.771  .  0766  .  62574348 
PREVOWN  -.  5767056780  .  14462641  -3.988  .  0001  .  29258807 
PREVSOC  .  4842092531  .  13378640  3.619  .  0003  .  37303645 
PREVPRV  .  9718648480  .  12546803  7.746  .  0000 
.  14617966 
LIKMOV2  1.167260938 
.  10668854  10.941  .  0000  .  12459966 
URBAN  -.  9171255931 
.  10637467  -8.622  .  0000  .  79891719 
AFFOWN  -.  5208250691E-01 
.  14263408  -.  365  .  7150  .  11499161 
PRVTCITY  .  3005099892 
.  13637955  2.203  .  0276  .  10713741 
POORCNL  .  4350125983 
.  24753993  1.757  .  0789  .  99893244E-01 
LNPERINC  -1.401174421  .  25082309  -5.586  .  0000  9.1980788 
LNUCCN_1  -.  8313451764E-02 
.  12756927  -.  065  .  9480  7.6690047 
266 3.  The  Results  of  Model  Three-Estimating  Subsidy  and  Rationing  Effects 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
Multinomial  Logit  Model  ý 
Maximum  Likelihood  Estimates 
Dependent  variable  TENURE 
Weighting  variable  ONE 
Number  of  observations  13114 
Iterations  completed  7 
Log  likelihood  function  -5022.817 
Restricted  log  likelihood  -11289.02 
Chi-squared  12532.40 
Degrees  of  freedom  42 
Significance  level  .  0000000 
+------------------------------  ---------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Variable  I  Coefficient  I  Standard  Error  lb/St.  Er.  IP[IZI>z]  I  Mean  of  X) 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Characteristics  in  numerator  of  Prob[Y  i] 
(Social  Renting:  Owner-Occupation) 
Constant  43.86589843  1.9380401  22.634  .  0000 
AGE  .  4915204208E-01  .  12548072E-01  3.917  .  0001  51.277795 
AGESQ  -.  6133140354E-03  .  12230262E-03  -5.015  .  0000  2943.4899 
NDEPCH  .  6488399474  .  42088865E-01  15.416 
.  0000  .  57777947 
MARRY  1.360804092  .  14127043  9.633  .  0000  .  57777947 
MALE  -.  2291683314  .  98268337E-01  -2.332  .  0197  .  69246607 
FULLWORK  -.  2796158890  .  11316411  -2.471  .  0135  .  44547811 
PARTWORK  .  4302268655  .  17846816  2.411  .  0159  .  45981394E-01 
UNEMPLOY  1.178392949  .  16064336  7.335  .  0000  .  60012201E-01 
HOUSE  -.  8119850990  .  77161556E-01  -10.523  .  0000  .  62574348 
PREVOWN  -1.298952171  .  10699976  -12.140  .  0000  .  29258807 
PREVSOC  .  6558951872  .  88011083E-01  7.452  .  0000  .  37303645 
PREVPRV  .  1171167304  .  10458899  1.120  .  2628  .  14617966 
LIKMOV2  .  3390042943  .  10365967  3.270  .  0011  .  12459966 
URBAN  -.  1846426242  .  82662695E-01  -2.234  .  0255  .  79891719 
AFFOWN  -1.848042006  .  18529974  -9.973  .  0000  .  11499161 
PRVTCITY  -1.913282730  .  12206225  -15.675  .  0000  .  10713741 
POORCNL  1.462330799  .  13449211  10.873  .  0000  .  99893244E-01 
LNPERINC  -1.485537977  .  20121703  -7.383  .  0000  9.1980788 
LNUCCN_1  -4.247685508  .  12878209  -32.984  .  0000  7.6690047 
RATMORT  3.288755588  .  79970859E-01  41.124  .  0000  .  45020589 
RATSOC  -.  7130610722  .  10169910  -7.011  .  0000  .  62223578 
Characteristics  in  numerator  of  Prob[Y  -  2] 
(Private  Renting  :  Owner-Occupation) 
Constant  8.709303901  2.4117683  3.611  .  0003 
AGE  -.  6499297031E-01  .  17614955E-01  -3.690  .  0002  51.277795 
AGESQ  .  3880798460E-03  .  17822831E-03  2.177  .  0294  2943.4899 
NDEPCH  .  2631751266  .  59248216E-01  4.442  .  0000  .  57777947 
MARRY  .  1278333817  .  18901879 
.  676  .  4989  .  57777947 
MALE  .  2115929509  .  13288850  1.592  .  1113  .  69246607 
FULLWORK  -.  5141394028  .  16104829  -3.192  .  0014  .  44547811 
PARTWORK  -.  4096461802  .  28178696  -1.454  .  1460  .  45981394E-01 
UNEMPLOY  1.033845819  .  21104936  4.899  .  0000  .  60012201E-01 
HOUSE  -.  3361272912  .  13174685  -2.551  .  0107  .  62574348 
PREVOWN  -.  9786101975 
.  15518544  -6.306  .  0000  .  29258807 
PREVSOC  .  2792321607  .  14126232  1.977  .  0481  .  37303645 
PREVPRV  .  7616582775 
.  13514451  5.636  .  0000  .  14617966 
LIKMOV2  1.427788419  .  11528936  12.384  .  0000  .  12459966 
URBAN  -1.077287448  .  11435923  -9.420  .  0000  .  79891719 
AFFOWN  -.  1653157236 
.  15623176  -1.058  .  2900  .  11499161 
PRVTCITY  .  2023277886  .  14657894  1.380  .  1675  .  10713741 
POORCNL  .  5568017902 
.  25504231  2.183  .  0290  .  99893244E-01 
LNPERINC  -.  3520762219 
.  26712909  -1.318  .  1875  9.1980788 
LNUCCN  1  -.  8014292924 
.  13624790  -5.882  .  0000  7.6690047 
RATMORT  2.919903479 
.  11935639  24.464 
.  0000  .  45020589 
RATSOC  -.  2607573559 
.  15399234  -1.693  .  0904  .  62223578 
267 A.  6.2-Limdep  Programme  Estimation  Results  of  the  NMNL  Mobility  and 
Tenure  Choice  Model 
1.  The  Results  of  Model  One  and  the  IIA  Test 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML:  Nested  Multinomial  Logit  Model 
Maximum  Likelihood  Estimates 
Dependent  variable  ACHOICE 
Weighting  variable  ONE 
Number  of  observations  52048 
Iterations  completed  73 
Log  likelihood  function  -4893.708 
Restricted  log  likelihood  -10584.75 
Chi-squared  11382.09 
Degrees  of  freedom  44 
Significance  level  .  0000000 
R2=1-LogL/LogL*  Log-L  fncn  R-sqrd  RsqAdj 
No  coefficients  -10584.7536  .  53766  .  53714 
Constants  only  -5991.4232  .  18321  .  18229 
At  start  values  -18038.4622  .  72871  .  72840 
Response  data  are  given  as  ind.  choice. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML:  Nested  Multinomial  Logit  Model 
The  model  has  2  levels. 
Coefs.  for  branch  level  begin  with  M2 
Number  of  obs.  =  13012,  skipped  0  bad  obs. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
The  IIA  Test  Results 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML:  Nested  Multinomial  Logit  Model 
The  model  has  2  levels. 
Coefs.  for  branch  level  begin  with  M2 
Number  of  obs.  -  13012,  skipped  525  bad  obs. 
Hausman  test  for  IIA.  Excluded  choices  are 
OWNER 
ChiSgrd[  3]  -  429.5991,  Pr(C>c)  -  .  000000 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Variable  I  Coefficient  I  Standard  Error  lb/St.  Er.  IP[IZI>zj  I  Mean  of  XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Attributes  in  the  Utility  Functions 
(Tenure  Choice  Level) 
Ti  -10.50520974  1.6984682  -6.185  .  0000 
T2  -.  4942818350  .  13556765  -3.646  .  0003 
T3  -.  1082910691E-01  .  63944974E-02  -1.694  .  0904 
T4  -.  5457003215E-01  .  74096993E-02  -7.365  .  0000 
T7  .  3117453917 
.  94985968E-01  3.282  .  0010 
T8  .  1758699582  .  10579398  1.662  .  0964 
T9  -.  8024783158 
.  22399644  -3.583  .  0003 
T10  -.  5818314818  .  24638937  -2.361  .  0182 
T11  -.  4112369711  .  23203113  -1.772  .  0763 
T12  .  3767932772  .  24305977  1.550  .  1211 
T13  -1.758564121  .  22984961  -7.651  .  0000 
T14  -1.583568842  .  25193406  -6.286  .  0000 
T15  -1.216913576  .  36197218  -3.362  .  0008 
T16  -2.237282128  .  55932899  -4.000  .  0001 
T17  .  7811248654 
.  41013665  1.905  .  0568 
T18  .  6807148670  .  43191551  1.576  .  1150 
T19  -1.142245405  .  27008193  -4.229  .  0000 
T20  -.  1526898324 
.  26270186  -.  581  .  5611 
T21  1.604533558 
. 
22522474  7.124  .  0000 
268 T22  .  3143601889  .  27123897  1.159  .  2465 
T23  .  6883681318  .  25081884  2.744  .  0061 
T24  1.218222738  .  24465756  4.979  .  0000 
T25  -1.480358238  .  19241355  -7.694  .  0000 
T26  -.  1024195795  .  24563813  -.  417  .  6767 
T27  -.  5010708269  .  21039283  -2.382  .  0172 
T28  -.  8761920017  .  22029134  -3.977  .  0001 
T29  -1.085610498  .  41524656  -2.614  .  0089 
T30  .  5039736510E-01  .  31899323  .  158  .  8745 
T31  -1.675734814  .  27986779  -5.988  .  0000 
T32  1.132860307  .  26353889  4.299  .  0000 
T33  1.483714432  .  33800031  4.390  .  0000 
T34  -.  2310384925  .  53385915  -.  433  .  6652 
T35  -.  3120831616  .  49644592E-01  -6.286  .  0000 
T36  -.  8496554334  .  19954907  -4.258  .  0000 
Attributes  of  Branch  Choice  Equations 
(Mobility  Decisi  on  Level) 
M2  .  5470349026E-01  .  23335191E-02  23.442  .  0000 
M3  -.  1561390332  .  11752768  -1.329  .  1840 
M4  .  1962085332  .  37958956E-01  5.169  .  0000 
M5  -.  1452580814  .  92299924E-01  -1.574  .  1155 
M6  .  1146975369  .  14524579  .  790  .  4297 
M7  .  5341658909  .  13722140  3.893  .  0001 
M10  -.  1746947967E-01  .  11423254  -.  153  .  8785 
M11  .  2715749003  .  13879760  1.957  .  0504 
M12  -.  1963938506  .  93848986E-01  -2.093  .  0364 
Inclusive  Value  Parameters 
NOMOVE  1.000000000  ........ 
(Fixed  Parameter)  ........ 
MOVEYES  .  2425680441  .  42658128E-01  5.686  .  0000 
2.  The  Results  of  Model  Two-Estimating  Subsidy  Effect 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML:  Nested  Multinomial  Logit  Model 
Maximum  Likelihood  Estimates 
Dependent  variable  ACHOICE 
Weighting  variable  ONE 
Number  of  observations  52048 
Iterations  completed  76 
Log  likelihood  function  -4881.280 
Restricted  log  likelihood  -10584.75 
Chi-squared  11406.95 
Degrees  of  freedom  44 
Significance  level 
.  0000000 
R2=1-LogL/LogL*  Log-L  fncn  R-sqrd  RsqAdj 
No  coefficients  -10584.7536  .  53884  .  53832 
Constants  only  -5991.4232  .  18529  .  18437 
At  start  values  -18038.4622  .  72940  .  72909 
Response  data  are  given  as  ind.  choice.  ý 
+----------------------------  -----------------+ 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML:  Nested  Multinomial  Logit  Model 
The  model  has  2  levels. 
Coefs.  for  branch  level  begin  with  M2 
Number  of  obs.  -  13012,  skipped  0  bad  obs. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
variable  I  Coefficient  I  Standard  Error  lb/St.  Er.  IP[IZI>z]  I  Mean  of  XI 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Attributes  in  the  Utility  Functions 
(Tenure  Choice  Level) 
T1  -12.96171616  1.7990265  -7.205  .  0000 
T2  -.  8303668099 
.  13528233  -6.138  .  0000 
269 T3  -.  1078332811E-01  .  63572564E-02  -1.696  .  0898 
T4  -.  5474203476E-01  .  73673161E-02  -7.430  .  0000 
T7  .  3075308284  .  94483155E-01  3.255 
.  0011 
T8  .  1864257299  .  10564692  1.765  .  0776 
T9  -.  7860175954  .  22234643  -3.535  .  0004 
T10  -.  4290881630  .  24870426  -1.725  .  0845 
T11  -.  4105496090  .  23083741  -1.779  .  0753 
T12  .  3755005703  .  24320038  1.544  .  1226 
T13  -1.761477845  .  22651829  -7.776  .  0000 
T14  -1.519032537  .  25084916  -6.056  .  0000 
T15  -1.195996721  .  35399604  -3.379  .  0007 
T16  -2.212307565  .  55967960  -3.953  .  0001 
T17  .  8115136186  .  40793183  1.989  .  0467 
T18  .  7191852646  .  43123773  1.668  .  0954 
T19  -1.133877946  .  26743687  -4.240  .  0000 
T20  -.  1140080817  .  26108080  -.  437  .  6623 
T21  1.609462169  .  22221535  7.243  .  0000 
T22  .  3052738982  .  26909395  1.134  .  2566 
T23  .  6799807746  .  24720655  2.751 
.  0059 
T24  1.197192670  .  24210797  4.945  .  0000 
T25  -1.475725677  .  18921340  -7.799  .  0000 
T26  -.  8986971500E-01  .  24353393  -.  369  .  7121 
T27  -.  4882242192  .  20728233  -2.355  .  0185 
T28  -.  8654406382  .  21834322  -3.964  .  0001 
T29  -1.089703757  .  41314209  -2.638  .  0083 
T30  .  7464344977E-01  .  31808217  .  235  .  8145 
T31  -1.754256219  .  27840493  -6.301  .  0000 
T32  1.054125828  .  26297591  4.008  .  0001 
T33  1.441749417  .  33794497  4.266  .  0000 
T34  -.  3092952114  .  53440810  -.  579  .  5627 
T35  -.  2951246772  .  49017404E-01  -6.021  .  0000 
T36  -1.110758876  .  20987024  -5.293  .  0000 
Attributes  of  Branch  Choice  Equations 
(Mobility  Decisi  on  Level) 
M2  .  5378826074E-01  .  23614003E-02  22.778  .  0000 
M3  -.  1524967920  .  11673722  -1.306  .  1914 
M4  .  1922890548  .  38541840E-01  4.989  .  0000 
M5  -.  1388096203  .  94163724E-01  -1.474  .  1404 
M6  .  1369824723  .  15226157  .  900  .  3683 
M7  .  5100783222  .  13662915  3.733  .  0002 
M10  .  1848158883E-01  .  11421502  .  162  .  8715 
M11  .  2424337052  .  14271682  1.699  .  0894 
M12  -.  1526113069  .  95461677E-01  -1.599  .  1099 
Inclusive  Value  Parameters 
NOMOVE  1.000000000  ........ 
(Fixed  Parameter)  ........ 
MOVEYES  .  2735460184  .  43814901E-01  6.243  .  0000 
3.  The  Results  of  Model  Three-Estimating  Subsidy  and  Rationing  Effect 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML:  Nested  Multinomial  Logit  Model 
Maximum  Likelihood  Estimates 
Dependent  variable  ACHOICE 
Weighting  variable  ONE  ý 
Number  of  observations  52048 
Iterations  completed  54 
Log  likelihood  function  -4858.736 
Restricted  log  likelihood  -10584.75 
Chi-squared  11452.04 
Degrees  of  freedom  47 
Significance  level 
.  0000000 
R2=1-LogL/LogL*  Log-L  fncn  R-sqrd  RsqAdj 
No  coefficients  -10584.7536  .  54097  .  54042 
Constants  only  -5991.4232  .  18905  .  18807 
At  start  values  -18038.4622  .  73065  .  73032 
Response  data  are  given  as  ind.  choice. 
270 +---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML:  Nested  Multinomial  Logit  Model  ý 
The  model  has  2  levels. 
Coefs.  for  branch  level  begin  with  M2 
Number  of  obs.  =  13012,  skipped  0  bad  obs. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Variable  I  Coefficient  I  Standard  Error  jb/St.  Er.  jP[jZj>z]  I  Mean  of  Xj 
+---------+--------------+-  --------------  -+--------  +---------+----------+ 
Attributes  in  the  Utility  Funct  ions 
(Tenure  Choice  Level) 
T1  -6.181569464  1.9282427  -3.206  .  0013 
T2  -.  8917281267  .  13874086  -6.427  .  0000 
T3  -.  5716129017E-02  .  63759370E-02  -.  897 
.  3700 
T4  -.  4377715575E-01  .  76674742E-02  -5.709  .  0000 
T7  .  2967973149  .  92495454E-01  3.209 
.  0013 
T8  .  1837427883  .  10643077  1.726 
.  0843 
T9  -.  2509497223  .  23670791  -1.060  .  2891 
T10  -.  3229861554  .  26605508  -1.214  .  2248 
T11  -.  3806758672  .  23265761  -1.636  .  1018 
T12  .  3032005972  .  24803416  1.222  .  2216 
T13  -1.631241395  .  22285642  -7.320  .  0000 
T14  -1.938373986  .  27306641  -7.099  .  0000 
T15  -1.118861525  .  34034141  -3.287  .  0010 
T16  -2.522832268  .  56004348  -4.505  .  0000 
T17  .  9253162639  .  40672592  2.275 
.  0229 
T18  .  9669213919  .  43943446  2.200 
.  0278 
T19  -1.149503253  .  26350984  -4.362  .  0000 
T20  -.  3014604211  .  26317593  -1.145  .  2520 
T21  1.481085498  .  21654987  6.839  .  0000 
T22  .  2393949770  .  26801364 
.  893  .  3717 
T23  .  6262853498  .  24212639  2.587 
.  0097 
T24  1.130792309  .  24177622  4.677  .  0000 
T25  -1.509891353  .  18645981  -8.098  .  0000 
T26  -.  2041385183  .  24438830  -.  835  .  4035 
T27  -.  5240649361  .  20309529  -2.580  .  0099 
T28  -.  9236818606  .  21848527  -4.228  .  0000 
T29  -1.115874516  .  41039724  -2.719  .  0065 
T30  -.  5254827294E-01  .  32154379  -.  163  .  8702 
T31  -1.705191690  .  28079089  -6.073  .  0000 
T32  .  9975211399  .  26740476  3.730  .  0002 
T33  1.348130759  .  34020464  3.963  .  0001 
T34  -.  3351544054  .  53770764  -.  623  .  5331 
T35  -.  1850419847  .  50349397E-01  -3.675  .  0002 
T36  -.  4962249358  .  22057632  -2.250  .  0245 
T37  1.036824643  .  17545783  5.909  .  0000 
T38  1.140670431 
.  20174580  5.654 
.  0000 
T39  .  7184567404 
.  25526884  2.815 
.  0049 
Attributes  of  Bra  nch  Choice  Equations 
(Mobility  Decision  Level) 
M2  .  5065495350E-01  .  24490453E-02  20.684  .  0000 
M3  .  1102321302 
.  11787338  .  935  .  3497 
M4  .  2245971463 
.  39175298E-01  5.733  .  0000 
M5  -.  1248819858 
.  98427222E-01  -1.269  .  2045 
M6  .  2173577943 
.  16599858  1.309  .  1904 
M7  -.  5128515789E-01 
.  13085181  -.  392  .  6951 
M10  .  4417264874E-01 
.  11499636 
.  384  .  7009 
Mil  .  2859884510 
.  15076375  1.897 
.  0578 
M12  -.  1414474463 
.  98539858E-01  -1.435  .  1512 
Inclusive  Value  P  arameters 
NOMOVE  1.000000000 
.  ....... 
(Fixed  Parameter) 
........ 
MOVEYES  .  3347962275 
.  43631050E-01  7.673  .  0000 
271 Variable  Definition 
T1  :  Constant 
T2  :  Lntcos-Log  user  cost  by  tenures 
Lnatcost-Log  net  user  cost  by  tenures 
T3  :  Agebsoc-Age  of  the  household  head  interacted  with  social  renting 
T4  :  Agehprv-Age  of  the  household  head  interacted  with  private  renting 
T7  Ndepsoc-Number  of  dependent  children  interacted  with  social  renting 
T8  :  Ndepprv-Number  of  dependent  children  interacted  with  private  renting 
T9  :  Marrysoc-Marital  status  of  the  household  head  interacted  with  social  renting 
T10:  Marryprv-Marital  status  of  the  household  head  interacted  with  private  renting 
Ti  1:  Malesoc-Male  household  head  interacted  with  social  renting 
T  12:  Maleprv-Male  household  head  interacted  with  private  renting 
T13:  Fullsoc-Household  head  in  full  time  work  interacted  with  social  renting 
T14:  Fullprv-Household  head  in  full  time  work  interacted  with  private  renting 
T15:  Partsoc-Household  head  in  part  time  work  interacted  with  social  renting 
T16:  Partprv-Household  head  in  part  time  work  interacted  with 
T17:  Unempsoc-Household  head  in  unemployment  interacted  with  social  renting 
T18:  Unempprv-Household  head  in  unemployment  interacted  with  private  renting 
T19:  Pvownsoc-Previous  tenure  were  owner-occupation  interacted  with  social  renting 
T20:  Pvownprv-Previous  tenure  is  owner-occupation  interacted  with  private  renting 
T2  1:  Pvsocsoc-Previous  tenure  is  social  renting  interacted  with  social  renting 
T22:  Pvsocprv-Previous  tenure  is  social  renting  interacted  with  private  renting 
T23:  Pvprvsoc-Previous  tenure  is  private  renting  interacted  with  social  renting 
T24:  Pvprvprv-Previous  tenure  is  private  renting  interacted  with  private  renting 
T25:  Houssoc-Household  living  in  house  interacted  with  social  renting 
T26:  Housprv-Household  living  in  house  interacted  with  private  renting 
T27:  Urbansoc-Household  living  in  urban  area  interacted  with  social  renting 
T28:  Urbanprv-Household  living  in  urban  area  interacted  with  private  renting 
T29:  Afownsoc-Household  living  in  neighbourhood  predominated  by  affluent  owners  interacted  with 
social  renting 
T30:  Afownprv-Household  living  in  neighbourhood  predominated  by  affluent  owners  interacted  with 
private  renting 
T3  1:  Pvctysoc-Household  living  in  neighbourhood  predominated  by  inner  city  private  tenants 
interacted  with  social  renting 
T32:  Pvctyprv-Household  living  in  neighbourhood  predominated  by  inner  city  private  tenants 
interacted  with  private  renting 
T33:  Pocnlsoc-Household  living  in  neighbourhood  predominated  by  the  poorest  council  tenants 
interacted  with  social  renting 
T34:  Pocnlprv-Household  living  in  neighbourhood  predominated  by  the  poorest  council  tenants 
interacted  with  private  renting 
T35:  Lnincosc-Log  household  long  term  income  interacted  with  social  renting 
T36:  Lnincprv-Log  household  long  term  income  interacted  with  private  renting 
T37:  Mratsoc-Mortgage  rationing  interacted  with  social  renting 
T38:  Mratprv-Mortgage  rationing  interacted  with  private  renting 
272 T39:  Sratprv-Social  housing  rationing  interacted  with  private  renting 
M2  :  Ageheads-Age  of  the  household  head  interacted  with  stay 
M3  :  Marrys-Marital  status  of  the  household  head  interacted  with  stay 
M4  :  Ndepchs-Number  of  dependent  children  interacted  with  stay 
M5  Males-Male  household  head  interacted  with  stay 
M6  :  Unemps-Household  head  in  unemployment  interacted  with  stay 
M7  :  Lnincs-Log  household  long  term  income  interacted  with  stay 
M10:  Affowns-Household  in  neighbourhood  predominated  by  affluent  owners  interacted  with  stay 
M11:  Porcnl-Household  in  neighbourhood  predominated  by  the  poorest  council  tenants  interacted 
with  stay 
M12:  Pvcitys-Household  in  neighbourhood  predominated  by  inner  city  private  tenants  interacted  with 
stay 
273 APPENDIX  III  Appendix  to  Chapter  Seven 
A.  7.1  Limdep  Programme  of  the  Simulation  Results  of  the  NMNL  Mobility  and 
Tenure  Choice  Model 
1.  The  Simulation  Results  of  the  Change  in  the  User  Cost  (Change  in  Income  Tax 
Rate) 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML:  Nested  Multinomial  Logit  Model 
Maximum  Likelihood  Estimates 
Dependent  variable  ACHOICE 
Weighting  variable  ONE 
Number  of  observations  52048 
Iterations  completed  75 
Log  likelihood  function  -4899.514 
Restricted  log  likelihood  -10584.75 
Chi-squared  11370.48 
Degrees  of  freedom  44 
Significance  level  .  0000000 
R2=1-LogL/LogL*  Log-L  fncn  R-sqrd  RsqAdj 
No  coefficients  -10584.7536  .  53712  .  53659 
Constants  only  -5991.4232  .  18225  .  18132 
At  start  values  -18038.4622  .  72839  .  72808 
Response  data  are  given  as  ind.  choice.  ý 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
----------------------------------------------- 
FIML:  Nested  Multinomial  Logit  Model 
The  model  ha  s2  levels. 
Coefs.  for  b  ranch  level  begin  with  M2 
Number  of  ob  s.  =  13012,  skipped  0  bad  obs. 
+-------------  -------------------------  -------+ 
+---------+--------------+--  --------------+--------+-  --------+----------+ 
Variable  I  Coefficient  IS  tandard  Error  lb/St.  Er.  IP  (IZI>z]  I  Mean  of  XI 
+---------+--------------+--  --------------+--------+-  --------+----------+ 
Attributes  in  the  Utility  Functions 
(Tenure  Choice  Level) 
Ti  -9.180816900  1.8641276  -4.925  .  0000 
T2  -.  1808371070  .  15482210  -2.042  .  0408 
T3  -.  1076580423E-01  .  63590565E-02  -1.693  .  0905 
T4  -.  5435099530E-01  .  74087827E-02  -7.336  .  0000 
T7  .  3074662724  .  94560757E-01  3.252  .  0011 
T8  .  1669533915  .  10563016  1.581  .  1140 
T9  -.  7640698791  .  22334586  -3.421  .  0006 
T10  -.  6320416444  .  25001437  -2.528  .  0115 
Til  -.  4111520615  .  23174524  -1.774  .  0760 
T12  .  3710912402  .  24284702  1.528  .  1265 
T13  -1.760397652  .  22806456  -7.719  .  0000 
T14  -1.615935217  .  25078060  -6.444  .  0000 
T15  -1.224152681  .  35915162  -3.408  .  0007 
T16  -2.250021198  .  55773476  -4.034  .  0001 
T17  .  7552406387  .  40856411  1.849  .  0645 
T18  .  6554388472  .  43068303  1.522  .  1280 
T19  -1.128616004  .  26838415  -4.205  .  0000 
T20  -.  1621707194  .  26177856  -.  619  .  5356 
T21  1.588357507  .  22293323  7.125  .  0000 
T22  .  3195990551  .  26988904  1.184  .  2363 
T23  .  6953434978  .  24913584  2.791  .  0053 
T24  1.223685592  .  24333753  5.029  .  0000 
T25  -1.502874046  .  19119978  -7.860  .  0000 
T26  -.  1135648127  .  24488904  -.  464  .  6428 
T27  -.  4574963825  . 
20885354  -2.191  .  0285 
T28  -.  8595830494  .  21928977  -3.920  .  0001 
T29  -1.091536567  .  41524092  -2.629  .  0086 
T30  .  4193246937E-01  .  31791677  .  132  .  8951 
274 T31  -1.602446848  .  27929457  -5.737  .  0000 
T32  1.125618627  .  26311503  4.278  .  0000 
T33  1.487371374  .  33651167  4.420  .  0000 
T34  -.  2383465084  .  53270158  -.  447  .  6546 
'T35  -.  2959666855  .  49143291E-01  -6.023  .  0000 
T36  -.  7190538067  .  21823064  -3.295  .  0010 
Attributes  of  Branch  Choice  Equations 
(Mobility  Decision  Level) 
M2  .  5560003564E-01  .  23371793E-02  23.789  .  0000 
M3  -.  1851614225  .  11707819  -1.582  .  1138 
M4  .  1908977910  .  38170306E-01  5.001  .  0000 
M5  -.  1474959542  .  93047884E-01  -1.585  .  1129 
M6  .  9789495456E-01  .  14782342  .  662  .  5078 
M7  .  6197683186  .  13535880  4.579  .  0000 
M10  .  1224119057E-01  .  11391884  .  107  .  9144 
M11  .  3183133761  .  14133228  2.252  .  0243 
M12  -.  1784462199  .  94286308E-01  -1.893  .  0584 
Inclusive  value  Pa  rameters 
NOMOVE  1.000000000  ..  ......  (Fixed  Parameter)  ........ 
MOVEYES  .  2566781032  .  43318332E-01  5.925  .  0000 
2.  Simulation  Results  of  the  Change  in  the  Net  User  Cost  (Change  in  Income  Tax 
Rate) 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML:  Nested  Multinomial  Logit  Model 
Maximum  Likelihood  Estimates 
Dependent  variable  ACHOICE 
Weighting  variable  ONE 
Number  of  observations  52048 
Iterations  completed  76 
Log  likelihood  function  -4897.270 
Restricted  log  likelihood  -10584.75 
Chi-squared  11374.97 
Degrees  of  freedom  44 
Significance  level 
.  0000000 
R2-1-LogL/LogL*  Log-L  fncn  R-sqrd  RsqAdj 
No  coefficients  -10584.7536  .  53733  .  53681 
Constants  only  -5991.4232  .  18262  .  18170 
At  start  values  -18038.4622  .  72851  .  72820 
Response  data  are  given  as  ind.  choice. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML:  Nested  Multinomial  Logit  Model 
The  model  has  2  levels. 
Coefa.  for  branch  level  begin  with  M2 
Number  of  obs.  -  13012,  skipped  0  bad  oba. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Variable  I  Coefficient  I  Standard  Error  lb/St.  Er.  IPEIZI>zj  I  Mean  of  X1 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Attributes  in  the  Utility  Functions 
(Tenure  Choice  Level) 
T1  -10.42669010  1.8837176  -5.535  .  0000 
T2  -.  2895485592  .  12040969  -2.405  .  0162 
T3  -.  1068102626E-01  .  63254247E-02  -1.689  .  0913 
T4  -.  5463466065E-01  .  73886014E-02  -7.394  .  0000 
T7  .  3083383559  .  94244770E-01  3.272  .  0011 
T8  .  1752781708  .  10570318  1.658  .  0973 
T9  -.  7446898570 
.  22242433  -3.348  .  0008 
T10  -.  5532769891 
.  25130873  -2.202  .  0277 
T11  -.  4104114237 
.  23098136  -1.777  .  0756 
T12  .  3730337945 
.  24304870  1.535  .  1248 
T13  -1.763761884  . 
22523811  -7.831  .  0000 
275 T14 
T15 
T16 
T17 
T18 
T19 
T20 
T21 
T22 
T23 
T24 
T25 
T26 
T27 
T28 
T29 
T30 
T31 
T32 
T33 
T34 
T35 
T36 
M2 
M3 
M4 
M5 
M6 
M7 
M10 
M11 
M12 
NOMOVE 
MOVEYES 
-1.592014259  .  24902154  -6.393 
-1.209780748  .  35429434  -3.415 
-2.227954657  .  55678952  -4.001 
.  7597925053  .  40735382  1.865 
.  6700571257 
.  43027753  1.557 
-1.119257072  .  26628406  -4.203 
-.  1426328252  .  26065433  -.  547 
1.577209022 
.  22048754  7.153 
.  3093161955  .  26838711  1.153 
.  6948256247  .  24674103  2.816 
1.222081816  .  24179952  5.054 
-1.504664313  .  18918338  -7.953 
-.  1113482713  .  24379862  -.  457 
-.  4462359908  .  20654582  -2.160 
-.  8503276443  .  21831671  -3.895 
-1.090285981  .  41340487  -2.637 
.  5195165174E-01  .  31796256  .  163 
-1.618867372  .  27729688  -5.838 
1.100719827  .  26275091  4.189 
1.461221685  .  33632988  4.345 
-.  2796075648  .  53370073  -.  524 
-.  2827821517  .  49049775E-01  -5.765 
-.  8604563284  .  22033077  -3.905 
Attributes  of  Branch  Choice  Equations 
(Mobility  Decision  Level) 
.  5552164387E-01  .  23584199E-02  23.542 
-.  1919820392  .  11606866  -1.654 
.  1867219789  .  38935925E-01  4.796 
-.  1459168058  .  94130488E-01  -1.550 
.  1020732023  .  15220665  .  671 
.  6408412354  .  14284749  4.486 
.  3832434934E-01  .  11442875  .  335 
.  3096103490  .  14317174  2.163 
-.  1509708424  .  96017968E-01  -1.572 
Inclusive  Value  Pa  rameters 
1.000000000  ..  ...... 
(Fixed  Parameter 
.  2757186915  .  45786067E-01  6.022 
.  0000 
.  0006 
.  0001 
.  0622 
.  1194 
.  0000 
.  5842 
.  0000 
.  2491 
.  0049 
.  0000 
.  0000 
.  6479 
.  0307 
.  0001 
.  0084 
.  8702 
.  0000 
.  0000 
.  0000 
.  6003 
.  0000 
.  0001 
.  0000 
.  0981 
.  0000 
.  1211 
.  5025 
.  0000 
.  7377 
.  0306 
.  1159 
Parameter)........ 
6.022  .  0000 
3.  Simulation  Results  of  the  Change  in  Mortgage  Rationing  Criteria 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML:  Nested  Multinomial  Logit  Model 
Maximum  Likelihood  Estimates 
Dependent  variable  ACHOICE 
weighting  variable  ONE 
Number  of  observations  52048 
Iterations  completed  58 
Log  likelihood  function  -4826.890 
Restricted  log  likelihood  -10584.75 
Chi-squared  11515.73 
Degrees  of  freedom  47 
Significance  level 
.  0000000 
R2-1-LogL/LogL*  Log-L  fncn  R-sqrd  RsqAdj 
No  coefficients  -10584.7536  .  54398  .  54343 
Constants  only  -5991.4232  .  19437  .  19340 
At  start  values  -18038.4622  .  73241  .  73209 
Response  data  are  given  as  ind.  choice. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
FIML:  Nested  Multinomial  Logit  Model 
The  model  has  2  levels. 
Coefa.  for  branch  level  begin  with  M2 
Number  of  obs.  -  13012,  skipped  0  bad  obs. 
+---------------------------------------------+ 
276 +---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Variable  I  Coefficient  I  Standard  Error  Ib/St.  Er.  jP[IZj>z]  I  Mean  of  X1 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
Attributes  in  the  Utility  Functions 
(Tenure  Choice  Level) 
T1  -6.151051062  1.8836195  -3.266  .  0011 
T2  -.  8853039139  .  13799907  -6.415  .  0000 
T3  .  2890046868E-03  .  67115379E-02  .  043  .  9657 
T4  -.  3691060049E-01  .  79283337E-02  -4.656  .  0000 
T7  .  3370448152  .  97069471E-01  3.472  .  0005 
T8  .  2163295699  .  10918744  1.981  .  0476 
T9  -.  2680706920  .  23573847  -1.137  .  2555 
T10  -.  4735688218  .  25983336  -1.823  .  0684 
T11  -.  3579348633  .  24002685  -1.491  .  1359 
T12  .  3382297507  .  25127254  1.346  .  1783 
T13  -1.742733460  .  23537779  -7.404  .  0000 
T14  -2.117348702  .  28326004  -7.475  .  0000 
T15  -1.118731301  .  35900394  -3.116  .  0018 
T16  -2.568702646  .  56647459  -4.535  .  0000 
T17  .  9503230436  .  42442855  2.239  .  0252 
T18  1.004205345  .  45350330  2.214  .  0268 
T19  -1.163319982  .  27369312  -4.250  .  0000 
T20  -.  2735696851  .  26683549  -1.025  .  3053 
T21  1.540199585  .  22745648  6.771  .  0000 
T22  .  2888985084  .  27580108  1.047  .  2949 
T23  .  6133848350  .  24998839  2.454  .  0141 
T24  1.101544402  .  24754508  4.450  .  0000 
T25  -1.585783754  .  19722463  -8.040  .  0000 
T26  -.  2487798836  .  24895702  -.  999  .  3177 
T27  -.  6515989042  .  21552772  -3.023  .  0025 
T28  -1.041488998  .  22596025  -4.609  .  0000 
T29  -1.070070345  .  42646259  -2.509  .  0121 
T30  .  3799604065E-01  .  32817957  .  116  .  9078 
T31  -1.768260476  .  28952005  -6.108  .  0000 
T32  .  9499544722  .  27200999  3.492  .  0005 
T33  1.395567258  .  35435050  3.938  .  0001 
T34  -.  3036953116  .  54416266  -.  558  .  5768 
T35  -.  9093458302E-01  .  53662507E-01  -1.695  .  0902 
T36  -.  5668497827  .  21651100  -2.618  .  0088 
T37  1.856364895  .  21275677  8.725  .  0000 
T38  1.707445432  .  25572325  6.677  .  0000 
T39  .  7861062595  .  25923930  3.032  .  0024 
Attributes  of  Branch  Choice  Equations 
(Mobility  Decisi  on  Level) 
M2  .  5138780785E-01  .  24343515E-02  21.109  .  0000 
M3  .  1268957050  .  11706368  1.084  .  2784 
M4  .  2270153827  .  38799917E-01  5.851  .  0000 
M5  -.  1083284715  .  96455338E-01  -1.123  .  2614 
M6  .  2045091755  .  15961160  1.281  .  2001 
M7  -.  6088072760E-01  .  13337963  -.  456  .  6481 
M10  .  4814844496E-01  .  11450391  .  420  .  6741 
M11  .  2486665960  .  14556239  1.708  .  0876 
M12  -.  1557465927  .  96904874E-01  -1.607  .  1080 
Inclusive  Value  Parameters 
NOMOVE  1.000000000  ........ 
(Fixed  Parameter)  ........ 
MOVEYES  .  3007583196  .  39393675E-01  7.635  .  0000 
277 A.  7.2  The  McClements'  Equivalence  Scales 
Married  couple  1.00 
Single  adult  (householder)  0.55 
2'd  adult  (non-household)  0.45 
3'  adult  (non-householder)  0.45 
4'  adult  (non-householder)  0.40 
Child  age  16-17  0.38 
13-15  0.28 
11-12  0.26 
8-10  0.23 
5-7  0.21 
2-4  0.18 
0-1  0.07 
Source:  Central  Statistical  Office  (1987),  p.  112. 
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N Table  A.  7.3.2  Equivalent  Household  Income  by  Tenures  and  by  Income  Quintiles  in 
Four  Cities  of  Scotland,  1996  (Average  Weekly  income  £) 
Quintile  Outright  Mortgaged  Social  Private 
Owners  Owners  Tenants  Tenants 
Aberdeen 
Bottom  97.43  149.27  83.02  45.42 
2nd  151.82  241.99  128.14  105.93 
3`d  205.06  309.88  159.86  162.03 
4th  287.56  389.00  188.33  282.50 
Top  595.12  652.32  278.99  505.95 
Total  Avg.  265.67  346.86  167.15  215.40 
Dundee 
Bottom  90.41  90.71  82.61  39.37 
2°'  155.68  170.44  126.60  100.38 
3rd  219.51  248.15  153.60  119.53 
4`h  321.63  315.57  189.22  234.43 
Top  583.62  490.53  302.64  413.93 
Total  Avg.  269.99  261.39  170.13  184.61 
Edinburgh 
Bottom  88.83  135.18  87.32  45.55 
2°d  139.81  232.13  136.02  100.84 
3'd  192.15  313.44  166.61  149.42 
4th  279.24  404.20  200.37  228.21 
Top  563.52  734.05  288.53  432.13 
Total  Avg.  251.22  362.52  175.56  189.57 
Glasgow 
Bottom  76.46  103.46  77.55  46.39 
2°d  126.82  196.53  118.21  111.02 
3rd  173.18  267.04  148.73  164.19 
4th  244.47  365.78  185.57  207.34 
Top  493.96  603.48  285.46  405.47 
Total  Avg.  220.66  306.62  162.98  185.36 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
Table  A.  7.3.3  Equivalent  Household  Income  Ranges  in  Scotland,  1996 
Income  Quintile  Weekly  Income  Range  (f) 
Bottom  0-121.80 
2nd  121.81-167.69 
3rd  167.70-222.55 
4`h  222.56-322.84 
Top  322.85-6833.77 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
280 Table  A.  7.3.4  Equivalent  Household  Income  Ranges  in  Four  Cities  of  Scotland,  1996 
Income  Quintile  Weekly  Income  Range  (E) 
Aberdeen 
Bottom  0-125.77 
2"d  125.78-175.80 
3`d  175.81-243.08 
4th  243.09-345.07 
Top  345.08-1540.42 
Dundee 
Bottom  0-115.25 
2°a  115.26-151.54 
3'd  151.55-209.10 
4th  209.11-304.02 
Top  304.03-1089.73 
Edinburgh 
Bottom  0-123.64 
2'd  123.65-177.27 
3'd  177.28-243.64 
4th  243.65-358.81 
Top  358.82-5006.61 
Glasgow 
Bottom  0-107.31 
2'd  107.32-147.27 
3'h  147.28-190.07 
4th  190.08-279.10 
Top  279.11-1904.31 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
A.  7.4  Annex  Tables  to  Tenure  Polarisation  in  Scotland  and  in  Four  Cities,  1996 
Table  A.  7.4.1  Tenure  Distributions  within  Income  Quintiles  in  Scotland  1996 
(Percentage  of  households) 
Income 
Quintile 
Outright 
Owners 
Mortgaged 
Owners 
LA 
Tenants 
HA 
Tenants 
Private 
Tenants 
Total 
Bottom  24  14  44  8  10  100 
2°d  17  17  50  9  7  100 
3'd  15  29  41  9  6  100 
4th  16  50  22  6  7  100 
Top  19  66  7  2  5  100 
Total  18  35  33  7  7  100 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
281 Table  A.  7.4.2  Tenure  Distributions  within  Income  Quintile  in  Four  Cities  of  Scotland 
1996  (Percentage  of  households) 
Income  Outright  Mortgaged  Social  HA  Private  Total 
Quintile  Owners  Owners  Tenants  Tenants  Tenants 
Aberdeen 
Bottom  16  10  54  4  16  100 
2nd  13  9  63  8  8  100 
3`d  21  33  40  3  3  100 
4`h  9  59  23  3  5  100 
Top  17  70  2  2  9  100 
Dundee 
Bottom  10  23  41  12  14  100 
2nd  10  22  43  20  5  100 
3'd  9  20  54  12  5  100 
4`h  14  47  22  7  10  100 
Top  19  55  16  4  5  100 
Edinburgh 
Bottom  28  14  16  14  28  100 
2°d  25  18  29  17  11  100 
3`d  23  29  25  12  10  100 
4th  19  55  9  6  10  100 
Top  21  69  2  2  6  100 
Glasgow 
Bottom  12  13  49  17  9  100 
2nd  9  9  52  25  5  100 
3rd  12  14  44  23  7  100 
4t'  9  30  32  21  7  100 
Top  13  58  12  13  5  100 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
282 A.  7.5  Annex  Tables  to  Housing  Subsidies  to  Households  in  Different  Tenures  in 
Four  Cities  of  Scotland,  1996 
Table  A.  7.5.1  Housing  Subsidies  to  Owners  in  Four  Cities  of  Scotland,  1996 
(Weekly  ±,  ) 
%  of  Econ.  %  of  MIRAS  %  of  Total 
Income  Mean  Economic  Sub.  To  Mean  Average  to  Mean  Sub.  To  Mean 
Quintile  Income  Subsidies  Income  MIRAS'  Income  Income 
Aberdeen 
Bottom  90.24  15.25  16.9%  3.61  4.0%  20.9% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (30)  (24)  (10) 
2nd  151.90  17.41  11.5%  4.27  2.8%  14.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (25)  (16)  (5) 
3rd  205.85  15.48  7.5%  3.88  1.9%  9.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (62)  (39)  (25) 
4th  291.54  12.78  4.4%  4.64  1.6%  6.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (79)  (55)  (54) 
Top  531.24  14.56  2.7%  5.00  0.9%  3.7% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (101)  (66)  (67) 
Total  Avg  323.08  14.56  4.5%  4.60  1.4%  5.9% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (297)  (200)  (161) 
Dundee 
Bottom  76.75  14.21  18.5%  3.50  4.6%  23.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (31)  (19)  (18) 
2nd  133.44  14.00  10.5%  3.45  2.6%  13.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (30)  (25)  (18) 
3rd  183.53  13.53  7.4%  3.58  1.9%  9.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (27)  (23)  (17) 
4th  253.27  14.53  5.7%  3.95  1.6%  7.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (57)  (38)  (32) 
Top  444.26  14.91  3.4%  4.85  1.1%  4.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (69)  (52)  (42) 
Total  Avg  263.68  14.39  5.5%  4.06  1.5%  7.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (214)  (157)  (127) 
Edinburgh 
Bottom  92.54  15.99  17.3%  4.55  4.9%  22.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (108)  (75)  (27) 
2nd  152.24  15.45  10.1%  4.10  2.7%  12.8% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (111)  (83)  (34) 
3rd  210.18  14.72  7.0%  4.17  2.0%  9.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (136)  (101)  (54) 
4th  303.91  13.37  4.4%  4.68  1.5%  5.9% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (192)  (138)  (111) 
Top  583.17  14.05  2.4%  5.13  0.9%  3.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (231)  (171)  (146) 
Total  Avg  319.46  14.47  4.5%  4.72  1.5%  6.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (778)  (568)  (372) 
Glasgow 
Bottom  77.88  13.83  17.8%  3.81  4.9%  22.6% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (97)  (69)  (37) 
2nd  125.78  14.33  11.4%  3.22  2.6%  14.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (70)  (49)  (22) 
3rd  169.68  13.97  8.2%  3.75  2.2%  10.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (102)  (77)  (42) 
4th  235.24  11.37  4.8%  4.19  1.8%  6.6% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (154)  (109)  (94) 
Top  455.81  10.68  2.3%  5.01  1.1%  3.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (277)  (193)  (190) 
Total  Avg  280.22  12.19  4.4%  4.45  1.6%  5.9% 
283 (No.  of  obs.  )  1  (700)  (497)  (385) 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
Table  A.  7.5.2  Housing  Subsidies  to  Renters  in  Four  Cities  of  Scotland,  1996 
(Weekl  t) 
%  of  Econ.  %  of  HB  %  of  Total 
Income  Mean  Economic  Sub.  To  Mean  Average  to  Mean  Sub.  To  Mean 
Quintile  Income  Subsidies  Income  HB  Income  Income 
Aberdeen 
Bottom  89.03  15.12  17.0%  31.72  35.6%  52.6% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (86)  (71)  (34) 
2nd  152.89  15.37  10.1%  23.82  15.6%  25.6% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (91)  (75)  (39) 
3rd  201.33  16.89  8.4%  26.62  13.2%  21.6% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (54)  (43)  (19) 
4th  282.09  12.70  4.5%  40.88  14.5%  19.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (37)  (27)  (12) 
Top  466.10  0.00  0.0%  0.00  0.0%  0.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (14)  (7)  (0) 
Total  Avg  175.19  14.96  8.5%  28.88  16.5%  25.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (282)  (223)  (104) 
Dundee 
Bottom  81.10  7.89  9.7%  31.44  38.8%  48.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (63)  (50)  (33) 
2nd  135.10  6.86  5.1%  34.56  25.6%  30.7% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (64)  (48)  (47) 
3rd  157.84  6.81  4.3%  31.44  19.9%  24.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (66)  (55)  (43) 
4th  246.94  8.59  3.5%  34.15  13.8%  17.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (37)  (27)  (13) 
Top  382.06  5.79  1.5%  34.14  8.9%  10.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (24)  (19)  (8) 
Total  Avg  172.24  7.24  4.2%  32.85  19.1%  23.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (254)  (199)  (144) 
Edinburgh 
Bottom  83.73  3.82  4.6%  34.49  41.2%  45.8% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (150)  (123)  (52) 
2nd  151.60  5.50  3.6%  31.67  20.9%  24.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (148)  (131)  (97) 
3rd  205.63  2.58  1.3%  38.79  18.9%  20.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (122)  (107)  (83) 
4th  287.63  1.55  0.5%  42.70  14.8%  15.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (66)  (53)  (24) 
Top  495.36  1.11  0.2%  36.00  7.3%  7.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (27)  (25)  (2) 
Total  Avg  180.20  3.59  2.0%  35.59  19.7%  21.7% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (513)  (439)  (258) 
Glasgow 
Bottom  78.27  8.79  11.2%  28.93  37.0%  48.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (294)  (249)  (193) 
2nd  127.87  8.64  6.8%  29.94  23.4%  30.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (322)  (261)  (242) 
3rd  168.31  7.39  4.4%  30.27  18.0%  22.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (288)  (241)  (224) 
4th  226.50  6.41  2.8%  33.22  14.7%  17.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (238)  (202)  (144) 
Top  361.85  6.34  1.8%  36.62  10.1%  1  1.9% 
284 (No.  of  obs.  )  (113)  (96)  (59) 
Total  Avg  165.30  7.75  4.7%  30.80  18.6%  23.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (1255)  (1049)  (862) 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
Table  A.  7.5.3  Housing  Subsidies  to  Outright  Owners  in  Four  Cities  of  Scotland,  1996 
(Weekly  £) 
%  of  Econ. 
Income  Mean  Economic  Sub.  To  Mean 
Quintile  Income  Subsidies  Income 
Aberdeen 
Bottom  97.43  17.55  18.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (18)  (15) 
2nd  148.22  20.48  13.8% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (15)  (11) 
3rd  208.11  21.47  10.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (24)  (16) 
4th  288.25  18.08  6.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (10)  (8) 
Top  562.98  21.86  3.9% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (20)  (17) 
Total  Avg  265.67  20.12  7.6% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (87)  (67) 
Dundee 
Bottom  81.71  24.19  29.6% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (9)  (7) 
2nd  128.84  18.46  14.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (9)  (8) 
3rd  188.81  17.65  9.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (8)  (7) 
4th  241.54  25.31  10.5% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (13)  (12) 
Top  491.33  21.91  4.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (18)  (17) 
Total  Avg  269.99  21.90  8.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (57)  (51) 
Edinburgh 
Bottom  93.52  18.48  19.8% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (72)  (53) 
2nd  150.22  18.83  12.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (65)  (54) 
3rd  209.85  19.72  9.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (60)  (55) 
4th  300.71  21.77  7.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (50)  (41) 
Top  583.22  25.11  4.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (54)  (44) 
Total  Avg  251.22  20.56  8.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (301)  (247) 
Glasgow 
Bottom  77.79  16.60  21.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (45)  (37) 
2nd  124.85  16.61  13.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (36)  (30) 
3rd  170.24  18.21  10.7% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (47)  (40) 
285 4th  229.86  17.84  7.8% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (36)  (32) 
Top  454.32  19.47  4.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (51)  (38) 
Total  Avg  220.66  17.81  8.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (215)  (177) 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
Table  A.  7.5.4  Housing  Subsidies  to  Mortgaged  Owners  in  Four  Cities  of  Scotland, 
1996  (Weekly  £) 
%  of  Econ.  %  of  MIRAS  %  of  Total 
Income  Mean  Economic  Sub.  To  Mean  Average  to  Mean  Sub.  To  Mean 
Quintile  Income  Subsidies  Income  MIRAS  Income  Income 
Aberdeen 
Bottom  79.47  11.41  14.4%  3.61  4.5%  18.9% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (12)  (9)  (10) 
2nd  157.42  10.65  6.8%  4.27  2.7%  9.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (10)  (5)  (5) 
3rd  204.43  1132  5.5%  3.88  1.9%  7.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (38)  (23)  (25) 
4th  292.02  11.88  4.1%  4.64  1.6%  5.7% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (69)  (47)  (54) 
Top  523.40  12.03  2.3%  5.00  1.0%  3.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (81)  (49)  (67) 
Total  Avg  346.86  11.76  3.4%  4.60  1.3%  4.7% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (210)  (133)  (161) 
Dundee 
Bottom  74.73  8.39  11.2%  3.50  4.7%  15.9% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (22)  (12)  (18) 
2nd  135.41  11.91  8.8%  3.45  2.6%  11.3% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (21)  (17)  (18) 
-  3rd  181.31  11.73  6.5%  3.58  2.07/6  8.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (19)  (16)  (17) 
4th  256.74  9.56  3.7%  3.95  1.5%  5.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (44)  (26)  (32) 
Top  427.65  11.51  2.7%  4.85  1.1%  3.8% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (51)  (35)  (42) 
Total  Avg  261.39  10.78  4.1%  4.06  1.6%  5.7% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (157)  (106)  (127) 
Edinburgh 
Bottom  90.59  9.99  11.0%  4.55  5.0%  16.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (36)  (22)  (27) 
-  2nd  155.11  9.16  5.9%  4.10  2.67/9  8.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (46)  (29)  (34) 
3rd  210.43  8.75  4.2%  4.17  2.0%  6.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (76)  (46)  (54) 
4th  305.03  9.82  3.2%  4.68  1.5%  4.8% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (142)  (97)  (111) 
Top  583.16  10.22  1.8%  5.13  0.9%  2.6% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (177)  (127)  (146) 
Total  Avg  362.52  9.78  2.7%  4.72  1.3%  4.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (477)  (321)  (372) 
Glasgow 
Bottom  77.96  10.63  13.6%  3.81  4.9%  18.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (52)  (32)  (37) 
2nd  126.77  12.63  10.0%  3.22  2.5%  12.5% 
286 (No.  of  obs.  )  (34)  (19)  (22) 
3rd  169.21  12.20  7.2%  3.75  2.2%  9.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (55)  (37)  (42) 
4th  236.88  9.39  4.0%  4.19  1.8%  5.7% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (118)  (77)  (94) 
Top  456.15  8.68  1.9%  5.01  1.1%  3.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (226)  (155)  (190) 
Total  Avg  306.62  8.52  2.8%  4.45  1.5%  4.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (485)  (320)  (385) 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
Table  A.  7.5.5  Housing  Subsidies  to  Social  Tenants  in  Four  Cities  of  Scotland,  1996 
(Weekly  £) 
%  of  Econ.  %  of  HB  %  of  Total 
Income  Mean  Economic  Sub.  To  Mean  Average  to  Mean  Sub.  To  Mean 
Quintile  Income  Subsidies  Income  HB  Income  Income 
Aberdeen 
Bottom  93.78  19.18  20.5%  24.92  26.6%  47.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (68)  (56)  (33) 
2nd  153.53  17.20  11.2%  21.90  14.3%  25.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (82)  (67)  (38) 
3rd  199.34  18.15  9.1%  26.62  13.4%  22.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (50)  (40)  (19) 
4th  281.46  14.14  5.0%  28.99  10.3%  15.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (31)  (24)  (9) 
Top  405.34  0.00  0.0%  0.00  0.0%  0.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (4)  (0)  (0) 
Total  Avg  167.15  17.82  10.7%  24.46  14.6%  25.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (235)  (187)  (99) 
Dundee 
Bottom  86.78  10.39  12.0%  31.44  36.2%  48.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (50)  (38)  (33) 
2nd  135.30  6.48  4.8%  33.30  24.6%  29.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (59)  (45)  (46) 
3rd  177.52  7.35  4.1%  28.67  16.2%  20.3% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (61)  (51)  (39) 
4th  246.05  11.04  4.5%  17.72  7.2%  11.7% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (28)  (21)  (8) 
Top  362.01  7.34  2.0%  37.31  10.3%  12.3% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (19)  (15)  (7) 
Total  Avg  170.13  8.25  4.8%  30.76  18.1%  22.9% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (217)  (170)  (133) 
Edinburgh 
Bottom  90.64  7.04  7.8%  31.75  35.0%  42.8% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (77)  (61)  (43) 
2nd  151.17  5.28  3.5%  31.23  20.7%  24.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (119)  (106)  (88) 
3rd  204.10  2.39  1.2%  34.69  17.0%  18.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (97)  (85)  (72) 
4th  285.83  2.35  0.8%  33.50  11.7%  12.5% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (40)  (35)  (17) 
Top  401.68  3.07  0.8%  36.00  9.0%  9.7% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (10)  (9)  (2) 
Total  Avg  175.56  4.40  2.5%  32.67  18.6%  21.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (343)  (296)  (222) 
Glasgow 
287 Bottom  80.92  9.83  12.1%  28.26  34.9%  47.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (257)  (214)  (182) 
2nd  127.75  9.11  7.1%  29.71  23.3%  30.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (302)  (247)  (234) 
3rd  167.83  7.85  4.7%  28.68  17.1%  21.8% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (261)  (217)  (209) 
4th  226.70  7.19  3.2%  31.21  13.8%  16.9% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (211)  (176)  (131) 
Top  344.06  7.69  2.2%  34.27  10.0%  12.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (94)  (78)  (57) 
Total  Avg  162.98  8.50  5.2%  29.68  18.2%  23.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (1125)  (932)  (813) 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
Table  A.  7.5.6  Housing  Subsidies  to  Private  Tenants  in  Four  Cities  of  Scotland,  1996 
(Weekly  £) 
%  of  Econ.  %  of  HB  %  of  Total 
Income  Mean  Economic  Sub.  To  Mean  Average  to  Mean  Sub.  To  Mean 
Quintile  -  Income  Subsidies  Income  HB  Income  Income 
Aberdeen 
Bottom  71.09  0.00  0.0%  256.00  360.1%  360.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (18)  (15)  (1) 
2nd  147.03  0.00  0.0%  96.69  65.8%  65.8% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (9)  (8)  (1) 
3rd  226.29  0.00  0.0%  0.00  0.0%  0.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (4)  (3)  (0) 
4th  285.33  1.17  0.4%  76.55  26.8%  27.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (6)  (3)  (3) 
Top  490.41  0.00  0.0%  0.00  0.0%  0.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (10)  (7)  (0) 
Total  Avg  215.40  0.10  0.0%  116.64  54.2%  54.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (47)  (36)  (5) 
Dundee 
Bottom  59.26  0.00  0.0%  0.00  0.0%  0.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (13)  (12)  (0) 
2nd  132.74  12.52  9.4%  92.31  69.5%  79.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (5)  (3)  (1) 
3rd  171.57  0.00  0.0%  58.38  34.0%  34.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (5)  (4)  (4) 
4th  249.70  0.00  0.0%  60.43  24.2%  24.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (9)  (6)  (5) 
Top  458.24  0.00  0.0%  12.00  2.6%  2.6% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (5)  (4)  (1) 
Total  Avg  184.61  1.30  0.7%  58.18  31.5%  32.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (37)  (29)  (11) 
Edinburgh 
Bottom  76.45  0.65  0.9%  47.59  62.3%  63.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (73)  (62)  (9) 
2nd  153.38  6.21  4.0%  35.99  23.5%  27.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (29)  (25)  (9) 
3rd  211.58  3.31  1.6%  65.57  31.0%  32.6% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (25)  (22)  (11) 
4th  290.39  0.00  0.0%  65.04  22.4%  22.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (26)  (18)  (7) 
Top  550.47  0.00  0.0%  0.00  0.0%  0.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (17)  (16)  (0) 
Total  Avg  189.57  1.91  1.0%  53.58  28.3%  29.3% 
288 (No.  of  obs.  )  (170)  (143)  (36) 
Glasgow 
Bottom  59.80  2.47  4.1%  39.90  66.7%  70.9% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (37)  (35)  (11) 
2nd  129.62  0.36  0.3%  36.59  28.2%  28.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (20)  (14)  (8) 
3rd  172.97  3.26  1.9%  52.39  30.3%  32.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (27)  (24)  (15) 
4th  224.95  1.14  0.5%  53.50  23.8%  243% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (27)  (26)  (13) 
Top  449.88  0.49  0.1%  103.85  23.1%  23.2% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (19)  (18)  (2) 
Total  Avg  185.36  1.78  1.0%  49.40  26.7%  27.6% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (130)  (117)  (49) 
Source:  1996  Scottish  House  Condition  Survey  (own  analysis) 
Table  A.  7.5.7  Housing  Subsidies  to  Private  Regulated  Tenants  in  Four  Cities  of 
4cntland_  1996  (Weekly  £) 
%  of  Econ.  %  of  HB  %  of  Total 
Income  Mean  Economic  Sub.  To  Mean  Average  to  Mean  Sub.  To  Mean 
Quintile  Income  Subsidies  Income  HB  Income  Income 
Aberdeen 
Bottom  -  -  -  -  - 
(No.  of  obs.  ) 
2nd  -  -  -  -  - 
(No.  of  obs.  ) 
3rd  -  -  -  -  - 
(No.  of  obs.  ) 
4th  254.55  3.52  1.4%  30.00  11.8%  13.2% 
(No.  ofobs.  )  (1)  (1)  (1) 
Top  -  -  -  -  - 
(No.  of  obs.  ) 
Total  Avg  254.55  3.52  1.4%  30.00  11.8%  13.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (1)  (1)  (1) 
Dundee 
Bottom  -  -  -  -  - 
(No.  of  obs.  ) 
2nd  137.20  37.56  27.4%  0.00  0.0%  27.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (1)  (1)  (0) 
3rd  -  -  -  -  - 
(No.  of  obs.  ) 
4th  -  -  -  -  - 
(No.  of  obs.  ) 
Top  -  -  -  -  - 
(No.  of  obs.  ) 
Total  Avg  137.20  37.56  27.4%  0.00  0.0%  27.4% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (1)  (1)  (0) 
Edinburgh 
Bottom  112.15  9.93  8.9%  18.89  16.8%  25.7% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (4)  (4)  (2) 
2nd  152.39  17.78  11.7%  26.55  17.4%  29.1% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (9)  (9)  (5) 
3rd  225.44  18.23  8.1%  9.23  4.1%  12.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (4)  (4)  (1) 
4th  -  -  -  -  - 
(No.  of  obs.  ) 
Top  -  -  -  -  - 
289 (No.  of  obs.  ) 
Total  Avg  160.11  16.03  10.0%  22.47  14.0%  24.0% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (17)  (17)  (8) 
Glasgow 
Bottom  57.41  17.27  30.1%  26.10  45.5%  75.5% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (5)  (5)  (2) 
2nd  130.42  5.06  3.9%  5.81  4.5%  8.3% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (1)  (1)  (1) 
3rd  168.48  15.66  9.3%  38.08  22.6%  31.9% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (5)  (5)  (2) 
4th  200.33  14.77  7.4%  12.70.  6.3%  13.7% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (2)  (2)  (1) 
Top  390.81  2.95  0.8%  0.00  0.0%  0.8% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (3)  (3)  (0) 
Total  Avg  177.10  13.00  7.3%  24.48  13.8%  21.2% 
(No.  of  obs.  )  (16)  (16)  (6) 
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